Reframing the turn: toward an ethical poetics of eco-elegy & The Counterpart (an excerpted novel) by Todd, Ruby
  
 
 
 
REFRAMING THE TURN: Toward an 
Ethical Poetics of Eco-elegy 
& 
The Counterpart (an excerpted novel) 
 
 
 
by 
 
Ruby  Louise Todd 
BCA (Hons) Melb. 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Deakin University 
 
December, 2014 
  
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
ACCESS TO THESIS - A 
I am the author of the thesis entitled Reframing the Turn: Toward an Ethical 
Poetics of Eco-elegy, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
This thesis may be made available for consultation, loan and limited copying in 
accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. 
 
'I certify that I am the student named below and that the information provided in
the form is correct'
Full Name: Ruby Louise Todd 
Signed:  
Date: 9.6.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
CANDIDATE DECLARATION
I certify the following about the thesis, entitled Reframing the Turn: Toward an 
Ethical Poetics of Eco-elegy, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy:
a. I am the creator of all or part of the whole work(s) (including content and 
layout) and that where reference is made to the work of others, due 
acknowledgment is given. 
b. The work(s) are not in any way a violation or infringement of any copyright, 
trademark, patent, or other rights whatsoever of any person. 
c. That if the work(s) have been commissioned, sponsored or supported by any 
organisation, I have fulfilled all of the obligations required by such contract or 
agreement. 
I also certify that any material in the thesis which has been accepted for a degree 
or diploma by any university or institution is identified in the text. 
'I certify that I am the student named below and that the information provided in
the form is correct'
Full Name: Ruby Louise Todd
Signed:  
Date: 9/6/15 
 
 
Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code 00113B 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Antonia Pont, for 
whose guidance I have always counted myself exceptionally privileged. Antonia’s 
frankness, emotional generosity, and sense of humour have been as bolstering to 
my journey as a doctoral candidate, as her philosophical and creative intelligence 
has been integral to this thesis—in both of its components, and in too many ways 
to name.                  
 My great thanks go to my original supervisor, Professor Michael Meehan, 
whose unceasing imaginative insight, kindness, and support in the early stages of 
my candidature was crucial to the development of my novel, The Counterpart. 
 I also gratefully acknowledge thoughtful assistance from Professor Marion 
Campbell, and financial support from both Deakin University’s SCCA and an 
APA scholarship. Thanks also to Leonard Lee, for his gracious permission to 
include two of his evocative photographs of Chernobyl. Closest to home, I thank 
Brad and my family, for their love and patience.        
        
* 
 
Sections of Chapter 1, in earlier versions, have been published as papers in the 
refereed conference proceedings of the Australasian Association of Writing 
Programs (AAWP), in 2013 and 2014 respectively, under the titles, ‘The art of 
presence: the case for presence after deconstruction’, and ‘Writing absence: a case 
study of Duras’s The North China lover’. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table of contents 
 
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
 
The Counterpart (an excerpted novel)…………………………………………..9 
 
1: Movements of negation & metonymy: the elegiac mode ........................... 132 
(I) Negation & metonymy in language ............................................................................ 134 
(I) Negation & metonymy in mourning & writing ........................................................ 141 
(III) Ethics & the Orphic turn .......................................................................................... 152 
 
2: Elegy under pressure: ecological loss ......................................................... 162 
Writing Chernobyl .............................................................................................................. 163 
Ecological elegy ................................................................................................................... 174 
 
3: Eco-loss, mourning & melancholia ............................................................ 179 
Nature/ecology ................................................................................................................... 180 
Eco-loss as deprivation ...................................................................................................... 185 
Mourning & melancholia ................................................................................................... 188 
Deep v.s. dark ecology ....................................................................................................... 193 
 
4: Toward an ethical poetics of eco-elegy ...................................................... 202 
(I) The other in us: Derrida's metonymy of ethical mourning ..................................... 203 
(II) Eco-elegy & ethics ....................................................................................................... 226 
 
  
Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 247 
 
Works cited ..................................................................................................... 254 
 
Appendix: additional figures  
Abandoned buildings (R. Todd)…………………………………………………266 
Dodgems (R. Todd)……………………………………………………………...267 
Sunlit chair in hospital (L. Lee)…………………………………………………...267 
Child’s single shoe (L. Lee)………………………………………………………268 
  
Figures 
 
1. The Weighing of the Heart (detail from The Papyrus of Anhai) ............... 132 
2. Structure of linguistic sign & movement of writing "felt absence"........... 147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
 
As the product of an inquiry realised via two distinct methodologies—practice-led 
research, and a more traditional scholarly investigation—this thesis comprises two 
correspondingly distinct parts. These parts, an excerpted elegiac literary novel and 
the critical essay outlined below, together constitute a creative and critical inquiry 
into the ethical conundrum of ecological loss and degradation in both life and 
literature.                  
 In light of the grave implications of climate change and our planetary 
ecological crisis, elegiac literature is increasingly attending to the reality of 
ecological loss. Despite the breadth of scholarship within elegy studies and the 
wider philosophies of mourning and ethics—concerning the question of what, if 
anything, we owe to the other in literary representations of loss—most of this 
work has been limited to the singular loss of a human person, through death or 
estrangement, and most has addressed a broad critical audience rather than 
creative writers particularly. Despite the vibrant and rapidly expanding disciplines 
of ecocriticism, ecopoetics, and the broader environmental humanities, research 
attending to the unique demands of ecological elegy as a literary mode at work 
across prose as well as poetry, and the complex ethics of writing such elegy, 
remains relatively sparse.              
 As a phenomenon encompassing not only loss that is foregone, but loss that 
is, variously, in-process, contingent and incipient, the divergency of ecological 
loss confounds traditional elegiac movements of literary mourning for human 
individuals. In view of the non-foreclosed nature of much ecological loss, this 
essay contends that the task of elegising such loss ethically demands particular 
attention to the relation of varying instances of ecological loss to temporality, and 
a resistance to traditional movements in elegy that objectify and totalise the lost 
other in the literary movement toward consolation and closure.     
 In view of such challenges, this essay aims to contribute to a rethinking of 
how we as writers might approach ecological elegy, and define ecological loss, in 
consideration of the ethical dangers involved in applying the elegiac mode to the 
  
literary representation of ecological devastation. In doing so, this essay will 
engage with key thinkers in the fields of elegy studies and the environmental 
humanities, such as William Watkin and Timothy Morton, while also drawing on 
psychoanalytic theories of loss and mourning, through the work of Freud and John 
Bowlby.                 
 Most importantly, in proposing a framework through which to rethink an 
ethical poetics of ecological elegy, this essay draws on Derrida’s understanding of 
ethical mourning as both a condition of living friendship, and as a metonymic 
relation to the dead other—an understanding that comes closer to accounting for 
the complexity and contingency of much ecological loss, and the difficulty of 
ethically speaking to such loss in elegy.         
 Ultimately, it will be argued that the extent to which eco-elegy is ethical is 
dependent on the extent to which such elegy eschews totalising or foreclosing the 
divergency, multiplicity and urgent contingency of loss—and others implicated in 
that loss—in the context of our present ecological predicament.  As such, it will 
be proposed that an ethical poetics of eco-elegy negotiate between foregone, in- 
process, and incipient forms of loss; loss which also constitutes our own 
diminishment and deprivation, and for which we are answerable. Such an ethics, it 
will be suggested, might be imagined in the mythical context of Orpheus finally 
resisting turning away from lost Eurydice in his mourning.     
 In proposing this framework, this essay aims to contribute to further 
discussion within creative writing studies, elegy studies, and related disciplines, of 
the vital relations between elegy, ecology and ethics. 
 
   
  
 
 
 
hell must break before I am lost 
 
‒ Hilda Doolittle, ‘Eurydice’ 
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Introduction 
 
 
His wife Camille on her deathbed, Monet writes, “I found 
myself, without being able to help it, in a study of my beloved 
wife’s face, systematically noting the colours.” What does a 
writer do, when the world collapses, but write?  
 
‒ Mark Doty, Heaven’s Coast 
 
 
Maurice Blanchot observes that every book ‘has a center which attracts it’ (1982: 
epigraph). If this thesis has such a centre, it is the point at which loss, desire and 
art converge, a point from which my creative practice, and the critical inquiry 
leading from this practice, have been drawn.          
 The result of this creative practice, The Counterpart, is a contemporary 
literary novel, spanning two continents and three decades—an excerpted version 
of which will follow this introduction. Exploring the effects of immeasurable loss, 
and the ends to which art can be brought to bear in the desire to redeem loss, The 
Counterpart enacts a narrative movement in which the unresolved grief of two 
generations intersect. As a narrative mobilised and pervaded by divergent 
instances of loss, felt absence and mourning—those of narrator Ivan and his 
parents, which are also inflected by the wider losses of history—The Counterpart 
is located broadly within the sphere of prose elegy, or elegiac literature. Of 
course, elegy refers to an ancient, distinct and still-evolving literary form and 
tradition, from Theocritus to Hardy and beyond, which is grounded in poetry, or 
verse. In a broad sense, the literary elegiac tradition originates in the ancient oral 
expressions of grief preceding the age of writing, such as the ululations reiterated 
in Greek tragedy. As David Kennedy, focusing on elegy in English, notes, elegy 
at once names: 
 
 (…) a song of lamentation, in particular a funeral song or lament for the dead; and, in 
 addition, meditative or reflective verse, more properly termed elegiac poetry (2007: 
 2). 
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While “elegy” in the formal sense of a discrete literary tradition of verse, or, to 
follow Kennedy, ‘elegiac poetry’, continues to sustain a rich field of scholarship, 
at the same time, theorists are attending to applications of elegy as a literary mode 
at work across a far wider range of literary registers. For example, Jahan 
Ramazani, in Poetry of Mourning: The Modern Elegy from Hardy to Heaney 
(1994), explores the operations of elegy through non-canonical forms, ‘such as 
self-elegies, war poems, the blues, epochal elegies, mock-elegies, and lynch 
poems’ (1994:xi). In On Mourning: Theories of Loss in Modern Literature 
(2004), William Watkin speaks broadly of the “literature of loss”, examining 
traditional elegies in dialogue with modern novels such as Ian McEwan’s The 
Cement Garden (1978), and observing elegiac structures at work across both verse 
and prose forms. As Kennedy notes, such broader applications of elegy 
correspond with “John Hollander’s observation that ‘the elegiac tone [is] a mood 
rather than…a formal mode’” (2007:56). It is in this sense of a narrative “mood” 
or “tone” that The Counterpart can be considered elegiac, in the way that many 
novels—The Go-Between (1953) by L.P. Hartley, Bruges-la-Morte (1892) by 
Georges Rodenbach, Housekeeping (1981) by Marilynne Robinson, The Virgin 
Suicides (1993) by Jeffery Eugenides, Lolita (1959) by Nabokov, In Search of 
Lost Time by Proust, most narratives by Anne Michaels, Marguerite Duras, John 
Banville or W.G. Sebald—might be considered in some way elegiac. (An 
innovative example of a narrative elegy bridging the forms of poetry and prose is 
Elizabeth Smart’s 1945 classic, By Grand Central Station I Sat Down and Wept.) 
Notably, as referenced by Kennedy, an entry in Virginia Woolf’s diary records her 
considering substituting the term “elegy” for “novel” in referring to her works 
(2007:1). And yet, beyond its wider resonance across literature as a mood or tone, 
elegy enacts a recognisable movement that is not limited to its verse forms. This is 
a movement in which the speaker looks back upon an instance of loss, in order to 
retrace the transition from presence to absence, understand the nature of what has 
been lost, and the way that life and the world have altered as a result. In enacting 
this movement, the elegiac narrative is at once mobilised and animated by the loss 
of which it speaks. Further, in the same way that the operations of elegy extend 
beyond its traditional form in verse, so it is that elegiac loss, the object of which 
has traditionally been a beloved human individual, deserves a far wider frame of 
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reference. Again, Ramazani and Watkin are examples of theorists moving in this 
direction, as evidenced by Ramazani’s consideration of elegies pertaining to the 
self, to war and to lynching, while Watkin eventually addresses the September 11 
terrorist attacks as an elegiac subject confounding in its enormity. However, such 
considerations remain firmly within the sphere of human loss. In addition to 
reckoning with the various forms of loss that are precipitated by death, exile, 
mental illness, erosion of religious faith, familial estrangement and relationship 
breakdown, The Counterpart approaches the immeasurable implications of 
ecological loss, through the reverberating impact of an ecological disaster on one 
of its characters. At the surface, the consequences of this disaster do not present as 
central to the novel. Yet, in many ways, these consequences constitute the point 
around which everything in the narrative turns. The implications of such 
ecological loss, as only intimated in The Counterpart, and the question of how to 
account for such loss responsibly in writing and thinking about elegiac literature, 
form the central concerns of the critical component of this thesis. 
 
* 
 
As a literary mode operating in poetry and prose, elegy is at once mobilised and 
complicated by the very paradox that animates literary language on the level of 
the linguistic sign. This is a paradox of generative absence, whereby literary 
presence is galvanised in the same movement as the real thing it refers to is 
negated. As George Steiner, referencing the poet Mallarmé, observes: 
 
 That which endows the word rose, that arbitrary assemblage of two vowels and two 
 consonants, with its sole legitimacy and life force is, states Mallarmé, “l'absence de 
 toute rose” (1991:96).  
 
Just as the material power of the word in a poem depends on the disappearance of 
its referent in the world, so is elegy’s existence and force predicated on the 
absence of its object, the loss of which the movement of elegy recalls and 
redoubles. This movement is exemplified in the mythical moment of Orpheus’s 
turn from Eurydice—the moment in which, after defying the gods by turning back 
to look at Eurydice emerging from the Shades and thus condemning her to a 
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second death, Orpheus turns his back and relinquishes her once more, before 
elegiacally singing of her in heavenly music that only Eurydice-in-absence could 
move him to create. The way in which the form of elegy enacts a movement, 
predicated on the absence of a referent, that is analogous to that of the linguistic 
sign, is underwritten by the way that the felt experience of absence, through 
personal loss, mobilises the authorial instinct itself. That loss, and the strange 
experience of absence which follows, compels writers to write is a truth on which 
the elegiac tradition is founded.            
 Moreover, just as the experience of loss mobilises writers to write, so do 
writers self-consciously mobilise the narrative and aesthetic powers of loss for 
their own literary ends. Speaking of this paradoxical productivity of loss in the 
lives of writers, Hélène Cixous boldly acknowledges how, as writers, ‘in losing 
we have something to gain. Mixed loss and gain: that’s our crime’ (1993:11). 
From its instigation in the act of writing to its formal and narrative operations as 
text, the nature of elegiac literature as a movement contingent on the absence of 
its object constitutes a complex ethical conundrum, converging around the 
question of what we, as writers, critics and readers, owe to the other whose 
absence we elegise. While this question has been considered both directly, within 
elegy and mourning studies—by thinkers such as William Watkin and Clifton 
Spargo—and indirectly, within the wider philosophy of mourning—notably by 
Levinas and Derrida—most of this work has been limited to considering the 
singular loss of a person, through death or some other means, and most has 
addressed a broad critical audience rather than creative writers particularly. 
 As Blanchot and others have discussed, in the negational movement of 
literary language, the real thing to which the word refers is negated as the 
materiality of poetic language is foregrounded. Similarly, in the movement of 
elegiac literature, the object of loss undergoes a kind of double loss on a literary 
plane, whereby as the original instance of loss is recounted, the poetic figures of 
language are foregrounded in its place, particularly through the metonymic use of 
the natural world which surrounds the elegist-mourner, constituting an evocative 
and consolatory backdrop to grief. Through the eyes of the elegist-mourner, the 
vitality, materiality and immediacy of the natural environment and its rivers, 
flowers and mountains, throws into relief the singular thing they have lost, the 
absence of what once lived. Everything that exists and which appeals to the 
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mourner’s senses is animated by their loss, and in turn animates the elegy. As seen 
in the work of thinkers as diverse as John Bowlby and Derrida, the movement of 
metonymy also characterises the real-world experience of mourning, when the 
mourner, reckoning with life after loss, must come to terms with a radically 
altered environment of relations, and her place in it without the other. While 
Bowlby theorises the experience of loss and recovery as contingent on a 
reconstitution of relations with objects within the mourner’s environment, Derrida 
emphasises the importance of mourning as an impossible and unending duty of 
respect to the other, by at once trying to preserve their alterity, and also maintain 
them as a living part of the self. These dual operations at work within literary 
language and mourning—the foregrounding of materiality through negation, and 
the metonymic relation of a subject to an other via an intermediate object—
converge in the relational movement of writing elegy. In this movement, 
mirroring that of Mallarmé’s rose which is animated on the page while effacing 
the real rose in the world to which it refers, the elegist-mourner works to signify 
an object of loss, the real thing which is absent, yet is only able to approach this 
object through the intermediary figures of language. In this movement of elegy, 
the object lost in life undergoes a second negation, in literary language which 
itself, as observed by Blanchot, already constitutes a double negation. This 
converging movement of negation upon negation, on the levels of language and 
mourning, which the elegy enacts constitutes at once its strange negative power 
and its paradox as a form, experienced not only through its reading, but through 
its writing.                
 Yet, what happens when it is the elegiac scene itself, the natural environment 
which for so long has been its source of tropes, which is the object of loss? The 
escalating global ecological crisis, epitomised by our radically changing climate, 
is for evident reasons increasingly becoming an object of elegiac literature, and in 
the process, calling into question not only the formal operations of traditional 
elegy but also our ethical responsibilities in elegising non-human others, and in 
thinking ecological loss, which is at once more contingent and more total than our 
customary modes of mourning and commemoration, and conceptions of loss, 
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account for. While the fast-growing disciplines of ecocriticism and ecopoetics are 
working to redress the historical lack of attendance to the natural environment and 
our relationships to it within cultural, literary and creative writing scholarship1, 
critical work specifically located at the intersection between elegy, ecology and 
ethics remains relatively sparse. A notable exception, Timothy Morton’s 2010 
essay, ‘The Dark Ecology of Elegy’, argues that an ecologically responsible 
literature of loss hesitates from too hastily mourning nature as lost, and instead 
galvanises the power of ‘politicized melancholy’ in testifying to our present 
planetary crisis (2010:255). While thought-provoking, Morton’s argument is 
troubled by inconsistency and a general lack of qualification, particularly 
regarding the complexity of divergent meanings encompassed by ecological loss, 
our human culpability in the face of this loss, and his reference to melancholy as a 
mode of poetic practice. Moreover, Morton’s essay is addressed to literary critics 
rather than creative writers. Morton’s concept of an elegiac mode that refuses to 
pre-empt an apocalypse that has not yet occurred, in favour of a mournful 
dwelling in the difficult moment of incipient loss, offers a useful point of 
departure for thinking an ethical poetics of eco-elegy. However, this essay argues 
that any such poetics must be theorised through a more rigorous dialogue with the 
philosophies of mourning, thanatopoetics and environmental criticism than 
Morton’s essay conducts. In particular, Derrida's complex understanding of 
mourning, as both a metonymic relation to the dead other and as a law of living 
friendship, offers a compass by which to orient a more nuanced thinking of what 
an ethical poetics of writing ecological elegy might constitute.    
 In view of contributing to further discussion, within creative writing studies, 
of how to reckon responsibly with ecological loss through elegy, this thesis aims 
to arrive at a tentative framework through which to rethink an ethical poetics of 
ecological elegy. In doing so, this study interprets “elegy” broadly, as not only a 
traditional form of poetry but also as a literary mood and movement at work in 
prose. It is with this broader inflection that this thesis invokes the terms “elegy” 
and “elegiac mode”. Throughout, the interrelated but discrete terms of “loss” and 
                                                          
1 Ecocriticism has been defined broadly as ‘the study of the relationship between literature and the 
physical environment’ (Glotfelty,1996:xviii). Ecopoetics can be understood as ‘writing about the 
nature and practice of poetry’ (Hass, 2012:754). 
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“absence” will be used in close association in discussion of both elegiac literary 
operations and mourning. Further, the term “felt absence” is used in reference to 
the visceral sensation of physical or symbolic absence, felt personally by the 
writer in the act of writing, while also being in a sense “felt” by the text itself and, 
by extension, the reader in experiencing the poetics of absence within language on 
the page. In preference to the psychoanalytical term “lost object”, I have generally 
used the term “lost other”, which foregrounds the agency of the being(s) lost. 
Unlike much work in elegy studies, this thesis attends to death as just one among 
other sources of loss which might call for elegy. Specifically, the term “ecological 
loss” is invoked in reference not only to the species extinctions and ecological 
degradation that has already occurred globally, but to that which appears incipient 
in the near and distant future, particularly in view of recent admissions by climate 
scientists that we have already gone past the point at which a dangerous two-
degree rise in global temperature is avoidable. While all terms are used, I have 
preferred the term “ecology” over “environment” or “nature” for the way in which 
the former emphasises the natural world as an interconnected and mutually 
dependent system of parts, in which humans are also implicated. Finally, for the 
sake of brevity, the term “ecological elegy” will henceforth be referred to as “eco-
elegy”.                 
 Following the excerpted novel, Chapter 1 of the critical essay considers the 
paradoxical co-movement of materiality and metonymy in elegy as a form and as 
a writing-act, through the negation of the object to which literary language and 
elegy/mourning refer, a negation on which the force of each movement depends. 
In doing so, it will examine Roland Barthes’s elegiac reflections on literature, loss 
and writing following the death of his mother, in Mourning Diary (2009). Also 
discussed in the context of elegiac ethics is John Bowlby’s psychoanalytic 
understanding of loss, and the Orphic turn.        
 Chapter 2 examines the paradoxical and ethically problematic form of the 
eco-elegy by reflecting on my own experience of visiting Chernobyl as research 
for my elegiac novel The Counterpart. With reference to Timothy Morton’s essay 
‘The Dark Ecology of Elegy’, this chapter argues that a more rigorous attendance 
to the varied meanings encompassed by the word “loss” is integral to developing 
an ethical poetics of eco-elegy.            
 Chapter 3 explores the implications of Morton’s argument that a melancholic 
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elegiac mode presents a more ethical mode of representing ecology in crisis, in 
dialogue with the work of other thinkers within the environmental humanities. It 
contends that such a mode must involve a greater attendance not only to the future 
loss that is now irremediable due to global warming, but to our human culpability 
and answerability in light of this loss.          
 Chapter 4 discusses Derrida’s metonymic ethics of mourning and 
commemoration in relation to eco-elegy, in contrast to more traditional 
psychoanalytic understandings of mourning that have influenced elegy and its 
criticism. In dialogue with the work of Derrida and of select thinkers within 
ecocriticism and creative writing studies, this chapter outlines a framework 
through which to rethink an ethical poetics of eco-elegy. This chapter argues that 
such a poetics would resist totalising the divergency of ecological loss, and the 
others implicated in this loss, while recognising our human implication in, and 
interconnection with, ecological reality. This ethical poetics is ultimately framed 
in the allegorical context of reimagining the moment of the Orpheus’s turn from 
lost Eurydice. 
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THE COUNTERPART 
                   
                  An excerpted novel 
 
 
 
PREFATORY NOTE: 
Where space constraints have required the 
omission of a significant section of intervening 
text, an explanatory note will appear.  
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I shall not decay, nor rot, nor putrefy, nor become 
worms, nor see corruption. I shall have my being, I 
shall live… 
 
− Address to Osiris by the deceased, The Egyptian Book 
of the Dead, Ch. CLIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
I see him from behind. In his heavy coat, he is a dark shape in a white land 
without shadow. The sky is white; the ground is white. The horizon is uncertain. 
Although it could be any time of day, I sense it is morning. Against the bench, his 
back is a broad wall. His breath is all that moves, unfurling in vapour and 
disappearing in the air before him. He waits, opposite the five-storey block in a 
town where tourists don’t go. As trackers get closer to the animal, they must make 
sure they see it before it sees them. He has already seen her. He is taking his time.  
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The day I landed for the funeral, the headless figure of a woman was discovered 
off the coast of Israel. In baggage collection at Borispol, I passed her image on the 
news, in one frame falling, in another, lying on the sand. She fell from a cliff 
being excavated by archaeologists, and had to be raised from the waves by a 
crane, around which an audience assembled, as if for the resurrection of Aphrodite 
herself.  Originally, this marble goddess had presided over the cliff-side Roman 
bath house which, after nearly two millennia, was disassembled in the same storm 
that caused her own fall. The statue would not have been revealed but for the 
unfortunate collapse of the ancient site, and there’s the paradox of history’s 
treasure hunt―had the bath house wall not been lost how much longer would she 
have languished unseen? In the footage she was weathered by the elements, and 
wanted not only for a head but for several fingers and a foot.  Waiting for my 
luggage there before the screen, I recalled something strange I have often thought 
to be true, that beauty in distress is sometimes the most arresting kind. I thought 
then of my father, and wondered again if I would ever be able to divide his 
thoughts from my own, his triumphs and tragedies from mine. Of course, I know 
that there is a way in which to have a family at all is to share in a certain collective 
self. Yet my condition was somewhat different. For, ever since my father died, I 
had been haunted by the feeling that I was, in some unfathomable way, living his 
afterlife.                  
 I had done nothing to help myself out of this predicament. In fact, for the 
previous five years, I had routinely positioned myself as the passive recipient of 
his posthumous orations. In more ways than one, they were my inheritance.  
 But I must begin at the beginning, and speak of another statue, and another 
place.   
 
* 
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This is not my story. In telling it, I am acting on my ex’s last words to me before 
she left, for a sunnier state with an affable lesbian kitesurfer. She said to write it 
down, this history I had begun to trace with the obsession of those who long to 
know of origins. As much as it irritates me to heed her, here I am, pen in hand, 
alone in my father’s house, with an indolent Labrador for company and a freezer 
full of stroganoff.              
 Don’t we all, as egocentric children, long to know the story of how we, and 
thus the known world, came to be? I still feel the weight of my mother’s silences 
at the questions I asked her as a child. What was my father really like? How did 
she meet him? There was fury in those silences, although I was not its object. It 
was, I suppose, a fury of self-preservation. Like anything persistently withheld 
from a child, the history of my parents came to occupy a disproportionate space in 
my mental universe.              
 When I turned eighteen, I came into my inheritance—my father’s Melbourne 
house, an expired Toyota, an ancient artefact collection, and his papers. My 
father, lover of the relic and the record, kept diaries and wrote certain letters 
which remained unsent. The day I moved in, I found them, stacked and 
unassuming on the shelf above his desk. The same day, I discovered that in death, 
my father told me more than my mother ever would while alive. Yet, even when 
writing for himself, I have no proof that my father wrote the whole truth. In fact I 
doubt it. He was a man with a singular vision. And so in this exercise of 
reconstruction I have taken many liberties.          
 Reading on painting the other day, I came upon a quote from Braque: Proofs 
weary the truth. Whether or not he is right, the ‘proofs’ I have are not enough. 
What I do not know, I have supposed; I have grafted new branches from fact. 
Using my father’s writings and all I know of both my parents, these pages 
imagine a story I was never told. 
  
* 
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PART ONE: 
The Marine Venus 
 
 
They met before the Marine Venus, Aphrodite aidoumene, the salt-worn goddess 
resurrected by sailors from the seabed off the west coast of the city. With the 
frequently obsessive attention to detail that marked Peter’s professional and 
private life, his personal diaries describe exhaustively the days that follow this 
meeting, and their bearing on his own mind and heart.       
 Picture an afternoon, during the late spring of 1988, in a museum on the 
Greek isle of Rhodes. That afternoon, inside a wide and echoing room, a shaft of 
deep light falls from a high window before which a tall man stands. The man is 
big-boned, with dark hair and a straight back. His regal face, of indeterminate age, 
bears the beginnings of a beard; his blue eyes direct a penetrating stare. His flared 
cheekbones and the warmth in his skin hint at some mystery in his otherwise 
European blood, a mystery of north or central Asia. Across the room, the light 
moves, as if reaching for its grave white host, whose eroded eyes, above her 
broken neck, in a head poised with philosophical dignity above her armless body, 
seem to look both everywhere and nowhere at once. Peter was still dazed by the 
ancient object exhibits, until he found the statues, and among them, in a farther 
room, this giant white woman in the corner toward whom the sun leans. He has 
seen her before. Perhaps it is like greeting an old friend. Decades ago, when the 
memory of fish was fresh on her stone, Lawrence Durrell was moved to remark 
upon the genius of her presence being impossible to describe. As her creator 
would once have done, Peter shifts around, appraising every angle, and then he 
stops. She compels him to be still. He is lost in her face.      
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 Hearing footsteps, Peter feels his time alone with her draw in. As other people 
enter, it occurs to him that he had almost missed the room. So does the design of 
chance become all the more marvellous for the events that follow.     
 Only one of the other visitors is as quiet as Peter. In his peripheral vision he 
sees her, having arrived with singular intent before Aphrodite. He shifts a little, 
his eyes still wandering along one eroded shoulder and truncated arm, imagining 
they are flesh. He hears a sigh. ‘Ah!’ says the voice. ‘She is far from home.’ He 
turns his head toward the voice, which is musical and hints of both wistfulness 
and wit, wondering of its mother tongue—Russian? Not Greek—and sees a small 
blonde woman with a battered camera at her neck, her hands thrust in the pockets 
of a quilted jacket that matches her hair. She looks back at him with an openness 
that seems to expect an answer. Her eyes are bright behind her glasses, which, he 
sees, now rest on her nose at an odd angle, likely owing to her habit of constantly 
moving them above and below her eyes in the act of looking. Unable to think of 
anything to say, he merely smiles, looks at her for perhaps a second too long, and 
resumes his efforts of committing the vision before him to memory. Frowning 
now, unable to truly see Aphrodite, he feels his eyes wanting to look back. While 
he resists his eyes, the real woman beside him seems to oscillate at the edge of his 
vision. Who is she? What is she there for? Questions echoing in his mind, he 
hears a sudden click before a bright light. Finally giving up on Aphrodite, he 
looks back. Her face is partly obscured. She is peering through the camera lens, 
her glasses balanced on her head.            
 ‘Oh, devil!’ she says, fiddling with the settings, ‘The flashing.’ Intrigued by 
her choice of expletive, Peter wonders if she is talking in English for his benefit, 
for surely if she were in the habit of talking to herself in public she would do so in 
her native tongue. She sighs, glances at her watch, and rubs at her nose for a 
moment while appraising Aphrodite again, with one foot forward, before 
becoming utterly still. Without looking at her directly, he follows the line of her 
profile with his eyes. Her eyes remain on Aphrodite, as if it were possible to 
fathom her by looking. He senses the presence of a like soul, and smiles. By this 
time they are alone. Like Peter, the woman in yellow shows no interest in the 
other statues in the room. When, the next moment, his stomach begins to growl 
audibly, he feels it is his time to go, but then she speaks.     
 ‘There is something about her, no? Everyone talks about the Aphrodite 
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Bathing in the other room, but this one, in ruin, she sticks in the mind. She has a 
better story to tell.’               
 ‘I wish she would tell it.’            
 ‘Ah, I could tell she had you too. May I ask you would have the time?’  
 She gestures to her wrist, as though unsure he would understand the word. 
 ‘Oh, yes,’ he says, glancing at his own wrist. ‘The dead hour of three, 
precisely. Three o’clock.’             
 Before he has finished speaking she gasps and picks up her bag, exclaiming 
under her breath in a foreign language, something like ‘aiy boch’, and then, ‘Oh, I 
am late, very late. Excuse me. Good day’, leaving Peter and Aphrodite alone once 
more.   
 
* 
 
That day, leaving the museum, Peter’s heart begins to race. For hours afterward, 
panic revisits him, pricking his skin with cold heat, causing him to forget his 
lunch bill, and later, while browsing in a bookstore, to walk directly into an 
elderly man. Repeatedly along the route back to the hotel, his mind draws forth 
the woman’s face. With the cool night comes a dread he has known before. 
Awake in bed in an atmosphere that feels sentient and impregnable as skin, the 
questions come, eschewing conscious thought. Why had he not asked her name? 
Why had he not made her stay? 
 
* 
 
I have never written much myself, not since the diaries, long lost now, of a few 
desperate childhood years. The world doesn’t need another memoir, and I feared 
indulging my introversion. The validation of writing is seductive, and, as my ex 
was so fond of reminding me, I am egotistical enough. Then, not long ago, 
between jobs, during a period when the darkness in my mind had begun spread 
like ink over our lives, she told me to either see a psychiatrist or instead see her 
walk out the door. When I knew for sure that she was serious and my arguments 
pointless, I found myself sitting on a couch opposite Dr. Goldman.    
 Upon greeting him and explaining my reason for being there simply as 
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surrender to my girlfriend’s ultimatum, I remember a long pause, during which I 
believe he expected me to elaborate. Instead I stared rather vacantly at his dense 
ginger beard. The fact that he was wearing a bow tie unnerved me further, as my 
instinctive mistrust of those who wear them has always been warranted in the end. 
And yet I knew my silence was insolent—the poor fellow hadn’t asked me to 
come. Finally, he began to pose tentative questions to which I replied. When he 
asked me to tell him about my parents, I asked what he wanted to know. I told 
him that I didn’t see what use reciting the facts of my parents would be. I told him 
it was just the way I was wired, and that this spell would pass when I was busy 
again. ‘Since you’re here, I’d like you to try talking anyway,’ he said. After all, 
even if I didn’t believe the way I was raised had a large hand in shaping me, 
surely I believed that the facts of my genetic make-up were entwined with my 
parents’. ‘I believe it all,’ I said. ‘I just don’t see how talk will change it.’ In the 
end, I talked, of course, to appease my girlfriend, to pass the time, and to see what 
wisdom three hundred dollars might buy me. The words came out almost before I 
had to think them. As I recited what I knew, I felt the vacant weight of everything 
I didn’t know. The facts sounded strange even to me.       
 I saw Dr. Goldman for as long as it took to realise that psychiatric sessions 
were not going to save my relationship. At the end of our first session, after I had 
recounted a hundred curiosities about my parents and noted by his expression that 
he no longer thought I was making it up, Dr. Goldman set me an exercise. It was 
simple. ‘When you’re alone, write down everything you told me, then keep 
writing until it’s not so easy,’ he said. While I met these instructions with a nod, I 
had no intention of following them. I had stood before the weight of tortured 
paper my father left behind, and leafed through the records of his days, mundane 
and occasionally extraordinary. He certainly wrote with a kind of flair, and who 
am I to know what good obsessive documenting did him when he was alive? I had 
read it all intently, grateful for his legacy. I just didn’t want to follow him.  
 Eventually, Ann did walk out the door, and she fired a parting shot. It left me 
finally unable to let my family history rest. Because a small revolution begins in 
the mind of a person who learns they are to bring about new life. Mortality bares 
itself, more insistent than before. The self shrinks in the wide arms of History. 
The mind is nudged on beyond its own death to ask, what will I leave behind? 
This revolution is only more dramatic in one who never longed for or expected 
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parenthood. That is where I found myself, one year ago, when Ann dropped the 
news, with a tone of perfunctory resentment, as we were clearing up the dinner 
dishes: ‘I’m pregnant’. As if I’d forgotten the bins again, or missed her birthday 
dinner. It was the result of one of our recent attempts to find each other, after 
months of tension. During that period, she had come to blame her persistent 
passive-aggression on her contraceptive pill, instead of the obvious culprit, which 
was her unhappiness. Knowing the futility of engaging her in argument (I lost my 
train of thought and grew glaze-eyed just as she got going, in an athletic verbal 
combat that made her glow), I agreed that she should stop the pills. She was on 
them because I don’t function well when gloved, and that particular occasion, 
having both drunk too much cheap chardonnay at her brother’s ridiculous buck’s 
night, I went glove-free. I fucked her on the lounge-room floor without a condom, 
and would be called to face the consequences.         
 My growing apathy toward my relationship at that time had frightened me in 
an abstract way. I tried to remember why we were together, and saw a union born 
of various corresponding factors, all of which might have easily been found in 
another woman and another man. I loved Ann, until I began to question the 
feeling, and then to forget the feeling itself. I felt I was moving through a fog, and 
when I interacted with other people or performed activities other than staring 
through the window of my father’s study, it felt like there was a lag between my 
brain and my limbs. I was exhausted, and began, in my more fatal moods, to 
anticipate being left alone with a longing I knew I would regret. But I was under 
the rule of Saturn. My body felt too heavy to carry, my thoughts devoured me, and 
I wondered whose life I was living. When Ann finally left, the fog closed in 
completely. I became what we had both feared, and, in my abandonment, found in 
self-destruction a hideous satisfaction. One day bled into another in the silence of 
my body in the house until hunger and despair drove me out on slow-motion 
expeditions to Coles for cornflakes and instant noodles. I grew to know the 
engorged, hallucinatory feeling of sleeping through the day, like the downside of a 
sugar high. Life had become timeless. I ceased to recognise my bearded self in the 
mirror. I had fantasies of Ann bumping into me in the liquor section, beholding 
my gaunt body and haunted face, pleading for forgiveness. At times, I imagined 
her doing so too late, after reading my obituary in The Age, over breakfast in the 
Queensland kitchen of her betrayal. In theory, I knew that I needed to return to 
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work and study. In reality, I had my dead father’s house and money. In the end, I 
made a bargain with myself.             
 One empty evening, long after I had ceased seeing Dr. Goldman, when there 
was nothing sufficiently mindless on television and the sky had released a 
downpour worthy of the tropics, I decided to humour his idea of a homework 
session. When I sat down to ‘write until it wasn’t easy’, the words came fast. For 
as long as my hand kept moving, I felt calm dawn in my mind. When the words 
stopped, and the questions which had always been there came to gather with an 
urgency I had never before admitted, I knew I must piece together for myself the 
full story of my birth.  
   
* 
 
Peter wakes late the next morning, with a listless feeling he hopes motion will 
cure. He takes the route from his hotel along the quay, beyond which ferries float 
like giant icebergs, filling the air with the honking of geese. He buys a pretzel 
from a bakery stand, and sits on a bench facing the sea, watching the coffee 
drinkers, the spires of the cathedral, the market sellers erecting the day’s wares. 
After filling his lungs for a few minutes with the ocean air, he reloads his old 
Minolta and heads for the museum for the second time in as many days. He had 
forgotten to take a photograph of Aphrodite the previous visit, and intends to 
review the ancient object exhibits.          
 Arriving at the entrance to the main wing of statuary in which Aphrodite is 
housed, Peter stops a moment to stand in the enormous cathedral-like hall of the 
former hospital. There, pale light filters in diagonal streams from the highest 
vaults to the floor, in which more minor relics cover the walls—stone reliefs and 
tablets, which are not too diminished by the lack of electric light. The first room, 
with the miniature Aphrodite Bathing, is empty but for an attendant slouched in a 
chair in the corner reading a magazine. Upon his entrance, she looks up and, 
apparently finding no reason for suspicion, resumes reading. From the angle of his 
approach, the adjoining room looks similarly empty. The sun, which had been so 
bright that morning and the previous afternoon, has recently faded, leaving the 
room bathed in an even, shadowless light.          
 It is only as Aphrodite in her corner rears into view—looking, he notes with 
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some disappointment, as if she hasn’t moved in the night—that he sees the figure 
standing still before her, partly obscured by a large bust of Dionysus. As he moves 
closer, he sees the figure’s yellow hair and jacket.        
 Peter pauses behind Dionysus, and for a moment it seems there are only 
statues in the room. He notices the ornate clock on the far wall, and wonders if it’s 
wrong. The hands rest at three o’clock, later than he thought it to be, and the same 
time as the previous day’s meeting. His eyes return to the woman and squint, as if 
to check his vision is true. He had not expected to see her again, yet there she is, 
before the great white lady of the Aegean, as if waiting for him. Somehow feeling 
his eyes, she finally turns, a haunted look on her face which passes.   
 ‘Oh! Hello.’               
 ‘Hello.’                 
 ‘She has put a spell on us,’ says the woman, laughing.      
 Peter nods, trying to think of something to say. Finding nothing, he peers at 
the statue through his camera lens, composing the shot. He feels her watching 
him, and worries he is being rude. Common odds do not favour the repetition of 
chance meetings. If she leaves now, there will not be another. When he has taken 
the shot, he turns back to her. She is turning over a book pulled from her bag. 
 ‘What brings you to Rhodes?’           
 ‘Oh, well—’               
 She is surprised, and stalls, her lips parted for speech, as if waiting for the 
answer. ‘Ah—I—I don’t remember.’           
 She turns to him wide-eyed, as if to share her shock, and speaks in the 
slowness of shock.               
 ‘This book is in Russian.’             
 She pauses, gazing into the middle distance.         
 ‘I speak Russian.’               
 She gazes back at Aphrodite, as if this fact is sinking in. She turns to Peter, a 
strange light in her eyes. She speaks her words now with grave certainty.  
 ‘I was on a train.’               
 Her eyes implore him to tell her that some truth she now knows isn’t so. Her 
hands are clasped tight together in front of her chest. She takes a breath.  
 ‘Did you know I’d be here? Have you seen me before? Tell me, do you know 
who I am?’                 
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 Peter blinks, waiting to understand.          
 ‘What? I didn’t know you’d be here; it was coincidence. I wanted to take 
some photos.’                
 The woman’s eyes are distant. With a short breath, Peter shakes his head. 
 ‘Why am I explaining this? We’re strangers. The first time I saw you was 
yesterday, right here. Don’t you remember?’         
 ‘I remember yesterday. But—I’m sorry, you’ll think I’m so strange. But I 
don’t remember before the train.’            
 She has begun to speak into her hands. Peter is worried she is about to fall 
over. Drawing a slow breath, she shakes her head.        
 ‘Ah! What is my name? Aiy boch, I don’t remember who I am.’ 
 
* 
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Note on omissions: 
 
In the intervening text, Peter, transfixed by the strange woman’s striking resemblance to 
his beloved, long-dead and desperately missed twin sister Klara, and deducing that she is 
suffering from amsnesia, decides to help her rediscover her identity. (The woman’s state 
of amnesia accords with that of the rare ‘dissociative fugue’, entailing a sudden travel 
from home, and often afflicting victims of extreme stress and trauma.) In the interim, 
Peter suggests that for convenience, he call the woman by the pseudonym of “Klara”, to 
which she unwittingly agrees. Klara’s lack of identity papers, combined with Peter’s 
mistrust of Greek beauracracy and his fears that the woman, if a Soviet citizen, could be 
charged with defection, compels him to take her by ferry to Athens, where he procures 
her a false passport.               
 Peter, a Siberian exile and naturalised Australian based in Melbourne, is by 
profession an art conservator (and frustrated artist), on leave from work due to a heart 
condition. (Importantly, Peter is also a religious man, adhering to his own eccentric blend 
of ancient Egyptian beliefs in an afterlife, and shamanic mysticism. Additionally, he 
holds to a belief that he was, in a prior life, an ancient Egyptian priest.) Having planned to 
travel on to Italy for a conference, Peter ultimately compels Klara to follow him for an 
adventure, during which she will ostensibly be his portrait model, and he her guide. 
Throughout this journey, as the two grow closer, and Peter sketches Klara with increasing 
frustration, Peter confronts the dangers of his own desire to recover the loss of one being 
through the image of another, and Klara realises the dangers of her dependency on him. 
 Ultimately, Peter’s escalating desperation, to obtain a lasting likeness of Klara’s face, 
leads to a radical decision. 
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PART TWO: 
The Mould  
 
It is during the opera in Bari that Peter decides to make the mould of Klara’s 
face.                   
 It is strange, the way that every faculty of a person can know an act is wrong, 
while never shaking their resolve to commit it. From the moment the idea occurs 
to him, Peter knows that it is as good as done, despite registering a feeling of 
disgust which, depending on your point of view, might by a minor degree render 
him a better or a worse man for having had the feeling at all. He will make a cast 
of her face, and it will be his masterpiece: this he thinks sitting beside her at the 
Teatro di San Carlo, at the opera Norma, during the exquisite warbling of ‘Casta 
Diva’.  
If there is any lost memory of those weeks which you have cause to mourn, it 
was that velvet evening in the teatro, the vibration of the soprano in your chest, 
your hands holding themselves tight in the lap of your new red dress, your eyes 
alive with saltwater. I was conscious of your breathing, the quickening rise and 
fall of your breast, your face transformed by emotion. The plan descended like 
a note of the music, independent of me and asserting its right to life. Your face, 
Klara. It was the face I had been looking for.  
So writes Peter of that night, in a letter to Klara that was never sent. 
 
* 
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After the opera, they sit in their room, the laughter of late-night diners in the lane 
outside. The arias still in their heads, they eat pizza at the table with a bottle of 
wine. Peter invokes their successful evasion of the sea port officials as reason for 
this particular indulgence. Peter will blame what happens on the wine. For having 
drunk the wine at all, he blames the drawing he made of Klara that afternoon. 
 Like the others before it, the drawing taunted him with the possibility of 
yielding to the glorious potential of a true representation, while always failing to 
do so, as if it were merely his own lack of technical skill that failed to manifest 
what was so near. There was no joy to the lines. They would not abide him, and 
his veins hummed with wine.  He had tried. He held the pencil with excruciating 
alertness to every possibility of the white page. She was still, she was patient; a 
willing sitter. She didn’t seem to mind Peter peering at her when he had a pencil 
in hand, and he was too timid to face her as fiercely without his artist’s props. At 
times he noticed amusement in her eyes. The sketchpad between them mediated 
these encounters in an elegant way. Like the configuration of a pieta, the staging 
of the portrait follows an old arrangement. Instinctively they knew their parts, and 
awkwardness was eschewed by having the point in common of that frail page. 
 Again that night, Peter’s pencil does not heed his eyes. It follows its own 
desires. His first lines, tracing her shape and pinning her down, lose their certainty 
in the detail, in the darker deciding line. For although Klara is there, breathing, a 
metre from him, it is never that face which looks back at him from the page. There 
he sees only a tortured matrix of lifeless lines. She does not agree. She sees his 
agitation, and offers him praise: Amazing, to achieve all this with a little lead. So 
true to life, like a photograph! But Peter shakes his head and spits that it is all just 
craft, learned trickery, arithmetic. For a while Klara had tried to save her portraits 
before Peter could shred them, keeping several in a roll that grew cumbersome to 
carry, until, seeing Peter’s irritation, she surrendered them all to a public bin. 
Sometimes she notes a wild look to the portrait’s eyes, a nose that is not her own, 
a larger mouth. The woman in the drawings looks like Klara’s close relative; she 
is not Klara. Sitting by sitting, she watches the woman’s face grow darker. 
 Klara had arrived in Peter’s life suddenly. Although he hardly dares to think 
of it, his superstition dictates the likelihood of her leaving in a similar manner. In 
that event, he would need more than an ordinary memento by which to remember 
her. Peter has photographs of Klara, but photographs are not enough. There is a 
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kind of seeing that is only summoned in the effort of creating a representation 
with one’s own hands. And yet neither are the portraits enough. Peter longs to re-
create her with his hands, to discover her in three dimensions. Only then could he 
truly commit to memory the dimensions of her face, the lineaments of her smile, 
the aspect of her gaze, the way she holds her head. Every material image of Klara 
is an aid to the image Peter aims to sustain in his mind. 
 
* 
  
Drawing Klara that night by the blue-lighted window, Peter observes the alarm in 
her face long before he connects it with any behaviour of his, figuring that she is 
perhaps musing upon her situation. In his efforts to define the fall of shadow on 
her nose, in relation to her eyes and lips, his breathing becomes savage, his lines 
too hard for the paper to sustain. Finding no hope in this, his hundredth attempt to 
render her, Peter tears the page off its clipboard, and with slow deliberation, 
crushes it in his hands while looking out the window at the night. Her voice comes 
to him as if through a pane of glass.           
 ‘Why is it never good enough? Why do you keep drawing me?’    
 He has walked over to the window, and stands before it with his glass of wine, 
feeling the air on his face. Behind him, Klara makes a despairing sound. 
 ‘Oh, god. What are we doing here? I’ll never remember who I am, and who 
on earth are you? You are a man who wants to help me, but will not say why. You 
draw me over and over and destroy every attempt!’        
 Even then, as Peter senses the absurd comedy in their predicament, he is 
grave. Turning from the window, he finds himself looming before her, his face 
above hers blocking the light, close enough to feel her breath. For several seconds 
he does not speak, but only stares at her, inches from that face which forever 
resists capture. Possessed, he snarls like a strange animal.      
 ‘You know why I draw you.’            
 She shrinks back in her chair like something hunted, before he pins her 
against the wall, knowing the wrong he is committing even as he commits it. So 
does a man at times find himself looking on from without, in the moment of an act 
he will regret. Finally he is near her, near enough to feel her heat. He wants to 
simply absorb her, it is an insane, mindless hunger to which no part of his rational 
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intelligence can speak. Finally she whimpers, and slips out of her chair from one 
side, ducking under his right arm and stopping only when she reaches the door. 
 ‘I don’t know why you do it! Who are you?’         
 It is only then that Peter returns to himself to realise what he has done. The 
door shuts. He does not go after her. 
 
* 
 
How does Peter spend the hours that follow?  Perhaps he seeks solace in another 
bottle, after which he surrenders to the oblivion of a dreamless sleep. Perhaps he 
sits, vacant-eyed, in front of late-night Italian TV. Perhaps he wanders the streets 
of Naples, searching.                
 In any case, when he wakes the next day, his eyes still around the shape of her 
jacket on the chair. It takes longer for his mind to register the vision than it does 
for his eyes to see it. He feels like a victim of head trauma who, waking from his 
coma, becomes cognizant of the event having happened at the same time as 
realising that, in the face of uncertain odds, chance has granted him reprieve, life 
has been restored to him when it might have been denied. This surge of fortune 
leaves Peter numb. The jacket on the chair declares that he is one of Chance’s 
chosen ones, before he has had time to contemplate the prospect of loss: because 
Klara has returned, when she might have vanished. He feels the entrance of a deep 
relief, intravenous and pure. Of course she has returned. It is no victory of luck, 
no gesture of forgiveness. At this point I would like to believe a deep repulsion for 
his own self causes Peter’s gut to lurch. She has nowhere else to go. Craning his 
neck from where he lies in bed, he sees her figure in the bathroom doorway, 
shuffling from the sink and fiddling with her underwear, careful even then of not 
disturbing him. Suddenly, he feels exquisitely alert, as if every nerve and synapse 
were attending to his forming decision. If he does not attempt to carry out his plan 
at that moment, he sees that the chance may not come again. He lies in bed for 
several more minutes, thinking, feigning sleep. There is only one way to do it, and 
it all rests on Klara accepting a cup of tea.  
 
* 
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That morning, Peter sedates Klara with his anxiety medication. He does it for 
accuracy. He does it for fear of her opinion of him, for fear that, had he asked 
instead of drugged her, she would have refused. Desperation invents reasons why 
a violation in the most horrendous taste is, in fact, a justifiable and relatively 
harmless act. She could do with a rest, evidently she is not sleeping well, and how 
could he, in all his suffering, not be entitled to her face? For it is not even her 
face, the living original, that he is asking to possess. He is already settling for 
second-best, although he looks upon it then as a kind of carbon, a security against 
the worst disaster. A true copy is what he seeks, whose truth he can trust the more 
for having lifted the mould from her skin. No portrait, the poor imitation by his 
hand and eye approximated so far from the living original, would suffice. The 
coincidences, the uncanny parallels, take advantage of his every latent religious 
weakness and his grief, to leave him convinced there is some divine will in her 
being sent to him, granting him this devious act, with Vaseline and dental alginate 
and plaster bandage. Forgive me, but it was so easy, he implores in an unsent 
letter. You awakened like an angel after it all, without a trace of accusation in 
your face. 
 
* 
 
Klara doesn’t take hold of the cup for several insufferable minutes. When she 
does bring the cup to her lips, she drinks steadily, without hesitation, until the tea 
is gone. The effects do not take long.           
 Of course, Peter doesn’t know what to expect. He has given her what he 
thinks is a conservative amount of sedating drugs based on her body type―small 
and light. He doesn’t consider the fact that the wine from the previous evening 
may remain in her system, or what dangers this new cocktail in her body might 
create. It is one of the singular moments in Peter’s life when the primitive forces 
of instinct and impulse eclipse entirely his rational mind—those faculties of self-
preservation and caution, and his adherence to the most rudimentary of moral 
codes.                   
 If he feels pity or horror as he undertakes these deceptions, it is bearable, with 
the object of his desire so close at hand. If he feels regret as he watches her finish 
the last of the tea and place her cup down, it is the passing regret made hollow by 
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the fact that given the chance he would only do the same again. What he feels is 
relief, and the charge of anticipation in knowing that soon, she will close her eyes. 
Face to face at last with this potential in himself, he is surprised to feel no great 
horror, understanding, as he does, the nature of the decisions he has made and the 
power he has abused. What horror he feels is academic.       
 He has the feeling of being propelled outside himself, toward a kind of edge. 
How is he to proceed? He has succeeded in entering a rather arbitrary dose of 
drugs into Klara’s veins by way of a very sweet cup of tea. Is it enough, is it too 
much, or is it, as he hopes, the perfect measure to avoid the risk of either 
alternative? While looking into his cup and contemplating what to say while he 
waits, he hears a noise.              
 Without a word, Klara has quite gracefully pitched forward in her chair until 
her brow hits the table’s edge. It is more than he could have hoped for. After a 
moment, he takes the opposite seat, lowers his face to hers, sees her eyes are 
closed and reaches out his hand to her mouth to check she is still breathing. He 
marvels at how, with only audacity in the place of skill, he has achieved perfectly 
his desire―a Klara deep in sleep, a sleep which no gentle manoeuvre of his is 
likely to disturb.    
 
* 
              
After Klara’s head drops onto the table, Peter carries her over his shoulder to the 
middle of the room, and lays her on the floor beneath yesterday’s newspaper. He 
brushes her hair from her face as he has always longed to do, and fans it out like a 
halo, observing how much lighter it is than was his sister’s, before hiding it all 
beneath the complimentary shower cap. For her hairline, lashes and brows he is in 
need of grease. The hair conditioner won’t do. He searches both their bags and, 
finding no Vaseline, begins to wonder about the pats of butter in the fridge. The 
pharmacies are closed, and he doesn’t want to go searching with her there on the 
floor like the victim of an unfinished murder. And then he remembers the cream 
for his chronically dry hands. It works well enough, as does the pudding bowl 
filled with potpourri he steals from the hall.         
 Crouching over her on the floor, like a loving mother, he wipes away the fine 
thread of drool running from the corner of her mouth, sets to mixing the alginate 
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in the right proportions, and laments the fact that he will have to apply it with too 
small a brush. He is too paralysed to scream when, at the first slimy touch of the 
alginate, Klara opens her eyes, moans, and rolls her head to the side. Peter has not 
contemplated this turn of events, and had it not been a momentary resurfacing of 
consciousness, there is little he would be able to do, short of delivering a 
concussive blow to her head. Although it seems like an eternity, it must in fact be 
only moments before he sees her eyes roll white and close again. Although 
relieved beyond measure that she is no longer looking at him with the vacant eyes 
of a sibyl, poised over her as he is, wielding his hook-ended modelling tool and 
clad in the disposable raincoat he packed in case of bad weather, he is all the same 
concerned that this is a bad sign, a sign of her body’s sedation taking a dangerous 
turn. For this reason, and because he cannot not be sure she will not wake again, 
Peter compromises his procedures and begins to apply the alginate with haste, 
having realigned Klara’s head. The pink goo drips thick down her face. He steers 
it swiftly from her nostrils, into each of which he has inserted a piece of soft drink 
straw to ensure the clear passage of air. He cuts the bandage with fervour, and 
begins to lay it on like sandwich spread.           
 He doesn’t allow it time to adequately dry. His nerves are shot, his courage 
gone. For a moment he employs the hotel hair dryer in speeding the process but 
abandons this from worry the heat will re-melt the alginate beneath. None of this 
is good for his heart, which is lurching like a hunted thing. Resigned to the 
ruination of his plans, his risks for nothing, he removes the mould and lays it 
down, where it collapses completely in the effort to sustain its own weight. 
 With a series of moistened tissues and a towel, gentle so as not to disturb her, 
Peter then begins to clean and dry her face. When he no longer sees a trace of pink 
sludge, he removes the makeshift newspaper bib he has tucked into her collar, and 
gathers into his arms for the first time the exact weight of his life’s desire, 
resisting the urge to extend the exquisite grief of holding her for any longer than it 
takes to reach the bed and lay her down.          
 When finally he turns his eyes from her sleeping face, he looks for a moment 
upon the sorry evidence of his deception—the pudding bowl of solidifying 
alginate, the pink-spattered business report, the abandoned modelling tools, the 
head-shaped lump of the mould, smelling of strawberry alginate, which seems to 
regard him with wounded and imperious distaste. Having collected everything but 
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the tools in a plastic bag, he hurls it over his shoulder, descends the stairs like a 
burglar and throws it in one of the laneway bins. 
 
* 
 
That night, Peter had forgotten to close the curtains of the double window, and in 
the morning his eyes open to a light so golden it is as if the dawn had distilled 
itself into that single room alone.            
 For a moment he is blinded. He turns his head toward Klara’s bed, and rests 
his eyes on her bright hair, falling from the edge of her pillow on the far side of 
the room. He moves onto his side and watches the top of her sleeping head, bitter 
pieces of the previous day re-joining.           
 It is only when she finally stirs, her arm abandoning the covers and dropping 
to the side of the bed, that he realises he has been holding his breath for a sign that 
he is not a murderer as well as a fool.           
 It is hours before she wakes. He wants to buy some bread for their breakfast, 
but cannot risk leaving her alone in case she decides to leave again. Instead, he 
lies in bed, attempting to amuse himself with the crossword in the previous day’s 
paper, the range of which far outstrips his holiday Italian. It must sustain his 
attention somehow, because he does not notice Klara waking until he sees her 
before him.                  
 He raises his eyes from the paper slowly, knowing but not believing what he 
will see. Because what he sees is Klara, blank-faced but for eyes that seem in that 
moment to have blackened overnight, standing there without clothes. The light 
picks out the down along her arms, which hang limp by her sides, caressing the 
curve and rise of all her angles with shadow in a liquid line. Knowing that she is 
waiting for him to speak and possibly growing cold, Peter forces his eyes to travel 
several times from her head to her toes, in order to preserve that chiaroscuro, and 
having done so, remains without words. She draws a long breath.     
 ‘If this is what you want, okay. But no more drawings.’      
 Her voice is soft and flat. Peter removes his glasses and looks at his hands, 
comprehending her words, feeling hot shame spread like an ink stain though his 
body. She has not taken her eyes off him. Now the words come without thought, 
although he can hardly speak.            
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 ‘I’m so sorry, Klara. No more drawings. Please, put on your clothes.’   
 She stands there, unmoving, for another long moment, during which he 
continues to fiddle with the glasses in his lap, before turning from him and 
walking back to her side of the room. Peter would never before have believed 
what relief seeing her clothed could induce in him. Several minutes later, she is 
sitting at the table in her old yellow jacket and jeans, her bag packed on the floor, 
pouring two cups of tea. Peter understands this for a truce of sorts, and determines 
not to take her grace for granted. When he takes a seat across from her she sets his 
cup down without looking at him. He takes a sip, waiting. What does she 
remember? For a moment she had seen him above her with a brush, like a 
deranged plasterer. He looks at her over his cup, furtive, hardly breathing. When 
she looks back at him, she gives a half-smile, her eyes clear, hiding nothing, it 
seems. Silently, Peter thanks his gods, before asking if she is hungry, and she 
nods. When they finish their tea, he stands, takes up their bags, and with Klara 
behind him, walks out the door, more uncertain than ever of what the coming days 
will bring. 
 
* 
 
They speak little at the station. Perhaps, both feeling the injury of the previous 
hours to the fragile web that binds them, they are unwilling to risk further damage. 
I see them at the grey station that morning, in the smoky bar drinking coffee. The 
heavy presence of the proprietor colours their silence, as he carries out a long 
conversation on soccer with two customers glued to the morning television news. 
When they are seated opposite each other in window seats before a plastic table, 
looking out the window as the train departs, Peter explains that they are headed 
for the coast of Sorrento, and will travel the next day to Pompeii, the buried city, 
the city of statues.                
 The disaster of the mould occupies Peter’s thoughts for the entire journey. 
The fact that the cast was a failure should have been no surprise to him, 
considering the manner in which he approached it, which was one of deranged 
haste, with an amateur’s disregard for materials. It was a bitter irony that his 
desire to avoid administering Klara further sedatives, compelling the slapdash 
haste so against his nature, is also the reason he will be compelled to do it all over 
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again that evening. And so Peter resolves to allow himself one last chance. Failure 
is not an option. This is the night he will create, with a care unequalled in his 
crafting life, a mould so robust and precise that it will sustain multiple castings. 
For this one night, in view of the mould it will manifest, Peter will sedate Klara to 
the degree, and for the length of time, that perfection requires. Bearing immediate, 
uncanny resemblance to the creature it comes from, this second cast will justify 
the end of his hopeless drawings, resolve the inadequacies of photography, and, 
were it ever necessary, aid his unfaithful memory. Peter reasons that Klara herself 
will be better off for the successful fruition of the mould about which she will 
never know. Better off for the peace its presence, wrapped in gauze like a secret 
wound in his briefcase, will induce in him, her greatest and only ally.   
 
* 
 
They arrive at Sorrento at noon, as the clouds begin to block the sun. Over panini 
and chatter at a trattoria by the station, something of the delicate balance is 
restored between them, the camaraderie of fellow travellers. If the feeling between 
them is not in reality as simple, their mutual hope for the day makes it so.    
That night in a bed and breakfast, after a lamplit stroll along the Marina Grande 
and a dinner of spaghetti alle vongole, Peter makes Klara another cup of tea. 
Then, to the halting sounds of a busking violinist somewhere in the street below, 
raincoated and calm of mind, he obtains his final mould. 
 
 
* 
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Note on omissions: 
 
In the intervening text, Klara, who wakes the following day appearing to have no memory 
of the previous night, accompanies Peter to Pompeii. When, in the afternoon, Klara 
recalls moments of the previous night and questions Peter, he confesses and begs 
forgiveness. Horrified, Klara runs away, even as Peter pursues her through the ruins. 
After weeks of searching, Peter finally flies back to Melbourne and, grieving, resumes 
work, while receiving treatment for his heart condition. Four years later, however, when 
Peter wanders into an exhibition of work by a renowned Soviet photographer, he 
encounters an image of Klara in a recent photograph of a group of scientists at the site of 
the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, and sets out to find her. 
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PART THREE: 
The Zone 
 
 
An unspecified period of months later, through a series of leaps and setbacks and 
a variety of sources, Peter arrives in the town of a woman named Vera Yenin, 
whom he once knew as Klara. Her town is in the newly independent Ukraine, near 
Kiev. There she will meet Peter for what will feel like the first time, although it is 
of course the second. It is winter, 1994. 
 
* 
 
Hers is a ground-floor apartment in a block which forms part of a larger complex 
in a nicer area of town, opposite a public park near the central square. All the 
same, there is a desolate anonymity to the place. The buildings are white, heartless 
and severe in the way of all buildings there. It is an ugly town. It is not what he 
would have chosen for Vera.             
 It is a short walk from the only hotel in town to Vera’s building. For three 
days, unable to sleep and gathering courage, he arrives at the park a little after 
sunrise. From a bench with binoculars and a thermos of tea, he watches her 
movements, knowing he is desperate, despicable and absurd. When he first sees 
her, closing her door in a blue coat, her gold hair tied back, Peter experiences a 
relief so vital it feels chemical, a surge of blood; a bright charge. It is almost 
enough to know she is near. But seeing her walking with purpose away from him 
in the direction of the square, he stands. From a distance of many feet, he shadows 
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her, feeling ashamed and yet justified somehow, if only for the fact that he once 
helped her and has things to tell her; if only because she left him once when he 
loved her.  
 
* 
 
Along with other state agency workers, Vera takes the train to the Zone. When she 
reaches the station platform, she waits until the train comes in, raising her coat 
collar against the cold, and exchanging cursory greetings with a rosy-faced 
woman and a man in jeans who looks foreign. From the edge of the platform, 
Peter watches the train arrive, when Vera, amid a file of several others, flashes an 
I.D. card at the official and disappears inside the train, to chug along the shaded 
tracks, through the floodplains, to the fabled place where he cannot follow her.  
 For the next two days he shadows her along the same route, from home to the 
station, growing by increments more brazen, venturing ever closer to her familiar 
back, always returning to town once she has boarded. On the second day, as he 
follows her onto the platform, Vera pauses mid-step, brings a hand to her neck, 
and peers for a moment over her shoulder, as Peter, several paces behind her, 
having also stopped instinctively, turns rapidly around to assimilate with the other 
figures. Burning, he prays for her not to notice his retreat. He realises that finely-
tuned Vera has sensed more than he had given her credit for. For the time Vera is 
at work, Peter walks the town, watching people in the square, eating salted 
cucumber sandwiches in local bistros over the newspaper. The few words he 
exchanges with shopkeepers and people on the street are Russian. It feels strange, 
the pulse of that tongue returning. The second day, he takes the train to Kiev, a 
city he had visited as a child but of which he remembers nothing. He visits St 
Sofia and St Vladimir, the House with Chimeras and Independence Square; he 
wanders the National Art Museum and Kiev Art Gallery, both of which house 
icons of international significance. A manic afternoon.      
 Vera arrives home around a quarter to six, often with a bag of shopping. From 
the park Peter watches her enter her building, and he watches for the lights he 
knows are hers to turn on. On the second night, he walks closer to her building 
and stands under a tree, looking at her window. He wonders how she spends her 
nights. She seems to live alone. Having no-one to share meals with, does she cook 
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only simple things; soups and one-pot stews? Does she watch television or read 
books? What kind of ornaments line her shelves? What thoughts pass her mind?
  
 
* 
 
Having discovered Vera’s building, and, instead of knocking on her door, 
observing her for three days—Peter, on the evening of the third day, in the stale 
air of his pink rented room on the third floor, finally ends the letter which he has 
been writing in his mind and on paper since the day she disappeared. This letter is 
to be his introduction.               
 He is disappointed that it is an apartment he must approach. This is altogether 
more complicated than a freestanding flat or house with a private door or a shaded 
garden in which an observer might hide. There are more ways in which it might 
all go wrong. 
 
* 
 
Before continuing this instalment in their story, I insert here the opening of Peter’s 
letter to Vera: 
 
 You want to know who I am.             
 You may call me Peter.     .         
 I am a specialist in the conservation of precious objects. It is a profession as 
marvellous as it is pernickety, traversing vast gulfs in civilisations and epochs through the 
conduit of a single object. I have always loved a good ruin. It is the art of repair that I 
have had to learn. Like most conservators, I wanted to be a maker. On weekends, I like to 
sculpt.                 
 English is my second tongue, the language of my freedom, the code dividing my 
second life from the first. What more am I? I am this curious riddle: a Siberian in exile, 
and for many years, a naturalised Australian. I am a self-taught expert in Egyptology, and 
a long-time enemy of the former Soviet Union.          
 For all that I profess to be, you might also think me something of a liar. To that 
charge, I can only say this: should these pages contain the merest trace of a thing not 
based in fact, it is the folly of a man who believes it. Lies have no place in this account.
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 My enemy status is my own assumption, and doubtless the case, conferred by 
nothing more exciting than my desertion of a Soviet tourist group in the middle of 
Picadilly Circus in 1958. The secrets I possessed pertained entirely to the sovereign state 
of my own soul, and they were none that Stalin would pine for. Nonetheless, I’d wager it 
was a sentence of death in absentia for Peter Volkov, a sentence in which I perceived an 
appropriate poetry.               
 What of that young, deserting soul? I suspect little of import has changed. Socialism 
suited my temperament as little as Orthodox religion, which is not to say I had no love of 
God or country in my heart. Like many a romantic, I had a weak spot for the Romanovs. 
Those wistful daughters, imploring fate in their white lace. With Alexandra I shared a 
love of that presumptuous, bearded rustic called Rasputin, although likely of a different 
kind. It was with that seer-eyed giant of my own woodland that I aligned my mysticism. 
Find, at war and peace in me, the Old Believer, the gifted dreamer and the charismatic 
fraud. Discern at once the lineaments of a Decembrist in revolt, and a white guard, tsarist 
heart. Perceive in this same man the native shaman of the North, the lost royal child and 
the vital dictator certifiably mad. Read this and tell me I am not a passion-bearer. 
 You see I am prone to a kind of flight. Forgive me this.       
 I defected formally on September 4th, 1958, when a gentleman officer of the British 
Embassy, whose lopsided silver moustache will forever reside in my mind, informed me 
of the decision of that nation to grant me formal political asylum from the motherland. I 
was twenty, having lived all of those years in an apron of land to one side of the river 
Yenisey. So was I exiled from the land of exile.         
 Whether manoeuvred through torturous calculation or the wild seizure of 
opportunity, successful defection has always been something of an art. It was an 
endeavour I prepared for as a gambler, having lost everything, might prepare to chance 
his last dollar. It didn’t really matter, I reasoned, with the fatalism of young men. I never 
truly expected to succeed. It took me a long time to overcome the fact of my luck, which 
felt like an error some god had momentarily overlooked and might at any moment rectify. 
In any case, it was luck come too late. It took me a long time to get close enough to the 
fact to let it drop back, and try to garner something of what life there was on the other 
side. The reasons one has for calling a place home, the gatherings of a life, departed for 
me one day before I left, as simply as bone cleaned of flesh. My lungs still hold the air of 
ice and pine at the moment I knew how truly nothing remained for me, and decided that, 
if I could not be happy, I could at least be free.         
 But who am I to you? What right have I to demand you read this? Dear Vera, I have 
no right at all. I must hope that something else, curiosity if I flatter myself, or, rather 
more likely, alarm that I know your name, keeps you with me a little longer. I ask most 
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fervently that you do read on, whatever the reason. I have a story to tell, and it concerns 
you. Do not believe your memory when it marks me for a stranger. Mine is a name you 
once knew, and I aim to prove it.             
 The ancient Egyptian race understood the power of objects and the power of 
concentrated intent. They understood the intricate significance of the name. But more 
than anything, they knew the vital weight of the body in life, at the moment of death, and 
beyond, as the bearer and conduit of all those elusive components that manifest an 
animate presence. To understand this is to understand not only the Egyptians, but also 
myself.                                         
 For the time of which I will now write your name was Klara, the name I gave you, 
that day when, after Chance had you stop by a certain statue in Rhodes and cross my 
path, I returned to find you there once more. My intentions in these pages are many―to 
fashion a bridge to cross these vast hours, to see whether exorcising your ghost is 
possible, to test my mind―but most of all, to offer you my memory of those days in 
place of your own. Understand: I ask for nothing in return.      
 Today, your presence seemed pervaded by that weary radiance I always remembered 
you for, back when you were lost to yourself and without a real name. Yes, radiance: a 
kind of light the origin and mechanism of which, for all the time I have to watch you, I 
still fail to locate. Then, you knew not who you were, or what you had lived, and that was 
the native quality of your presence: radiance, your bare flame, such as saints in those 
Byzantine icons have, and yet earthy, changeful; human yet yours alone. Now, your 
identity for so long restored, my eyes perceive both the friend and the stranger, although 
to you I am surely only strange. Where before, your limbs were heavy with hesitation, 
you move with purpose now, within the known country of your existence, in the world, in 
your body and your mind. There is ever a bearing of gravity to your head. I see it is filled 
with things I do not know. You are a mystery anew, Vera, and I never tire of watching 
you.                 
 Knowing where you live, being near your home, fills me with the kind of peace 
which is close to death. I am the philosopher who, finding the solution, can rest knowing 
he will never lose the way to the stone. Perhaps that is why this letter is so long. I wish to 
delay the disturbance I know I am to cause you. I feel my presence as an impending 
anachronism upon the most wonderful tableaux vivant, the scene of which changes as I 
follow its one constant. Often now I feel an ache, as bright and violent as the new blooms 
will be, here, when the snow melts. It is an ache which implores the gods of the coming 
spring for what feels to be a natural right: this old sceptre becoming what it was once in 
youth, this brittle stalk cleaving back to green, the bold young blade of a young man you 
might love. And then as you enter my line of vision again, the ache forgets its edge and 
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extends from me on this park bench, becoming another part of the luxuriant green dark. 
 Today is Saturday, and, after a week consumed in the intricate rituals that comprise a 
line of work you seem born to, and which remains ineffably strange to me, you moved 
through it slowly. You should live in a beautiful place. A wooden house with a broken 
white gate I would like to fix, shaded by willows and the assorted trees of an overgrown 
orchard. You should dry your clothes on a line strung between the willows, heavy with 
your colours, yellow and blue. There, you might wake late and bring breakfast outside to 
eat in an old cane chair, where I can see you, staring out through the apple trees. But 
instead you live here, in a hard new utilitarian town which does not honour you.   
 This afternoon, I saw you in the park. My heart stopped for a moment, believing you 
saw me watching you. But I realised eventually that you were not really looking 
anywhere, that your eyes had only been guided out by a tide of thought at which I could 
not guess. For a while you read a thin book with a green cover, sipping from your 
thermos, before resting the book in your lap and leaning back with closed eyes, your 
hands in your coat pockets. I sensed you never went entirely to sleep (how could you, in 
this cold!) but rather departed on a long daydream. After a while, you returned to your 
building, and I imagined what you did then. Perhaps you began something in the kitchen 
that smelled spicy and wonderful. Perhaps you were having your friend over, the short 
plump woman with the lusty laugh who must be your colleague. Would she make you 
laugh too? I can only imagine your solitude as a condition of your own choosing, and I 
wonder often about the reason. That you are devoted to your work is clear. I think you 
have come to cherish being alone, perhaps too much. Listen to me! This letter is filled 
with liberties.                
 For someone who believes herself alone, I have been struck by the composure with 
which you perform the smallest task. I include myself when I venture that the vast 
majority of humans become different creatures indeed in their private habitats, when they 
believe no one is watching. Our roles reversed, for instance, I can, most regretfully, 
perceive myself not hesitating to lope around, unshaven and half-clothed, performing 
base bodily functions such as belching and eating fried potato in a most ungentlemanly 
manner, leaving a city of detritus behind me, and generally projecting a deranged and 
half-wild air, most repellent and foreboding to a witness such as yourself, and a galaxy 
away from the less-instinctive impression you would find me straining for, should I have 
felt myself in your sight. From this angle, the fact that I am the spy and not the spied-
upon becomes a mercy for us both.             
 I have been candid for a man too cowardly to yet approach you. Perhaps you wonder 
how a man as apparently sensitive and philosophical as I, has as yet ignored a central 
condition of the situation by which this account has found you; that of my watching you 
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unaware, at work and leisure, by day and night, for some time, a spy. It occurs to me that 
only insane optimism could entertain your ever reading this far. And yet what choice do I 
have but to hope you will hear me despite what I profess to have done, and if not forgive, 
then to in some part understand a man who, even before meeting you, had dreamt of your 
face. My choice to spy on you as I have this week is only the most recent instance of 
other choices made concerning you unawares, and which were, I must try to convince 
you, never true choices at all…  
 
* 
 
 Let us now consider the aftermath of this letter.         
 In the morning of the fourth day, after Vera has left, at an hour which is 
uncertain—his courage having finally risen in the blue light of dawn, or, perhaps 
in the gathering chill of dusk—Peter waits, leaning against a wall near the door 
which had been so hard to find, holding the letter which had been so long in the 
writing. He laces and unlaces his shoes; rummages in his bag; eats an apple. He 
tries to be unassuming. When a man and a little girl come along the path, 
shopping in hand, and the man, fumbling with his keys, begins to open the 
building door, Peter is there behind them to slip inside, nodding politely at the 
man as he passes through.            
 Standing before the wall of numbered mail slots in the foyer which for an 
instant reminds him of funereal niches, Peter forces the letter—fat and buckled in 
an envelope which, though expensive, is too small—into number two. For a 
moment before leaving, he regards Vera’s mail slot, which looks like all the 
others, prim and unassuming, and which appears to be empty but for his letter. He 
wonders when she will find it, and how, if ever, she will let him know it has been 
found. 
 
* 
 
Has Vera noticed the tall shadow that crosses her window? Does Peter wait 
beyond her gate to see his letter in her hands? Peter’s diaries offer little about 
these early days. Shall we venture a supposition or two? When a supposition is 
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formed with patience by a sensitive imagination and an experience of its objects 
first-hand, it can hit the mark as surely as any other arrow. And so we proceed.  
 
* 
 
Peter does not see Vera receive the letter, but notices, the next morning, an 
alertness about her much sharper than before. That day he does not follow her. 
The next day is Saturday. Vera does not venture out. It is impossible from any of 
his vantage points to get a good view of her windows, but he imagines her, 
peering through the gauze to the trees beyond, as if to locate the man she knows is 
there. She has read my letter, he thinks. She knows my name. 
 
 
Peter waits. 
 
 
* 
 
On the afternoon of the third day of waiting, a slip of paper appears, a small white 
flag improperly hidden beneath the leftmost ceramic pot by the entrance to her 
building, which he can see from the fence.  He has been watching over this pot. It 
is the hiding place he suggested in the letter.    
 
* 
 
Peter, feeling hot and cold at once, wonders whether to wait until nightfall to 
retrieve what is his. Watching the white flag stir in the breeze, signalling for him 
to claim it, he surrenders to a rush of blood, and, brazen as a leopard, traverses her 
yard. 
 
* 
 
Beyond her gate once more, in safe possession of the note, he observes it to be so 
light that he might be holding nothing at all. It imparts no heat, triggers no 
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vibrational response in his nerve endings. He feels the need to hide. The leopard, 
sensing death, seeks the dark. 
 
* 
 
Further from her gate, having found the dark, he confronts the handwritten words 
she has given him: 
 
If faith in sense is not first firmly set,   
if it does not prevail, there is nothing 
to which we can appeal in what we claim, 
by any form of mental reasoning, 
about the truth of things we cannot see. 
 
* 
 
He knows this is not her voice. It is some verse of the canon, by another mind. He 
has failed. 
 
* 
 
Empty of hope, forsaken by the code of words and having nothing more to lose, 
he chances his last card. He leaves a box at her door. Inside the box is a cast of her 
face. All that is left to do now is wait. 
 
* 
 
That evening, a scream. The next morning, another note: 
 
Leave or I will call the police. 
 
* 
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Beyond grief, he ponders this. He ponders the fact that the cast of Klara has failed 
him. He confronts the fact, a solid horizon impossible to shift, that he cannot 
leave. 
 
* 
 
He returns to words. He leaves a note and a small package beneath the pot at 
night. For a moment, near her window, he sees a shadow. He hears voices from 
inside. The shadow is not hers. 
 
* 
 
Vera reads this latest note in the morning after wresting it, along with the package, 
from her plump friend, an unsubtle woman who feels it infinitely better to dispose 
of such things unread. 
 
I am sorry, Vera, for my macabre delivery. Frightening you was not my intention. I forget 
myself in these foolish ways at times. To me the mask is a thing of beauty, a treasure—it 
is also proof. Of course it is understandable that you might not view it this way.   
 Please accept, as a gesture toward my atonement, this pristine 19th Dynasty obsidian 
scarab of my favourite ancient race. Such were its properties that larger examples like this 
were frequently placed on guard over the hearts of the noble dead.  In a museum once, 
you professed to me your fondness for these. Might I thus suggest that, should you feel in 
danger, you wear it as a protective amulet against me? Naturally, if there were any 
superstitious symbol my vigilant passion might respect, it would be Egyptian. And so you 
see, I hand you a tool to use in my sabotage. If this fails, you will appreciate its function 
as a suggestive paperweight.              
 Do you smile at these frail little jokes? I am not a man you need be afraid of. 
 It is my task now to tell you I cannot leave without the answers, which I ask for in 
your own words, to these questions:  
Have you or have you not forgotten me? 
If you have not, why did you vanish in Pompeii? Because of the mask or because of 
something else? If you have forgotten, do you believe what I tell you is true?  
What has happened to you between that time and now? 
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& 
For all I have done, can you forgive me?  
If there is any condition for my leaving, it is your forgiveness. 
 
* 
 
Finally, a reply: 
 
I am fascinated despite myself, to consider “an otherwise sensitive man”, who deposits a 
horror mask at the door of a victim whom he wishes not to frighten. Your actions betray 
your words of love. Your questions are beyond presumptuous. This whole business grows 
more absurd each day, the one virtue of this being that as the absurdity grows, my fear 
fades into something like amusement. Your last letter ended on a sweet note, entreating 
me to forgive you god knows what with the intimation of future deceits into the bargain, 
the alternative to which I am left to infer being a lurking shadow beyond my gate for all 
eternity. There is elegance to your assuming the innocence of a child while coldly 
intending the full force of each word you write. I am not a fool. How can blackmail be a 
route to forgiveness? My forgiveness must mean less than you claim. When, at the 
beginning of your first letter, you told me you wanted nothing in return for my reading it, 
did you know it was a lie?              
 There. Much more than I meant to write, and a few questions of my own, to which I 
expect no satisfactory answers. In any case, Mr. Volkov:       
 I do not remember you.            
 Against my wishes, and with many reservations, I believe you.     
 I have lived a calm life of reasonable contentment, all things considered, working as 
a radiobiologist in various parts of the former Union, and that is all you need to know. 
You have my full forgiveness and I wish you peace, but (here is my own clause) only 
if you stop your spying. I love my solitude as much as I hate it. Whether or not you are as 
vigilant as you claim, you have ransomed this solitude and left me with a pressing feeling 
I can’t escape, a feeling far from solitude or company. I see myself constantly through the 
nocturnal eyes of a nearby creature who will neither leave nor come inside. Something 
tells me that if our roles were reversed, you would find this solitude even harder to lose 
than I. 
 
* 
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Sweet Vera, I thank you for your letter.            
 My blood is still charged from the knowledge that, despite remembering nothing, 
you believe me, even if you would rather not. You have the virtue of logic on your side, 
and, with the weight of all likelihood before you in my testimony and in your knowledge 
of your own history, no simple desire could facilitate your self-delusion.  You do not 
know from what constriction my heart was freed in reading your words of forgiveness. 
Nor do you know what horror it causes me to be the source of your discomfort. You seem 
to know that solitude is, for me too, a scarab at the breast, a burden and a treasure. 
Perhaps it is a sign that we are more alike than you think.       
 If I say that I never intended to blackmail you, you will not believe me. In any case, 
without intending to, blackmail you I did. My actions betray my words only by force of 
desperation, which has lessened with your attention to my letters and with your 
forgiveness. Without wishing to free myself from fair judgement, might I suggest that I 
may be more innocent than you think? You must see that even if you allowed me this, it 
would cost me a measure of self-awareness in your estimation. Please rest assured that, 
even though it will require the most superhuman effort of will on my part, I will not 
remain much longer, and by my leaving your solitude will be restored.     
 Is it possible that when I wrote I expected nothing of you in return, I lied and told the 
truth at the same time?              
 Finally, I must venture this—I perceived in your letter the grounds for inferring that I 
might have reason to ask the question with which I will now end this letter. If, swayed by 
the hope that, regarding you, knows no exhaustion, I am mistaken, forgive me, but:
 Dear Vera, is coming inside an option? 
  
 
 
 
Nothing for a day. 
 
* 
 
Oh Vera, where is your tongue? Because it is my nature and because we have no time, I 
speak without artifice or design. This is a rare occurrence among strangers these days, 
which startles, if not repels one accustomed to greater opacity in discourse of a deep 
nature. But you are no stranger to me. And it is because my words are so bare that you 
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must trust me. Please continue to respond, in your voice or in the voice of any other. 
While you hear me, I have hope.            
 I dreamed last night an old dream of Egypt. I was again sheathed in cotton, my own 
sail in the wind, the water beneath me a liquid mirror of a million reflections, including 
the nearing horizon I could not tear my eyes from. It was a horizon of ink, from which the 
source of all creation shone, burnishing the world. But the shadows were growing longer, 
Vera. The orange god was going down for night. I feel the truth of it in my heart.  
                 
* 
 
That evening, a reply: 
 
Where is it you sleep, being such a tireless spy? I realise I have been imagining a nearby 
earthen pit you have dug, from which you arise in the morning like a hare, nervous, 
round-eyed and quick. Then I realised it was far more likely you were at the Parkview.
 I have decided, for better or worse, and probably for worse, that tomorrow at two you 
may knock on my door. At your knock I will open it, and you may hold out your hand for 
mine to shake, and come inside, and we will settle things that way. 
 
* 
 
The next day, at two o’clock precisely, Peter arrives at the door of her building. 
For a moment he stands there, straight and tall, regarding the paintwork without 
really seeing it. He is thinking of reality and dreams, of the face he has not seen at 
close range for such a time, and the question of what light the eyes inside will 
reflect him in. He raises his hand to press the buzzer, and lowers it again. He asks 
himself if he is ready, counts off the list of ways it might all go wrong, and draws 
energy from the heat beneath his solar plexus.        
 When finally he buzzes and she appears, opening the door, they face each 
other for a moment in motionless silence, she in the doorway, he on the step. With 
both hands, he holds out the thirsty lilies he has brought her, which she takes, 
without expression or thanks, standing aside for him to enter, like a figure of 
wood. Neither has yet said a word. Their hands do not shake. She leads him to her 
apartment a few paces left of the main entrance and pauses at the threshold. 
Standing there to the side is a tall middle-aged man, who looks at Peter 
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inscrutably from behind his glasses. Vera looks at the man for a moment, and 
nods, as if to dismiss him, and says, ‘Thanks, Yuri’. With a polite smile, the man 
disappears into the adjacent apartment. Why should I be surprised if she is on 
guard, thinks Peter. Letting him in is a leap of faith. Finally, looking at him for the 
first time with a wary half-smile, she gestures him through her open door.  
  
 
* 
  
Her apartment, which opens onto a lounge, has the same shade of apricot carpet as 
his hotel room, and is similarly sparse. Vera’s rooms betray little. Following her 
down a hall to the right of the entrance, he hears his feet scuffing softly, thinking 
of how they are scuffing on her floor, of all floors. Because the moment is at once 
real and unreal, and passing too fast, he fights the instinct to pause right there in 
the hall, and instead rests his gaze on her back. He recalls the hesitant grace of her 
gait, the weary way her hips sway in walking, and confirms how this hasn’t 
changed.                  
 The apartment is larger than he expected. It glows in the dim afternoon, with a 
soft light made rosy by the pinkish tones of its furnishings, and by the many 
lamps. Books are the only other element of her apartment to diverge from tight-
lipped anonymity. In odd corners of the lounge and laundry, they form forgotten 
pedestals. Klara favours non-fiction—books on plants, chemistry, Platonic and 
Epicurean philosophy.              
 He follows her to a small white kitchen that smells of lemons and looks out 
through a window onto the back of the block, where the road is partially obscured 
by a few young elms. The table, spread with a white lace cloth, bears a vase of 
snowdrops and a teapot. Glancing at him briefly, she draws back a chair and lifts 
her palm, inviting him to sit, before turning to the cupboards above the sink. 
Carefully, her back to him, she arranges the lilies in a jug, and leaves it by the 
sink. He hears her breathing deeply. Then, with slow deliberation, she sets a china 
cup and saucer before each chair, seats herself opposite Peter, and looks at him 
directly. It is a look of limpid yet inscrutable appraisal. She seems relieved. 
Evidently, she is not about to be pinned to the floor or clubbed over the head. A 
moment later, as she pours the tea, he wonders what challenge is to be read in the 
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gaze he is still seared by. He feels like a child as she fills his cup, wordless with 
wonder, telling his fingers not to fidget in his lap, thinking of her nearly humorous 
calm before his barely held-in heart. In all the time he has waited for this moment, 
he entertained the possibility of many things, but never, truly, her taking it all for 
a joke. Her intake of breath cuts his thoughts. She is leaning back in her chair. He 
is unprepared for the verbal rush, the dissonant convergence of icon and 
embodiment.        
 
* 
 
‘So you are my spy.’              
 In a rush, he remembers her voice, the charm of the husk hiding the high, 
clear tone. She speaks in Russian, and so he follows. After a momentary struggle 
with some weaker instinct, the corners of her mouth turn him a smile. He only 
sits, expressionless and intent, knowing it is not his turn. In the white room that 
smells of lemons and bread, there is an electricity which seems to administer to 
his cells a change. He is recalling the feeling of being twenty. As if hearing his 
thoughts, she speaks again.            
 ‘My spy is younger than he gives himself credit for. Have I changed much?’
 Slowly, he inhales. He has realised she is enjoying this, and wonders then if 
she has done all along, and if not, just what has changed. His voice, when it 
comes, is distant and strange.           
 ‘Your hair is shorter. Your speech is surer.’      
 Nodding as if pleased, she holds out her pack of cigarettes, and, when he 
shakes his head, lights with a match the one she puts between her teeth. He has 
not, even having watched her as Vera, accounted for this self-possession, so 
different from his Klara.             
 ‘This really is, you must admit, an interesting situation. You’re lucky I have a 
curious nature.’                
 She lowers her gaze to the table, perhaps waiting for him to speak, as her 
fingers flick ash onto her saucer. He can think of nothing to say. She settles for a 
question, and asks him how he found her. He tells her how he recognised her in 
the background of an Andrei Maschev photograph.        
 ‘You were one of the scientists collecting muskrats in the Zone. This is the 
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town of the Chernobyl workers. When I got here I checked the local directory.’
 She says nothing, glancing at the table and, for a moment, pinching her lip. 
After a few seconds in which they each drink their tea, Vera again leans back in 
her chair and sets upon him the most earnest gaze he has yet seen. He senses how 
clearly she sees him, and how utterly pointless would be an attempt to hide.
 When she takes in a sharp breath and speaks again, he experiences it as a kind 
of launch, an almost nautical pledge of faith when the ship, deciding it is time, 
departs from the harbour, pointed at an as-yet invisible horizon.   
 ‘Your letter, Peter, your letter. How does one answer such a letter?’  
 Her voice is at once playful and stern. For a moment her head turns to the 
side, and then toward the window behind. Peter thinks of a bird.    
 ‘I considered the question. I decided that an answer from me was not what 
you waited for. You call that pile of paper a letter only for lack of a better word. 
How could it need a footnote from me?’          
 She looks at him for a moment with narrow eyes, letting out a sigh and 
tapping ash onto her saucer. Peter, who has been alternating between glancing at 
her and a particular painted flower on his teacup, shifts in his chair, taking it for 
granted that this question requires no answer. Vera, having twice turned her 
saucer around in thought with the same hand that holds her cigarette, the other 
pressed to her mouth, leans forward suddenly, one elbow on the table and her chin 
in hand. She speaks with slow precision, looking at the table, looking at him, each 
quiet sentence pulled forth as if from a deep pool of difficult truth.   
 ‘When you track animals and spend much of your time alone, in a recently 
Communist country, you know when someone’s following you before you see 
them. That was a despicable thing to do.           
 When I found your letter I was relieved to at least have a name for that 
faceless figure at the station. And I saw you also had a name for me—two, in fact. 
Reading your letter, I suspected the only answer your ears could hear was the one 
you might discern in the echo of your own voice. Time will tell if I am wrong. 
Your words inspired my fear and fascination in equal measure. You called me by 
name, you said we had met in Greece beneath a statue’s gaze!’    
 For an instant, incredulous and on the verge of laughter, she hid her face in 
one hand, before shaking her head and resuming with a half-smile.    
 ‘Shortly after which you drugged me in order to make a cast of my face, that 
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lovely cast I had the pleasure to receive the other day, which apart from scaring 
me half to death, accomplished your aim of convincing me at least something of 
what you said was true.’              
 For a moment she was silent, concentrating intently on the table, before 
looking up at him again.             
 ‘Your letter. It sings of a fiction, but it fetishises details of my body, and my 
life. These are difficult things to reconcile. I know that in place of memory, there 
is a scar on my mind for several months of 1988. In one sense, anything I learn of 
it since is a revelation I’m inclined to believe. I wondered about that lost time. I 
believed I must have many kind strangers to thank for keeping alive throughout it.
 ‘Ah, Devil. Don’t you know I’ve worked hard for this quiet life?’   
 She nods, then, as if to herself, in a way he remembers, her eyes glancing up 
past him toward the ceiling. Shrugging, she taps her cigarette against her saucer 
and looks back at him.             
 ‘You are right to assume you are strange to me. Remembering who I am cost 
me the memory of the months I was lost. I’m sure you’ve done your reading. My 
condition is more common in film, and instances of medical fraud, than in reality. 
Fugues are a kind of flight. It is commonly speculated that, in the face of 
unbearable pressure, the mind of a fuguer opens itself to a void. Cases of the 
condition increase during times of war and other forms of mass unrest. A fugue 
state permits a kind of internal emigration, a self-imposed exile from the home of 
the self. Why did I wish to flee? Even your imagination cannot presume to know. 
I myself can’t be sure. But perhaps you would like to hear my speculations.’ 
 Slowly, she draws herself upright in her chair, and stubs out the cigarette.  
 ‘You have told me of Peter and Klara. I will tell you of Vera. When you have 
heard her story, perhaps we can have an equal conversation.’ Resting her cheek 
on her hand again, her eyes fixed at a vague point between Peter and the hall, 
Vera begins to speak in a low voice, as the late light outside, arcing across the 
room from the window behind her, lights one side of her yellow hair and leaves 
the rest in shadow.               
 ‘It happened not far from here. It was spring. I was thirty-four, and home for 
Easter…’ 
 
* 
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The sky was blue, the day I came home. My mother’s roses had opened. The little chicks 
were hatching. The air was alive, everything was crying ‘life’—the wild geese, the blue 
jays, the piglets and lambs. It was harvest time. Apples and cherries were on the trees, the 
new potatoes were in the ground. Everyone was ready with their buckets and trowels. 
Sergei next door had been busy with his queen bee. His famous honey was nearly ready. I 
always took the train home that time of year. My lungs were impatient for the clear air.
 I can see my mother in her good shoes, waiting for me at the station. I can see the 
wide green boulevards, filled with the sounds of a hundred afternoon homecomings. I can 
see our white house with the blue shutters. In the kitchen, my mother’s Easter bread is 
rising on the sill, the daffodils I brought are on the table. My father and brother are 
waiting at the fence. There are many hugs. There is much to speak of.  That night my 
brother Ivan and I sat up late painting eggs, and after going to bed I couldn’t sleep. 
Winter had felt like forever; spring had given me a fast heart. The window above my bed 
was open to the night, and everything smelled new and familiar at once. It was like 
sediment set adrift by the spring—memories of childhood kept arriving. Hide-and-seek 
with Ivan in the pine forests, picnics by the Dnieper river, dances at the music hall, my 
father’s voice telling the dark fairy tales of his German childhood. Sixteen years before 
that Easter, I’d left home for university in Kiev. To get by, I had worked in a flower shop, 
and later, as a research assistant in the department where I was finishing my PhD. I didn’t 
want to meet the fate of so many of my friends, who were housewives. But I didn’t want 
to work for the State, either. I was in evolutionary biology, then.    
 Ivan’s twenty-first birthday coincided with the May Day parade the following week, 
and everyone was already busy with preparations. Coloured balloons had been bought. 
An amusement park was opening in nearby Pripyat. The district band was going to play. 
After the parade we were to have a party, with fire displays. Everyone was coming. But 
the next day was Saturday, and I was glad: a day of quiet and chatter in the kitchen with 
my mother. We were going to bake a cherry cake.        
 Saturday morning was bright, but the birds were silent. I pulled out an old sleeveless 
dress; it was an unusually warm day for spring. After breakfast I wandered around the 
garden, milked our cow Laika, greeted the chickens and the new chicks. The light was 
brilliant. It seemed to impart a charge to everything—the leaves, the roses, my body. I 
said hello to Sergei over the fence—he was raking a potato patch to Verdi on the radio. I 
passed him a painted egg. I grinned at him and said, ‘When do we get some honey?’ and 
he paused to lean on the rake, looking toward the hive. ‘Soon, young Vera,’ he said. ‘But 
I must say the bees are quiet today.’ Everything was quiet. Those bees, along with the 
worms and the wasps, were about to disappear.          
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 After lunch, when my mother and I were pipping cherries for the cake, Ivan burst in. 
He had gone out to a party late the previous night, and stayed with his friend Mikhail in 
town. My mother was annoyed with him. He was meant to have been back for lunch. But 
before she could say anything, he began to gush.          
 ‘There’s a fire at the plant! We saw it from Mikhail’s window on the fifth floor and 
went there on our bikes. Everyone was out in their dressing gowns! There was blue 
smoke! All the firemen came!’ He had the eyes of an evangelist. They had watched the 
scene from Mikhail’s balcony until the sun was up. The air was hot and smelled strange. 
Their throats tickled. The entire sky was shining, and apparently it looked magical. My 
mother sighed and wiped her hands on a teacloth. When Ivan stopped talking, she sat him 
down in front of a bowl of borscht.             
 ‘You sound mad. Eat this and then get some sleep.’       
 At dusk, when Ivan was up, we sat under the cherry tree, and I pressed him for 
gossip about a rumoured girlfriend. He went pink, and said her name was Natalya. They 
met at the birthday party of a mutual friend. I remember noticing the lines of his face, 
then. In them I could trace my own, and a little of my mother, and something of my 
father. I thought, how arbitrary and yet miraculous is the game of genetics, the game of 
life. I was the unlikely end of so many strange crossings—born finally to this body, this 
time and place—and unable to imagine any other. We talked there for a while. Except for 
the sound of the wind through the leaves, there was an unearthly quiet to the air.   
 It was such a beautiful day, Peter. It is hard to describe the quality of the light, the 
way the leaves shone. I had the feeling of being blessed, and a little outside of time. 
 At some point my father came home from his usual Saturday fishing trip with 
friends, and I suppose Ivan told him about the fire. In the evening I think my mother 
turned the radio on to see if there was any news, but there wasn’t, and we went on eating 
dinner. Recently I heard that sixteen weddings took place that day, while at the same time 
children played outside, men fished in the river and people sunbathed near the cooling 
vents of the power plant.              
 On Sunday, I woke early, because when I was home, my mother liked me to 
accompany her to church in the next town. I remember the walk. The air was filled with 
that same unreal light. We passed the houses and farms of friends and neighbours, people 
we had known forever. Children were playing ball on the road. Mothers were pushing 
prams, balancing shopping bags and toddlers. We waved at our hairdresser Nadya, who 
had been out to buy bread. In church, the priest spoke of the Resurrection, and we sang an 
Easter hymn which stayed in my head.            
 On the way home, we saw government officials heading towards Pripyat in armoured 
military vehicles. We saw an all-terrain tank in a quiet street. Uniformed men were 
 53 
hosing down the straw roof of a hut, as the babushka who lived in it stood before them, 
expressing her confusion with her hands. The shadow had already fallen over us. Like 
many terrible things, we felt it before we knew what it was. In the space of seconds on 
Saturday, while the world was sleeping, all that was to happen was set in fatal motion. 
For us, for all but a few, it was still a known world, still an ordinary Sunday.   
 In increments over the following hours and days, we began to sense what was 
already fact. Black government cars and trucks with trailers rolled down the road to 
Pripyat. Columns of military personnel began to patrol the streets of our own village, 
washing a strange white powder off the roads. Planes and helicopters flew low. 
Apparently the trains and trolleys stopped running. The old people began to speak of an 
American attack, of war, of 1937. Suddenly there were patches of white in our garden, as 
if the snow had returned. Little black spots appeared on the leaves. The cockscombs of 
our chickens turned black. Sergei reported finding strange blue minerals by his fence. Our 
neighbour one street over said her kids found strangled moles in the garden. Laika’s milk 
wasn’t right. There wasn’t a bird in the sky. I lost my sense of smell. Still, they had told 
us nothing.                  
 My father was a regional correspondent for a Kiev newspaper called The Red Star. 
He mostly covered local community matters—festivals, feuds, town development, local 
soccer. He withstood the boredom of it for my mother, as it meant he left for the city less 
often. On Monday, when a warm dark-coloured rain was falling, he said he was going to 
investigate. People needed to know what was happening. The same morning, Ivan got 
ready for the bread factory a few towns over, where he was working to save money in 
order to move to Moscow. My mother had words with them both at the door. She wanted 
everyone to stay home until there was an official announcement. Ivan said he didn’t want 
to lose his job. My father said he didn’t want to wait forever. Secretly, I wanted to go 
with him, but I stayed inside with my mother instead, and embroidered tea cloths with the 
radio on. Finally, there was an announcement. It mentioned an accident at the power 
station, and that there was to be an evacuation that night for the residents of the main 
town, who needed to pack enough for three days. My mother put a hand to her chest, and 
said thank God it’s not us.               
 We knew so little about the atom. We were like children. The puddles that day were 
green and yellow.                
 The next evening, Ivan said he and several friends had been called for service in the 
clean-up. Two men had come to the factory in a black car for him and several of his 
friends. He tried to calm my mother.            
 ‘It’s just to clean-up’, he said. ‘They’re paying us. I might get a certificate.’   
 ‘But you’ll miss your birthday, and the parade!’ said my mother. Ivan said we could 
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celebrate when he returned. Another car came for him the next morning, and so we said 
goodbye for the month he had been told he’d be in service for. I think part of him was 
actually happy to be called, as if for an adventure.        
 Ivan had been gone a week before the soldiers came for our town. By then my father 
had begun to stay out, driving around and interviewing local people and taking 
photographs until the early hours of the morning, growing blue shadows beneath his eyes. 
Photography was his hobby, and I sometimes peeked into his shed to see what new 
apparitions were pegged above the chemicals. I think it was the first time in many years 
that he had felt a purpose in his work, although I don’t know how much he’d told his 
editor about his new project. One night I snuck out and walked as far as I could toward 
evacuated Pripyat. It was like a war-zone. Soldiers and police patrolled the perimeter of 
the town. I noticed signs in fields and outside houses listing numbers of curie—units of 
radioactivity. The road smelled of dust. Military vehicles were still leaving and arriving, 
with trailers full of wheat or equipment or bare earth. All along the road were open graves 
waiting to swallow trees, dead sheep, military equipment, whole houses. I wondered 
where Ivan was, and what they had him doing. We all attended the parade in Red Square 
on May Day. It was tradition. People waved roses, balloons and red flags, soldiers 
marched, young people danced and sang in nationalistic dress, children sat on the 
shoulders of their fathers. It was hot. I remember praying for the politicians to finish their 
speeches so we could go home. Several of the high-profile party men and a few of their 
children wore raincoats in the sun. We all felt a burning unusual for spring. At home that 
evening, we ate cake in Ivan’s honour and toasted his twenty-first year.    
 I began to spend most of my time in my father’s study at the front of the house, in 
front of the window looking out to the street, which I kept open in order to hear things. I 
sat in his armchair with my embroidery and watched the changing light, the faces of our 
neighbours, the procession of cars and soldiers. Sometimes I’d go outside and lean on the 
fence, or out into the street. When the soldiers began to knock on doors, I heard all kinds 
of things. ‘Don’t dig up your potatoes,’ they’d say to people in their gardens. ‘Don’t eat 
your apples, don’t drink that milk’, ‘wear gloves’, ‘don’t go outside’. Half-measures. It 
all seemed absurd. People laughed, and then they cried. ‘Pack a change of clothes, you 
have to leave. We need to bury this house.’ Some of the soldiers were just boys like Ivan, 
their faces poised in child-like surprise at what they had to say. They buried houses and 
churches, schools and town halls. The old people were so stoic. They fought with the 
soldiers. ‘I lived through 1937, boys. They took everything. This is my home. Leave me 
be or shoot me here’; ‘What’s this nonsense? During the war, my own family almost ate 
me. Where’s the enemy now?’ Those are the things I heard. One old lady told them that 
they needn’t bother with her. She would take herself to the cemetery before she’d leave 
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her home. I was glad my grandparents were dead. Most people packed their bags, 
frightened for their children. Women would plead with the soldiers to let them take their 
cats, or their cow, in exchange for gold or vodka. You’d see them crying at the fence. 
Sergei went into hiding in the forest but they dragged him out. There was no dignity for 
anyone.                  
 I waited for the knock on our door. When it came one morning, I was there to open 
it. There was only one soldier, middle-aged. He breathed heavily. He looked bored. He 
said, ‘You’ve heard of the accident at Chernobyl. We’re now evacuating the wider area 
for a period to allow for the implementation of safety measures. Pack enough for a few 
days. The buses leave tonight.’ I must have looked very blank, as he raised his eyebrows 
at me then. I asked him to tell me how long we would really be away for. If we would 
ever come back. I knew that the residents of Pripyat had not. I saw his face soften for a 
moment, before becoming official again. ‘A few days is the current estimate,’ he said. 
But I had my answer.                
 I had tried to prepare my mother for this news, but she refused to hear it. My own 
grief was suspended in fear of hers. She was at the table reading the paper when I entered 
the kitchen, sitting very stiffly. She took a moment before looking up at me. Her eyes 
were full of terror, and before I could say anything, we both began to cry.   
 A little later, we walked to the cemetery. All along the way, in the stillness of the air, 
in the supernatural golden light—the steady sound of every person’s faith collapsing. But 
my mother and I kept walking, calm, our eyes on the horizon. We collected earth from 
my grandparents’ grave in a pickle jar, left eggs and bread on the stone. There were wild 
roses in the cemetery, so red. And mulberries. Below the mulberry bush was a dead 
sparrow. When we got home, my mother told me to pick the best of my childhood 
treasures. I stood, paralysed in the doorway at the sight of our garden in the sun. My 
mother did not speak. She sat on the steps and weaved a wreath out of ivy for the door. I 
moved through the rooms of our house, stopping to stare at objects and corners I had not 
noticed before, unable to think, my body slow as a cow.        
 My father’s face registered nothing when he came home and heard the news. He 
walked with purpose to the kitchen and poured us all a vodka. We drank it as the sun 
went down. Then we began to tread the floors. Back and forth, like insomniacs. Every 
object I touched recalled a universe to me. We were tracing the geography of our lives. 
Our arms grew full of things we piled at the door. We hardly spoke. We were apart, as if 
in water, in a terrible calm. Each choice, each object we took added weight to an 
extraordinary new reality. What would we take, what would we leave behind, and what 
difference would it make? We piled clothes, toiletries, and the most necessary of 
treasures—Starka in her cage, the leather-bound Tolstoy, the photo albums, my 
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grandmother’s icon of the Virgin, birth records. After a while, I noticed my father 
standing motionless in the dark outside, smoking cigarette after cigarette. I sat on the 
steps behind him and wondered what to do with Starka, Laika and the chickens. We 
wouldn’t be allowed to take even Starka. What if we didn’t return in a few days? I 
imagined them all starving to death or being eaten by abandoned dogs. I saw Laika, who 
I’d named after the moon dog, unfed and unmilked, growing thin as her udders grew 
painful with sour milk. In the kitchen, I drank a fifth of my father’s vodka and waited for 
my body to ignite. I stood on fire in the garden, waiting for courage that didn’t come. I 
found the quiet clucking of the chickens and imagined breaking the necks of the adults 
and the tiny chicks. I found the wind chime sound of Laika’s rusty bell, and saw her turn 
to look at me in the dark. She had been swishing her tail to ward off the midges bothering 
her, and was chewing slowly on a mouthful of grass. I was shaking and cold. A friend had 
given us Laika when she was still a calf. I knew the sweet hay smell of her breath. I 
wished for a gun, but I had only a knife, and an oar from the canoe we drove to rivers in 
the summer. I stood there before her as she watched me, chewing and swishing her tail. A 
few times I found a surge of electricity, which died as I stood, unable to move, unable to 
decide on which side of her gentle head to aim the blow. But I could barely breathe by 
then. My throat closed. I was too weak to spare her a more miserable death. The 
government didn’t think about the animals.          
 We were ready long before the buses came. Our bags were packed at the door, which 
was open to the street we had lived our lives on. The windows were open, and had been 
for days. The idea was so foreign that we considered it with a dimness people like to 
think unusual of our species, if we thought of it at all: how could air be an enemy? It was 
invisible as God. We sat at the table, breathing in that air as we had for weeks, just five 
kilometres shy of the first evacuated zone, drinking tea we shouldn’t have been drinking, 
now and then getting up for some artefact we had forgotten to pack. It was as if objects 
suddenly came to exceed their inanimate and often arbitrary nature. As if they bore a 
weight of memory we couldn’t carry but couldn’t leave behind. Our minds seemed too 
frail, too wild to remember everything alone; the task seemed to eclipse physical capacity. 
The angles and shadows of the kitchen became final, the faces of my parents like icons 
regarding eternity from a place of stillness. Exile is absolute, and on the level at which 
instinct overtook Soviet complacency, they also knew that exile was our fate.  
 
Before my mother led us out the door, she turned her icon of Christ Pantokrator upside 
down, left bread and eggs on the table with four spoons for all our souls, and wrote in 
chalk our names on the door, so that we would return. Eventually we assembled outside 
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the local school with the rest of our town. Many old people were taken there by force. 
People brought the most impossible things—half the potato harvest, fur coats, canned 
herring, a chicken. Some children thought they were going camping. Some people’s eyes 
were enormous and glazed, as if hiding inside their own bodies. The scenes were terrible. 
It was like a surrender of souls. I remember the banner above the school door: ‘The 
accomplishments of people are immortal’.           
 On those buses we travelled out of our own histories into the early hours of the new 
day. Leaving some, I knew, hiding like partisans in the forest. Leaving Ivan behind, Ivan 
and so many others, breathing an atmosphere most immediately fatal for children and the 
unborn, yet calamitous enough for everyone grown. That atmosphere had already 
descended in the form of acid rain upon cities as distant as London, and would, even that 
day, impart a radioactive tan to children in the playgrounds of many towns beyond ours. 
It would condemn the pine forests of my childhood to burial, the houses to ruin, the 
mineral-rich soils to radioactivity and the harvests of our ancient plough lands to waste. 
The memories of generations, unconsciously inscribed in a geography of storybook 
beauty—the waters in the Dneiper river from which for three days people yet drew fish, 
the udders of the treasured cow every second person owned, the ripe red apples on the 
trees which by the first fatal afternoon were marred by black spots and their leaves by 
holes, the unassuming treetop homes of newborn birds, the germinating lives in every 
living womb, the family cats and dogs too numerous and too insignificant to be saved in 
life or death by shotgun, the bedrock of an agrarian history ancient and latent in the very 
land—to all these was allotted the outrage of a rape so absolute it was sublime. It was 
sublime, and even as we left it was beautiful. The beauty made it harder to believe. A 
little known effect of a newly radioactive atmosphere is the rapid blooming of flowers, 
and the heightened luminosity of plant pigments.         
 Our faith was primitive, it led us astray. Faith and fatalism run together in the 
Russian mind. We are too romantic; our fervour has always found expression. We 
believed in the atom as we had believed in the railroad, in Byzantium, in Rasputin and the 
Romanovs. A fatal vein in everything.           
 Our home became The Zone. It’s something out of Gogol; it’s science-fiction. 
Months later, Ivan told me of something he saw while on patrol that I couldn’t forget—an 
old farmer in her field milking her cow, each of them wrapped in cellophane. Cellophane 
to protect them from radiation. That was in hospital before he died. He shovelled graphite 
off the reactor roof with his bare hands in a handmade lead suit. 
 
* 
 58 
 
Dusk comes suddenly, or so it seems to Peter and Vera, when she stops speaking 
and they again notice the day. Out the window, the light of the low sun reddens 
the trees. As if in response, their voices also drop, before words themselves 
dissipate in the gloom between them. The sound of Vera’s sudden breath rouses 
Peter from his daze, as she stands to switch on another lamp. Yellow light pools in 
the corner behind her chair. Seated again, she breathes steadily, inspecting her 
hands. It seems she has said all she intends to say. Leaning forward, Peter places 
his elbows on the table, presses his hands in a steeple beneath his chin, and looks 
at her, unconsciously affecting the aspect of a priest.       
 ‘You have survived a tragedy. I’m sorry. But I’m glad you told me.’  
 Vera nods and for a moment scratches her head. Their physical configuration 
at the table is now reversed, as Vera leans back, and Peter sits forward, rigid and 
tense. Neither speaks for some minutes. Eventually, Peter straightens in his chair, 
eyes fixed on Vera until she glances past him toward the hall, and says in a low 
and level voice, ‘Vera you are unwell.’           
 The next second, he sees her eyes widen, while in every other way her face 
remains impassive. She brings a hand to her throat to touch the faint curved scar 
there, as is her habit. He hears her swallow as she looks at the table. When she 
looks at him, a frown forms between her eyes.        
 ‘What are you talking about,’ she says, without the inflection of a question. 
That instant, Peter’s heart heaves; certainty closes its circle in his mind. The 
thought charges every part of his body:  All I have sensed is true.  
  
* 
 
There is a challenge in the gaze of each upon the other now, although of what kind 
exactly neither is sure. Peter for a moment feels himself cast out on the tide of 
Vera’s eyes, and, before the radiant blur of her warm being before him—so 
impossible and so real—fights the urge to take her by the shoulders, to possess 
her. Vera, in her efforts to fathom Peter, finds him incomparable; like an albino 
owl, an unlikely strain of his own species, and feels herself losing the resolve she 
had counted on for this meeting. She has the longing to surrender all to this 
stranger who is more than simply strange—to his quiet conviction, a force which 
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seems to extend beyond his body—to his stony presence before which it seems 
nothing is lost. At the table, she straightens in her chair and draws a breath.  
 ‘How did you come to make such assumptions about my health?’  
 Finally, without taking his eyes from her, Peter speaks the words which are 
already on his tongue.              
 ‘I knew.’                
 She looks at him for a long while. She raises her fingers to her mouth in 
thought, and looks away with a tired smile that passes.      
 ‘That is not enough. Besides, it can hardly be true.’      
 ‘I understand your doubt, Vera.’           
 ‘Why make so much of a chance meeting, Peter? I was just a woman with 
amnesia and an empty purse. You were as kind to me as you seem to have been 
cruel. Why the effort to find me?’          
 ‘Because our meeting was no act of chance. I understand how the word fate 
sounds to a scientist, but there is no other. Before I saw you I had dreamed of your 
face.’ 
 
* 
 
Vera has no more words for Peter that day. She looks up at him when he shifts in 
his chair and begins to adjust his jacket, making to go. She remains in her chair as 
he stands. When she speaks, she regards him from a slight angle, her tilted chin 
suggesting a defiance he wonders at, and her eyes searching his face as if to 
discern something that might not be immediately apparent.     
 ‘Be here tomorrow at the same time. I have something to show you.’  
 He holds her gaze for a moment, and nods, before turning for the hall. She 
rises from her chair to follow, and leans against the flaking doorframe as he faces 
her on the step.             
 ‘Tomorrow,’ he says. Before he turns she raises her hand. He believes she is 
trying not to smile. 
 
* 
 
 60 
The next day, the door opens before his hand touches the buzzer. She stands in the 
doorway, pink-cheeked and unmoving, her damp hair falling from a blue scarf. 
Involuntarily, his eyes close for a moment. He can smell the flowers in her 
shampoo.                  
 ‘I saw you from the window,’ she says, standing aside for him to enter. The 
bodice of her shirt rises and falls with her quick breath. He looks down at his 
shoes, and notices for the first time that large clods of earth from outside have 
stuck to the soles. He smiles up at her in apology, and returns to the doormat 
where he scrapes them clean, before once more stepping inside, feeling too wild 
and too large for her hall. She walks slowly in front of him, hesitating before the 
sitting room off the kitchen. After a moment, she moves aside, and looks up at 
him with an expression he has not seen before, an expression neither of despair 
nor of hope, yet closer to each than other words he can think of.    
 He steps forward, and, in the fall of light, for a moment doesn’t see what it is 
he has come to be shown: a small boy, sitting at the table, kicking his leg and 
holding a glass of the milk which dribbles down his chin. He is quite oblivious of 
the adults watching him until Vera moves over to touch his shoulder.   
 ‘Ivan. There is a man here to meet you.’         
 Kneeling on the floor behind the boy, she uses her sleeve to wipe his chin, 
before leaning an elbow on the edge of the table and finally looking up at Peter, 
who hasn’t moved. For that moment it is as if the sun shines on them alone. Peter 
runs a hand over his mouth. He takes a breath, and moves toward the opposite 
chair to sit down. He looks at Vera. He looks at the boy. Vera’s eyes have grown 
enormous.                
 ‘Hello,’ says the boy, looking at Peter.         
 ‘Hello, Ivan’ says Peter, offering a smile.        
 Moments later, in the hallway, he faces Vera.      
 ‘You don’t need to tell me,’ he says in a low voice, looking not at Vera but at 
the boy. He is looking at his shoes, as though deep in thought. Absently, Vera 
walks over to stroke his head, and sits down at the table as the boy opens a picture 
book. She is looking at her hands on the table when Peter looks at her. They sit 
together for a while, speaking politely. The boy is shy. When he goes to the 
bathroom, Peter asks Vera:             
 ‘Have you managed alright?’           
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 She nods, returning his gaze with a smile.        
 ‘You didn’t need the mask to prove your story. I knew as soon as I saw you.’
 ‘Yes. We have the same eyes. I only hope he has your character.’   
                   
* 
 
They do not speak for a long time after that. Vera eventually leaves the table to 
prepare a supper of soup on the stove, and Peter remains seated at the table, 
looking out at the darkening window and at the boy with his father’s eyes and his 
mother’s mouth, listening to the regular sound of Vera’s breathing nearby. When 
they have eaten, Peter thanks Vera in a formal tone, rises to his feet, and quietly 
asks if he might have a photograph of the boy. After disappearing into another 
room, she returns to press an envelope into his hands. Peter smiles, for a moment 
unable to look at her face. Looking down, he sees she is wearing red shoes with 
old-fashioned laces. Peter wonders why it is that these shoes seem so particular to 
Vera, and then, looking up, notices that she is gazing at him with a furious 
consternation, softened by the features of her face. He can see her, that instant, as 
a child.  Swiftly, Peter kneels before the boy to voice a solemn goodbye. Vera 
turns then, walks down the hall, and stops before reaching the front door. When 
Peter reaches her, he sees they are at the entrance to a bedroom. It is sparse, with a 
neat single bed. Leaning now against the doorframe, one red shoe over the other, 
Vera looks at him openly, as if calculating the meaning of his features. He thinks 
for a moment that she is on the verge of issuing him some kind of dare. Instead, 
she lets the moment pass, glancing down and then touching his arm with a 
consolatory smile.               
 ‘You can come for tea on Saturday, same time.’        
 At that, she turns and walks back down the hall, leaving Peter by the door. 
Still standing there, he hears her clearing the plates from the table. Before leaving, 
he steps for a moment into the spare room. It smells of plaster and clean linen. He 
walks over to the window and pulls back the curtain. With some force, he eases 
open the pane, and stands there a moment, feeling the cool night on his skin. It is 
dark now, but the air is sweet. 
 
* 
 62 
 
He recalls how it had happened, the morning after the mask, the day she left him 
in the shadows of Vesuvius. He had dreamed strange, tropical dreams in the night, 
and awoke with a world of colours fading beneath his eyelids. In comparison, the 
room was dim. He listened to the heavy breath of Klara asleep, the sound of the 
laneway shops opening for the day, and to those church bells far away, until 
something savage in his breast told him the mask was not enough. If he did not 
put his scruples aside long enough to see if she would have him, he would live 
with the regret forever. He had watched over her from a bedside chair until her 
eyes opened. What dreams had she been living? Was this the day she would 
remember her name? These questions occurred to him every morning. During the 
long moment in which they looked at each other without blinking, it occurred to 
Peter that Klara knew all he was thinking. He stood just as the distant bells tolled 
the hour, walking over until his face leaned over hers directly. After another 
moment in which their eyes did not part, his hand reached down to touch her hair, 
his other hand found her breast, and Klara did not ask him to take it away.   
 He remembered wondering at the time whether making love, for a woman 
with amnesia, was like making love for the first time. He would never know truly 
where memory ended and the innocent unknowing of childhood began in Klara. 
 That morning was, he supposed, just another passage in the long hall of those 
weeks that now lived for him alone.            
 It happened only once.              
 He can still hear her cries.     
 
* 
 
The day that Peter had first stood before Vera in her doorway, a cold wave took 
his body. It came as if from far away, and took his breath when it broke. Looking 
into her face, he knew in an instant she was not well. A fatal radiance emanated 
from deep beneath her skin. The truth of it struck his heart like a chord. The Klara 
he had found was dying, and he wondered if she knew it yet. 
 
* 
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And so Peter remains in his pink room at Parkview through the winter. He visits 
Vera that Saturday, and then every Saturday thereafter.      
 ‘Next Saturday I won’t be here at two, but at three, I will’, she says the next 
time they meet, farewelling Peter at the door. Perfunctory but deliberate, with 
clear, cold eyes. With a dart of joy, Peter understands the invitation, but wonders 
at her reasons. What is it she sees in him, this man who has taken such liberties? 
Does she merely see the father of her child? What does she hope to gain from 
yielding, albeit rather stiffly, to his longing to see her? He knows she is lonely. He 
knows that she guards her private life closely. Perhaps he had stepped through the 
hardest wall when he professed to already know so much.      
 On these Saturdays they drink tea or coffee, eating sandwiches or a type of 
strudel Vera likes to make. Slowly they grow more at ease together, although 
always a certain edge remains between them. Slowly they begin to talk of other 
things. Ivan is never there.             
 Peter comes to an arrangement with the manager of the hotel for a long-term 
weekly rate, including breakfast in the forlorn basement dining room with its pot 
plants and lonely lorikeet. It is the only meal they serve there, and so Peter always 
makes a feast of the cornflakes and sugary yoghurt, stale rolls and cold cuts. There 
are hardly any other guests, a good thing. It is not a holiday town. He has 
outstayed the fat businessman with his noisy fussing wife and children; he will 
outstay the pale professional couple who eat toast at seven and seem not to speak 
often. When alone, he stays reading the paper until the coffee in the urn is too cool 
to drink, talking to the lorikeet. He is sick of eating out in town; sick of walking 
its artless streets. Peter is living for Saturdays. 
 
* 
 
Over the Saturdays, an understanding which is unsaid grows between them, the 
delicate tightening of a shared thread neither really understands. It is as if some 
residue of a past only one of them remembers is beginning to bind, beginning to 
find the careful threshold of a future. It is hard to put words to these things, and 
that which hesitates to be born in syllables and vowels is eel-slippery, unbidden 
and unanswerable, coming in a dart, and receding in a shadow, before we wonder 
whether it was ever real at all.            
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 As hard as it is at times for Peter, they keep to simple things. They let the rest 
settle in the silences and looks they share, each wondering whether it signifies to 
the other what it does to them. Such are the quiet questions which animate the 
most thrilling of exchanges.           
 Sometimes Vera saves interesting articles from the paper to discuss with him. 
One afternoon Peter helps her plant her internal window boxes with seeds for 
early spring, on another when he finds her mixing up a cake batter, she 
ceremoniously suggests he pours it into the tin, and he is, on each occasion, so 
childishly delighted that he colours. When he enters Vera’s rooms he enters a 
particular order. Often they do not speak.  
 
* 
 
One Saturday, while Vera is rinsing the dishes from a cake just placed in the oven, 
and Peter is leaning back at the kitchen table vaguely watching her, she says, ‘You 
know, don’t you?’ Her voice is quiet and certain. She turns to face him, then, with 
eyes of glass. Her face is impassive. She leans a little against the sink, gloved 
hands at her sides. Two pools of soapy water collect on the lino.    
 Peter says nothing, his eyes unshifting upon her. Vera pulls off a glove and 
sighs. 
‘How on earth do you know.’           
 This is not a question. She turns from him to grip the sink. His opening has 
arrived. Blood thuds in his ears, his heart lurches for a moment as he propels 
himself to speak words which will be irreversible, and likely premature. But they 
do not have the luxury of time, and he is desperate to stop their tip-toe talk which 
is growing dry. He wants it out, in light, between them: the viscera, the guts, the 
primitive urges, the truth for so long unspoken. Knowing it is too early but 
bursting with the urge to be brazen, Peter speaks now, in a cold, low voice she 
will not mistake.              
 ‘Come home with me, Vera.’           
 Peter had expected wide eyes, a frown, even a hoot of disdain. Above all he 
expected surprise. But Vera is not surprised. Carefully, she peels off the other 
glove and drops them in the sink. Is this enough to infer that she in fact registers, 
beyond what shows, the perpetual current between them? She doesn’t blink; her 
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eyes upon him are unchanged. She only stands there against the sink, a little limp, 
and shoves her hands, warm from the water and pink, into the front pockets of her 
antiquated apron. For a moment she looks at her red shoes.     
 ‘You are a unique man, Peter,’ she says, before, slowly, she shakes her head. 
Peter, louder now, digs in.            
 ‘Come home with me to Australia. We’ll take Ivan. I’ll look after you.’ 
 ‘No,’ she says, quiet and looking now to some mystery beyond his left 
shoulder. ‘I know where I am going, and it is not to your home.’    
 Peter knows better than to question this new assertion in the air between them. 
Saying it, Vera’s voice is without doubt, detached. It is as if she believes her end 
belongs only in this place, and in going there she is simply abiding a natural law. 
Peter is quiet for the rest of that visit, but his hope doesn’t die.  
 
* 
 
After that day, Peter begins visiting occasionally on Sundays or in the weekday 
evenings a little after Vera arrives home from work. He stands with a bottle of 
wine, a loaf of rye, a block of chocolate, holding his offering like a libation to 
some fickle god in her doorway until she answers his knock, in her work skirt and 
bare feet, or in leggings and a flannel shirt she drowns in, which is awful and also 
somehow touching. Before him in the doorway she pauses, placid and concerned, 
always long enough for Peter’s doubt that she will let him in to flood him with 
cold heat. And then she stands aside for him to enter.        
 In this way, Peter keeps coming, unbidden, on days and nights not Saturday, 
and Vera keeps letting him in. As the days grow warmer, she begins to expect 
him. Such is the frequency, now, of his knock on her door. Peter notices what 
Vera never draws attention to— that before he comes she is already preparing 
dinner for two; that she has a story from her week ready to tell; a new window 
flower to show him; a question about Australia. It is quiet and unsmiling, this way 
she allows a place for him. It is not light or lightly given. She never surrenders all 
her trust. He sees that even in her face. Perhaps because she is, by nature or from 
the course of life, so grave, the occasions when she laughs or smiles become 
Peter’s singular delight; to increase them, his challenge.      
 He wonders about how to test a territory whose borders must be touched, in 
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order to be known. There is danger in such expeditions, precious land to be lost. 
But Vera will not be the one to test it, this he knows. 
 
* 
 
Already by spring, every evening, when Vera is back from work and he from a 
day of roaming, and dinner is eaten and the last light of dusk fading outside, Peter 
voices the same words; ‘Come home with me.’ To which she only says ‘No.’ 
Asked where it is she will go instead, she only ever shakes her head. After a 
while, Vera stops responding altogether, although Peter, like the Beast in the tale, 
does not stop asking. He feels he is being tested, and wonders how long her 
patience will last.               
 Vera is as intrigued by Peter’s work as he is by hers, although it is not easy to 
get her to talk about it. Peter, for his part, is pleased to answer her questions, 
which grow more specific each time. ‘Do you do statues?’ she says suddenly one 
day, a glint of mirth in her eye. ‘What’s the most broken thing you’ve ever put 
back together?’ ‘How many pieces did it consist of?’ ‘Did you use ordinary glue?’ 
‘How do you remove lime scale off an old statue?’ ‘If you had been the one to 
clean the salt and barnacles off the Marine Venus when she was brought back to 
earth, how would you have done it?’           
 It is a game she plays. She is always more animated when the subject is not 
herself. 
 
* 
 
It is now late spring. Vera has a week off work. One night, over dinner, which 
they have, on these balmy evenings, on the tiny concrete balcony overlooking the 
park, she tells Peter that she wants to take him on a drive. Peter is delighted. They 
will escape this town, in which he is languishing for Vera alone. He will know her 
in another setting. She may wear her hair down. It will be a beautiful day. A day 
he determines to always remember, should it never happen again; a cameo set 
with her face.                
 She is taking him to her family’s dacha, not far from here, by a river. Ivan will 
be there, and her mother. It is a place her father loved, where he would fish and 
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read the books he didn’t have time for in town. It is alive with memories Vera 
does not always have the strength for. The day before, Peter comes to help her in 
the kitchen. He hands her ingredients, rinses bowls, keeps an eye on the oven. He 
watches her. She does not use recipes. She kneads the bread with expert hands. 
She fries the potato pancakes without a single spare movement. She folds the 
batter for the almond cake with tender attention. There in the wonderful-smelling 
kitchen with Vera at peace in her labours, accepting his culinary ministrations and 
taking his presence for granted, Peter thinks of how it is at a moment like this that 
he would like to die.             
 With a boot-load of food, they drive for an hour to get there. It is interesting 
to watch Vera drive. He had expected her to be a nervous driver, but she is calm. 
She handles the wheel lightly. Now and then she looks over and indulges him 
with a smile. He asks about the towns they pass. She tells him their names. She 
mentions what the town is known for; excellent sunflowers or good butter; a 
notable healer; an unsolved murder; a kulak massacre. In one town she speaks of 
having a school friend she sees no longer, in another a cousin with dementia. 
History is an element of the atmosphere, here. Personal and eternal, it is a kind of 
humidity, still, in the air.             
 Finally, she speaks to him. He coaxes nothing.  He is careful to retain a mild 
countenance beside her, lest the revelations stop. Today, whether she knows it or 
not, and if only for today, the weather has declared it time for Vera to open a little, 
under the sun. She quiets before they reach the place. He feels her gathering in. 
 He wonders about meeting her mother, seeing the boy he still cannot think of 
as Son, as he has never imagined being Father, and indeed, has not been. This son 
who is called Ivan, who he does not know and to whom he is unknown, who is 
half of her and half of him, the bodily union of a love she never owned. It is his 
love, his love alone. Ivan is the lacuna between them, the missing text, the lexical 
gap, the extended silence. Lacuna of the son; of the years; of her memory. Lacuna 
of her love. 
 
* 
 
Vera’s mother is small, stolid in a graceful way, round-faced and rosy, with dyed 
russet hair in an unruly bob. She wears a loose-fitting multi-coloured dress, a 
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bright green apron and house shoes. Her eyes are bright and sharp. This is Nina. 
She has Vera’s inward strength and gentleness, without the stiffness and the threat 
of closing in—that shell-dwelling creature’s retreat which Peter fears. Warmer 
than her daughter, more open, more trusting, she has the same thoughtful quiet. 
She has the same hesitation to laugh, as though such things come at a cost. When 
Nina and Vera do laugh, there is a tiny frown that follows, as if in self-rebuke at 
such forgetting, such indulgence. It is a frugality neither could have been born 
with.                 
 Peter cannot guess how much Vera’s mother knows, although she seems 
pleased to meet him. At the sound of the car she rushes out, tea towel in hand, 
waving. She embraces her daughter, effusive, light-hearted, an ironic humour in 
her eyes as they exchange kisses and words. Peter, shy, waits by the car. With a 
small hoot, seeing him there while still holding Vera’s shoulders, she bustles 
around to embrace him too, clucking with exclamations of greeting.    
 ‘Ah, and you are Peter! From Siberia first and now from Australia! What a 
travelled man. We are so pleased to have you.’         
 She has taken him by the arm, guiding him up the path to the door of the 
dacha, the traditional Slavic country shack, as Vera, carrying the baskets of food, 
trails behind. Inside, Peter presents Nina with a bottle of her favourite vodka. She 
is theatrically touched, marvelling with delight at the vodka as if it were myrrh. 
They talk a little as Vera sets everything down. She tells him this dacha has been 
in the family a long time.              
 ‘Many memories,’ she says, nodding, cheerful and then wincing a little. Peter 
sees her resisting, the little dart driving in. She smiles and smacks her knees. A 
hearty woman, he thinks. A woman of the earth, not so complicated as her 
daughter. In her mother’s countenance, none of Vera’s distance. Although Vera 
had a good dose of earth in her, too. This combination in Vera is as ravishing as it 
is confounding. He will always be guessing. If she ever has, she will never now 
yield her whole self, not to life, and not to him, perhaps not even to herself alone. 
She is a deep lake, his Vera. Somewhere within her, he is sure, resides a 
magnitude which would astound them all. It is this, thinks Peter, regarding her in 
her mother’s kitchen, oblivious of him, levering the cake out of its tin with a look 
of childlike consternation. This beyond all else, this quiet, submerged weight 
borne so deeply, so unassumingly in her voice and face and body. A gravity which 
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reflects the mind and heart within. Like most sublime phenomena, there is danger 
in it, and redemption. To be near her is to be alive with the hope of revelation. It is 
for this, above all else, that he loves her. 
 
* 
 
Together they walk through the main room and out the back door, where a table 
and chairs are laid beneath a cherry tree roped with a homemade swing. On the 
swing sits Ivan, propelling himself forward with his right foot now and then, 
looking out at the adults with a blithe, wizened little face, the face of his mother. 
 He has to be induced to hug Vera. It seems painful to him. She pretends not to 
notice. At the table, he looks at her all the time, his face bathed with a vital light. 
Regrettable, thinks Peter, that his introduction to yearning had come so young, 
through his own mother, who was nearby and alive. Peter wonders why this is the 
order of things. It seems that Vera sees Ivan only on Sundays, an unnatural 
situation for which there must be a reason.         
 Around the table they eat and talk slowly, enjoying the sunlight which, 
through the tree, throws patterns on the table which waver like reflections on 
water. They hypnotise Ivan. Peter watches him. Ivan looks at things with a 
reverent kind of patience rare in a child. His eyes drink things in and calculate. He 
appears to have a visual sensibility. Watching this child, this stranger of his own 
blood, Peter wonders what he is supposed to feel.      
 Vera treats him carefully, like a foreign but devoted aunt. She winks gently, 
passing him a plate of bread. It is hard to watch the effect a smile from her has on 
that five-year old face: joy, unmediated, religious. After the main course, the 
women go inside—Vera to cut the almond cake, Nina to brew the coffee. For a 
moment, Peter and Ivan sit alone. Ivan gazes around the garden, biting his lip, his 
eyes returning to the open door. Peter watches him until he looks back, and sees 
his own eyes.                 
 ‘Do you want to know a secret?’ he says.         
 Ivan’s eyes are wide. He doesn’t know what to say.       
 ‘We have something in common, you and me. We live beneath the same 
throne. The queen is inside cutting cake.’        
 Ivan looks at Peter as if he had been speaking Latin. Peter straightens in his 
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chair and smiles.                
 ‘I have brought you a gift,’ he says, holding out a rectangular box with a 
ribbon. Ivan takes it after a moment, saying thank you in a quiet voice.  
 ‘It’s a kaleidoscope. It makes art out of everything.’     
 Peter helps Ivan place it to his eye the right way. Ivan looks through it at the 
chestnut tree, and then, smiling, at Peter. They both begin to laugh.    
 ‘You see?’ says Peter, now taking it to his own eye to look at Ivan. ‘Don’t we 
look different!’               
 ‘Very different!’ says Ivan. Peter pats him on the back and gives him back the 
kaleidoscope.               
 ‘This is a pretty place, Ivan. Does your grandmother take you here often?’ 
 ‘Not really,’ says Ivan in a soft voice, shifting in his chair to face Peter better. 
He seems relieved. ‘We usually come in Easter and in summer.’     
 Polite; well-spoken for his age.            
 ‘Do you ever swim in the river?’         
 ‘Sometimes,’ says Ivan, suddenly plonking his elbow on the table to rest his 
cheek on one fist, the pose of the thinker. Such a gesture in a five year old might 
look affected if it were not so genuine to his countenance. An interesting little 
specimen. 
 
* 
 
Mother and daughter return, coffee and cake are served. The four maintain a light 
chatter guided by Nina. Vera grows more relaxed and more lively. She teases 
everyone charmingly. She pushes Ivan on the swing. Ivan seems happy. Peter 
speaks of his history, and of his work; he gives them a fine oration. At times he 
appeals to Ivan’s attention.  ‘I was born in a land of shamans and snow, of 
ancient woods, reindeer and Eskimos…’          
 He asks Nina many polite questions: ‘What was your family’s main crop?’; 
‘Did your town suffer the purges?’; ‘Did you manage to keep your horses?’; 
‘What was Vera like as a child?’            
 The more he asks, the more she tells. She is in the mood for reminiscing.  
 ‘Oh Vera, she was a little doll to her father and the neighbours. I was the one 
who witnessed her rages and her tears of sorrow. A very red heart she has, my 
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Vera…’                  
 His vision of Vera’s beginnings gains focus. The day goes on, languorous and 
long, in the garden until it grows chill. They stand for a while on the riverbank, 
watching the sun go down, until it is time for goodbyes and home. 
 
* 
 
Vera will die first.               
 This is the fact. Its truth and its necessity, which Peter neither predicted nor 
chose, dawns upon him one day in the contemplation of his own death. To bury 
Vera, he must survive her. He must survive her in order to lay her down.  
 The days grow warmer. As if she were a plant unsuited to such temperate 
conditions, it begins. Vera’s illness, at indiscernible speed, impregnates her outer 
skin. Blue shadows beneath her eyes. Her delicate skull foregrounded in her face. 
Her hair losing its lustre, her cheeks their colour. She is beautiful as ever to Peter, 
only farther from the earth.   
 
* 
 
A month after the day at the dacha, let’s call it a week night, Peter arrives at the 
customary time for supper. Vera takes longer than usual to answer. The rims of 
her eyes are red. Her work clothes look dishevelled. She says hello in a thick 
voice and turns back down the hall, not waiting for him to follow. In the kitchen 
she is pouring tea, a cup for him, a cup for her. With their cups in hand they face 
each other. He asks her what has happened. She shakes her head and sniffs a little. 
She mumbles about a bad day. Doesn’t want to talk about it. They drink their tea. 
They look out the window. Tell me Vera, says Peter. What on earth has happened. 
Vera sighs, traces a finger along the edge of the table.       
 She was very weak today. At work in the lab she fainted. Her doctor had 
words with her. From home she phoned her boss. She is no longer fit to fulfil her 
duties. From today, she will cease all formal work activities at the Institute. 
Everyone agrees. It is what must be. Vera must stay at home and rest.   
 She holds her head in her hands.          
 ‘It’s too soon. The days of nothing will swallow me. I’ll have nowhere to 
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hide. How will I look away?’            
 For a moment Peter has the vision of Vera becoming a statue before him, 
slowly remade in stone. He aches to help her, but he has never been enough. 
Trying to keep the pleading from his voice, he tells her of the other things she 
might do. The things they might, if she likes, do together. With this time, they 
could drive everywhere, they could visit galleries, he could teach her to paint, she 
could teach him to bake, they could take a scenic tour of the Carpathian 
mountains. He could outline for her the fundamental tenets of Egyptian religion.
 She sits still as he speaks, at once hard and tremulous. Never before has he 
been so near to her real feeling, to her bare and brilliant soul. A light-giving stone, 
he thinks, a lunar body, her own moon. In his thoughts then, her voice. Hold me, 
please.                  
 Has he heard right? Yes. She is looking at him from across the table, on her 
face, an expression which is terrible. Terrible, in the old sense of that word. The 
features of her face look like they might break. Across to her, as if through water, 
he travels, a mile which is a metre or so. At her feet, at her red shoes he brings his 
knees, and with arms more alive than ever in life, embraces her rigid shoulders, 
buries his face in her neck. Blood rushes to his head. His heart is in his ears. His 
body is a drum. With all his cells, he imagines imparting strength to her, from his 
body to her own. He holds her for a long time. Refusing to issue her with 
platitudes, he has few words for her. All he can say is contained within their 
embrace.                 
 The embrace creates between them a visceral channel, through which a deeper 
energy now flows. In his feelings now, somehow and without real reason, Peter 
feels less alone.  
 
* 
 
He begins to visit Vera every day, sometimes early, sometimes late, bringing the 
daily paper, and, now and then, a bunch of tulips, as Vera has politely suggested 
that her waistline needs a break from the sweet pastries he likes to bring her (the 
bakery ladies now expect him). Sometimes they take a walk around town, drink 
coffee, sit in the park with a section of the paper on their separate laps and mutter 
about events which seem far away. There is a growing restlessness in Vera. She is 
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frightened, she is bored. Yet she never wants to venture farther than the town. The 
city is too loud. She is not strong enough for the mountains. Alright, she says 
when Peter suggests they paint. While they paint, they talk.    
 One night in Vera’s lounge when it is late, and they have each been reading, 
Peter falls asleep in his chair beneath the newspaper. He wakes when Vera 
removes the newspaper and touches his shoulder. You can stay here, if you like, 
she says, with a hesitant gesture of the thumb toward the spare room behind them. 
 In the morning at the kitchen table as they drink coffee, watching each other’s 
pale morning faces, she tells him that he doesn’t have to go, as if she is not certain 
that at her word he would stay forever. 
 
* 
 
On that quiet day, Peter checks out of his hotel, his heart racing so fast he fears for 
his health. Vera left after lunch to visit Ivan and her mother, and will not be home 
until evening, and so Peter takes the train to Kiev for the afternoon. The train is 
quaint, with leather seats and window curtains and smart conductors. At a village 
called Vorodsky a red-cheeked man in an old-fashioned suit boards and sits 
opposite him. They speak a few words about the weather, about Siberia, and share 
a few capfuls of the man’s vodka. Peter enjoys the journey.       
 In Kiev, having farewelled the suited stranger, Peter finds his way to the 
nearest square. He knows what he needs, but not where to find it. He will not be 
able to get everything. He will have to make do with what he can carry. Without 
his Russian, he wouldn’t like his chances of procuring anything at all in that busy 
city. By appealing to a succession of shopkeepers and pedestrians, he finds a craft 
shop within an hour. When he walks in, the owl-like woman at the counter seems 
suspicious, reluctant to leave her accounts to help him. He peruses the shelves 
alone, aware of being watched. He asks the woman if she has any gold leaf. She 
does not, and seems satisfied by this fact. Sighing, Peter buys ten jumbo rolls of 
plaster bandage, a kilo of terracotta, turpentine, the entire range of the most 
expensive acrylic paints, and a case of brushes and modelling tools. Softened, 
perhaps, by the sum of money he has just spent, the woman relents when he asks 
whether there is a haberdashery or hardware store nearby. Both, she says, on the 
opposite side of the next street over.           
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 At the haberdashery, he buys a ream of raw linen; at the hardware store, a 
toolbox and a collection of bolts, rivets and nails. All guesswork; certainly there 
are things he has forgotten. He buys a suitcase. Reaching the station is not easy.
 He thinks all the way back to town, looking out the window at a shifting 
landscape once familiar. How is he to present at Vera’s with this odd hoard? He 
will let her assume that half of it all is for their ventures in painting. He will be 
vague about the details. 
 
* 
  
 The apartment is now too small a world.          
 Vera sits in the park re-reading the copy of Anna Karenina, full of her father’s 
student notes. She bakes bread for her favourite neighbours, teaches Peter how to 
know when kneaded milk dough is elastic but not yet tough. She lies in bed for 
long afternoons in the blue shadows of her room, feeling the coming autumn in 
the air through the window above her head. She cannot accustom herself to this 
rest. Where before it had been the unreal shadow of a nightfall far away, lying 
now in her bed, Vera thinks only of death. She longs only for the forest, for its 
confounding stillness and its shade. This rest rehearses death. To stay this way in 
a grey town which is no-one’s true home, which is a raft of sorrow, is to wind 
herself in a sheet now, ready for the ground with a beating heart. She wants the 
company of barn owls and voles. She wants to picnic on the ground of home, 
waiting for the wild boars, for the elk to come, leading on their growing young. 
She wants to watch the Przewalski’s horses, allowed a life there on that lost land 
and possibly evolving differently for it, their impossible beauty yet undiminished, 
imagining all of this as it is now, going on tomorrow, when she will be gone. If 
death is to come for her at forty, it will come on the ground that bore it. At a 
moment she hopes will keep its shadow close, to catch her unawares in sleep or 
thought, near the cool and beating forest she knows so well, it will come. 
  
* 
 
Vera says goodbye to her friends and neighbours, and speaks to her doctor. She 
packs crackers, cans of pickles, beans and fish, dry goods, evaporated milk, still 
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water, gas cans and a camp stove. To these she adds an album of photographs, a 
stack of music tapes, a Russian translation of Whitman, and her medicine.  
 Where are you going? asks Peter, observing her from a chair in the lounge, 
and she says what he has known she will say: Home.       
 An unspoken understanding has grown between them.     
 Peter is quiet while she is packing. For hours she paces around, lifting things, 
caressing them, returning them to their places or dropping them in boxes she 
carries outside to the car until the boot will barley close. The car swallows half the 
larder, the thickest bedding, whole shelves of books. Vera stops when there is no 
room left. The entire backseat is full. She does not look at Peter. She does not 
speak. It is time.  
 
* 
 
I see her, a last suitcase in hand, edging out the door, looking proud. Finally, Peter 
steps forth from the shadows of the morning, catching the door before it closes 
behind her, gently wresting the suitcase from her hand. His heart barely beating, 
his own bags on his shoulder. They are silent as she locks the door. He follows her 
to the car outside, stands as she shuffles things around. Finally, she turns, as if to 
grant him a cursory parting glance. She takes in his stance before her, his grave 
face and his bag. He sees her taking a breath. She is biting her lip. Her face has a 
look of impassive deliberation, her eyes roving a little, her mouth unsure. Finally, 
and with a perfunctory, routine air, she reaches swiftly for his bag, hurls it onto 
the back seat, and opens the passenger door, revealing the seat left bare. She 
walks around to the driver’s door, business-like, as if going to work, gets in and 
starts the ignition. Before they drive off she looks at him with a naked face, a 
strange light in her eyes, as if humbled by a gift, and, looking away, in a small 
voice says, ‘It’s not far.’               
 
* 
 
At the border, the guards nod at Vera’s familiar face and wave her through, blind 
to the car’s heavy cargo. They enter the forbidden road, edged with summer’s 
green leaves, and Peter unfurls from the floor where he had crouched beneath a 
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coat. Vera gazes ahead, her grip tight on the wheel. They are to find her childhood 
home, where, with the instinct that calls a wounded elk to drag itself into the 
shelter of a cave, she is to die.            
 She tells him she has avoided the house all the years of her work there. She 
does not know in what condition they will find it, if it still stands at all. It is on a 
side street of one of the Zone villages, a street of farm lots, fallen fences and the 
ruins of chimneys and rooves. They drive slowly, for the road is cracked and 
littered with fallen branches. Vera stops midway, and leans against the car door 
facing the street’s right side. The remains of a gate lie before her, a three-walled 
house with a blue door beyond. Like playing cards, the roof and remaining walls 
of the house seem to balance each other at odd angles. The shed behind the house 
is in better condition, having retained all its walls. Vera, her breathing uneven, 
backs away, returns to her seat. For several minutes they crawl the surrounding 
streets in silence, Peter keeping his eyes on his own window, as Vera, with cold 
ferocity, scans every standing house in every street. He knows they must find a 
place. She cannot return to town.           
  The house Vera stops at is on a corner. The street is full of trees. The house is 
of stone, set back from the road behind a yard of tall grass and apple trees. With a 
groan, the door gives. Debris strews the floor—yellowed papers, old bottles, 
mouse droppings and bird feathers. It smells of mould and urine. Like 
everywhere, it has been scoured for valuables. Chairs are upturned. A pair of 
empty picture frames lie on the floor. The table, which would have held the 
television, is bare but for a lace cloth. Painted plates lie in shards in the kitchen. 
The back door is open, and has admitted years of leaves. The floor and walls are 
rotting from rain and frost. Here the wall is warped, there the floor forms a dip. 
There is evidence of owls roosting in the window sills and on the kitchen shelves. 
Every window has fallen in, allowing ivy to take hold of the walls.  
 Vera says: ‘This will do well.’  
 
* 
 
The day is still early. Peter, saying nothing, follows her out to the car. She has 
prepared well. From the boot she draws out two crates, which Peter takes inside. 
One contains disinfectant, sponges, scourers and old towels, the other hammers, 
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bolts, machine oil and screwdrivers. Along with the crates, Peter hauls one of the 
industrial-sized casks of water which fill half the car. A moment later, Vera comes 
back inside with a shovel, two buckets, a broom and a wireless radio. She tunes 
the radio to a classical station, hands Peter the shovel, and begins sweeping the 
dirt, leaves and shit from the kitchen floor into the bucket, to the tune of a waltz. 
Peter looks at her for a long moment then, standing in the dip of the sitting room 
floor, holding the shovel. For a moment she returns his look, challenge alive with 
something like humour in her eyes, and the matter of their task here seems settled. 
It is a large task. Speaking little, they work like machines, unceasing, until the 
afternoon, scouring walls, filling and unfilling buckets with water and filth, 
assembling a pile of junk in the yard and salvaging what they can—still-usable 
cups and chairs, pots to clean, a table that might be repaired. Peter removes the 
fetid rugs, levers out the worst of the floorboards. They begin the more intricate 
chores of sweeping the dust, scouring the floor and kitchen cabinets. Vera ties a 
scarf around her head to keep the dust from her hair. Her rosy face is flecked with 
dirt. She looks healthier than he has seen her in weeks. This house will take time 
he does not know they have. Such exertion is the last thing he wants for Vera 
now. And yet her face disproves his inclinations. This is one stage in a long-held 
plan, he sees. He wonders how she expected to do it without him, for it is nothing 
she could ask of her mother.             
 Vera, having concentrated on the hallway and kitchen, has achieved a vaguely 
habitable state in those areas. Two chairs sit before a scrubbed table. The open 
stove is another matter. It is clogged with old ash, dust and mouse droppings. 
Having cleared and cleaned it, she throws in a handful of coal from the bag she 
has brought, and flings in a lit match, at which it comes alive in flames the house 
would not have seen for years. When she is ready, she calls to Peter, who is using 
the broom to clear the worst of the dust from the window frames. She sees that he 
has begun to remove the ivy. ‘Leave it,’ she says. ‘Come.’     
 Peter obeys and takes a seat at the table. The bread they brought from town is 
laid out with a round of cheese and a jar of pickles. From the disarray of the 
cupboards, Vera has resurrected two plates and two china cups cleaned over the 
sink with water from the cask. She takes the pot, also found and cleaned, from its 
place over the stove, and pours sweet black coffee into both cups. It smells 
wonderful. When Vera, seated in the chair opposite, smiles at Peter then, it is a 
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smile of the moment, hiding nothing and looking to neither past nor future, and it 
seems to expand the room. Perhaps she is relieved she will die not in her own 
childhood house, but a stranger’s. No memories within these walls to bear. Only 
the objects of frail suggestion; a photo in a drawer, a doll on the floor, a clock 
stopped at midday; more universal than personal. Abandoned, the rooms within 
which different people lived their lives were reduced to a similar composition of 
human relics, those relics they are now removing or restoring. What place had 
they to be there? Acting thus, were they any better than the looters? Vera hopes 
so, if only for the silent blessing her hands conveyed to every object, if only for 
the way she scrubbed that table as if it were a living thing, touched the walls as if 
made of human skin, and at the threshold of each room she entered, 
acknowledged the lives once lived there, and cleared away what dirt she could 
with a feeling that was love. 
 
* 
 
It is five days before the house is habitable, a Herculean feat of which they are 
proud. The piss smell has faded; the faint reek of mould lingers. The cupboards 
are stocked with non-perishables from town and dry goods for making bread and 
soup. The windows are boarded in with pickets from the fence. Lacking a viable 
alternative, the bedroom mattresses are beaten, aired, turned, and fitted with the 
sheets and covers Vera has brought from home. From old doors and chairs, Peter 
has built the frame for a couch, which Vera fits with spare pillows and folded 
blankets. Outside of winter, at least, the rooms of the house now afford a Quaker-
like comfort; the skeleton of quarters for living: a source of heat, a roof and walls, 
space for rest. The stove keeps them warm at night, and allows for all kinds of 
cooking. Of course, the coal, the matches, the water and flour Vera has so astutely 
packed will not last forever. But they do not need it to. There is enough that they 
should not need to risk passing the guards again, and Peter does not think about 
the inevitable day when he will be left there alone. Of these things they do not 
speak.  
 
* 
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Later that week, Vera shows Peter about the Zone. Peter tries to imagine how it 
must have been in her childhood, when it was full of people and industry and 
fresh cement, knowing he would prefer it as it is now. She shows him the murky 
river of giant catfish. She shows him the abandoned streets of the pretty towns, the 
rotting wooden church not far from her old house, the primary school, the 
community hall in which her parents were married. She shows him the reactor 
from the distance, and the edge of the pine forest, which turned orange from the 
radiation in 1986. They spot two elk, a falcon and evidence of boar. Standing 
there beneath the trees, Peter wants to enter that forest as he has wanted few 
things in life. Vera sees this, but still she says no. The red forest is second only to 
the reactor in degree of danger. She moves her dosimeter slowly back and forth 
before him. It clicks furiously. They return to the stone house. Along the way, 
Peter’s eyes search everywhere for the right place. 
 
* 
 
During the afternoons when Vera rests, Peter walks. He walks the streets of the 
main town, he stands in buildings in the company of owls; he watches the silent 
brown river reflect nothing. He loiters on the edge of the forest, watching for one 
of the wild horses Vera spoke of, whose stolid elegance recalls prehistory. He 
wanders the overgrown roads through the disparate farming villages beyond 
Vera’s, toward the other side of the Zone. Now and then he will note some detail 
that tells of a human presence—a cleared path, a potato patch, a cow, a smell of 
wood smoke—but a living soul he does not see. He is always back by the time 
Vera rises, with something to give or show her—a new nest in the willow tree, 
some irradiated souvenir from his exploration of abandoned rooms—a marriage 
certificate, a gilded crucifix, a volume of Pushkin. He is always scolded for these 
relics, and advised that they are not to come inside. Once, to prove her point, Vera 
waves her dosimeter over a child’s portrait in a wooden frame, and rams it in 
Peter’s hand as it continues to click.         
 Banished from the house, Peter’s daily finds begin to assemble in a kind of 
involuntary sculpture in a corner of the yard under the apple tree. He begins to 
regard it as a kind of calendar of his time there. Vera threatens every day to dig a 
hole and bury it. Eventually, Peter himself buries his lost objects.    
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 He fixes the gate, repaints the door, clears the path of tall weeds. Sometimes 
together and sometimes alone they made dark bread, goulash and soups, for the 
suppers they have in the garden as the sun goes down, savouring the dog days of 
summer. What they speak of I don’t know, but phrases come to me anyway, like 
sound through glass, as I see them side by side, the late sun in their eyes, looking 
not at each other but at the other side of the street, their voices low and dry, 
muttering words that a foreigner would assume to address nothing deeper than the 
details of household chores. Only since their days in the stone house has speech 
between them been free. Slumberous, gazing without focus through the lighted 
trees, they address each other, in conversation carried on across gulfs of silence. 
For everything there is to say never can be said. 
 
‘It is my belief that I was once a priest’. 
‘In this life?’ 
‘No, another.’ 
‘I can see you as a priest.’ 
 
‘Maybe, in another life, we knew each other.’ 
‘The same life in which you were a priest?’ 
 
‘Sometimes I am jealous of your faith.’ 
‘I have faith enough for two. Do you believe that? 
‘Perhaps.’ 
 
‘Souls can live on.’ 
‘You are too intelligent for such fantasies.’ 
‘Yes, I believed that once.’ 
 
‘There are many things I would like to believe that common sense will not 
permit.’ 
‘You have not had the memory return to you of life in another body, time and 
country.’  
‘No. I suppose common sense cannot speak to that.’ 
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* 
 
‘There is something sublime about this ruined place.’  
‘Something only a foreigner would say.’ 
‘But it is a different earth. In the landscape you discern the lineaments of life, 
the nerves, the naked spine. Revelation is possible. You can look upon the 
earth at a certain distance—the distance of having left it, bodily or in death.’ 
 
‘I see my poisoned home.’ 
‘I know.’ 
‘But I have worked here for years since the evacuation, and there is peace in 
life’s persistence. The adaptation of creatures people never allowed for.’ 
 
* 
 
‘Our own language drew a circle of solitude around our world.’ 
‘I have heard of such things among twins.’ 
‘A lone twin is half a person. A living oxymoron.’ 
 
‘I may resemble your sister, but I am Vera Yenin, born of Vladimir and Nina 
Yenin, one street over, forty years ago. I am one point in a genetic line evolved 
from a prehistoric strain of particularities that could never be replicated. As are 
you, Peter.’ 
‘Such logic cannot diminish what is true.’ 
‘Then let me appeal to your superstition: don’t you think that if your sister had 
wanted to haunt you, she would have? You create her ghost. That does not 
honour her.’ 
‘She had no need to haunt me, as I have always carried her. Lost souls look for 
bodies.’ 
‘Peter, that is a fairytale.’ 
 
* 
 
‘I will tell you how she died—my sister Klara.’ 
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‘Why? I don’t need to hear it.’ 
‘I told you on the ship that I would one day explain why I left home. You 
should know.’ 
‘Alright, Peter, I am listening.’ 
‘We lived in a larchwood house weathered by the atmosphere. The floor 
seemed to know when you were coming. When the ground froze in winter it 
groaned like a creature. It was winter then…’ 
  
* 
 
The wind was loud outside. Peter’s sister was peeling potatoes in the kitchen, her 
back to the door he stood behind. He was about to enter for an apple, but paused 
there, without knowing why.             
 There was a man at the icebox. His name was Avgustus Bli. Avgustus was the 
state official who came once to inspect their farm for the collectivisation of grain, 
and stayed. Peter’s mother had a beautiful face and a quick brain. They kept the 
farm.  
At once, having filled his glass, Avgustus’s hand was at Klara’s thigh. For a 
moment she stopped peeling and stood there, looking at the wall with a potato in 
one hand and a knife in the other. She moved her head back toward his, turning as 
if to face him. She did not face him, but held herself inches away. They stood 
there as if united by the strange rapid breathing they now shared. Was she afraid? 
Or was the moon in her eyes? Peter could not see her face. He walked away 
before they saw him that day, and carried the secret for many more, like a dark 
firework he did not ask to own.             
 A week later, when he came to replace the hay in the stables, he found her 
brushing the horses. Before he could hide it, she seemed to recognise the truth in 
his face. But there was not a secret on earth he could have kept from her. The days 
when the secret drove itself between them were filled with a strangeness he had 
not known before.                
 She paused mid-motion behind the old mare Sasha, and peered at Peter from 
above her rump, with eyes that seemed to look through him into the rye fields 
behind. Sasha, sensing the disturbance, shook her head and snorted, cutting 
through the frozen atmosphere. Klara arched her neck at the ceiling, and, as if 
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unable to hold it in, gave a slow cry. She knew Peter knew, and Peter had nothing 
to say. He left the hay at the door, and walked out into the early dusk.   
 That night, Avgustus felt like fish for dinner. He told Peter to go try his luck 
on the lake, where he had drilled a hole in the ice. This suggestion asserted his 
authority, got rid of Peter, and manifested dinner all at once, but Peter didn’t 
argue, already exiled in his mind.            
 He set out with a stool, a radio and a can of worms just as the sun had begun 
to go down, glad to be out. After finding the hole in the ice, he sat. Ice fishing is a 
philosophical sport, and the only one to which Peter had ever been inclined. You 
drill your hole, sink your hook, keep your worms somehow from freezing, 
preferably through a method other than holding them in your mouth (he kept a 
few in his palms beneath his gloves, beneath his coat). And you wait. The ice was 
blue and brilliant. The pines around the lake threw long shadows. The radio 
played a rousing orchestral march with a lot of brass, an alien sound in that 
landscape of snow.  
She came quietly. He had known she would come. The end of winter was 
nearing, the ice was thinning, and their mother forbade them to ice fish alone. 
Klara threw an oilskin at his feet and settled on her knees with a deep breath, 
looking over the ice holding her gloved hands around a thermos. Hot apple tea 
was their lakeside custom. A moment later, frowning with thought, she unscrewed 
the lid, poured in a cupful of heat and held it out to him. He placed the rod 
between his knees and balanced the cup between his fingertips, so as not to burn 
the worms in his gloves. Seeing his need for a third hand, she set her own cup 
down and took the rod from him.           
 ‘Nothing yet,’ he said, to put something in the air between them. ‘Mother 
can’t know. You can’t tell her,’ she finally said.         
 ‘No.’                
 ‘And you have to forgive me. How did you know?’      
 ‘I saw you in the kitchen. Besides, you can’t lie to me.’     
 ‘We can’t lose the farm. Mother needs him.’         
 He told her that their mother had lived through a war without him, and that 
the farm did not come before his sister’s dignity. She said that the farm was their 
home, and she couldn’t leave the horses. He told her he loved the horses and the 
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farm, but would not live to see her so dishonoured. There was a limit to what 
could be forsaken for the farm, and Avgustus had to know it.     
 ‘Mother has grown to love him,’ she said.       
 ‘Mother is blind.’              
 She looked at the ground.            
 ‘I can’t challenge him.’              
 ‘Do you want to?’              
 ‘I don’t know anymore.’             
 Peter spat on the ground.            
 ‘I can’t stay here any longer,’ he said.         
 For a long time, they looked out over the ice. He felt her shock in a cold 
wave.                 
 ‘How will you leave?’              
 ‘I don’t know.’               
 As she began to cry, he looked at her harder than he had ever looked at a 
living creature, and knew her tears were not for their mother, or for the farm, or 
for shame, but for Avgustus Bli. He felt words forming on his lips, but they didn’t 
come. A moment later, with a gasp, she rose to her feet, the rod in her hands, her 
body straining to balance the tug. When Peter took the rod, he reeled out a shining 
carp, stunned by the air, which he killed with one strike on the frozen ground. 
They took the carp home to Avgustus for supper, and ate little themselves.
 Peter contemplated the limits of his resolve to keeping Klara by his side, and, 
peering hard, found none. He had been restless for a long while before. He knew 
that elsewhere the borders were closing in, and with them his future. But Peter 
considered nothing without the silent clause, the condition that contained his 
sister. He could leave only because he knew she would leave her lover to follow 
her brother, and that was why she had cried.  
 
* 
 
‘The snow was old by then,’ continues Peter, as if speaking to himself. Vera is 
just a statue beside him.              
 ‘We had made snow people again, and they were melting—an apple-snouted 
lady with a chest like a nesting duck. A tall man without a nose and their coal-
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eyed children. Our bones were ready for the sun.’        
 I don’t know what Vera is thinking. Perhaps a part of her has stopped 
listening, not wanting to know of the woman whose name she was given by a man 
who remembered another when he looked at her face. Perhaps she does not want 
to hear of death. And yet she bears the heavy presence of the man beside her, 
unloading his heavy words, as she has always borne him.     
 ‘Klara argued with me for days, but I had been bound for Moscow long before 
I saw her with that miserable man, despite how I would miss my mother.’  
 ‘So you left Siberia?’             
 ‘I left on the train.’             
 ‘With your sister.’             
 ‘That was my wish.’ 
 
* 
 
Vera says nothing more, sensing the story’s end. Peter tells it like a blind man 
nearing a vale of new truths, each found and set down alone, amid a silence: 
 
‘But in the end she wanted more time. She told me the train she would arrive 
on.’  
 
‘When it came she wasn’t on it.’ 
 
‘The telegram came at night. It was mother calling me home.’ 
 
 ‘Klara was not reckless; emotion must have blinded her.’ 
 
‘She had wanted a last skate on the lake I suppose. Of course, she had not told 
mother.’  
 
‘That lake is deep.’  
 
‘Her body was not found.’ 
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* 
 
Death quickens everything.  
Vera now needs rest in the afternoons. She wakes in the mornings for the 
breakfast Peter cooks her: jam toast, oat pancakes or porridge with powdered 
milk, which they eat together at the table. She takes her tablets and, depending on 
how she is feeling, either settles by the stove to read or knit and listen to the radio, 
or returns to bed. Usually, she takes a walk before lunch, alone. At first, Peter had 
accompanied her. Now, unless she invites him, he stays home, understanding her 
need for solitude. Afternoons belong to him. His routine grows around Vera’s, 
and just as it is a known fact between them, in the delicate fabric of their days, 
that Vera retires to her bedroom after their post-lunch conversation, so is it known 
that at this time, Peter leaves the house. He leaves against his better instincts. 
What if Vera needs him when he isn’t there? But he must continue to search. And 
so he walks with the anxiety of his distance from Vera, trying not to venture too 
far. He wishes he might find some kind of brass instrument; a bugle or horn, 
which Vera might sound in an emergency to bring him home. In the peace of this 
place, he would probably hear it. Yet if he was not there already, he wonders 
whether, at the last moment, she would call him. Whether she would call him, or 
face the end alone. 
 
* 
 
It is not just the right place he must discover, but the vessel. From civilisation he 
brings to this task only what he could carry; the rest must be found. Only since 
coming here has he conceded that these things, brought as precautions, are now 
the measure of a task he must undertake in this very place. All this, he had hoped 
to do in Australia. But she would not come.          
 He has never been an improviser, his art has never thrived under the pressure 
of necessity. He feels it to be against his classical nature, this gift he has admired 
in others. Imagine him now, gleaning like a peasant from already-looted ruins, 
stalking about a radioactive forest, finding himself contending between 
disassembling some structure built of fossilising wood planks or leaden stone, or 
else augmenting some found object for a ready-made, making Duchamp’s piquant 
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absurdity of necessity. I have to concede it makes me smile. The conservator must 
be aware of his own limitations.  
 
* 
 
Behind the house at the back of the garden, there is a cowshed which has not seen 
a cow for a long time. One day while looking at the apples on the apple tree and 
wondering whether, considering the fact of his numbered days, he might try one, 
the shed catches Peter’s eye. He moves closer. It is evident that the shed does not 
interest Vera. Clover has almost entirely obscured its entrance. With the help of 
an old rake, he begins to clear a path. When he reaches the door, he has to try 
three times before the rusted latch gives. The air is stale, with a clean smell of 
earth. Daylight falls in between the roof slats upon the dirt floor. A collection of 
garden tools lean along one wall, beside an upturned cane table and chair and 
across from a pile of ancient straw. Peter sits down in the chair, and looks out the 
door at the garden, so impossibly bright from those shadows. The shed isn’t 
weatherproof and it lacks light, but these things are solvable. It is a fine place for 
working.                
 That day, by the hour at which Vera usually emerges, Peter stands before a 
sturdy new workbench running the length of the shed. The bench is made of two 
large doors fitted between the wall slats on either side, and he tests its strength by 
hauling half his body onto it. The bench holds out. Swinging down, Peter touches 
a hand to his chin, as he does when pleased for a reason he cannot quite believe, 
and gives the bench a slap for good measure.         
 The next afternoon, he returns. Onto the bench with careful hands he sets the 
items down: the brushes, the gold leaf, the pot of paint; the mask of Klara, his 
Penguin Book of the Dead by Budge. The objects glisten in the shadowed light, 
eyeing him with incredulous indifference. So little for so great a task. Looking at 
the objects, he sees only what he lacks. How on earth to find it here? Grand plans 
of perfection are the enemy of any achievement now. Authenticity has always 
been impossible; in this place, it is a joke. The conservator should not make 
determinations that are beyond his knowledge or undertake tasks that exceed his 
skills.                  
 All Peter can aim for is the best he can manage, a result born of what 
 88 
materials he can scavenge. His creation, despite its failings, will manifest his pure 
intent, faithful yet to the ancient truth. 
 
* 
 
One day out walking, having visited the nearby wooden church and returning to 
the house along an overgrown road which cut through abandoned farmlets, few 
buildings of which still stand, although their relics are everywhere, Peter comes 
across one solution to his problem: a water trough of tin. After clearing the mass 
of grass which obscures it, he looks it over. The trough is rectangular and long, 
rusted but easy enough, being tin, to carry home, as it is unattached to the ground. 
At a time when he knows Vera will be resting, he drags the trough into the shed. 
Inside, with linseed oil and a scourer, he removes what rust he can. He does not 
yet concede that a farmyard water trough, from which swine and horses once 
drank, is the vessel he must settle for. There is time. In the shed he will assemble 
his options, and then he will choose.             
 
* 
 
 Does Vera suspect?               
 Peter worries about this, and other things. What is he doing, carving in a shed 
while she is alive and nearby? Vera is dying, Vera is to die: as he knew before she 
told him, yet still it is a kind of knowing owned by only half the body, the 
intellect’s weaker, drier half. Those words tell the plot of an impossible story, 
oxymoronic, even as he carves. The primitive in his body is incredulous as the 
opponents of Galileo: Vera cannot die. The heart denies what the imagination will 
not contain; Peter is no exception. He repeats the words until he hears them no 
more; still, that part of him disbelieves. Yet, he begins to see Vera now as the true 
figure of what, to his eyes, she has always been—a sceptre of a woman, with a 
foot already aground beyond; a persistent presence transcending a body, not truly 
human.                   
 Yet in truth, Vera is the earthiest of women. No instinct is more native to her 
heart or mind than the instinct of sensing her place within nature’s landscape. 
Hers is an exquisite attunement. She knows when there will be rain by the dusk 
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and when a cow is ill by its lowing; she knows which hollows keep the wild 
honey and how near spring is by the geese. She can measure flour by eye and 
make herbal balms when no doctor is near. She knows how to measure the 
quantities and characteristics of radionuclides in any environment, and, within the 
ever-expanding limits of science, what this means.        
 I see Peter, defying all his powers of insight, obscuring Vera with a mirror 
that reflects himself.              
 My father was nothing if not a shaman by nature, and it was a nature 
experience had not changed. Far from dulling the sense in which, from childhood, 
he perceived a kind of living being in all things, his lifelong study of objects had 
served to sharpen this sensibility to an exquisite point. His world was animate; all 
orders of being were in some way aligned. He believed in the mysterious primacy 
of the senses and the truths they told him, truths which, for Peter, when touching 
an object or a human hand, when beholding the lineaments of a landscape or a 
human face, reached beyond the capacities of most men—in his own mind, if not 
in reality.                 
 In the physical world, my mother took an equal delight, and yet her own 
enquiring mind turned upon uncovering the hidden operations behind the most 
empirical of truths. Peter observed no such delineation between earthly matter and 
the figures of his mind, although not necessarily for wont of trying. While he 
sought from the world of phenomena and ideas an answer to his own reality, she 
sought from that same world an answer to itself. So for both did the notion of the 
soul diverge: Peter believed in it; the woman he loved did not.  
 
* 
 
In the evenings, over a wood board in his lap, Peter begins to craft tiny sculptures 
in Vera’s image out of the clay he bought in Kiev. He does this openly in Vera’s 
presence as she reads nearby, eyeing her as he approximates the traditional cross-
armed standing pose with headdress. These placid-faced sculptures are shabti 
tomb figures who were intended to hoe fields and steer river boats for the Ancient 
Egyptians in their Afterlife. He would prefer to have had her pose formally. When 
he asked her to pose standing rigidly straight with her arms crossed against her 
chest in the garden one sunny day, it was, even for amnesiac Vera, a case of déjà 
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vu. She remained sitting in her chair, only looking at him darkly with heavy-
lidded eyes. For a moment he felt them rearing up against a familiar rock face, 
each steeled for impact, before he smiled and turned away to rake the path instead. 
He does not ask again, but continues in the task alone with good humour. When 
the shabti begin to appear, for the purpose of drying, in the space beneath the 
stove, Vera does not look at them. After a while the stove is never without one or 
two, standing in defiance, like sentries before a sacred fire.  
         
* 
        
Twenty years before meeting Klara, a series of dreams induced in Peter an 
irrevocable conviction which he could never otherwise have entertained, for all 
his superstitious shaman blood. He met and rediscovered Klara, of whom he had 
also dreamed, through the wild interweavings of chance. It happened that she was 
born in a doomed place, in which the residue of Armageddon wrought a slow 
havoc in her veins. His weak heart would beat beyond hers; she, the beloved, 
would die first.                 
 Vera does not believe that Peter was a priest in a prior life. She does not 
believe that any life is lived before or after the present one. She believes that Peter 
believes these things. Time has convinced her of God’s inexistence. The only 
eternity is on Earth. Vera contemplates the fact that, for better or worse, this tall, 
fine-boned man, years older than herself, is the person with whom she will see out 
her last earthly days. This warm-skinned, familiar stranger with a carved face, 
whose eyes and cheekbones are her son’s. She knows he loves her. Why? He 
emanates love like an urgent red current he tries to hide. It is a love Vera cannot 
own. It arrived in her life independent, fully formed and foreign as a botanical 
transplant. It needs neither her consent nor her reciprocation. Hardy as a weed, it 
thrives alone. Peter’s love happened to her, as had his child. Peter had all the 
holdings of memory to stake his love on. He claimed the implications of moments 
in days and weeks that she could never judge.        
 Why does she let him stay? Is it simply because she could not be here in her 
illness alone? She is facing her own end. Peter knew this instinctively. It seems 
that nothing need be spelled out in order for him to know it, and there is comfort 
in this. He is a man unafraid of mortality. He claims to love her unconditionally. 
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Vera does not want her son to see her dying. She does not want to burden her 
mother, who must look after him. Because Peter is there to look after her, Vera 
may choose the way she dies. This is a gift. She believes it is given by a man who 
essentially is good, without condition or design.        
 Perhaps she is wrong.              
    
* 
 
Peter decides on the trough, for he must now begin. One day in late summer, he 
finds the perfect lid. It is a solid cedar door. He has only the most rudimentary 
tools for carpentry in the toolbox from Kiev. With these and with the axe Vera 
brought to chop wood, the carving knife from the kitchen and the rusty saw in the 
shed, he makes do. Often when he is working, he composes the words he wishes 
Vera could hear. Peter’s diaries, at times, would also lapse into speeches to Vera, 
addressing all the things he knew he could never say:       
 No shroud or earth pit for you, my dear. This will transport you faithfully. I 
wanted to craft two inner holdings of cedar, varnished to the point of 
incandescence. I could not. Yet I have painted upon it old images in beautiful 
colours. The one glory of this crude vessel is to be your true image, brought with 
me from home, the mask I made of your face in gold.  
 
* 
 
One afternoon in the shed, having lunched on an egg sandwich with vodka under 
the apple tree, Peter is bathed in the light of his favourite time of day there, the 
radio crackling out a vigorous gypsy tune of violins inside the burnished gloom, 
inhaling the smell of moss and cedar. Standing before the workbench on which 
the cedar door is laid, Peter thinks about design, and dreams of his tools, cool and 
gleaming in their canvas roll on his desk in Australia. From the shed door, which 
stands ajar, a shaft of sunlight falls across the bench. He places his palms on the 
wood, feeling them warm. The lid needs sanding. With a piece of chalk, Peter 
begins to trace the outline of the trough, the border he will remove to ensure the 
right fit, leaving an overlap under which he will carve a groove to slot in the lid 
snug over the trough, before bevelling the edge. All I can do for her is my best, he 
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tells himself, and takes the saw.            
 He is too deep in concentration and making too much noise with the saw to 
notice, moments later, the sudden way the light is blocked by a doorway shadow. 
Vera stands there observing him for a full minute before he turns. For a moment, 
they look at each other, Peter’s face in shadow and Vera’s in the light. She walks 
away before he can think of what to say. She is meant to be sleeping.  
 
* 
 
 When he comes inside, she is cutting bread in the kitchen.     
 ‘I felt better this afternoon so I came outside. I heard the music.’    
 She speaks in a soft, even voice, cutting more bread than she needs to eat. 
Pale, she pauses for a moment to grip the table. Gently, Peter nudges her aside and 
gestures to a chair. He spreads jam on two slices of bread and sets it before her 
with a glass of water. Vera is holding her head in her hands.      
 ‘I am tired.’                
 ‘I know.’                
 She eats a little, carefully, and Peter watches over her. When she has finished, 
she looks at him seated opposite her, his large hands folded on the table between 
them.                  
 ‘What are you doing in the shed?’          
 ‘Working with some wood I found. A gift for you.’      
 In the pause that follows, Peter deduces that this explanation is enough for 
now. He expects a retort about the poisoned nature of most wood he could have 
found nearby, or an inquiry as to what the gift will be. But Vera only nods, saying 
nothing. He cannot tell whether she believes him. In any case, he hasn’t lied.  
                    
* 
 
Even had Peter not been a fatalistic sort, bereavement, a condemned heart and a 
fervent belief in an afterlife were all conditions sympathetic to a reckless task 
involving radioactive earth and the breaking of international laws.    
 What qualities has the ideal site? Evidently, he is bound by the possibilities of 
a particular geography. There is no desert here. All the same, it must be dry. It 
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must also be hidden to the naked eye. Peter is thinking of some dug-out 
underground. Inexperienced in such constructions, Peter sees he will have to 
learn. He ruminates on the poisoned things buried beneath the soil here, on Vera’s 
body becoming another of the things that this earth swallows up. The site of 
Vera’s internment demands camouflage, and so he situates it in the forest, 
underground, drawing an intricate map in order that the location should never be 
lost. The map is drawn in his diary. He marks the spot, amid a pine copse in the 
south-east of the Red Forest, with a V.  
 
* 
 
Vera is never going to return with him to Australia; this Peter knows, and he has 
long ceased asking. Her burial is another matter. He would like her blessing. He 
would like to explain it all, and to have her understand. He would like it to be a 
source of comfort. ‘Let me bury you, Vera’, he wants to say in a low, fervent 
voice into the silence as he observes her one day, sitting on the stool before the 
stove, and then to tell her how it is to be. The words hover on his tongue.   
 He has been on the couch reading Vera’s Gogol in Russian, surrendering 
again to the intricacies of that language, the more complex contractions 
summoning in him forgotten muscles, weak but living. Vera is waiting for their 
afternoon coffee to boil, staring glaze-eyed into the flames.      
 What if he had really said the words? Imagine them said—imagine afterward, 
the seismic reality of that room. She does not turn immediately when he speaks. 
Peter at first thinks she has not heard. A moment later, though, she does turn, 
meeting his eyes with slow deliberation. She has heard. Her eyes are clear, and 
hold his own for a long moment. Her face reveals nothing, and nothing is said. 
Finally she blinks, and stoops to stoke the fire.         
 A half-minute later the coffee is boiled. She places his cup before him. Who 
knows what then might have been said. For of course, he never does ask her, and 
never receives her blessing.  
 
* 
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One evening, when Vera retires to bed early, Peter goes in to warm her room with 
a pail of embers, before sitting down in the chair beside her bed. For a while he 
watches her face, peaceful at first and then, for a few minutes in which her body 
turns back and forth, pained. When she is deep in sleep again, her breathing 
regular, he forces himself to look away, worrying she will wake beneath his 
constant gaze. Whatever the coming weeks might bring, he sends a silent word of 
thanks into the wild night, for her presence here beside him. He remembers the 
certainty he felt, so recently, that he would never see that face again.    
 Opening a Russian volume of Pushkin, whom he has not read since 
childhood, Peter finally sits back to read. Eventually, he sleeps.    
 While he sleeps, he dreams that he is chasing Vera through the red forest. 
Although it is the dead of night, somehow, he can see. As he races, he notes how 
his body, somehow, has become an extension of the forest. In his heartbeat echoes 
the heartbeats of a thousand nearby creatures in the trees, in burrows above and 
below ground. He feels the deep nocturnal hoot of the long-eared owls in his 
chest, imparting to him strength. His legs and feet seem capable of running 
forever; he barely feels them, and yet he never seems to gain on Vera. Barefoot, 
she runs on and on, tireless as a cheetah, weaving through trees, her hair wild. She 
wears a white nightgown he has not seen before, which trails behind her without 
impeding her speed. It is the white nightgown which lights his path, it belongs to 
the moon. Running through the night behind her, Peter realises that there is 
nothing he wants that he does not have. He realises, running, with Vera within his 
vision, that he is happy.              
 After a while, Vera looks back at him and smiles, as if she is going to wait for 
him. Yet she does not. Running on after her, suddenly Peter feels afraid. He 
wonders whether he is following the real Vera. He doesn’t want her to look back 
again. When she does, he screams. He stops running, and looks through where her 
face should be, to the trees beyond, before she tears off again and he is somehow 
impelled to follow.                
 The nightmare goes on, as the owls in his chest grow louder and he begins to 
feel the cold. Fluid as ectoplasm and without missing a step, Vera splits in two, 
and Peter must choose which figure to follow. When the figure he chooses looks 
back, it is his sister, and he pleads for the nightmare to stop. At that moment, the 
figure he is chasing stops running, and stands still, her back to him. He advances, 
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without wanting to. When he is a metre away, her head begins to turn toward him, 
and before she is facing him directly, he sees the plaster mask. She looks like a 
regal Venetian at Carnevale. Her eyes are black holes that look through him. It is 
the mask he made. Finally, when his eyes take her in again as a whole, he sees 
that she is no longer human, but completely remade in plaster. She does not move 
when he speaks her name. He finds he cannot go closer, cannot bring himself to 
touch her. Finally, he runs on, without knowing where he is headed, passing the 
statue frozen in the forest, passing her image, for the last time. 
 
When he wakes, the room is cold, the owls are calling beneath a steady patter of 
rain, and Vera is awake, sitting up, staring for what he feels might have been a 
long time, at his face. He cannot read her.         
 ‘Did I wake you?’ he asks.            
 ‘I don’t know.’                
 ‘I’m sorry if I did, it was a nightmare.’         
 ‘It doesn’t matter.’            
 Glancing at her, he notes how she seems transfixed by some magnetic point 
within herself, her cheeks flushed, her eyes with a strange light.    
 ‘Did you sleep well?’ he asks.           
 ‘I don’t know. I suppose. I dreamt of the forest…’      
 She speaks the words as if to herself, before resting her eyes on him, for a 
moment in which he feels winded. It is not possible, he thinks, it is too much. 
 ‘I…dreamt I was in a forest too, chasing you.’       
 ‘Yes,’ she says, matter-of-fact, as if this is something she already knew. Peter 
worries she may be in the grip of some delirium related to her illness. Then, as if 
reading his thoughts, she looks at him, calm and direct and utterly sane, her eyes 
full of kindness and sorrow. Her voice is measured. He feels her struggling to 
guard her emotion.              
 ‘You know you cannot chase me where I’m going. That’s why we’re here. 
Peter, at some point you must let me go.’        
 Silently, he nods. For a moment, they look away from each other in silence. 
When, looking back at her, he sees her brimming eyes, and her mouth pressed in 
so as not to tremble, he breaks. He lets the tide in, pleads at the ceiling, gasps for 
air on his knees. He can hardly speak.           
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 ‘Oh Vera!’ he cries, at the foot of her bed, grasping her bedclothed feet. 
 ‘Don’t,’ she says, ‘please, don’t!’          
 For her eyes are streaming now too, when she vowed not to let it come to this. 
She refuses to look at him, as he says, ‘You know how I love you!’   
 At her feet, Peter weeps. She says nothing, she looks away, fury and fear on 
her face.                
 ‘I’m sorry,’ he says, ‘I’m sorry, I can’t bear it!’      
 When his sobs die down to heavy breathing, some time later, he finally looks 
up at her, and is fixed with the most imploring look.       
 ‘Stop it.’                
 He looks at her, a question on his face.         
 ‘Whatever it is you’re doing in the shed, stop it.’       
 He stares, a dart in his chest, his eyes enormous.      
 ‘You know what I mean, Peter. I can’t stand it. I need you to be here, with 
me.’                  
 She is sobbing openly now, having lost the battle with herself. 
 Astonished, Peter draws her to him, and she lets him hold her until her sobs 
die down.                 
 ‘But Vera. Where is it that you think you’ll go?’      
 ‘Where we all go, Peter. Back to the earth.’        
 There are many things, at this moment, that he wants to say. The words well 
in him, in the silence between them. What he wants to say, I suspect, is something 
like: it needn’t be that way. But her fragility scares him, and he only holds her 
closer.                   
 ‘I’m sorry, Vera. I’m here. I’m here.’         
  
* 
 
The next morning they sleep late, and after breakfast, walk all the way into 
Pripyat, the ghost city, stopping at the river. They stand on the frail bridge, 
leaning over the railing, staring into the water, seeing who can spot the largest 
catfish.                 
 ‘Look, right there,’ says Peter, pointing at a dark, submerged shape. 
 ‘Where? Where?’ says Vera, her head darting around to find it. As she looks, 
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Peter, brazen in the cool air, walks around to encircle her from behind. He feels 
her body tense, like a hare, before relaxing into the embrace. He nuzzles into her 
neck, as she pretends to look for more giant catfish.       
 Later, warning him that they must be careful to avoid being seen by any of the 
officials working in the town, Vera shows him the town supermarket, the sports 
centre, the cinema, explaining them all from a narrative distance. From the open 
window of an office building nearby, they see the face of Lenin peering out from 
a mildewed poster, in which he smiles benevolently, his figure unnaturally large 
amid a crowd of robust, rosy-faced workers, above the caption, ‘We’ll give the 
Motherland bread!’                
 They step inside the crumbling preschool with its debris of heartbreak—one-
eyed dolls, drawings of flowers, all amid a mass of Cold War era gas masks and 
droppings and bird feathers. Inside the nursery room atop an iron cot, lies the 
skeleton of a deer. From her pocket, Vera draws her Geiger counter, and holds it 
over the bones. It clicks on and on.           
 She tells him they cannot visit the reactor. It is too dangerous; there are 
workers there, and guards.             
 Tiring, Vera takes Peter’s arm. On the way home, they pass an elderly couple, 
part of the Zone’s small population of ‘re-settlers’, tolerated by the government as 
they cost nothing, have nowhere else to go and will die soon. The couple, 
probably far younger than they look, are hauling firewood back to wherever it is 
they live. They seem cheerful, and exchange a greeting.       
 ‘It’s getting cold, now!’ says the woman, her sun-weathered face a map of 
lines, her smile flashing a gold tooth. ‘It’s time to burrow, like the animals!’  
 But neither Peter nor Vera wants to think of winter.      
 All day, Peter avoids the shed. 
 
* 
 
That evening, faced with the quandary of dinner and their diminishing supplies, 
they begin what will become, for the following weeks, a ritual routine.  
 ‘What will we have?’ asks Vera, as Peter wanders over to gaze 
philosophically at the contents of the cupboards.         
 ‘I’d say it’s time for Lobster Newburg, wouldn’t you?’      
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 She disagrees. ‘I would prefer Beef Stroganoff’, she says, or Viennese 
Schnitzel or parmesan soufflé; any one of a succession of impossibilities.  
 Peering deeper into the cupboards, Peter clicks his tongue.    
 ‘Well, it’s not my night. Looks like we’re just out of lobster. But it seems 
we’re out of beef too.’ Vera dares a smile at this.        
 ‘Ah well. We’ll have to settle for potatoes instead’.        
 Thus is their delicate order for a time preserved. 
 
* 
 
We will be judged when the heart is measured, in the last hall. If the heart is true 
and the body whole, eternity may beckon. Life may be lived in death. Even if the 
real body does not resurrect, the vital presence of the being it held will endure, in 
a myriad of colourful incarnations. Souls do not die.        
 All this, my father Peter Volkov believed, in the wrong time and place to 
believe it. The idea of the human soul is the most persistent of proofless truths. If, 
of the ideas alive today, still quick from the pulse of ancient thought, there are 
those as fundamental as the soul—God, Judgement, eternity—there is not one as 
universal. Proofless, it haunts the poet, philosopher and scientist alike. It absorbs 
the theologian, it breathes into the atheist’s ear, it allows the dying no place to 
hide. Are we animal or are we spirit, and if we are both, by what mechanism are 
they tied?                  
 It is not easy, this new order, in which he avoids the shed.    
 Around this time, Peter’s diary often lapses into a kind of shorthand. It is 
filled with lists of materials and tools, with geometric sketches and measurements. 
There is much I will never know. I suspect that, at this point, he felt physically 
torn. He did not want to hurt Vera, or ever again betray her trust. But how much 
did Vera comprehend of his work in the shed, of his ultimate designs? Even I 
can’t be sure, because I myself don’t know exactly what Peter’s work in the shed 
really signified.               
 When I think about Peter’s faith, that strange ancient faith he tried to 
reanimate from books and ancient artefacts, I feel that he might have found reason 
to deceive Vera, despite her trust, and despite his love. Because Peter’s faith 
decreed that, should the body be put to rest correctly, eternal life was possible. It 
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is tempting to laugh. But faith in eternal life is hardly remarkable—it’s just the 
methods the ancient Egyptians ascribed to that now seem archaic, deviant, and 
morbid. In another time and place, whole kingdoms practiced these rites.  
 I don’t know whether Peter and Vera had talked about how she was to be 
buried. I don’t know whether she expressed explicitly a desire to be buried 
covertly in the Zone, or to be buried conventionally in town in a grave my 
grandmother and I could visit. I like to think the latter was true.     
 Certainly, Peter was building a coffin in that shed. He was grieving, and 
needed something to do with his hands—I would not begrudge him that. But was 
a beautiful, unorthodox coffin, painted in the Egyptian style and made with love, 
his only design? That is the question I cannot answer.      
 Was the plaster bandage he brought from Kiev only for the coffin’s layer of 
cartonnage, on which he painted? Why would a man who truly believed he could 
grant his dying beloved an afterlife, not consider doing so, despite her?  
 
* 
 
Vera retreats inside herself. Peter keeps a meticulous vigil. Perhaps, to signal 
trouble during those rare moments when he is not by her side, he gives Vera a bell 
or whistle, which she refuses to use. Peter keeps his vigil in the perpetual 
expectation of being asked to leave. But he takes his cues from her, is quiet when 
she is quiet, and is allowed to stay. Usually, they read, separately. Sometimes, 
they eat bread made by Peter to Vera’s instructions, toasted on a poker over the 
stove fire, with jam from the berries of summers far from there. Sometimes they 
pause to share aloud a funny or striking sentence. Ordinary speech has for the 
most part been replaced by something more primitive; a dense, all-pervading 
knowing that cannot and need not be signified with words. This is not the kind of 
peace either would have chosen, but it is a peace of sorts, all the same; when what 
is and what will be are known and bowed to.        
 One afternoon, Vera’s voice interrupts Peter reading Lives of the Artists. 
 ‘You are a hungry man, Peter.’            
 He turns to stare at her. She half turns toward him from her position on the 
base of the stove, her hands moving absently to wind the red wool she has just 
unravelled from an old cardigan, from which she plans to knit a hat. She wears a 
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matter-of-fact look which retains in it a kind of dreaminess.      
 ‘Desire devours you because you allow it to.’ 
 ‘You misunderstand.’            
 ‘No. You don’t see what is clear to me. You have already what you desire: 
desire itself. For you it is its own end.’         
 These are the words I imagine Vera speaking to Peter at some point in time 
after he finds her again. Her phrases change; the meaning stays the same. And yet 
after years I cannot hear Peter’s reply. I have thought out some possibilities, none 
of them right. After a while the image of Vera waiting for the words fades in my 
mind, my ears fill with white noise, and I confront the fact that anyone’s guess is 
as good as mine. Perhaps the truth is that he said nothing at all, because, to the 
truth as Vera spoke it, there was nothing to add.         
 Let us imagine that, one day not long after this, Vera quietly dies.   
 I can only see her dying as quiet, if for no reason than her natural discretion.  
 
* 
 
Suppose this is the moment, now: Peter alone in a room of that ruined house, from 
which Vera’s live being has just receded. There he is, at the precise point a 
beloved being becomes a body, unanswerable, inanimate, unbreathing—which is 
the moment of love’s true reckoning. Only when the irreducible, animate presence 
of such a being departs is its weight in the living finally known. As the warmth of 
life is still leaving, the rift opens like the yawning earth. Desire comes upon him, 
the dusk light chased by dark. To absorb her. If he could not absorb this being 
with its native soul, he could preserve it.           
 So do bodies become objects.            
 After he inspects her face, her hands, like a lover, he inspects them as a 
conservator, assessing the composition of a patina, the settings in an irreplaceable 
ornament of an unquantifiable value. The conservator must examine, record, and 
diagnose the object in question.             
 He has never trained for this. 
 
* 
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Perhaps, on the kitchen table atop a bed sheet, a candle or two alight for 
atmosphere, Peter prepares her body. In conserving an object, correct procedures 
must be upheld. His eyes are dry. He brushes her hair. With chaste hands he 
undresses her, blesses with water her cooling skin, before drawing over her a 
washcloth soaked in ammonia. It grows dark outside. The fire is out; he is cold. In 
the twilight gloom, Vera’s body is luminescent. Somehow then, in that forsaken 
room, Peter summons the ability to do what it is he does next; to mar that body 
with hooks and knives. The conservator must now take action.     
 I will not shy from picturing what he is now required to do: the organs are 
removed, what fluid can be drained in a primitive way is drained, the organs are 
replaced with muslin packs of table salt and baking soda; the cavity left by the 
brain is replaced with epoxy resin which hardens. The heart is left intact. He does 
not bother with the kidneys. At last, he weeps. 
 
* 
 
This process would take seventy days, taking Peter into the depths of winter. 
Outside, the grass is so cold it snaps. When his nose runs, it freezes before he can 
find a handkerchief. During this time, the salt absorbs the moisture inside her. 
Finally, the salt is removed. The skin is anointed with fragrant oils and resin. The 
openings are closed with suture thread. Within a silk sheath, the body is bound in 
bandage ripped by hand. At last, the conservator must revise the record, and 
administer final care.              
 It is a vital moment, this binding. Irrevocable. When he draws the fabric over 
Vera’s face, when he binds it snug around her body, Peter says his last earthly 
goodbye. Vera is now a heavy oblong object in need of further packaging. 
Lacking an adequate burial chamber, the onsite ritual must begin with a body 
prepared elsewhere—I see it for some reason as the kitchen; it could have been 
anywhere. I see Peter in the gloom before her, a craftsman at his bench before he 
becomes a priest, binding the linen strips tight around her with visible exertion. 
Has he begun to think of the days beyond this? Can he imagine returning to his 
prior life?                 
 When she is bound many times, she is ready. For a moment, perhaps in the 
dying light of afternoon, Peter steps back and allows himself in full consciousness 
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to behold the body, to feel the weight of her departure and her death. He registers, 
with the wonder of a long-ago self, this end to that day before Venus in the 
museum, to that luminous woman, ever familiar and ever strange, left to him now 
only in this frail form. After this pause, Peter manoeuvres Vera onto a door, and 
arranges her as best he can lengthways across the car, which he drives slowly to 
the forest, stopping to clear branches from the road along the way. He can only 
just carry her on his shoulder.             
 Finally he reaches the dugout, shielded from humans and animals by a 
thatching of branches made inconspicuous by a layer of earth and leaves. Setting 
the door down, he clears the branches from the opening. He looks at it now, and 
wonders if he could have done better. It is no pyramid. It is the width of four 
standard graves, six feet deep, the best he could do in a few months of afternoons 
alone with a shovel and trowel. The casket is already there, the lid lies in wait. 
Having eased himself down, he lowers Vera vertically.      
 Finally, he sets her in the water trough of tin upon which all the spells are 
painted. His measurements were correct. She fits. It is now that Peter commences 
a ceremony that could never be rehearsed.  
 
* 
 
I compel myself to picture it, a ludicrous vision: he reads from the Book, the 
Budge translation, as, for all his accomplishments, Peter cannot fluently decipher 
hieroglyphs. Like the performance of all ritual divorced in time and place from its 
native origin, this ritual is a re-enactment. I see in it an aspect of farce.   
 Peter’s is a faith grafted from the material remains of a dead culture—the 
artefacts of museums, the consequent deductions of historians. I wonder whether 
at some level he balked at the sheer absurdity of his predicament, reciting the 
translated vignettes of a religious text with no true living adherent, before the 
bandaged body of a dead woman, inside a forest pit in Ukraine. Considering the 
fervour of the religious convictions that put him there, I suppose I have to doubt 
it.                    
 Is it curious that when I think of him there in the pit in the final hour of his 
task, my first instinct is always to laugh? It is too ridiculous. Tragedy often is. For 
Vera is dead, and her body will do nothing more as a mummy than decompose 
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more slowly than she would have were she buried in the dress she chose, at a site 
her mother and son could have visited.   
               
* 
 
It is always curious when learned intelligence and deep superstition converge in a 
single mind, and the combination tempts all kinds of theories. I think, for 
example, of the psychic laceration of losing a twin, and the turns a grieving mind 
can take. I think of the seduction of seeing a dead beloved in one who breathes; of 
a wound closing around a fiction. And I think of how easy such answers are, 
daring me to mistrust them.             
 Peter claimed to draw his faith from a series of dreams, an involuntary 
experience of such narrative coherence and visceral intensity that it left him 
without recourse to doubt. My culture does not hold such dream visions to be 
much beyond a broken psychic code; others, such as those of shamanic Siberia, 
are known to differ. How is Peter’s intelligence itself to be judged? The human 
brain is capable of all kinds of wonders. Twins in particular have often been 
known to develop between each other certain esoteric inclinations, notably 
various forms of extra sensory perception. Peter came from a land of shamans. 
Who is to say his father was not some gifted tribal chief of the northern 
mountains, imparting his own charge to his son’s blood?       
 For years I have tried to fathom the desperation of a creature—so sensitive, 
capable of such tenderness—who could choose to deny so violently the wishes of 
a loved one in death, and in the fervour of faith, find moral justification for such 
an act. How did he plan to deflect suspicion, after it was done? What was he to 
say to Nina? Would he assert that Vera, driven mad in her wait for death, had 
thrown herself drugged into the poisoned river? No-one would look for a body in 
there, and this is a story people could believe of Vera, strong as she was, 
autonomous, fatal. Of course, Peter was not a murderer. His assault was more 
subtle, and did not end with a dead body alone. His assault was to the integrity of 
his own professed love, to Vera’s soul and memory, and to a dead woman’s 
mother and son.  
 
* 
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I began this puzzle in order to look upon it as a whole. I hoped to gain the distance 
necessary to make sense of it—so that this unrest about my own history would 
recede finally into the background of my life. The making sense is quite a task, I 
realise now, as it entails the judgement of a story put together with many 
imagined pieces. I think of one of Peter’s Egyptian urns, restored to wholeness 
with replication clay, forming the greater shape that the true remnants suggest. 
The question I come to is this: should Peter be judged by the ultimate end which 
his actions aimed to realise, or only by what it was that reality finally permitted? 
The answer depends on the degree of certainty one has in the solidity of his 
intentions. Were these intentions ever breached by the doubt of moral conscience, 
the uncertainty of whether, ultimately, they were good and right? Could anything 
but the intervention of gods have prevented his carrying them out? I look at what 
evidence I have—his diaries and letters—my feeble childhood memories do not 
count here—and squint into the distance.  
 
* 
 
Now, return to the point before Vera’s death, and envision a different story: Peter 
and Vera in the stone house three months after arriving, in autumn. The coffin is 
made, the burial site chosen; Peter is prepared. Life has continued on much the 
same—Vera’s solitary morning walk and Peter’s free afternoons, shared dinners 
at dusk and frail jokes about food. Vera’s condition is weak but unchanged. They 
have both lost weight. There is less and less to separate their bodies from the bitter 
outside air. They feel at times exquisitely light.  Soon it will be too cold to remain, 
but neither speaks of this.             
 Peter, living to see out his task and neglecting his own terminal condition, has 
been out of medication for two weeks. He thinks of Vera finding him dead in a 
field. He thinks of not being alive to bury her. Peter can no longer ignore the fact: 
he is only waiting now, waiting for Vera’s death.       
 And yet this death does not come. Winter is on the way, with the early frost 
and a bitter chill which seeps through the cracks in the walls and which the most 
ravenous stove fire cannot touch. When it rains, it also rains inside. Neither wants 
to be the first to declare that they must leave.           
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 For this is the real story, the story Peter did not envisage. Vera does not die. 
Euridyce has turned from the Underworld, and Peter must consider his position. 
The water trough-coffin with the golden mask remains forever in the cowshed. 
The burial pit lies empty in the forest, waiting to claim some other creature—an 
elk, a deer, their hunter. 
 
* 
 
That Vera will not die—not, at least, for many years—is a fact that does not sink 
in for Peter until they have passed a week in Vera’s civilised town, in her 
apartment again, opposite the neat park, sealed from the bitter Ukrainian cold. 
 ‘He says it isn’t common, but it happens. He says the tumour is now the size 
of half a rouble,’ says Vera to Peter in a mystified voice, after a visit to her doctor.
 ‘It is wonderful Vera, so wonderful,’ he says in a voice she finds strange, 
supposing it is shock.             
 Vera’s cancer is in remission, and Peter’s heart is seizing. By phone, he 
wrangles an agreement between a local doctor and his own, replenishing his store 
of medications. He feels time running from him now, like a vital fluid of his own 
body.  
In the following weeks, as Vera’s vitality returns, Peter begins to discern the 
true distance of the pyramids. His feels his appalling mortality, the exhaustion of 
his skeleton, the futility of plans before a hostile fate. What of his own body? 
Peter is in a foreign country. He is with the one he loves. He is tired.  
 
* 
 
That winter, without formal discussion and as if by natural progression, Peter 
settles into Vera’s spare room. At a pace so gradual that the change at first escapes 
them, Peter begins to accumulate there the materials of living—trousers and shirts 
bought one by one, English novels, paper and crayons and Indian inks, a cheap 
card table for writing, easels for their art sessions.        
 In the months before Vera returns to work, they do many things together. 
Vera shows Peter her favourite parts of Kiev and the Polessia region. They visit 
museums and sit in churches talking. They visit expensive restaurants for Lobster 
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Newburg and drink wine. In St Petersburg, after a recital by the Philharmonic 
Orchestra, they are caught outside when it begins to snow, and Vera buys Peter a 
Russian winter hat with flaps that he cannot wear without provoking in her fits of 
laughter. They have long, slow mornings over coffee. The cold confines their 
drawing and painting to inside, so Peter oversees Vera’s mastery of the still life. 
When he goes to the market, he often returns with the oddest fruit and vegetables 
he can find for her to draw, turnips and misshapen pears, Chinese cabbage, 
swedes, celeriac. In the evenings they take turns reading aloud from Peter’s 
volume of Poe. They make plans to visit Lyviv with Ivan in the spring.   
 There is now an altered light to Vera’s face—it is not the light of Klara, it is 
not the light of Vera when she was ill. The bearing of her body and soul has lost 
its former weight. Whether it is due to having looked into the void that is the 
atheist’s death, and being granted a reprieve; or due to coming finally to own 
some part of the tenderness she was enveloped in—for the first time since Peter 
has known her, Vera is happy. Now, he asks for no more than this.  
 
* 
 
Vera wants to see more of Ivan. Since her return, and the delivery to her mother 
and son of her good news, they have visited more frequently. The fact is that, as 
religiously as Ivan loves his mother, he is afraid of her. She is to him a distant 
figure, a sad-eyed and changeful goddess who comes and goes like the figments 
of his dreams. Each time he farewells her, he imagines it as the last time. 
Compared to his mother, Ivan’s grandmother is a stoic presence, dependable as a 
ledge in an old landscape which is always warm. It will take time for his mythical 
image of Vera to be displaced by the Vera who is simply a woman, and his 
mother, who is now well, and there to stay.         
 It is not only Vera who wants to see more of Ivan. Peter’s unlikely fatherhood 
has been a late revelation. He delights in his son, and, with fascination, attempts to 
discover him as he might an artwork.           
 At some imperceptible point in the course of things, Vera realises that she 
prefers life with Peter around. As this is a fact her brain has little to do with, she 
does not interrogate it. I imagine that Vera expressed these feelings to Peter in her 
own way—of course, as to how exactly, I don’t know. But I imagine that Peter 
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might not always have slept in the spare room.       
 Peter’s visa has expired, but he will not be returning home. 
 
* 
 
Vera knows nothing about the state of Peter’s heart. He has access now, through a 
local doctor to his medications at an exorbitant price, but these medications are no 
longer enough. He does not want to tell Vera of his difficulty breathing in the 
night. He hides from her the nausea he experiences without warning throughout 
the day. He hides his swollen ankles and distended stomach. He is exhausted, at 
times, he can barely move. Every day feels stolen. 
When there is no longer a choice, Peter tells Vera, if she has not already 
guessed, that he is now the dying one. It was not beyond either of them to see the 
joke in it, but the joke would not have been felt for long. In the end, they had just 
over a year, and for that time I believe they were happy. 
 
* 
 
Peter dies in his sleep, from a heart attack, and is spared the indignity of being an 
illegal in a foreign hospital.             
 His funeral is a dim memory. Before the priest in the cemetery, my mother 
shed tears without motion or noise. I remember thinking she looked pretty in her 
black lace dress.                
 She probably had a list of people to contact when Peter died. Ezra was the 
only one who made it over. He was a wisp-haired, delicate man in a trench coat, 
older than Peter, with a kind face. He gave me an Australian dollar and a toy 
koala. After the service, my mother spoke with him over tea and cake in the 
kitchen while I pretended to watch TV. I realise now that they must have talked, 
among other things, of his understanding with Peter that, whenever I came to 
Australia, his guardianship would always be mine. When Ezra’s airport taxi 
arrived, we said goodbye.  
 
* 
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Vera is alone again. Her life is full of time, and she longs for the absorption of 
work. She contemplates the possibilities of her remaining years as if she is not the 
one who will live them. At this point, on the heels of Peter’s death, my 
grandmother dies, and I, Ivan, the child, re-enter this scene.      
 The afternoon my grandmother is admitted to hospital, I wait in a foyer full of 
echoes, with a chocolate bar and a fat nurse who has a voice too high for her 
body. Despite my fear for my grandmother, I am enraptured by the spectacle of a 
foreign place. When my mother appears before me in grave-sounding shoes and a 
yellow dress, I realise my grandmother must be gravely ill. I stare at her as she 
speaks to the nurse in tones that tell me she is flustered, as the light from the 
window behind makes a halo of her hair, until the nurse pokes me and I come to. 
Holding my mother’s hand on the way to the car I hurry to keep pace, inhaling the 
heavy floral smell about her, trying to discern it. After strapping me in with a deep 
sigh, and arranging herself on the driver’s side, she turns to me, and I decide the 
smell is similar to that of the shopgirl who gives me butterscotch at my 
grandmother’s chemist. I see that my mother’s eyes are not blue as I had thought, 
but grey, and forgive myself as I cannot remember her ever having been this 
close. She is saying something about my grandmother needing to stay at the 
hospital for a little while, and that for now I will stay with her. She delivers this 
news as if it is something to be borne, as if she is expecting some tantrum to 
contend with. I long for my grandmother, and wish that my mother were there 
because she herself truly wanted to see me. I wonder whether she behaves the way 
she does because she thinks I don’t love her. Considering this along the road, my 
chest tight with guilt, I think about what I can do, short of laying bare my feelings 
to her outright, to make my love clear. In the end, I decide that it doesn’t matter 
what I do or what my mother thinks, as long as my grandmother gets better. 
 I don’t know what I am expecting when we reached her apartment. Milk and 
biscuits and a board game, perhaps, or the heart to heart we never had. I chastise 
myself for this later—‘can’t you see she’s tired?’ because when we are inside, she 
sets me in front of the television with a ham sandwich and retires to bed until the 
evening. I watch ice hockey and a program on the life of Lenin until the room 
grows dim and hunger impinges on my sense of propriety, inducing me to tiptoe 
around the strange kitchen and form a meal of cheese and rye.     
 I think my mother is surprised by the depth of her grief at Peter’s death, and 
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when my grandmother finally succumbs to cancer, her despair is total. She begins 
to move as though her body is too heavy to carry, neglects to brush her hair, and 
speaks as if words cost money. The occasions when she leaves the apartment 
induce in me a paralysis of fear. More than once, she is out until late at night. She 
seems to exist on tea and crackers, and I hear her shuffling about at all hours of 
the night. Sometimes when I get out of bed to check on her she will look through 
me as if I am formed of ether, at others she will freeze and peer at me as if 
stricken, and say something soft. Once I find her surrounded by locks of her own 
hair, having cut it, at a quizzical angle, into a new-wave bob. She hoots when she 
sees me, and turns to and fro like a movie star as I tell her she looks modern. 
Another time I catch her baking a sponge at two in the morning, and, because she 
is in the mood for my company, I stay up to help her ice, cut, and eat a quarter of 
it, before school. Most of the time, though, I find her in a chair or at the table with 
a cup of cold tea, gazing in the dark into the mid-distance as if shattered by a 
thought.                 
 During that period, when she is well rested, she spends much of her time 
continuing the task Peter had set for her, only now without variation, painting 
curiously arranged assortments of flowers, withered vegetables, and small animal 
skulls in the style of the Dutch memento mori masters. I long to join her in 
painting, but am too shy to ask, and so I watch her.  Like a naturalist observing the 
seasonal progression of a landscape, I note her brushstrokes grow more refined, 
her shadowing more true, the composition of objects in the frame more grounded, 
and feel an almost paternal pride. Yet I sense, somehow, that the object of her 
efforts is not in the final work, but in something esoteric; the way the process 
holds her body and her mind, perhaps; the way it obliterates time.    
 I watch her desperately always, hoping to learn her, hoping to be seen. I am 
neither a guest, nor at home. My grandmother has died, I have lost the radiant 
point around which my life has turned. I am unmoored in grief, move like a 
somnambulist throughout the absurd rituals of school, and arrive home to formless 
place where the chance of dinner, conversation or an encouraging presence cannot 
be calculated. I am living with a ghost.           
 As my body absorbs the daily shock of this new life, I develop strange habits. 
Like my father, I diarise the minutiae of every day, living my life on the page. My 
inclinations become increasingly influenced by magical thinking, a superstition 
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which converges around my mother’s safety, and compels me to, among other 
things, tie my shoelaces in triple knots, tap my nose at thresholds, and avoid the 
number nine. I ask my mother to dress wounds I have purposefully sought. I speak 
to myself in the school yard and sleepwalk in the night. I douse myself in the 
brand of talcum powder my dead grandmother wore. When my mother is in bed, I 
sit at the table and pour tea for my grandmother, who looks at me with mirth and 
love, asks me how school was, and tells me to be kind to my mother. I begin to 
hoard. Broken glass I find walking home from school, a bird’s nest, my mother’s 
shopping lists and lipsticks, photographs I find of her as a child, empty jars.  
 The exquisite moments when I arrive home to find her animated and dressed, 
with dinner on the stove and the will to hug me, only make me more ravenous for 
everything that is not, ravenous enough to believe for a long time the change she 
promises on those good days is just over the hill. For many years I will be visited 
by the dream I begin to have then, a dream of standing on a stage, not singing or 
dancing or acting, not doing anything but standing still, as my mother, in red 
lipstick and a gold ball gown, rises before me in rapturous applause, her face 
brighter than the lights.             
 This state of affairs endures as long as it does, I suppose, because by that 
point my mother is isolated, without family or a job, and wary of friends, 
neighbours, and her doctor. Terrified of losing her, I take money from her purse 
and become admired by the local grocer, baker and butcher for my precocious 
contribution to household chores, although after a while they begin, with 
concerned brows, to ask after my mother. Of course, it was always unlikely to last 
for long. When a hawk-eyed old woman in our building begins to catch me on the 
stairs after school, and asks me in for milk and jam biscuits in her cosy lounge 
where we listen to Bach over dominoes and joke about the regality of her cat 
Pushkin, it is as if her apartment door opens right into paradise. In her quick-
witted and gentle way, she ferrets out the truth without asking me to tell it, and I 
discover my fear being drowned by relief. Soon after, my mother’s local doctor 
visits for a cup of tea, discerns my mother’s madness, and sends her for treatment 
in Kiev, while I am placed for the interim in a boarding school for wards of the 
State.  
 
* 
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It is strange how a piece of paper can so change a person’s position in their 
landscape.                  
 Some years ago, when I had begun to re-read my father’s diaries, I found a 
fold of papers in his Collected Poems of Thomas Hardy. It was a letter to me. I 
had to sit down. Because I appeared as such a minor character in the story of his 
accounts; because I was possessed by this story as a reader and not an actor; and 
because of the transience of his real presence in my life before his death; the 
sensation I experienced then was that of the author, hitherto removed and semi-
mythical, breaking through the suspended white quiet of the page to address me, 
not as his son, but as his reader. Among other things, the letter told me that he had 
planned to leave several other letters with his lawyer, for me to be given when I 
was older, a plan for which, it seemed, he died too soon, as I never did receive 
them. After I read it, I held it, feeling my mind rear up against an object too large 
for thought, like a ship unable to launch, unequal to its opposing force. It was a 
verge I had come to before, at other moments when I had been confronted by 
life’s exquisite happenstance, when I couldn’t help but wonder at what might 
otherwise have been, and, more unbearable, what, in my ignorance and in face of 
an indifferent fate, might be yet. 
 
* 
 
For Ivan at sixteen 
 
 Now you are sixteen, but today you are seven.        
 Who have you become?              
 I am dumbstruck by the realisation that I will never really know. You are the wild-
eyed creature of another woodland, you are pink and tender to a point that pains me, 
trying to hide your raw little soul. I wonder if you were born to be so grave.    
 For a time I believed you would come home with me, to my large island in a 
different sea. Your grandmother is old; there would have been no alternative to this. It 
was likely to spare you this fate that your mother came back to earth. And yet I wonder 
how it would have been.                 
 I would like to know you. At such a late time in things, nothing surprises me more 
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than the lightness you bring me. In the afternoons when you are home from the school 
you hate, and afternoon sunshine fills the main room, I bring in your milk and the plum 
cake your mother makes, and you sit in the chair across from mine, straight-backed and 
holding the glass in your lap, as if we were in church, as the sun gilds your head and I 
wonder how on earth you manifested there. It is the kind of Slavic cake I could also have 
bought in Melbourne, to remind you of home.       
 Sometimes during our conversation, which usually consists of my questions and your 
polite but hesitant answers, you fix me with a look I can hardly bear. It is utterly your 
own, and yet it is hers. I don't think you intend to betray all that is in this look, when it 
passes across your face sometimes. It is a look of innocence, unassuming, and full of 
grief; so much older than your years. I feel a terrible weight at my feet. Never do I feel 
more answerable. I worry you will break one day. And I will not be here to hold you.           
 I feel myself being much more formal around you than I would like. But we are 
strangers, and I am not used to children. If you are angry, if you dislike me, you are too 
polite to show it. You are a solemn child, solemn as children often are when they have 
seen war, or lost their mothers, although you live in relative peace, with a mother still 
alive. You starve for her, I know. We are two hungry souls at the end of a particularly 
beautiful spring, and tomorrow is Saturday. In the morning I am going to show you how 
to plant marigolds, and at noon my lawyer Mr. Dakov is coming to meet you. Vera is 
making two kinds of pie. It will be an important day.        
 Do you notice the way I sometimes stare at you? It must be the stare of one 
enraptured by a stolen curio. Incredulously, I look for evidence of myself in any part of 
your creation. Knowing you so little, I can only speak for the physical. We share the same 
mouse shade of hair, though yours is lighter. Your chin has the ghost of a cleft which 
time might reveal to be mine; I wonder if you might have my nose? Reproduction is, of 
course, the only kind of immortality most of us can be certain of. Your arrival in my 
life—so singular and so unlikely. For so long, I’ve had one foot on the threshold of 
eternity. Just as I am closer than ever to leaving, here you are. Right now the sun is 
falling across my hand, and the breeze from the window which is moving the leaves is in 
my hair, and I can hear the birds, and at any moment you and your mother will walk 
through the door with the groceries. I think of how I was once ready to leave this earth, 
and imagine the gods laughing somewhere. Alas, it is my inclination that has changed, 
not my condition. No greater anguish than this. What I would give to stay. You must 
know I am unwell. My thoughts on this subject follow an unending course of opposing 
paths. You are at once too old and too young: for the unthinking way I would have had us 
grow to be at home with each other; for the things I want to tell you within this mean 
little gulf in time, ending at some near time decided by my cells, each day of which 
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already feels stolen. But this day is all there is, and you, my son, at this age: seven, a 
magical number, the number of fate. I am glad you are home. In my country, without 
your mother, your childhood would have been lost to your grief in an alien place, where 
at night it would have seemed no shadow was any longer simple for its being forever 
known—the bed you dreamed good dreams in, the garden outside you played in, the 
dimensions of the walls—all these, by impostors replaced. And not only shadows, but 
life’s every sensuous dimension—the tongue you heard and spoke by day, in sleep; the 
perfume of the plants native to the seasons; the texture of your breakfast bread. From the 
undulation of land and building and the kind of light they are lit by, to the attitudes of 
local people, and the animals in the street, what was ordinary reality, all you had known, 
would have been rendered an otherland of your mind, defined from dreams only by the 
memories that would animate every suspect new day. Time would pass; that land would 
deepen in you, a dark weight, asking less of your heart in the day-to-day, but asking more 
of your mind to recall it was real. This is one comfort to me--you will not know 
geographical exile. As for the other kind, I cannot tell.      
 How these two years—two years! I find myself marvelling—have raced. For what I 
realise is perhaps the first time in my life, my heart is truly heavier for someone else than 
for myself. This is an appalling claim for one of my age and situation in life. It surprised 
me to realise it was true. How spectacularly the curtain can collapse on our faithful 
vanities, Ivan, if you don’t shy from this twilight. It is the most delicate savage the world 
has known.                 
 It is both an absurdity and a dire necessity to preserve some means of answering the 
questions you will doubtless be left with when I am gone. You lived for years before we 
met, I hope you will live for many more after me. Our time together will have been little 
more than a course of the seasons or two. My failure to make an affecting impression on 
you is not all my fault. More than anything, we have simply not had time. You have no 
reason to trust me. Yet I wish you would open yourself to me a little. You are a small 
wooden soldier with impeccable manners and a very reluctant tongue, you move with 
more hesitation than your mother when she didn’t know who she was or where she 
belonged, and you have the eyes of an owl, in which I can see the reflections of most 
anything I think of. As much as I hope you will one day be happy and at home in this 
world, I also hope you will retain something of these qualities. I can only assume your 
strength is Vera’s. It could not be mine.           
 It is with the most supernatural effort that I project your little image into that sacred 
future where you are grown, tall I am sure, and good like your mother. These letters will 
tell a one-sided story, full of the suppositions of a father who writes for a son in a 
mythical future, who at present is a seven year old boy he knows barely, yet loves 
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absolutely. Remember that, if nothing else. My greatest concern is always that you might 
question whether you were loved. My greatest hope is not that you should come to some 
kind of retrospective love for me, which, being unearned in life, would not be real, but 
that you might in some way understand—understand enough that my shadow in your past 
may rest easy; that my memory in your mind may give way to no ghosts. Misfortune 
deprived you of a true father. Instead, you will receive a letter like this every year for the 
next ten years. Paper is a poor substitute, I know.         
 I would like you to know my story, which might be traced to an origin any number of 
years or days before or after the one I will choose. This is always the way with 
beginnings.    
 
* 
 
Not long ago, I took my Labrador Roy to the park and thought of the day with my 
mother, all those years ago on the other side of the world.      
 When I saw her again, a few weeks after she was committed, her movements 
were no longer erratic, and when she looked me in the eye I saw sanity. In the 
playground of the city park, red with leaves and overlooking a stream of traffic, 
we sat on a bench feeding pigeons, and then she turned to me.    
 ‘The sadness is like a vagrant fog,’ she said. ‘I can’t control it, and it always 
returns.’                  
 She told me that she should have foreseen what might happen while she was 
still rational, and that she would never forgive herself for the last years. She told 
me she fell pregnant during a time she could not account for, and was unprepared. 
She had no money and needed to work, so my grandmother looked after me.  
 ‘I want to fight for you but I fear I will fail you again. I cannot let my illness 
poison you’, she said. ‘You are a wonderful boy, and I take no credit for it. I wish 
I were different.’                
 She began to cry, and I gripped her arm as my throat closed in.    
 ‘I love you Ivan, and I am sending you away.’  
 
* 
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Roy’s favourite playmate was there that day, a boxer cross called Elizabeth.  I 
nodded to her owner, an elegant Englishwoman called Estelle, almost twice my 
age but whose beautiful breasts I strained to ignore. Like Roy, I was happy to see 
Elizabeth, who gave him a run for his money, and left him docile and happy, if a 
little frustrated when he lost a wrestle—she’s an alpha girl. Each time, Roy 
whined from the back of his throat, as if at an unnatural injustice, before inciting 
her to play again.                
 I saw a dog give birth once. I had a school friend whose mother fostered 
strays, and in this instance had found one of them, a scruffy little terrier, to be 
pregnant. I still remember when the pups came out, one by one, each still in the 
sac their cells had formed in, until the mother licked them free, and they began to 
breathe, their seal-fur slick with amniotic fluid. They moved around blind as 
moles, pink noses to the ground, paws splayed. The pups and their mother knew 
by instinct what to do, the scene was quiet and calm, except for we humans 
gathered around, gushing.              
 But humans, too, know what to do when the time comes. Like death and sex, 
childbirth is the most commonplace thing in the world—until it happens to you. I 
tried to imagine what it would be like when Ann gave birth. Resisting my distaste, 
I YouTubed ‘childbirth’ and watched for myself, biting my fist, at the pain and 
indignity of pushing a human head from a tiny hole. I assumed she would never 
be the same again. 
 
* 
 
A few months after Ann left for Queensland, I arrived home from my interim 
sales job in antiques to find Roy in a seizure in the lounge. Before I could call the 
emergency vet, it was over. He rolled over, registered my arrival, and sidled over 
to me as he always did, panting and waiting for a pat. I kneeled down before him 
and held his head, looking into his eyes. His gaze was as intent as it always was, 
challenging for a play, his tail wagging the whole of his rump as his forefeet 
began padding up and down in impatience. I couldn’t discern any sign of distress. 
I gave him a liver treat and watched him eat it. What had happened? I put the 
kettle on and began to Google. When I looked up next, he was on the floor again, 
seizing, oblivious to the world and to my calls, taken over by the convulsions of 
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his body. By the time we arrived at the vet’s that evening, Roy’s brain had him 
locked into an unstoppable circuit. He paced mindlessly in circles, and as I 
listened to the vet, I had to shield his head from colliding with the legs of the 
operating table. He had no spatial awareness, and he couldn’t stop pacing. He 
didn’t register my voice calling his name. The greeting he had given me that 
evening, I realised then, had been the last. He no longer knew me. I travelled 
through the next twenty-four hours in a dream of grief. The colours around me 
seemed horribly bright. That night I had left him under observation, and when the 
call came in the morning to tell me that Roy, after sedation, had not improved and 
that the only potential treatment for what was almost certainly a brain tumour 
would involve invasive surgery interstate, I told them I was coming to say 
goodbye. He was fifteen, and I wanted his life to end with dignity. When I had 
held him as well as I could against his impulse to keep pacing, and said I loved 
him and nodded to the vet, I felt him settle into me, as the anaesthetic travelled 
from the needle into his bloodstream. I buried him that day, in his favourite 
blanket, under the lemon tree in my father’s garden. Afterward, I drove to a 
nursery and bought some white and pink cyclamens, and planted them in the soil 
above him. Finally, I cried. I cried as I hadn’t cried since I was a child, orphaned 
and in a new country without the words for speech. I thought about how Roy and I 
had now taken all the walks we ever would together, played all the tug-of-war, 
shared all the Vegemite toast. The day was insolent with sunshine. I sat for hours 
on the verandah, staring into space, until the air chilled and the wind began to 
make everything whisper and move. For the longest time, I looked at the 
cyclamens on Roy’s grave, poised and shuddering in the air. Life and death were 
happening despite me. My best friend was gone, and I had been wading around in 
my own misery for the last months of his life, blind to what mattered. The baby 
had happened, and would soon be in the world. Ever since Ann had sent me an 
ultrasound image—labelled with a “g” for “girl”—now and then at the shop or at 
home in between readings of my father’s journals or episodes of Antiques 
Roadshow, I had Googled the age of the foetus. At twenty-five weeks, I 
discovered it was the size of a swede. It was beginning to be able to sense touch, 
and imprinted already on each fingertip was the genetic blueprint of ridges that 
would identify its singularity among all others. At thirty weeks, it was the size of 
a cabbage, with eyelids and eyebrows, gaining weight by the day. I read of the 
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symptoms Ann might be experiencing—heartburn, mental fog, constipation, and 
wondered how she was coping, carrying around this growing cabbage we made. 
The notion of the child, despite the medical facts, felt remote to me. I realised I 
still thought of myself as something of a boy. Fatherhood seemed like a train 
meant for other passengers, and yet there I found myself, at the station. Soon, the 
baby would reach the weight of a cantaloupe, and finally a pumpkin. Regardless 
of what I chose to do, the baby was fast approaching the end of its equation with 
edible plant products, and would be born, a discrete being in the world who would 
need her own name. I realised that I still loved Ann, as I always had, and missed 
her like a limb, but in my misery and fear had pushed her away, obsessed with 
charting the infinite variations of my mental landscape. Finally, her grace dawned 
on me. She had, at every point, kept the door open to me. She had listened, she 
had let me speak, she had not sought to dismiss or diminish my expressions of 
fear and horror, knowing better than myself, perhaps, the reasons. She had offered 
me no platitudes, and in the most difficult of circumstances, she had tried to 
understand.                
 That evening, I visited Ezra—the man in this story who eventually adopts 
me—and told him about Roy. We played scrabble over wine, and he asked if I 
had heard from Ann. I said that last I heard she was good, still in Queensland, and 
in the eighth month now. ‘You know, Ivan,’ he said, sitting back from the game, 
‘You’re not destined to repeat history. Your father was troubled by many ghosts, 
as is your mother in her way, both of them good people who scarred you despite 
loving you. But you have already survived them. You have survived your 
childhood. You are a different person from both of them. Let yourself live your 
life.’ 
 
* 
 
Despite her absence in my life, and despite my having, according to Ezra 
‘survived’ her, Vera was still alive on the other side of the world. That is, she was 
still alive until a week after my conversation with Ezra, when I answered my 
phone to hear her solicitor informing me of her death. She was fifty-seven. And so 
the line was drawn under her story and mine: we would not meet again. And I 
would never reply to her last letter. I had been resisting this reply for months. As 
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always, she had asked how I was. As always, it was brief, one page in her large, 
looping hand, intent and effortful as an engraving. She didn’t seem to like email. I 
still wonder whether it was only guilt that carried the letters to me, one a year 
usually around my birthday, with sometimes another to follow. In many ways I 
wished she didn’t bother, because of the way these letters condemned me to bend 
over a single piece of paper for hours longer than the words took to read, thinking 
of her and hating myself for hoping that each time, there might be something 
meaningful to decipher between the lines. Without effort, I committed most to 
memory, anyway. From the last letter I learned that, after six-months postdoctoral 
fieldwork in Japan surveying the rodent population of Fukushima, she had been 
living through the Ukraine winter, writing up data in a tiny university room with a 
temperamental heater and an office colleague who sighed instead of breathed, and 
ruined her focus. I treasured these details, and I worried she was cold. She didn’t 
deserve it, but I couldn’t help it. I delayed replying because I didn’t know what to 
say, because the letter this time might never have ended, and because wagering 
my heart on her was more than I knew how to bear. Yet whatever I do, even now 
she is gone, there remains inside me the child who refuses to relinquish her.  
 
* 
 
We all long for origins; we are all hungry for the knowledge that we are, or have 
been loved. The grief I still feel is the grief of my seven-year old self, who gained 
a father only to lose him a year later; who regained a mother only to realise that 
her distance would never be eclipsed.           
 It was late autumn when I returned to my mother’s town for the funeral. 
Winter was impatient that year; even as the red leaves fell you could feel the frost 
on your neck. In the street you could observe in people a stiffening, bodies braced 
against the air. The funeral was simple. It rained on the day. For the sake of both 
my parents I wished the cemetery were not so ugly and new. There was no formal 
service. The gathering was small. Cousins I’d never met came, old school friends 
of my mother, colleagues from the Institute; there was red-faced Mrs. Chenkevich 
from the local bakery, her neighbours Marya and Viktor, a solitary man in a hat 
who, for all I knew, might have been an old lover. People talked in low tones, 
shook hands, smiled, cried. The women kissed my cheeks and peered into my 
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eyes, the men took my hand firmly in theirs and said sorry. The chief mourner is 
always something of a spectacle. They were kind. Valiant, we stood on around the 
open grave as it began to rain. I did not speak; a priest delivered a sermon with a 
Biblical verse on goodness and humility.         
 Was she good, was she humble, Vera Yenin, my mother? Suddenly I no 
longer knew the meaning of those words. I remembered an image of her then, 
waving goodbye once, from an open door. It must have been spring, because I can 
smell my grandmother’s roses. I am craning my neck toward her face, which is 
half obscured by sunlight. Her wave is limp and unconvincing, and I cannot read 
her expression. Her stance is hesitant, her feet uncommitted to her decision to 
cross the threshold. I am conscious of a warm solidity behind me, my Baba, who 
is holding up my hand and clucking to me in melodious Russian to wave back. I 
don’t seem to feel a great need anymore for this ritual of goodbye, and allow my 
limp hand to be moved like a puppet’s. For it has happened so many times before. 
My mother was a golden-haired mystery to me, forever raising her hand in 
greeting or farewell, a fickle priestess in a story I did not understand.    
 As I watched the coffin being lowered into the ground, the plain rosewood 
coffin I ordered in from Kiev, the coffin she would have wanted, I felt more like a 
cousin than a son, and wondered whether I had ever really known the woman 
being laid to rest. We had exchanged intermittent letters, and spoken on the phone 
once or twice a year, but I had not seen her in years. Who was she truly? What 
would she have been like, had she not been so scarred? Mourner’s questions, 
unanswerable.                  
 By any name, and in her own incarnation, Peter loved the being that was my 
mother, regardless of whether he also loved in her the image of another. Did Vera 
love Peter? For certain she was fond of him, with a patience which seemed self-
replenishing, unending, and from a source that did her good. His death left her 
devastated. If she never felt love for Peter, when she knew him first or in the end, 
who am I to say whether fondness was enough, or more than he deserved?  
 
* 
 
I threw the first handful of earth. Rain running down my face, I stood before the 
adjacent plots, one old, one new. In every excruciating detail, he must have 
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imagined this, the way she would go down. Vera lived until an aneurism took her 
at fifty-seven; Peter had been cold in the ground for ten years before her. 
 Peter never knew me truly, and yet he loved me. Some love is unanswerable, 
biological, a fact of tissue. It is blind to the details of circumstance, inherent, 
predestined, and we must forgive it this. That is how I see his love for us both. I 
do not know whether he ever questioned his right to carry out his plans for Vera’s 
burial. It would seem inhuman for him to have not. And yet, I find myself 
believing it of him somehow. Perhaps certain decisions, made within a universe of 
logic structured by realities outside our own, yet guaranteed by a person’s 
unquestioning belief, must ultimately be judged on their own terms, by the ethics 
of the reality they answer to.           
 Standing there, before their graves, knowing they were both gone to the 
ground and together, the feeling I had was not grief, but peace. Without absolving 
Peter for what he might have intended for my mother, I believe he was convinced 
that, in the matter of Vera, the end justified the means, and that end was pursued 
with love. I choose to call it love. Ferocious, mad perhaps, arguably unfounded—
but love nonetheless. A love that blurred the boundaries of the self, on the level of 
the soul. I tell myself to remember this, and I begin to understand.   
 
* 
 
The day after the funeral, I took a tour of the Exclusion Zone around the ill-fated 
Chernobyl nuclear reactor, replete with its spectral sarcophagus. In recent years, 
the Zone has become popular with tourists and zombie video game enthusiasts for 
reasons I can understand. But I was not going there to appease an impersonal 
curiosity. I was going to see the territory which had once been my mother’s home. 
It was something I had meant to do for a long time.       
 I had a private guide. I met her in the foyer of the Lenin Hotel. Lena was 
vigorous and small, wild-haired, about my age. I was relieved. She had a ready 
smile and a quaint grasp of English. I sensed Lena was one of those people who 
come alive in the cold, and she learned all the basic facts of my life before we 
reached the car. The driver’s name was Sven. He was a walking Russian cliché. A 
stolid, unsmiling presence in a fur hat, the product of heavy stew, vodka, and 
cigarettes, all the things that led so many Slavic men to early death. He had a habit 
 121 
of making sly underhanded digs at Lena which she translated for my benefit: ‘Ah 
yes, Lena likes the cakes’ (Sven’s contribution to our discussion of Ukrainian 
cuisine); ‘Lena would do better to marry a fat American than guide fat Americans 
in Kiev. Then you divorce and find a good Ukrainian. Sorry Lena, but you know 
I’m taken’ (his thoughts during a conversation regarding Ukrainian tourism). 
 We arrived in the Zone after two hours of driving through scattered villages of 
wooden houses and naked coniferous scrub, stopping at the checkpoint to show 
the border guards our papers. That morning, there seemed to be a surplus of 
officials for the tasks at hand, and a pair of them, on the other side of the 
checkpoint, sat on a bench drinking coffee, muttering and bemused in the 
company of a grinning Alsatian. When we passed through, and I stepped on that 
damp winter ground, it was not as I had imagined. That ground felt like all 
ground—solid; my body registered no sudden charge. I paused for a moment 
against a tree to collect my thoughts. I had told Lena I would not be requiring a 
standard tour, the day’s itinerary was my own to decide. She would guide me 
where I was allowed to go, oversee my conduct on behalf of the government, and 
answer what questions she could. Of my reasons for visiting I told her no more 
than was necessary: family history.  
 
* 
 
I was looking for the stone house. About its location, Peter offered little: it was on 
a corner in the village of Balev, opposite a field, beneath an apple tree. My hope 
was that, amid so many demolished and collapsed houses, finding one that 
remained standing would not be impossible.          
 I believe I found it. This house was made of stone, situated beneath a tree 
heavy with apples. I pressed open the door as Peter must have done. The hall’s 
rotting floorboards were falling in. I edged down the more solid side, reached the 
wide central room, saw the stove, the boarded windows. The roof was half-
collapsed, broken tiles joining the floor’s compost of leaves, feathers, dust, dirt 
and excrement. There was elegance in the disintegration; to every corner an 
asymmetrical balance of the kind sculptors toil for and nature always provides: the 
way the peeling render of a wall grades into raw mortar, the shape of an 
abandoned nest balanced on an exposed beam, the arrangement of broken 
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porcelain fallen to the floor years ago. The back wall had begun to crumble from 
above, creating a plateau of white plaster and mortar below, and permitting the 
pines behind a triangle through which to look. The house had become a roost, a 
nest, a burrow. By imperceptible increments for twenty-five years, the outside had 
been coming in. I imagined the house in five years, in fifteen, alive in death, 
devoured from within. Until the day no remnant could be seen; the total return to 
earth. I asked myself why I did not feel sad. There was little evidence to suggest 
that Peter or Vera had ever been there. For a long time I stood there in the back 
room of that house, upon the droppings of rodents and owls, beneath the white 
glare of half a sky, my chest a void, registering nothing until after my eyes found 
certain objects on which to pause. Disinterested objects, inanimate, arbitrary until 
they speak. In the intelligence of objects: the capacity to grow a shadow they 
never owned; to wound, privately, only you. As I listened to my own breathing 
amid the discreet shufflings of that place, and what I imagined as the sound of the 
plaster’s dissipation; as I inhaled the strange smells of desertion, I thought of how 
deep griefs are generational. Held in the cells, they are passed on. And so I saw—
a table crudely repaired; a scrap wood couch now covered in filth. In the 
cupboard, a bag of coffee, my mother’s favourite kind. In the bedroom, warped 
and damp, Gogol’s Dead Souls. And yet the wound was dull, for the skin was 
numb. I did not linger.  
 
* 
 
My parents threw long shadows. In some ways, they have lived for me more truly 
as creatures of myth, than as real people of my own flesh; so truly that, at times, I 
have forgotten the unremarkable nature of my own life. And how could they 
really have been otherwise, knowing them as I did, so barely and so briefly? The 
fact that, like my father, I myself was exiled, at the age of eight, to Australia, by 
my mother, to live under the guardianship of Ezra—exiled by her and from her, 
from my tongue and my land, a few weeks after the day in the city park— only 
ensured my parents’ immortality—never would they shake those shrouds of myth. 
 Autumn has arrived, and set alight the Virginia creeper on my father’s house. 
In the morning, the sound of the wind in the dry leaves, and the hint of sun 
through the chill gilding everything, hit me in the guts mid-step on my way for 
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milk, and I am eight again. Everything is strange. People who look like the ones at 
home, despite being more smartly dressed and of a wider variety, speak like 
creatures underwater. The streets are full of foreign wonders—flashing lights at 
night and glass towers reflecting the sky, Chinese ducks and spaceship cars, 
billboards of beautiful women and cinemas promising other worlds. There are 
signs everywhere, heralding all kinds of desire. Everything is open and working, 
nothing is shut down. People buy food from giant stores that gleam like hospitals 
and play music. Anything and everything can be bought and sold. This planet 
seems wider and brighter and full of money, but I cannot translate it. I miss the 
countryside of dachas, I miss cabbage dumplings, the sound of church bells, snow. 
In all her madness, I miss my mother, and I miss my grandmother most of all. 
 When I arrive in Melbourne, Australia, at the airport called Tullamarine like 
some exotic ocean reserve, it is five in the morning and I have slept two hours in 
two days. When I am led, by the flight attendant’s hand, to the man called Ezra 
who I have met only once before, I don’t know what to say. With a smile and a 
comic bow he greets me in Russian, and I am relieved, until he looks blankly at 
my consequent rush of words. We are both silent for a moment, and I gaze at our 
reflection in the glass doors behind him, which open to the city of my new life.
 Ezra’s house looks like a castle to me. It is shadowed by two willows, in a 
wide street near the city. It has two floors of dark wooden furniture from other 
centuries, a garden of ferns and herbs, and a pond with fluorescent fish. The house 
is insulated as a tomb from outside noise, but full of its own echoes. It smells of 
sandalwood polish and the coffee Ezra brews incessantly. I map it by coming to 
know the antiques—an ex-carousel horse, a German tin plate wind-up ship, an 
Egyptian chest full of figurines, a Chinese tapestry of women bathing in a river. 
On one wall is a Papua New Guinean tribal mask of indeterminate gender, which I 
speak to at night. I delight in Ezra’s macaw, Akhi, and believe he must in truth be 
a pirate.                  
 I know only a smattering of English taught to me by my mother and Peter. I 
do not own this foreign tongue, and want to curl within my code of Russian. In the 
first few months Ezra takes time off work and teaches me himself. He sticks 
words to their objects using Post-its for ‘wall’, ‘chair’, ‘cup’. We go to the beach, 
that yawning eternity of horizon, like nothing I have seen before, and roll the 
sounds around. ‘Sea’, ‘sand’, ‘ball’, ‘dog’, I repeat after Ezra, like a second parrot. 
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After the embarrassment of board books from the local library, gnawed and 
bearing the marks of toddler teeth, I improve rapidly. We graduate to fairy tales, 
and the abstract syllables of the English tongue begin to animate my mind with 
the same witches and forests I saw reading Russian. We watch Mary Poppins 
without commentary. Our conversations grow more comfortable, and he declares 
me ready for school. The peacetime holiday over, I enter the mid-term 
battleground. I learn the cruelty of children. I fear the death which comes several 
times a day when my accent is mocked, when I misunderstand a teacher’s 
question, when I eat lunch alone, feeling the eyes of strangers and my distance 
from home, feeling the cavern in my chest that might devour me, that knows my 
mother is gone. But I am stronger than I feel, and resurrect daily on arriving 
home, where Ezra and Akhi await me.           
 I think sometimes of what might have been, had Ezra not existed to take me 
in. Would my mother have tried harder? Would I have gone to a Home? Would I 
be a soft-spoken daydreamer, soon-to-be father, working in antiques, with a 
fondness for cheese?               
 In my odd moments between customers in the shop, since Ann told me the 
news, I’d been on Ancestry, typing in strange names, mapping my family tree. I 
did it absently, on the sly, as if to avoid catching myself. I didn’t want it to cost 
me anything; I didn’t want it to count. I typed in Vera’s name, I typed in Peter’s 
name, neither of which, I discovered with surprise, felt much more familiar to me 
than the tree of names that grew from them, names of strangers I had never met, 
who had lived lives I had never heard of in towns and countries I had never seen. 
Then I thought of Ezra, a man whose ancestral tree knew nothing of my own, and 
in whom I had found, without condition, my real home, and wondered what, in the 
end, blood counted for. I suppose that as a father, I’ll find out.    
     
My family tree has now reached the proportions of a giant oak—seven 
generations back on both sides. I suppose it will only end when I stop searching, 
or else, when the records stop. The strangest thing, the thing I cannot and will 
never be able to shake, is the mystery of the second branch on my father’s side. 
His name sits by a question mark. I know what the second name should be: Klara 
Volkov. But where are the records of her existence? I have liaised with 
genealogists online, I have emailed libraries in Siberia, and yet this branch of 
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branches remains bare. Of my father’s beloved twin sister, I have located not one 
record. 
 
* 
 
That day in the Zone, I walked back up the crippled hall into the day blinking and, 
empty-handed, closed the door. Lena, resting against the car, stomped out her 
cigarette.                  
 ‘So, we go? We find the next house?’          
 I drew a breath, and the words, when they came, surprised me.   
 ‘No, I’ve seen what I came for. We can go.’        
 This had not been my plan. I had come to see the stone house—why would I 
not also visit the nearby ruins of my mother’s childhood home, or walk twenty 
metres from where I already stood to the cowshed studio of Peter’s futile labours? 
According to his diaries, I had every reason to believe the glorious coffin would 
be there still, languishing in the gloom of twenty-one years. Yet I realised then 
that I did not need to know, did not need to see it there, on the bench as he had 
described it, or to find that there was nothing inside the shed at all. Because it 
would change nothing, and I wanted to go home; because I wanted to be present 
when my daughter was born. 
 
* 
 
Forty-eight hours after that day in the Zone, my plane flew into Tullamarine, and I 
emerged into an afternoon so bright it barely cast a shadow. Riding down the 
highway in a taxi, I felt as if I had somehow left a part of my body behind. I had 
traversed a great distance in my mind, but still didn’t feel I had arrived. And yet I 
was moving, propelled finally by some primitive force in myself that was stronger 
than my reason or my fear. Ann and the child couldn’t wait for me, and even if it 
was too late, I had nothing to lose that I had not lost already.    
 Before leaving for the funeral I had sent Ann an email, in which I said things I 
didn’t want to scramble in a phone call: that I had thought a lot about the past 
year, had acted upon Dr. Goldman’s advice in writing about my parents, and 
hoped to talk to her in person. While Ann wrote little in response, she did agree 
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that we should meet. I also discovered that she had moved back to Melbourne, and 
all I had to do to see her was visit her parents’ house in Eltham.    
 I set out the next day in the afternoon, still light-headed from sleep 
deprivation but wired from nerves. When I pulled in, Ann was standing on the 
verandah, her arms crossed, bearing a tight, shy smile. Turning off the ignition, in 
a strange expansion of time, I watched her move into the light. Her hair had 
grown long. I wondered if the lipstick was for me.        
 It was only when we were in front of each other, she on the steps, myself on 
the path, that I registered the size of her stomach between us, and almost 
immediately felt that I had stared at it too long. I looked up at Ann’s face, at once 
familiar and strange, suddenly unsure of what to do, how to answer to what had 
passed between us. Before her clear gaze, I had the sudden feeling that she knew 
my mind better than I knew it myself, that she could see the outline of the hours to 
come, and that her gaze itself was the measure of my recent reckoning with 
history. I searched for words, wanting to preserve for longer this instant in which 
anything seemed possible. ‘It’s good to see you,’ I said finally. She only let out a 
breath and put her arms around me, and held me in her strong arms for longer than 
I had a right to expect, and said close to my ear, ‘I’m sorry about your mother’, so 
that I smelled the sweet, herbal perfume she always wore, and remembered again 
the softness of her neck. When she was facing me again, smiling her warm, wise 
smile with its edge of laughter, I wondered why visiting her had taken me so long. 
For some reason then I noticed her bare toes, painted a lurid shade of green. ‘You 
never used to paint your nails.’ She laughed. ‘Time goes slowly here. Come in, 
Ivan, I’ll make some tea’.             
 By chance or design, Ann and I were alone in the house that day, except for 
her parents’ marmalade cat Doris, who positioned herself on the kitchen counter 
in order to regard us from a thoughtful distance, while we sat there at the kitchen 
table as the sun fell. I told Ann about the funeral and the trip to the Zone, and she 
answered my questions about the pregnancy. She was due in three weeks, and 
booked in at the Royal Women’s. Things had gone okay apart from a succession 
of migraines and, lately, disrupted sleep. She compared the final part of the 
pregnancy to being marooned. ‘I don’t have to tell you, Ivan, how too much time 
and liberty let the mind turn to dark thoughts’, she said with a grin. Despite her 
longing for the stimulation and routine of work, she had cherished the chance to 
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read and take photographs with the kind of single-minded absorption that had 
evaded her since university. She showed me the prints of the final series she had 
taken at Harriet’s. Shots of wheat fields and green plains rising and falling into 
hills and valleys, horses in paddocks and rusting sheds, sheep skulls, and sheets on 
a line airborne by wind, always below a sky that almost swallowed them, 
blanched to nothing, dark with thunder, or dissolving blue. When we had finished 
our tea, we moved into the garden to sit on the porch steps, in air traced with 
frangipane, a perfume that somehow always recalled the bittersweet feeling of 
every summer I had lived. But it was late in the season, and I could feel autumn 
coming, quickening everything. We looked out into the fading light, at magpies 
darting about an oak and the brightness of camellias, and I took a deep breath. 
 ‘You’ve been so much kinder than I’ve deserved’, I said. ‘I’m sorry I haven’t 
been here.’                 
 Slowly she nodded, her eyes on her feet, as if she had already heard my 
words.                  
 ‘Look at all the months, measured by your stomach,’ I said.   
 Tentatively, I put my hand to it, and looked at her again. She gave me a dry 
smile, and moved my hand higher up, where a second later I felt a kick, a strange 
fillip, like a frog’s heart.             
 ‘Yes, Ivan’, she said. ‘It’s been a long time.’ I couldn’t place her voice. 
 That night, I drove us to a Chinese restaurant for dinner. As we talked over 
bowls of noodles, I discovered that Ann had not been happy with Harriet, a fact 
she didn’t try to hide, although her references to the reasons were discreet. While 
she enjoyed Harriet’s irreverent sense of humour and general gusto, the fact that 
they had little in common had become painfully apparent. Harriet’s lack of 
curiosity about non-finite things, things unrelated to sport, food, sex or money, 
had left Ann lonely and starved of conversation, a predicament made worse by her 
isolation. She missed her family and friends in Melbourne, and knew that she had 
to come home, and return when she could to nursing.      
 ‘I’m sorry it didn’t work out,’ I said when she finished speaking, and she 
nodded with a wry expression as if she doubted my sincerity. ‘But I’m glad you’re 
home.’ Finally, I laid down my cards.         
 ‘Ann, I want to be the father’. She blinked at me and shrugged.   
 ‘You are the father, Ivan.’             
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 ‘Yes, but I want to be there, for the baby, and for you.’    
 ‘Really?’ She stared at me in thought, and put down her chopsticks with a 
sigh.                    
 ‘You made it very clear from the start how you felt, Ivan. I’m going to be 
fine.’                   
 ‘I mean it’.               
 ‘Okay, then listen. It’s been really good to see you, and you do seem well. But 
I’m giving birth in three weeks. The last thing I need is for you to force yourself 
to do this out of guilt, or the desire to punish yourself, or to redefine your identity. 
I’ve never wanted you not to be involved in bringing up our child, but please only 
sign up for this if it’s for good, for the long-haul, for the rest of your life. And 
only if you want to be a father, irrespective of our relationship’.  
 
* 
 
Three weeks later, and not for the first time, I asked Ann to move back in with 
me. We were in the delivery room when I floated the idea. Ann was half delirious 
from gas, and even though my request for some had been declined by the nurses, I 
was also on the verge of delirium from exhaustion, adrenaline and congratulatory 
champagne. The cord had been cut, and we were alone for a moment, our strange 
arrival between us like an exclamation, like daybreak after war. Our mouths hung 
open and our eyes stilled on her, a newborn wild-eyed and stricken as a nocturnal 
creature wrenched into light. I told Ann that at her word I would have the spare 
room set up within a day, and then she nodded, and finally I cried, in astonishment 
of the return of everything I hadn’t wanted.   
 
* 
 
Evie has my eyes, my father’s eyes, and time might reveal her to have my 
mother’s smile, but she is entirely herself. Each day is a discovery. In the 
ferocious, near-clairvoyant honesty of children, she reflects me back to myself, 
erodes my vanity, and shows me the hilarity in hubris when life is so brief, 
although for her it is still eternal. But my old fears have given way to new ones. I 
might fail her in some way, I might burden her with my own ghosts, I might not 
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always be here. The obsessive spiral of myself has blown open and cannot be 
contained. It is at once terrifying, and a great relief. 
 
* 
 
I dream sometimes about the headless marble woman discovered off the coast of 
Israel, the day I flew in for the funeral. I know it is her, although in my mind the 
coast where she is found could be any coast at all. In the dream I somehow see her 
face. When I wake, I try to recall it, the line of her nose, the shape of her eyes and 
lips. I know I possess the memory of this precise geometry, as when I close my 
eyes and reach for it I feel it resting in the dark, yet sinking as I reach. In bed, Ann 
looks at me through the twilight between wakefulness and sleep, and as if to a 
diviner asks me what it is, but I can’t explain. Her face lives for me only in sleep, 
when my anchor is thrown there, off that coast which is never here. 
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Source Notes: 
 
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Svetlana Alexievich’s masterpiece of literary 
journalism, Voices from Chernobyl, from which I have drawn in writing Vera’s account 
of her experiences. I have referred to Keith Gessen’s 2005 translation, published by 
Dalkey Archive Press, London.             
 In addition, the quotation in Vera’s note to Peter on page 43 is from Martin 
Ferguson Smith’s 1969 translation of Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things, published by 
London Sphere, London.                
 I have referred, throughout, to the 1998 edition of E. A. Wallace Budge’s 
translation of The Egyptian Book of the Dead, published by Penguin Classics, London. 
 Finally, the italicised lines on pages 87, 100, and 101, are from Andrew Oddy’s The 
Art of the Conservator (1992), published for the Trustees of the British Museum by 
British Museum Press, London. 
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Figure 2: As above. Detail of reproduced image from The Egyptian Book of the Dead (Budge,   
   2008) 
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1  
Movements of negation & 
metonymy: the elegiac 
mode 
 
 
Now I am dead you sing to me 
    The songs we used to know, 
But while I lived you had no wish 
    Or care for doing so. 
 
 ‒ Thomas Hardy, ‘An Upbraiding’ 
 
 
In the Idylls, a collection of pastoral elegies by the ancient Greek poet Theocritus, 
William Watkin, in On Mourning: Theories of Loss in Modern Literature (2004) 
identifies a moment that illuminates a defining paradox of elegy. This is the 
paradox of materiality, inherent in any attempt to create ‘physical, material works 
of art out of the very event that destroys our own physicality, in other words, 
death’ (Watkin, 2004: 6). In fact, Watkin’s articulation here of the strange way in 
which the textual artefact of elegy finds its being via an instance of death speaks 
to a broader truth of elegy, which is not limited to death. While traditionally, 
elegy is most frequently mobilised by the authorial urge to somehow figure and 
account for the absence entailed by the physical death of a human individual, 
elegy is increasingly responding to forms of nonbeing, absence and loss that are 
not contingent on the death of a human body. Such elegies are still implicated in 
the paradox of finding their “presence” through an instance of absence, however. 
Moreover, as Watkin suggests, ‘the problems of elegy remain those of language 
itself’ (2004:6). In the passage of the Idylls in question, a goatherd laments losing 
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his lover, describing an occasion in which he learns a ‘bitter thing’ upon smiting 
‘a poppy-petal’ lying on his arm (1924:35). When the petal makes no mark of 
pigment on his arm, the speaker, figuring the poppy-petal as his own loss, declares 
‘the love-in-absence made no smear but withered away’ (1924:35). In 
Theocritus’s smiting of the poppy-petal, Watkin observes ‘a foundational moment 
of modern cultural modes of mourning’, illuminating ‘the three-part structure of 
commemoration’, which he enumerates in the following way: 
 
 First, we have the problems of materiality involved in getting the petal to speak; then 
 the  means by which the subject of loss comes to know itself as a subject in the 
 realisation of love-in-absence; and, finally, the importance of a clear encounter 
 between this personal  loss and the more public gain represented by the lover’s failure 
 to speak through the petal  and the poet’s auspicious and felicitous record of the 
 event (2004:8). 
 
In this structure, the speaker in the poem relates the experience of trying and 
failing to obtain a lasting trace of his loss, or physical reminder of his dead lover’s 
absence, through the allegory of the petal that leaves no smear. This failure to 
obtain some material testament to the truth of the speaker’s loss is described by 
Watkin as the speaker’s losing a second time, that is, losing even ‘the event of 
loss itself’ (2004:8). Of crucial significance here, however, is the fact that, 
ultimately, a testament does exist—that of, as Watkin states, ‘the poem itself’ 
(2004:8). At the same time, the speaker confronts the altered reality of his identity 
as a being in the world in the aftermath of his loss and the felt absence of his dead 
lover. Finally, there exists the movement between the different entities of author 
and speaker as represented in the elegy, in which the author, Theocritus, 
essentially enacts his speaker’s private mourning in the public arena of the 
published text. In this way, the speaker’s private loss and ‘failure to speak through 
the petal’ is configured as the author’s ‘public gain’ in being able to make an 
‘auspicious and felicitous record of the event’, a perhaps prototypical instance of 
absence mobilising literary production (Watkin, 2004:8). Working from the 
assumption that the goatherd’s grief was once the author’s own, Watkin observes 
that: ‘Theocritus the poet may have been Theocritus the mourning, spurned lover, 
but by the time we get to hear about it, Theocritus the poet is a professional doing 
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a good job of mourning, and Theocritus the lover is a skilled actor in the drama’ 
(2004:8). As Watkin elsewhere observes of the dead subjects of Yeats’s 1918 
elegy ‘In Memory of Major Robert Gregory’, ‘[t]heir presence in art, their bid for 
the eternal, is predicated on their absence in life’, a truth exemplifying ‘the 
paradox of mourning in art’ (2004:54). The poppy-petal in Theocritus’s poem 
functions, of course, as a metonym for his love-in-absence. Watkin’s delineation 
of the wider elegiac operations represented by the poppy-petal emphasises the 
paradoxical co-movements of materiality and metonymy, at work across 
language, mourning, and writing, and which converge in the elegy.   
 This chapter examines the paradoxical co-movement of negation and 
metonymy in elegy (as both a form and as a writing-act), whereby the force of 
each movement depends on the effacement or distance of the object to which 
literary language and elegy (and mourning itself) refer. In doing so, it will discuss 
Roland Barthes’s elegiac reflections on literature, loss and writing following the 
death of his mother, in his posthumously published Mourning Diary (2009), in 
dialogue with the work of Maurice Blanchot, William Watkin, John Bowlby and 
Hélène Cixous, among others. In doing so, this chapter aims to outline the key 
operations of the elegiac mode with which this essay is concerned. 
  
 
I.  
Negation & metonymy in language 
 
The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics defines metonymy as ‘[a] trope 
in which one expression is substituted for another on the basis of some material, 
causal, or conceptual relation’ (2012:online). As Hugh Bredin notes, the diversity 
of metonymical structures might encompass associations between ‘thing and 
attribute, cause and affect, container and contained, an object and its material, sign 
and signified, maker and product, and so on’ (1984:100-1). Common examples of 
metonymy at work within ordinary speech offered by The Oxford Dictionary of 
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Literary Terms are ‘the bottle for alcoholic drink, the press for journalism, skirt 
for woman, Mozart for Mozart’s music, the Oval Office for the US presidency’ 
(2008:online). There remains debate as to whether the trope of synecdoche, which 
specifically relates a part to a whole or a genus to a species or vice versa, should 
be considered as a discrete trope or as a subset of metonymy—either way, it is 
clear that their movements are intrinsically tied. For the purposes of this 
discussion, metonymy is taken to include the operation of synecdoche, thus 
following the example of thinkers like Barthes and Derrida who routinely invoke 
the term “metonymy” when referring to synecdoche2. Beyond its function as a 
figure of speech within both everyday and literary language, metonymy has been 
applied as a kind of analogical or allegorical movement of association at work 
within a vast range of cultural and psychological processes, from painting to 
speech disorders3. In this essay, metonymy is similarly employed as an analogical 
structure by which to interrogate the (inter)relation of two or more contiguous or 
proximate things, as a relation of simultaneous intimacy and distinction between a 
subject and an object, a whole and a part, or a sign and a signified. In this and 
later chapters, I will consider the ways that this metonymic relationship 
complicates rather than reinforces traditional subject-object binaries, through their 
mutual implication as discrete yet intrinsically connected entities, each “bearing” 
the other and thus transformed by that other in a relation contingent upon 
exchange, dialogue and responsibility.  
 
* 
 
The production of meaning via linguistic signs is itself a process necessarily 
mediated by absence. To cite theorist Kevin Hart, a basic tenet of that which we 
call a ‘sign’ is something that ‘is what it is in the absence of its animating 
presence’ (2000:12). As recognised by Ferdinand de Saussure, these signs operate 
as semantic markers that stand in for the external concepts they signify. That is, 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Barthes’s Camera Lucida (1980), and Derrida’s Memoires: for Paul de Man 
(1986). 
3 See, for example, Julia Friedman’s ‘Cézanne and the poetics of metonymy’ (2007), and Roman 
Jakobson’s ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances’ (1990). 
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there exists no intrinsic union between the word “tree” as a signifier and the 
concept of a tree as its signified, or, indeed, with the real tree itself, in the world, 
which exists externally to the sign as its referent. Words do not embody what they 
signify, but rather depend on their estrangement from the real presence of the 
signified in order to create the illusion of presence. Similarly, the signifier does 
not represent a pre-existing concept, but rather, a concept whose meaning depends 
on its relation to other words. As Saussure explains: 
 
 Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term 
 results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others (1959:114).  
 
Speaking of the system by which meaning is produced by the interrelation of 
linguistic units, Saussure emphasised the relational and differential nature of 
meaning as produced by signs, and the operation of values in this system over 
ideas. That is, he asserts how in producing, exchanging and comprehending 
patterns of linguistic signs, speakers, writers, thinkers and listeners find not ‘pre-
existing ideas’ but rather: 
 
 (…) values emanating from the system. When they are said to correspond to 
 concepts, it understood that the concepts are purely differential and defined not 
 by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the 
 system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not 
 (1959:117).                
 
Saussure’s above assertion that linguistic concepts are ‘defined (…) negatively’, 
by ‘being what the others are not’ highlights the inescapably negational nature of 
language in the lexical and semantic rifts and absences by which the operations of 
its sign-system is structured. Nowhere is this negational structure of language 
more vividly elucidated than in the work of Blanchot. In his essay, ‘Literature and 
the Right to Death’ (1981), Blanchot discusses absence as being at once a 
phenomenon by which the experience of writing is structured, and by which 
meaning and literature is made possible through its animation of literary or, more 
specifically, poetic language. Blanchot’s conception of the negation at work 
within literary language must be understood in contrast to the functional 
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negativity that operates on the level of everyday language. In the case of everyday 
language, the interconnected linguistic structure of the signifier, signified and 
referent, or, as expounded by Haase and Large, ‘the word, the concept and the 
thing’ work to deliver meaning via the disappearance of the “thing”, the real-
world object to which the concept refers in the material mark of the word (2001: 
27). Literature thus emerges as the realisation and foregrounding of that which in 
ordinary language is bypassed in the relay of a message (or concept). That is, ‘it is 
not the message, but the medium that is important, and this medium can only be 
understood as that which resists, interrupts or suspends the message’ (Haase & 
Large, 2001:29). While, in everyday language, the delivery of the concept is 
achieved through the negation of not only its real-world referent but also of the 
material word that represents it, in literary language, ostensibly the referent and its 
concept are negated while the word itself is foregrounded. Accordingly, literary 
language, suggests Blanchot, ‘observes that the word cat is not only the 
nonexistence of the cat, but the nonexistence made word, that is, a completely 
determined and objective reality’ (1981:44).          
 That is, within the sphere of literature, words emerge as autonomous entities 
of intrinsic value beyond their everyday function of relaying meaning. Consider, 
for example, the radical strangeness of encountering familiar language 
transformed in poetry, where figures such as metaphor and metonymy create an 
entirely different frame of reference to that of literal language, most particularly in 
the movement of poetry to foreground the materiality of language and dislocate 
the delivery of its apparent signified, maximizing the distance between word and 
concept and the absence of the referent. As Steiner says, ‘>t@he truth of the word is 
the absence of the world’ (1991:96).          
 From the onset of modernism in the late nineteenth century in the West, can 
be traced an increasing awareness on the part of writers as diverse as Gertrude 
Stein and Stéphane Mallarmé, of the self-referential nature of language; the way 
in which words refer to other words, rather than to the world. As aphorised by 
Steiner, this shift in aesthetic consciousness under modernism entailed a 
fundamental ‘break’, ‘between word and world’ (1991:93). With this shift came a 
spirit of play and exploration, in which emerged a writing which foregrounded its 
own materiality and formal structures, reflecting back on its own processes in a 
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reflexive style which celebrated the power of abstraction and the primacy of 
words unmoored from their real-world referents. For Blanchot, this movement of 
literature to disrupt the everyday referentiality of language, constituting an 
“unmooring” between words and the world which is extant in ordinary language 
yet only truly “felt” in literature, is epitomised in the experimental poetry of 
Mallarmé. In Mallarmé, one can discern a testament to Derrida’s observation of 
the absence at the heart of the sign and its fundamental estrangement from its 
signified as being the very conditions by which it is animated4. Speaking of 
Mallarmé, Steiner discerns a revolutionary shift, that of modernism itself, which 
acknowledges that ‘non-reference constitutes the true genius and purity of 
language’ (1991:96).  In Mallarmé, words are revealed in a strange freedom of 
reference that pronounces their aesthetic properties, through the assembly of 
heterogeneous phrases and images, at times breached by the blanks of the page, 
which don’t immediately “match up”, arising often as if by coincidence. 
Mallarmé’s famous long and typographically complex 1897 poem, Un Coup De 
Dés (A Throw of the Dice), exemplifies the potential of such devices to trouble or 
circumvent the meaning-circuit of the sign, prompting abstract associations and 
cognitive leaps, while drawing attention to the autonomous properties of words 
referring not to the world but to themselves and each other in the aesthetic 
freedom of a poem on a page. In this wild space, outside the frame of everyday 
utilitarian language, words range as if left to their own devices, and the 
possibilities for meaning itself seem unbounded. In this way, the negation that 
literature enacts exceeds the negation of everyday language in which the absence 
of the thing or referent is supplemented by the presence of the concept, and can 
thus be seen as operating via ‘a double absence’, an absence which literature calls 
                                                          
4 In the context of this discussion about textuality and the relations between literary signification 
and the physical world, it is pertinent to note Timothy Morton’s compelling consideration of the 
affinities between scientific understandings of ecological life and deconstructive understandings of 
text. Morton’s argument, in ‘Ecology as Text, Text as Ecology’ (2010), empahasises the analogous 
way in which the respective study of both ‘life forms’ and ‘texts’ is increasingly disputing the 
possibility of either being defined as ‘hav[ing] a single, independent and lasting identity’ (2010:1). 
That is, Morton shows the study of life forms to resist logocentric categorisation in a manner 
corresponding to Derrida’s demonstration of the untotalisable nature of texts. Drawing on a wide 
range of references, from Darwin to the genome, Morton also underlines the difficulty of 
separating textuality from the physical environment, in view of their congruence and interrelation 
as phenomena. Despite being beyond the scope of this essay, the implications of Morton’s reading 
here stand at once to enrich and complicate discussions of the significatory (inter)relations 
between word and world. 
 139 
us to experience and attend to, rather than circumvent (Haase & Large, 2001:30-
31).               
 It is this particular quality of absence which lends literature its primacy and 
strangeness, as a dominion “outside” the order of ordinary social structures of 
language and law. The operation of this literary absence is also inherently 
supplementary, as something that at once adds and replaces. As I will discuss, the 
supplementary movement of this absence is both complicated and intensified 
when the absence in question is not that of (literary) language alone, but also of 
the writer’s own felt experience, in a corresponding relational structure galvanized 
by absence. In this case, it is the felt experience of absence personally felt by the 
writing subject, whose writing is mobilised by and directed toward that absence. 
In one way, this double movement constitutes the amplification and cross-
indexation of what Blanchot calls ‘the torment of language’, whereby this torment 
‘is what it lacks because of the necessity that it be the lack of precisely this’ 
(1981:45-6).              
 For Blanchot as for Mallarmé, the way in which, manifestly, ‘a cat is not a 
cat’, creates the possibility of literature; poetic meaning depends on negativity, on 
the condition of words being ‘torn apart by equivocation’, ‘falsified by 
misunderstanding’ and ‘imbued with emptiness’ which ‘is their very meaning’ 
(Blanchot, 1981:30-31). The ‘realm of the imaginary’ over which the writer 
presides is total, suggests Blanchot, and in fact:  
 
 (…) it is the world, grasped and realized in its entirety by the global negation of all 
 the individual realities contained in it, by their disqualification, their absence, by the 
 realization of that absence itself, which is how literary creation begins (1981:36, my 
 emphasis).   
 
Further, writing enacts the ‘illusion’ of primal, originary creation, ‘seeing and 
naming’ ‘each thing and each being’, ‘from the starting point of the absence of 
everything, that is, from nothing’ (Blanchot, 1981:36, emphasis in original). 
Literary language effects the presentation of its signifieds (or generates meaning) 
not ‘by causing whatever it portrays to be present, but by portraying it behind 
everything, as the meaning and the absence of this everything’ (Blanchot, 
1981:37). This vital negativity in literature also encompasses death, that radical 
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event that incites writing in answer to its threat of nothingness. Referencing 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Blanchot suggests that literature is 
concerned with ‘that moment when “life endures death and maintains itself in it” 
in order to gain from death the possibility of speaking and the truth of speech’ 
(1981:41). In this way, literature can constitute a premonitory reckoning and 
encounter with the otherness of death, which in attending to the negation of life, 
speaks of life itself, of that which death imparts to life and by which life is 
necessarily defined, the very things that also give rise to literature, and afford its 
urgency and power. Blanchot illuminates the negational power of language in his 
example of the act of naming involved in enunciating the phrase, “‘This woman’”: 
 
 For me to be able to say, “This woman” I must somehow take her flesh and blood 
 reality away from her, cause her to be absent, annihilate her. The word gives me the 
 being, but it gives it to me deprived of being. The word is the absence of that being, 
 its nothingness, what is left of it when it has lost being—the very fact that it does not 
 exist (1981:42). 
 
Placing the problematic gender politics of this particular example to one side, 
Blanchot here proposes that the nature of language is to negate being in order to 
speak it, in order to make it “live” in its passage from the world into words. The 
act of naming is by its nature violent, Blanchot suggests, for in naming we 
necessarily negate the singularity of what we name, supplanting a particular, 
inimitable, irreplaceable real thing (this rose, that woman) to a rhetorical 
designation transferable to any number of other comparable things; we create an 
idea autonomous from the real, particular thing, a generality capable of infinite 
transferal. In this way, language can function to reduce and to totalise, and is 
implicated in the sphere of ethics. Expounding further the above example, 
Blanchot asserts that:  
 
 [W]hen I say “This woman”, real death has been announced and is already present in 
 my language; my language means that this person, who is here right now, can be 
 detached from herself, removed from her existence and her presence and suddenly 
 plunged into a nothingness in which there is no existence or presence; my language 
 essentially signifies the possibility of this destruction (…) (1981:43). 
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As such, Blanchot declares that ‘when I speak: death speaks in me’ (1981:43). In 
this way, the power of language to summon images and ideas hinges on the 
negation of the real things it refers to, on the distance and difference between 
words and the world that language depends upon and maintains as it speaks “what 
is” only by speaking “what is not”. As Mallarmé writes: 
 
 I say: A flower! And, out of the oblivion where my voice casts every contour, insofar 
 as it is something other than the known bloom, there arises, musically, the very idea 
 in its mellowness; in other words, what is absent from every bouquet (2007:210). 
 
 
II. 
Negation & metonymy in mourning & writing: 
Barthes’s Mourning Diary 
 
In correlation to these energising and animating operations of absence with 
respect to language and literary creation, however, is the notion that a writer’s 
own “felt absence” or emotional experience of loss (whether physical or 
symbolic) might be instrumental in propelling them to the act of writing. This 
potential of absence or loss to mobilise literature (and other forms of art) is 
powerfully explored in Julia Kristeva’s wide-ranging, and itself elegiac study, 
Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (1987), wherein Kristeva notes that ‘loss, 
bereavement and absence trigger the work of the imagination and nourish it 
permanently as much as they threaten it and spoil it’ (1989:9). Nowhere does this 
possibility of loss or absence-as-trigger for writing find more traction than in the 
elegy, that most ancient and enduring literary tradition of lamentation, in which 
the elegist turns to language to testify to the irremediable absence of a lost loved 
one. Of crucial significance here is the way in which the structure of writing, 
mirroring the situation of the subject grappling with an irremediable loss, has no 
recourse to its referent other than through the representational structures of 
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language; through linguistic signs and poetic figures such as metonymy and 
metaphor, the operations of which depend in different ways on their remove from 
tangible, real-world objects. As Watkin notes, ‘writing can never call up the 
mimetic, reflective or transparent powers of traditional representation because its 
referent is permanently absent’, an observation of especial relevance to elegy 
(2004: 8). This paradoxical relation between the materiality of a text of loss and 
its wellspring in absence, and the animation of literary language by effacing the 
referent, is central to elegy’s formal and affective power, and also to its inevitable 
failure to restore or redeem the absence to which it speaks.     
 That the real experience of absence on the part of a writer can also mobilise 
the act of writing is a truth resonating throughout Roland Barthes’s late works, all 
of which emanate from his mother’s death5. Forming a kind of index to all these 
writings are the raw, fragmentary and private entries of Mourning Diary, begun 
on the day following his mother’s death in 1977. Nowhere is there to be traced a 
more nuanced or direct dialogue by a writer with himself on the experience of felt 
absence and its implications for writing. In it, like any mourner, Barthes implores 
the universe, wrings his hands, wracks his brain, finds himself in disbelief at an 
event, a death, both inevitable and irredeemable—and confronts the spectre of his 
own death, at once the living death borne by the eradication of life’s meaning, and 
the real death awaiting us all. He questions the viability of his ongoing life and 
work. In the desolation of felt absence, although riddled with doubt about the 
viability of ‘making literature out of it’ (Barthes, 2012:23), Barthes reinvests in 
writing as a means of being able to justify and to bear going on living in his 
mother’s absence, describing writing in almost religious terms as his only hope of 
redemption: 
 
 Confusion, defection, apathy: only, in snatches, the image of writing as “something 
 desirable,” haven, “salvation,” hope, in short “love,” joy. I imagine a sincerely 
 devout woman has the same impulses toward her “God” (Barthes, 2012:59). 
 
                                                          
5 See also Camera Lucida (1980); and the posthumously published texts ‘Longtemps je me suis 
couché de bonne heure’ (1986); The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977-
1978) (2007), p. 13; and The Preparation of the Novel: Lecture Courses and Seminars at the 
Collège de France, 1978‒1979 and 1979‒1980 (2011). 
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Capturing everything from the sensory minutiae of a bakery transaction to 
instances in which he is reduced to tears, each entry in Mourning Diary is 
permeated by the memory of his mother’s presence and the persistent feeling of 
her absence; by the question of what is to be made now of life without her: 
 
 February 12, 1978 
 Snow, a real snowstorm over Paris; strange. 
     I tell myself, and suffer for it: she will never again be here to see it, or for me to 
 describe it for her (2012:93). 
 
This ‘questioning of torment’ (Richard Howard’s phrase) recorded by Barthes in 
Mourning Diary constantly returns to the subject of writing, and the possibility 
that his loss might finally yield to a redemptive great work, dreamed of as an 
apotheosis on the levels of both life and literature, converging around the 
idealised figure of his mother (Howard, 2012:259-60). Barthes called this project 
“Vita Nova” after Dante’s 13th century poetic narrative of love and longing for his 
beloved Beatrice. Concurrently, Barthes considers the ethics of thus redeeming or 
transforming through art the radical event of the death of one as sacred and 
singular as his mother. Even as he articulates his misgivings over such an 
intention or act, Barthes self-consciously detects his critical and creative faculties 
conspiring toward this end, and in this movement recognises himself as retaining 
desire and lust for life and the pleasures of his work in a manner unchanged from 
before, as if his being were not sufficiently altered by his being condemned to 
now live forever in his mother’s absence. Says Barthes of his mother’s death:  
 I don’t want to talk about it, for fear of making literature out of it—or without being 
 sure of not doing so—although as a matter of fact literature originates within these 
 truths (2012:23). 
Despite this self-professed fear, Barthes, in Mourning Diary, routinely discusses 
the effects of his mother’s death on his emotions and on his thoughts with an 
explorer’s inquisitive eye, a writer’s eye. The entries of Mourning Diary 
ceaselessly affirm his instinct and desire to “make literature” out of his mother’s 
death, and work through the implications of this event for his future writing. 
Ultimately, Mourning Diary reads as a notation of evolving thought, an effort 
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toward transmuting the confounding absence of a beloved into a meaningful, and 
to some degree, consolatory, work. Three passages (among many) reveal the 
extent to which the question of writing was implicated in the experience of 
grappling with his mother’s absence: 
 
 Always (painfully) surprised to be able―finally―to live with my suffering  (…) 
 But―no doubt―this is because I can, more or less (…) utter it, put it into words. 
 My culture, my taste for writing gives me this apotropaic or integrative power: I 
 integrate, by language (2012:175). 
 
 (…) writing transforms for me the various “stases” of affect, dialectizes my “crises” 
 (2012:105). 
 
 Depression comes when, in the depths of despair, I cannot manage to save myself by 
 my attachment to writing (2012:62).  
 
For Barthes in the grip of mourning, writing is thus conceived of as a potentially 
transformative medium, a vehicle by which to render the loss and absence of his 
mother bearable through the absorption of activity and the redemptive quest for 
meaning in the face of death’s despair. To write is to access the “integrative 
power” of language, of poetic signification, in loss and absence. This correlation 
of writing with redemption and positive transformation is echoed in the 
supposition: ‘no doubt I will be unwell, until I write something having to do with 
her’ (Barthes, 2012:216, my emphasis). Instinctively and in desperation, Barthes 
at once searched for a means of justifying daily existence without his mother, 
while searching also for a new way of writing that would attest to an altered 
world. His answer to this two-sided question was one and the same: in the vision 
of “Vita Nova” that was planned but never completed, and in the constellation of 
other writings, including Camera Lucida (1980), which were completed during 
his mourning.               
 Barthes’s compulsion to write about absence in spite of the impossibility of 
signifying the other, an enterprise that exhausts itself in realising a failure that is 
from the outset guaranteed, is the compulsion of every elegist. The radical 
experience of loss and felt absence begs even non-writers to rise to the impossible 
 145 
challenge of trying to “make sense”, or at least attest to its enormity, in 
language—the otherness and unknowability which divides us from death and 
makes it so confounding is at once why it exceeds our ability to signify it, and 
why we desperately try anyway. For the professional writer this challenge is 
intensified. Their habitual activity and vocation is intrinsically implicated in what 
is foremost a personal crisis. For one who, like Barthes, in a great sense lives in 
order to write, the radical occasion of loss in the sphere of private life and the 
reckoning with felt absence which loss entails is a transformative experience of 
encountering the other and the very negation by which language is structured and 
animated. The reckoning with loss is also a reckoning with the limits of language. 
 Blanchot ultimately suggests that the redemption of literary negation lies in 
the materiality of poetic language itself. Speaking of the melancholy power of 
literary language to summon the exquisite particularity of a single flower only by 
effecting that real flower’s disappearance and maintaining its infinite distance 
(echoing Mallarmé), Blanchot at once exults and laments, for at such distance to 
real presence, ‘what hope do I have of attaining the thing I push away?’ 
(1981:46). His answer lies in the supplementary presence of language itself, in its 
materiality, its tangible, sensuous form as a ‘thing’, celebrated in the rhythm and 
rhyme of poetry, or as beheld in the shapes of letters on the page. The wonder and 
‘obscure power’ of the word is ‘as an incantation that coerces things, makes them 
really present outside of themselves’ (1981:46, emphasis in original).   
 This absence by which literary language is given life is amplified in the 
literature of loss, in writing whose subject is also absence. Within this frame, the 
materiality of literary language, of words in themselves, is thrown into greater 
relief when what those words refer to is a referent already absent in the world, 
even before it is negated in language. When Roland Barthes turns to language to 
speak of his dead mother, we feel the poverty of that language, its inability to 
“speak her”, but also its unlikely power of summons, the “glimmer” of his 
mother’s truth, the presence of her absence, under the weight of Barthes’s grief 
and effort to recover her in words. Such literary efforts to signify loss and absence 
gain in affective intensity via the foregrounding of language under pressure to 
signify, when the singular absence each word strains toward is exactly what 
disappears in their movement.            
 In this way, the process of writing felt absence can be conceived as passing 
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through an additional movement of negation, analogous to that of the linguistic 
sign (see figure below). In the movement of literary signification, a signifier/word 
is foregrounded via the negation of both its signified/concept and referent. In the 
movement of signifying felt absence, the writing subject works to signify the 
absence of the referent/lost other via the objects in the world around them that 
remain present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Operational structure of linguistic sign (above), in relation to experiential     
                 movement of writing “felt absence” (below). 
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Writing & supplementarity 
 
In considering the mobilising potential of absence in the activity of writing, it is 
worth attending briefly to Derrida’s discussion of supplementarity in Of 
Grammatology (1967). Conducted as a deconstructive reading of the contradictory 
assumptions held by Jean-Jacques Rousseau regarding speech in relation to 
writing, this discussion is most relevant here for its illumination of Rousseau as a 
writer consumed by the possibility that writing poses for ‘the restoration, by a 
certain absence and by a sort of calculated effacement, of presence disappointed 
of itself in speech’ (Derrida, 1997:142). In this reading of Rousseau, we glimpse 
an instance of the paradoxical interrelation of absence and presence that operates 
in language being encompassed in a writer’s own motivation to write.  
 Derrida describes Rousseau as caught between the uncontainable nature of 
speech, which in its immediacy at once promises ideal presence and withdraws it, 
and writing as an ‘unnatural’ method of violence to this promised presence which 
yet offers recourse to its incomplete salvage. He describes Rousseau as resigning 
himself to the compensatory operations of writing, as a removed and imperfect 
recapture, mediated by absence. In this way, writing serves a ‘supplementary’ 
function. As Derrida posits, the supplement is in fact a contradictory phenomenon 
that, rather than adding itself to and enriching an existing presence, in fact ‘adds 
only to replace’; it fills at a remove only that which cannot be filled, and ‘its place 
is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness’ (1997:145). Language, 
and in particular writing, with its code of signs ‘standing in’ for their referents, is 
inherently supplementary. In Derrida’s words, ‘The sign is always the supplement 
of the thing itself’ (1997:145).             
 As Derrida shows, the seduction of the supplement for Rousseau extends 
beyond writing to become the seduction of any sign, representation or symbolic 
presence that stands in for and appears to promise a real presence in the world. In 
this way, Rousseau’s notorious attachment to masturbation emerges as a corollary 
to writing, through which the immediate experience of presence (intercourse with 
a living woman) is threatened and possibly exceeded by its supplement, the 
secondary simulation of intercourse in auto-eroticism. Later, Derrida quotes 
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Rousseau (1782) describing his desperate love for his mother, affirming the 
paradoxical relation of presence to absence in the statement, ‘“I only felt the full 
strength of my attachment when I no longer saw her”’ (1997:152). As Derrida 
highlights, it is only ‘when the mother disappears that substitution becomes 
possible and necessary’ (1997:152-3). Ultimately, Derrida suggests, 
supplementarity operates as ‘an infinite chain, ineluctably multiplying the 
supplementary mediations that produce the very thing they defer: the mirage of 
the thing itself, of immediate presence’ (1997:157). God, Logos, origin—all those 
entities of ‘absolute presence’, urges Derrida, are non-existent, and ‘what opens 
meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence’ 
(1997:159). In this way, writings of “felt absence” can be seen as perpetuating the 
negations by which they are structured. For Rousseau, the act of writing appears 
to have indeed been mobilised by his own complex experience of absence, serving 
to supplement and, at times, to paradoxically exceed the experience of presence.   
 
The metonymy of loss 
 
In conceiving of this analogous movement, I have drawn from William Watkin’s 
application of psychoanalyst John Bowlby’s work on grief and loss (referred to by 
Watkin as an “environmental model” of loss), in view of elegiac literature. 
Building upon the object relations theory of Freud and Melanie Klein, John 
Bowlby’s understanding of loss, broadly termed “attachment theory”, is explained 
by Bowlby as pertaining to ‘>a@ttachment behaviour [which] is conceived as any 
form of behaviour that results in a person attaining or retaining proximity to some 
other differentiated and preferred individual’ (1980:39). Further, more than 
previous theorists, Bowlby emphasises the fundamental importance of what he 
describes as ‘a mourner’s urge to act—to call for and to search for the lost 
person’, an urge that leads the mourner to ‘engag[e] in those very acts, fragmented 
and incomplete though they may be’ (1980:28). Moreover, Bowlby contends that 
the strength of human attachment is such that, while at times, in mourning, ‘the 
effort to restore the bond’ might ‘wan[e]’, ‘usually it does not cease’ (1980:42). In 
the words of a widow cited by Bowlby, ‘[m]ourning never ends: only as time goes 
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on it erupts less frequently’ (1980:101). In discussing studies on the bereavement 
experiences of widows and widowers, Bowlby notes that ‘half or more (…) reach 
a state of mind in which they retain a strong sense of the continuing presence of 
their partner’ (1980:96). Bowlby notes that, while such a sense of the lost one’s 
presence might also be experienced through dreams, or through the mourner’s 
performing of activities linked to their memory of the deceased, frequently, in the 
experiences of the subjects of these studies: 
           
 (…) the [deceased] spouse is experienced as located somewhere specific and 
 appropriate. Common examples are a particular chair or room which he occupied, or 
 perhaps the garden, or the grave’ (1980:98). 
 
In this way, Bowlby’s attachment theory stresses the relation of the subject of loss 
to diverse objects present within their environment, rather than to the lost object 
alone, ‘an environment of subjective presence but also of objective loss’ (Watkin, 
2004:186). That is, for Bowlby, loss is experienced through the subject’s diverse 
relations with objects around them, through which the subject retains proximity to 
the object6 that has been lost (Watkin, 2004:187). This relational structure allows 
for the mediation of loss and the radical otherness of absence by the subject via 
their metonymic interaction with objects or ‘things’, “parts” that “stand in” for the 
unfathomable totality of loss, circumventing the alterity of absence and the 
difficulty of facing it “head-on” (Watkin, 2004:186).        
 In applying the principles of Bowlby’s attachment theory to select examples 
from the literature of loss, Watkin offers insight into the diverse elegiac structures 
at work within such texts and outlines a means by which to both identify ethical 
modes of writing about the other, and to conduct ethical readings of such texts. 
Analysing novels by Ian McEwan, Douglas Copeland and Dave Eggers, Watkin 
observes that: 
 
                                                          
6 While in this essay I have generally preferred the term “lost other” over “lost object” (due to the 
latter’s tendency to diminish the agency of the lost being or entity), in this section I invoke the 
latter psychoanalytic term for consistency while discussing the work of Watkin and Bowlby. 
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 (…) loss does not happen in a dialectic scene between subject and object in an 
 artificial pastoral realm, but is what happens dynamically between subjects, other 
 subjects, lost object and present object in a living, metonymic environment of 
 proximity and distance (2004:177). 
 
Approaching loss through the intermediary of objects that metonymically figure 
as partial to the overwhelming “whole” of absence is at once necessary and 
problematic. On the one hand, doing so risks reducing the lost other to a collection 
of phenomena left behind (be they inanimate things or the thoughts, memories and 
emotions of the living) which in reality do not and cannot represent them, denying 
their alterity and agency while being lured ourselves into false emotional 
investments in objects which cannot and should not provide us with the certainties 
we desire. On the other hand, how can we avoid conceiving of such an 
unquantifiable and confounding an experience as loss, and its attendant absence, 
in relation to the physical phenomena of our everyday world and the phenomena 
of our own minds and emotions? For these are the very things by which our lived 
experience is structured, constituting the environment in which we also 
experience loss. As Watkin suggests: 
 
 (…) to speak of the proximate of loss―the closeness of the corpse, the 
 unknowability of the other, the rent fabric of the environment―is to speak of the 
 everyday world of things (2004:176).  
 
Moreover, Watkin pointedly asserts that ‘metonymy refers to the proximity of 
things to things, or signs to signs, not of signs to things’ (2004:191). As such, 
metonymy is a relational structure comparable to that of literary language, in 
which words ultimately refer to other words, rather than to their referents in the 
world. In this way, both structures are mediated and animated by the absence of 
an external referent—the real thing to which a word refers, or the lost other of 
which the elegy speaks.               
 In his efforts to express the experience of his mother’s absence in words, 
Barthes also turned to objects, the inescapable everyday world of things around 
him that remain behind after loss. His reflections in Mourning Diary are cross-
indexed by wide-ranging references to his own books and those of Proust (157), 
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Dante (74), a story by Tolstoy (209); to Biblical verse; the music of Souzay (47); 
an interaction at a bakery store (37); a cocktail party (214); the family house at 
Urt (20); the weather in Paris (93); photographs (143); the state of his apartment 
(35); a film which mentions a ‘rice-powder box’ that evokes his childhood with 
his mother (112); a ‘dreary’ coat and scarf ensemble that his mother would not 
approve of (99); swallows in flight (159); his mother’s ‘pink Uniprix nightgown’ 
(34); her grave site (241); a dream in which he sees her smile (243); Cézanne’s 
watercolours (134); a trip to Tunisia (58); conversations with friends (71). In the 
absence of his mother, everything surrounding Barthes, his “metonymic 
environment”, seems to speak of her, emphasising the ways in which he himself 
and the world are now diminished without her. The stupefying materiality of the 
world is foregrounded in the absence of his mother, the testamentary weight of 
objects by turns imbued with pathos or indifference, signifiers displaced from 
concept and thing, parts displaced from the whole. Such objects signify only the 
absence of his mother and the impossibility of signifying her presence, just as in 
literary language the referent and its concept are negated while the word itself is 
foregrounded. In this sense, Barthes’s work of writing his mourning involved 
translating one kind of signifier into another.         
 The effort of expressing in language a deeply felt sense of loss throws into 
strange relief Blanchot’s observation that, ‘when I speak, I recognize very well 
that there is speech only because “what is” has disappeared in what names it’ 
(1993:36). The desire to recover absence in writing is always an enactment of 
failure, when the presence we long to recover in language is just what we negate 
in writing it. In the absence of Barthes’s mother, the material weight of not only 
the world and its objects, but the words that refer to it, are magnified: 
 
 August 18, 1978 
 The locality of the room where she was sick, where she died, and where I now live, 
 the wall against which the head of her bed rested where I have placed an icon—not 
 out of faith—and still put flowers on a table next to it. I have reached the point of no 
 longer wanting to travel in order to be here, so that the flowers here will always be 
 fresh. (Barthes, 2012:191). 
 
 152 
Yet, as writers like Barthes show us, the effort to write of the difficult persistence 
of felt absence in our lives can yield to literature of power and value, which in 
failing to reach the referent, testify to: 
 
 (…) the eternal torment of our language when its longing turns back toward what it 
 always misses, through the necessity under which it labors of being the lack of what 
 it would say (Blanchot,1993:36). 
 
 
III. 
Ethics & the Orphic turn  
 
From the operations of literary language as a structure, to the mobilisation of 
writing as a felt process, to the real experience of loss and mourning—the 
movements that converge in elegy hinge upon negation and metonymy. Moreover, 
elegy itself enacts a movement additional to those inscribed within it, a movement 
allegorised in the Orphic (or elegiac) turn. In this turn is crystallised the question 
of what we, as writers and mourners, owe to the one we mourn in elegy, the 
question of elegiac ethics.             
 In Freudian subject-centred models of mourning, as seen replicated in 
traditional elegy, the work of overcoming loss is predicated upon the subject’s 
introspection upon the lost other and the nature of their loss, in anticipation of 
commemoration as a means of consolation and preservation, before “turning” 
from the lost other in order to speak of them. This turn is a movement by which 
the subject overcomes loss while interiorising the lost other, compromising the 
lost being’s agency and, through the movement of the elegy, enacting losing the 
lost being for a second time, thus, in a sense, as Watkin suggests, losing loss itself 
(187). This turn, which in negating or sacrificing the lost other mobilises the 
mourner to speak of them and master their grief, underwrites the elegiac tradition, 
and is epitomised in the ancient Greek myth of the death of Eurydice. In this 
myth, Orpheus, upon finding the dead body of his wife Eurydice and being 
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overcome by grief, is moved to make such beautiful music in lamenting her death 
that he impels the gods Hades and Persephone to allow him to take Eurydice from 
the underworld back to earth with him. This is granted on the condition that 
Orpheus remain in front of Eurydice, and not look back at her, until reaching 
earth. However, during their ascent from the underworld, Orpheus is at the last 
moment unable to resist looking back, thus forfeiting his wife forever7. In The 
Space of Literature (1982), Blanchot suggests that Orpheus had to look back 
because he:  
 
 (…) does not want Eurydice in her daytime truth and her everyday appeal, but 
 wants her in  her nocturnal obscurity, in her distance, with a closed body and sealed 
 face—wants to see her not when she is visible, but when she is invisible…not to 
 make her live, but to have her living in the plentitude of her death (1982:172). 
 
Despite the troubling implications of Blanchot’s persistent equations, here and 
elsewhere, of Eurydice with familiar tropes of the woman as other and as muse for 
the purposes of male creativity, his reading of the myth here speaks incisively to 
the operations of elegy with which this discussion is concerned. That is, Blanchot 
underscores here the way in which Orpheus’s song depends on the infinite 
distance, and absence, of the one of whom he sings. Blanchot’s reading, if 
unapologetically, also frames Orpheus’s forsaking turn back toward Eurydice 
clearly within the context of his conscious artistic desire ‘to have her’ in the 
darkness, mystery and otherness of ‘her death’, and within the context of what 
Orpheus’s art demands (Blanchot, 1982:172). As Blanchot suggests, ‘>Orpheus’s@ 
desire, and Eurydice lost…are necessary to the song (1981:101). By contrast, 
Orpheus’s turning back, so fatal to Eurydice, is often framed in a more forgiving 
or opaque light, for example in the context of his being a ‘lover, / Fearing for his 
partner and eager to see her’, as in Stanley Lombardo’s translation of Ovid’s 
account (2011:129). Blanchot’s reading of Orpheus’s turn back as a movement of 
desire to seize absence for the ends of art, which for the analogical purposes of 
this essay is followed herein, is compelling to frame in light of Hilda Doolittle’s 
                                                          
7 The earliest recorded versions of the myth are found in in Book IV of Virgil’s Georgics (29 BC) 
and in Book X of Ovid’s Metamorphoses (8 AD). 
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modernist rewriting of the myth from the viewpoint of Eurydice, in her poem 
‘Eurydice’ (1916), which imbues the latter with a sense of agency and a demand 
to be answered which is lacking in traditional accounts of the myth. Doolittle’s 
Eurydice, as speaker, is fiercely alive to having been sacrificed by Orpheus in his 
turn back, and (unlike in many versions of the myth) is unforgiving, calling for 
Orpheus to answer for his actions: ‘why did you turn back, / that hell should be 
reinhabited / of myself thus/swept into nothingness? (…) what was it you saw in 
my face? / the light of your own face, / the fire of your own presence?’ (1983:52).
 For the purposes of this essay, it is important to understand that Orpheus, as a 
mourner and elegist, conceivably also makes a second, less famous turn—the turn 
away from Eurydice when she is already lost, which relinquishes her to a second 
death in the same moment in which Orpheus experiences a second loss. This turn 
of the mourner away from the lost other, and toward their own interiority and the 
living world around them in order to mourn this lost other, remember them, and 
sing, paint, or write their absence in a form that derives its power from that very 
absence, is a movement that haunts commemorative art. Orpheus’s treatment of 
Eurydice’s death exists not only as a symbol of male creativity being mobilised at 
the expense of female agency8, but an allegory for the sublimation of any other in 
the movement of elegiac art.             
 It must be noted that Watkin, in his discussion of Orpheus, rather confusingly 
omits significant discussion of the crucial original turn toward Eurydice whereby, 
by force of his desire to see her prematurely (before reaching the upper world), he 
condemns her to a second death. Instead, Watkin discusses the Orphic-elegiac 
movement as comprising of the abovementioned turn away from Eurydice, and 
also of a consequent ‘turn back’ or ‘re-turn’ to Eurydice (2004:189). As Watkin 
explains, this dual movement involves the subject’s ‘turn>ing@ away from the 
object as a real thing’ and then ‘turn>ing@ to the object as something for the reality 
of the subject’ (2004:190). Thus, the subject not only turns from the object as a 
discrete other, but turns back, to reappraise the world and their place in it in light 
                                                          
8 In Beyond consolation: death, sexuality, and the changing shapes of elegy (1997), Melissa F. 
Zeiger conducts an insightful examination of the changing representations of gender and sexuality 
in elegy, including the diverse responses of modern female elegists (such as Doolittle) to historical 
representations of Eurydice by male elegists.  
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of what has been lost, assimilating the object within their own subjectivity 
(Watkin, 2004:190). In this way, Watkin extends the allegory of the Orphic turn to 
encompass three turns: toward, away from, and back toward Eurydice. In this 
essay, however, I have not followed Watkin in the unnecessarily confusing 
analogy of a third “turn back” toward Eurydice, a phrase and image which to my 
mind more readily suggest Orpheus answering to his ethical responsibility to 
Eurydice than they suggest his assimilation of her as a part of himself, a process 
which in my analogy occurs during the second turn. Rather, in the later chapters 
of this essay, the prospect of Orpheus “resisting turning away” and of “turning 
toward” or “back to” Eurydice represents the promise of an Orpheus who, as a 
mourner, resists forsaking Eurydice in her death, and answers to her gaze, even 
(or especially) when she is absent. That is, such movements will be invoked 
herein as analogies for thinking ethical mourning in the context of eco-elegy, in 
which we face and are answerable to the other in their alterity, as will be further 
contextualised in light of Derrida’s mourning theory in Chapter 4.    
 Regardless of the vaguely confusing nature of his treatment of Orpheus’s 
turns, Watkin offers an insightful consideration of the implications of Bowlby’s 
work for elegy. Watkin figures the difference between the Orphic “turn away” of 
the mourner-elegist in the traditional subject-object model of mourning, and the 
structure of the Bowlbyan environmental model, as being between metaphor and 
metonymy. In the first model, the subject must ‘memorise the scene of their love 
for the thing, because when the scene is interrupted, as it always will be, it will be 
their job alone to memorialise its loss’ (Watkin, 2004:187). Like Orpheus, 
suggests Watkin, the mourner-elegist turns from the object, ‘and by interiorising 
turn[s] the object away from its objectal status’, appropriating it within their own 
subjectivity (2004:187;189). This movement whereby the subject effectively 
negates the alterity of the object as other is that of introjection, an integral step in 
Freud’s process of “healthy” mourning for the subject to recover from loss. As 
Watkin explains, the work of Bowlby reframes the mourning ‘scene of metaphor’ 
as instead ‘an environment of metonyms’, a shift from metaphorical distance from 
loss to metonymical proximity to loss (2004:190). Watkin further notes that this 
shift was foreshadowed by Lacan’s ‘conception of metonymy as the movement 
from word-to-word, rather than word-to-thing, that typifies desire’, whereby: 
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 (…) in the network of signifiers the real thing is always sliding under the bar of 
 signification. Each sign, therefore, brings us closer to, and further defers, the truth. 
 The Lacanian subject, the metonymic subject, is the subject formed from the 
 problems of the proximity of lack, perceived of as a loss (2004:190). 
 
In diverging from Freud’s ‘dialectic, inter-subjective scene’, and instead situating 
loss within an environment contingent upon the proximity of the lost other, rather 
than simply upon the subject’s presence and the other’s absence, Bowlby’s theory 
is ethical, suggests Watkin (2004:187). Bowlby’s establishment of attachment as 
“‘any form of behaviour that results in a person attaining or retaining proximity to 
some other differentiated and preferred individual’” (Bowlby, 1980:29), leads 
Watkin to outline several implications for critics and readers of literature in 
identifying and engaging with ethical representations of loss (2004:191). Hence 
Watkin emphasises that ‘ethical mourning’ involves a relation not between 
‘subject-object but subject-object-other’, and not ‘a metonymic scene but a 
metonymic environment’ (2004:191). In addition, he stresses that ‘metonymy 
refers to the proximity of things to things, or signs to signs, not of signs to things’ 
(2004:191). Finally, ‘the environment is a place where the subject maintains 
proximity to a number of favoured love objects’ (2004:191). For these reasons, 
‘the critic must pay special attention to the environments of loss’ (2004:191). In 
doing so, we are caused to attend to the alterity of the other as in fact ‘never 
having been possessed and so demanding of responsibility’ (2004:191). 
Ultimately, Watkin asserts that: 
 
 (…) reading works of mourning should be a detailed process of reading proximity, in 
 particular looking for those moments when proximity is troped out, the gaps between 
 things smeared over to fake a continuum (…) reading literature of loss should be the 
 activity of considering the proximity to otherness encountered in an environment 
 (2004:191, emphasis mine). 
 
While Watkin, here as elsewhere, speaks to the implications of ethical mourning 
to literary criticism, his observations regarding the importance of attending to the 
proximity of otherness are vital not only to the activity of reading, but also of 
writing loss. The Orphic turn, and turn back, at once denies and totalises the 
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alterity of the lost other, reconstituting them as merely an object in relation to the 
subject’s own reality, rather than as ‘a real thing’ in itself (Watkin, 2004:190). By 
contrast, Bowlby’s figuration of mourning as a relation to multiple objects within 
a mourner’s environment constitutes a movement whereby, rather than 
objectifying the lost other, ‘the subject simply turns from one object of attachment 
to another’ (Watkin, 2004:194). Watkin likens this process to one in which ‘one 
stop-gap >is@ inserted into another until the gap becomes all one has’ (2004:195). 
In this model as in Freud’s, the process of mourning ultimately centres on the 
subject, who endlessly reconfigures their relation to the lost other through their 
relation to other objects around them. Bowlby’s model, however, at least 
emphasises the ongoing proximity of the other in the mourner’s experience, even 
in absence, instead of smearing over the space that separates mourner from 
mourned (Watkin, 2004:195). Watkin illuminates the difference between these 
modes of relating to the lost other by contrasting the movements of metaphor and 
metonymy in reference to Freud’s account of his nephew’s fort-da game of 
playing ‘gone’ with an object. Conceiving of this game as a form of mourning 
practice, Watkin emphasises the fact that the child’s exclamation is not ‘gone-
here’ (fort-hier), but ‘gone-there’ (fort-da), suggesting that rather than being an 
enactment of ‘“disappearance and return”’ as Freud suggests, it is in fact one of 
‘deixis and distancing’ (2004:164). As such, Watkin observes these movements as 
constituting a distinction between ‘inter-subjective metaphor’ and ‘environmental 
metonymy’ (2004:165). Metaphor ‘requires a significant distance between subject 
and object so as to justify relocating the object tropically within the subject’ 
(Watkin, 2004:165), a movement enacted in traditional Freudian elegies but 
posing an inadequate model for figuring loss. By contrast, metonymy, as a 
relation between the ‘proximate but separate’ corresponds to the way in which 
death (or absence) is also strangely ‘proximate but separate’ from us as mourning 
subjects existing in relation to other objects within environments which are 
themselves altered by the absence of the other (Watkin, 2004:165). Watkin’s 
conception of metonymy as a structure encompassing a relation of both 
‘proximity’ and ‘separateness’ to the other could also be considered in terms of 
intimacy and distance, or difference.        
 Importantly, the implication of such a metonymic structure in thinking about 
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ethical mourning in elegy (as in life), is mirrored on the level of elegiac writing as 
an act of signification, and on the level of language itself. Each of these 
movements, converging in elegy, are structured by a metonymic relation to an 
absent or negated referent—be it the lost other in real-life mourning, the lost other 
in writing elegy, or the real thing in the world to which a word refers. Elegy’s 
enactment of negation upon negation in foregrounding its own materiality and 
affective power as literature speaks to the ethical importance, highlighted by 
Watkin, of at once retaining proximity to the other we elegise, while preserving 
their distance and alterity as an other who is absent. In writing elegy, it is 
incumbent on us to recognise that, just as the experience of loss might mobilise us 
to write, so do we self-consciously mobilise the narrative and aesthetic powers of 
loss for our own literary ends. Speaking of this paradoxical productivity of loss in 
the lives of writers in Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing (1993), Hélène Cixous 
boldly acknowledges how, as writers, ‘in losing we have something to gain. 
Mixed loss and gain: that’s our crime’ (1993:11). Here, Cixous relates these 
paradoxical ‘gains’ of loss to her own experience, explaining that ‘The first book I 
wrote rose from my father’s tomb’ (1993:11). In speaking of the aesthetic and 
ethical implications of generative death (which we can relate more generally to 
absence), Cixous suggests that while we can perpetuate a kind of secondary 
killing through writing, ‘we can also…be the guardian, the friend, the regenerator 
of the dead’ (1993:13). Considering the way in which writing about death 
encompasses an ethical struggle ‘not to kill, knowing there is death, not denying it 
and not proclaiming it’, Cixous, like Blanchot, is mindful of the subtleties in 
grammar which can implicate us in the act of denying the other’s agency 
(1993:13). Cixous suggests that simply attaching the possessive pronoun “my” to 
a subject such as ‘daughter’ or ‘brother’ constitutes ‘verging on a form of murder, 
as soon as I forget to unceasingly recognize the other’s difference’ (1993:13). We 
are mistaken in believing ourselves to truly ‘know’ even those we have known all 
our lives, asserts Cixous in a sentiment echoed by other poststructuralists such as 
Derrida. For Cixous, we writers and the dead are caught in a circular bind: ‘You 
kept him or her in the realm of the dead. And the other way around’ (1993:13). 
The negation of the other that writers collude in when writing, and the paradoxical 
way in which writing involves ‘departing while remaining present, (…) being 
absent while in full presence’, is likened by Cixous to a form of violence not only 
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to the other by the writer or to the writer by the other, but of the writer by writing 
itself (1993:21). Ultimately, says Cixous, in discussing Poe’s story of the painter 
who, in finally realizing his artistic ideal, loses its object in a terrifying (and 
Orphic) eclipse of life and art:  
 
 What we are made to understand is that there can’t be life on both sides. (…) we 
 cannot create in a just manner. In creation we find ourselves before the inevitable 
 failure. It’s a double bind: either you don’t render life or you take it. (1993:31).  
 
In this discussion, Cixous offers an understanding of writing as a paradoxical act 
of creation and violence, which demands the writer be answerable to its stakes. 
On the level of language and narrative, writing makes vulnerable not only the 
other’s alterity, but the writer’s interiority. In answering ethically to the stakes of 
writing, suggests Cixous, the writer must at once acknowledge the violent, 
perhaps unavoidable potential of writing to totalize and reduce the other it 
represents (and which itself “gives life” to writing), and to manoeuvre in ways 
that limit this violence. Recognising the other’s difference through the 
preservation of a certain distance within writing offers one means of doing this. 
Cixous’s observations regarding the relation of writing to death, the strangely 
germinative effect that bereavement can institute in writers, and the “taking of 
life” which artistic creation entails, are applicable not only to writing of death, but 
also to writing springing from the experience of absence which arises from less-
finite forms of loss. Ultimately, Cixous defines writing as ‘the delicate, difficult, 
and dangerous means of succeeding in avowing the unavowable’ (1993:53). For 
Cixous, the violence to the other that writing perpetrates when it expends itself in 
search of the truth, in the aim of ‘avowing the unavowable’, is a difficult and 
unavoidable fact of the creative act (1993:32). Moreover, it is a violence directed 
not only upon the other but also upon the writer themselves, upon the other within 
us—‘when we kill a dead person, we kill ourselves’ (Cixous, 1993:13).  
 Cixous’s understanding of writing as a paradox of ‘succeeding in avowing the 
unavowable’ is echoed by Blanchot in Death Sentence (1978), when the narrator 
reflects upon his telling of the story, explaining that ‘[o]ne thing must be 
understood: I have said nothing extraordinary or even surprising. What is 
extraordinary begins at the moment I stop. But I am no longer able to speak of it’ 
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(1978:30). Here, Blanchot’s narrator speaks to the strange way in which it is 
through the failure of language and literature to manifest the real, in its negating 
of the other and in its being negated by that other, that it paradoxically verges 
toward truth, toward presence, and toward the other. As Marguerite Duras 
articulates, writing involves ‘the telling of a story, and the absence of the story’ 
(1991:27). This understanding speaks directly to the way that not only literary 
language, but elegy as a form performs its own failure to say the unsayable, while 
somehow still leaving something behind that attests to the truth of presence-in-
absence. In addressing this paradox, Watkin invokes Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
concept of the “singable residue”, a phrase appropriated from Paul Celan. 
Analysing Celan’s poem, ‘Tubingen, January’, Lacoue-Labarthe speaks of poetry 
as having ‘nothing to recount, nothing to say; what it recounts and says is that 
from which it wrenches away as a poem’ (1999:20). ‘A poem’, Lacoue-Labarthe 
contends: 
 
 (…) is nothing but pure wanting-to-say. But pure wanting-to-say nothing, 
 nothingness, that against which and through which there is presence, what is 
 (1999:20). 
 
Ultimately, he posits: 
 
 (…) the question…of the singbarer Rest, the singable residue: what saves this poem 
 from wreckage in, and the wreckage of, poetry? How does it happen that in poetry, 
 out of poetry, all is not lost, that a possibility of articulating something still 
 remains…? (1999:23, emphasis in original).  
 
In the singable residue, Lacoue-Labarthe articulates the paradox of generative 
negation that sustains and supplements the elegy. This residue is what remains in 
excess of our ability in language to testify to the other’s absence in language, an 
excess which Watkin suggests ‘does not describe the importance of language for 
mourning, but the importance of mourning for language’ (2004:14). To cite 
Steiner, ‘>t@here is always, as Blake taught, “excess” of the signified beyond the 
signifier’ (1991:84). Elegy is a form mobilised and foregrounded by absences in 
language and the world that its movement further negates (not least through the 
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use of tropes), in verging upon saying the unsayable at the very moment in which 
‘it wrenches away’. These absences are those of the real things or beings to which 
the word, and the mourner lamenting loss, refer.         
 The question of elegiac ethics pertains to what we, in enacting such a 
movement of writing, owe to the other whose loss we recall, and whose absence 
we negate, for a second time in literature. Further, how do we answer in writing to 
this responsibility? As this essay will further discuss, this question has received 
sustained attention, through the reflections of writers themselves, within elegy and 
mourning studies and within the wider philosophy of ethics. Questions that 
demand increased attention, however, relate to the ethics and poetics of reckoning 
in elegy with the phenomenon of ecological loss. What do we do when the 
absence and loss we speak of is the environment itself? How do we account for 
such loss in words? And how do we mourn in elegy for something that which is 
not “fully” lost?  Specifically, how might we as writers approach eco-elegy, and 
define eco-loss, in light of the ethical dangers involved in applying the elegiac 
mode to the literary representation of ecological devastation? In addressing this 
question, the following chapter will discuss the paradoxes involved in defining 
eco-loss, arguing for the need to rethink the signifier “loss” in view of eco-elegy. 
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2 
Elegy under pressure: 
ecological loss 
 
 
Our morality is complicated by the fact that the sky above even 
the most demonic folly is often exquisitely colored, and its clouds 
as breathtakingly pure. 
 
‒ Rachel Solnit, Savage Dreams 
 
(…) what is true of all exile is not that home and love of home 
are lost, but that loss is inherent in the very existence of both. 
 
‒ Edward Said, ‘Reflections on Exile’ 
 
 
Just as absence mobilises the linguistic sign, so does felt absence mobilise writers 
to write, and so do writers self-consciously mobilise the narrative and aesthetic 
powers of this absence for their own literary ends. Writers “put absence to work” 
and in doing so, face a myriad of formal and ethical conundrums concentrated in 
the project of representing a lost other in literary language. These conundrums are 
infinitely complicated when the absence of which they are writing stems from 
ecological loss.                
 This chapter reflects on my own experience of visiting the Ukrainian part of 
the Exclusion Zone created after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster9, as research 
for The Counterpart, before interrogating the meaning of the signifier “loss” in 
relation to “nature” and ecological destruction, and examining the paradoxical and 
                                                          
9 For a selection of photographs suggestive of the “metonymic objects” present 
throughout the Zone (as discussed in this chapter), see the Appendix. 
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ethically problematic form of the ecological elegy. Finally, it will briefly discuss 
the literary form of the ecological elegy with reference to Timothy Morton’s essay 
‘The Dark Ecology of Elegy’ (2010), arguing that a more rigorous attendance to 
the varied meanings encompassed by the word “loss” is integral to developing an 
ethical poetics of eco-elegy. 
 
 
Writing Chernobyl 
 
During the course of research for The Counterpart, I visited Ukraine’s Exclusion 
Zone, or Zone of Alienation, the 4300 square kilometre area, spanning three 
countries, that was evacuated of humans following the 1986 nuclear accident at 
Chernobyl power plant, the worst nuclear disaster in history. Taking a bus from 
Kiev’s Independence Square for two hours through suburban sprawl, straggling 
villages and woodland, to the Exclusion Zone that had for so long occupied my 
thoughts, was a strange journey. To finally “be there” was a surreal feeling, as if 
my being able to reach that place was a violation of the order of things that 
stipulates that certain regions should always remain beyond the reach of those 
who would visit them (certainly, regarding certain modes of “dark tourism”, there 
are grounds for such an argument—I remain ambivalent about the nature of my 
visit).                   
 It was as if, in simply being there, I had entered otherness itself, and I felt that 
Conradian thrill which commingles aesthetic distance with the awe of the real. In 
this, of course, I was guilty of a dangerous kind of metaphysical thinking, the kind 
that romanticises reality and, in doing so, undermines atrocity, as well as the 
singularity of the beings in its web. Like much of the world, I had mythologised 
as other the real place of Chernobyl, and to step into it did not bring about an 
apotheosis of truth and understanding, but an abiding sense of stupefaction. 
‘Chernobyl’ itself has become a metonym for an event and a territory far larger in 
scale than the accident at reactor four at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.   
 If the loss of a beloved person to death confounds our emotions, minds and 
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imaginations in the aftermath, the kind of loss occasioned by Chernobyl is more 
confounding still. What do we do when the object lost is the environment itself? 
How is Bowlby’s model of loss (of which I will shortly say more) reconfigured? 
Grappling with other discrete kinds of loss, the subject is able to redefine itself 
and its attachments in relation to its proximity to other objects within its 
environment, while retaining through these very relations a proximity to the object 
it has lost—the existence of which, in this model, ‘does not rely totally on the 
subject having its gaze returned to it’ (Watkin, 2004:194). The subject of this kind 
of loss is unable, practically or ethically, to simply turn to another object of 
attachment because it is the subject’s attachments with its interconnected 
environment of objects itself that is the object of loss. Of course, this conundrum 
is further complicated by the fact that the “object of loss” is in fact not yet lost in 
the totality suggested by that word, but rather, “partially” lost; at stake, threatened 
with the total loss of annihilation.            
 In the case of Chernobyl, an entire territory of farmland, forests, towns and 
villages which had sustained both human and other-than-human life, was polluted 
for thousands of years with radioactive waste from a nuclear reactor explosion, 
and evacuated by the Soviet government. Some human beings died as a direct 
result of the explosion and the clean-up―inadequately protected clean-up 
workers, fire fighters, journalists, and medics, in addition to unborn infants and 
children whose bodies are most vulnerable to nuclear radiation. Thousands 
more—the character of Vera being a fictional example—suffered not only a loss 
of health, but the unspeakable loss of the very environment of being that had 
structured their lived experience, and sustained their relationships to home, work, 
tradition, history, culture and community—losses also constitutive, to a significant 
extent, of a loss of self. Added to this is the loss of meaning in life and of spiritual 
faith suffered by many. To this tally must be added the enormous and uncounted 
loss of non-human creatures, who died (or whose populations were compromised) 
as a result of the radiation and also, as was the fate of most farm and companion 
animals, at the hands of clean-up workers tasked with eradicating them. More 
confounding still is the unquantifiable damage wreaked by Chernobyl upon the 
living ecosystem of the affected area, a fragile interconnected system of 
waterways, forests, marshlands and farmlands now forever altered by 
radionuclides. Neither can this damage be understood as limited to this immediate 
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ecosystem―Chernobyl’s release of nuclear radiation into the atmosphere was 
detected in Sweden, and resulted in radioactive black rain upon Britain10.   
 Yet, while the nuclear explosion at reactor four led to this vast and 
unspeakable proliferation of loss, “Chernobyl” as a territory was not, in absolute 
terms, itself lost. In fact, since the evacuation of humans following the disaster in 
1986, the remarkable regeneration of the Exclusion Zone has been studied by 
scientists and reported on by journalists, and stands to complicate any assumption 
about what loss means in relation to ecological destruction. Almost thirty years 
following the disaster, the Zone is an unprecedented reminder of the resilience of 
nature. Somewhat ironically, not even the world’s worst nuclear disaster exceeds 
the adverse impact of humans upon the natural environment—virtually deserted 
by humans, this radioactive territory has become home to apparently thriving 
populations of many native and endangered species, not seen for years before the 
accident—wild boar, elk, eagle owls, brown bears, grey wolves, and lynx11. In 
addition, the Zone has provided a precious opportunity in densely populated 
Europe for the reintroduction of endangered species such as European bison and 
Przewalski’s horse. To visit Chernobyl is not only to reckon with the eerie 
reminders of a vast tragedy, but also to wonder at the strange beauty of wilderness 
which by increments is reclaiming the austere concrete landscape of an 
ambitiously planned Soviet town, of farmlands long cultivated for food 
production, and the surrounding villages which had stood for centuries. In this 
way, Chernobyl offers not only the most vivid image yet of what the end of 
human civilization might look like, but an ecologist’s fantasy of nature 
transcending the destructive vice of human activity, given a chance―even under 
                                                          
10   See ‘Remember Chernobyl: a continuing nuclear tragedy’, by Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) (2011:2-3). 
11  See Chernobyl’s Legacy (2nd ed.), the report of The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005. While the 
Forum has been accused by groups such as CND of downplaying the consequences of the disaster, 
this report includes a concise account of radiation effects on plants and animals, while also noting 
that, ‘facilitated by the removal of human activities’, ‘the Exclusion Zone has paradoxically 
become a unique sanctuary for biodiversity’ (2006:29; 30). It must be acknowledged here that 
debate among scientists continues over such claims, as can be glimpsed in conflicting news 
commentary on the subject. For example, see ‘Wildlife defies Chernobyl radiation’ (2006), and 
‘Chernobyl Zone shows decline in biodiversity’ (2010) on BBC News Online. Findings pertaining 
to Chernobyl as a haven for wildlife by Robert Baker and Ron Chesser (2006), for example, can be 
contrasted with findings by Anders Møller and Timothy Mousseau (2011) regarding such factors 
as radiation-induced mutations and selective deaths.  
 166 
the shadow of radioactivity―to once again sustain interconnected populations of 
flora and fauna as would never be possible amid an ever-growing human 
population. As the site of the world’s worst nuclear disaster, Chernobyl at once 
stands as the prevision of post-ecological apocalypse par excellence, and 
confounds the idea of the apocalyptic loss of nature in its presentation of human 
industry and settlement regenerating into a verdant wilderness abundant with 
wildlife, evocative of a kind of post-human pastoral.        
 As epitomised by the alteration in colour of the Wormwood Forest pines 
around the reactor in the immediate aftermath of the accident, to the effect that the 
area is now better known as the Red Forest, Chernobyl’s landscape at once marks, 
and is marked by the signs of loss. Physical objects, man-made or cultivated by 
man—houses, town buildings, cars, Communist posters, dolls, cots, once-prized 
orchards, overgrown farms—remain behind in various states of ruin, attesting to 
what has taken place there. Signs bearing the symbol for radiation warn of danger 
in overgrown wheat fields. The iconic Pripyat Ferris wheel and dodgem cars of an 
amusement park that never opened continue to rust in strange arrest. The spectral 
“sarcophagus”, the entombed reactor four, stands silent at the power plant. Like 
the archaeological remains of a past age, these revenential objects―so 
evocatively displaced from their original context in time and space before the 
accident―appear to the visitor as signifiers―markers―of the signified 
“Chernobyl”, vividly recalling the order of being that has been lost, and throwing 
into relief the radical alteration of their surroundings―facilitating a kind of 
sensory oscillation between what was and what is, the familiar and the strange. At 
the same time, these objects in themselves partially constitute the referent, the real 
thing to which the signified refers―because “Chernobyl” is only a kind of meta-
noun and metonym standing in for what is really an endless and proliferating 
structure of relations between such objects in space and time. If we consider the 
way in which these individual objects are all implicated in this wider structure of 
relations, we could also view these objects as metonyms; parts interconnected 
with a plurality of parts, a greater “whole”. Of course, also constituting 
“Chernobyl” within and without the environment of the Zone are a myriad of 
subjects living and dead―the humans who lost the environment in which they 
lived their lives, those who died, the few “illegal re-settlers” who stayed in the 
Zone―and all the other beings of the animal kingdom, from mammal to 
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arthropod, who have been and continue to be affected by the consequences of the 
disaster. On an individual and collective level, from elk to owls, untold numbers 
of non-human creatures have variously died, been biologically altered, and had 
their activity reconstituted by the Zone’s depopulation of humans. To the human 
visitor, evidence of this impact is everywhere. Radioactive deer antlers litter the 
Red Forest. White owls nest in abandoned schools. Free of fishermen, overgrown 
catfish fill the Pripyat River. Wild boars cross the overgrown roads between field 
and forest. Grey wolves congregate in crumbling ghost villages, and perch on 
rooves to glimpse deer.             
 Moreover, an ecological understanding of the organic life-forms and 
processes implicated in the Chernobyl accident must also encompass organisms 
such as plants, insects, fungi, algae, and bacteria, as parts constituting the 
interdependent community of organisms, which in interacting with nonliving parts 
such as water, air and soil, comprise an ecosystem. As defined by the Merriam-
Webster Online, an ecosystem is a ‘[c]omplex of living organisms, their physical 
environment, and all their interrelationships in a particular unit of space’ (Concise 
Encyclopedia entry, “Ecosystem, n.”, 2014).         
 In this way, we could say that the event and site of “Chernobyl” names not an 
object of loss but a vast, diverse and interconnected constellation of objects and 
subjects within and without the Zone, implicated in the proliferation of 
consequences from reactor four's release of radiation in 1986. In saying “within 
and without”, I refer to the way that the ongoing impact of Chernobyl extends 
beyond the area in which it occurred, continuing to affect its now-dispersed 
human population who were displaced. In addition, Chernobyl has implicated 
scientists, scholars, doctors, activists, politicians, aid workers and artists around 
the world in dealing with the fallout―working to heighten consciousness about 
nuclear dangers, minimise the chances of the reactor's unspent fuel being released, 
treat and seek justice for those suffering the health effects of radiation, studying 
the long-term effects of radiation from the accident, and provide a means of 
expressing the grief of various forms of loss. Chernobyl has also, of course, 
entered the collective imagination as a cautionary symbol of previously 
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unimaginable disaster, in which we wagered destruction on an incredible scale 
with an enemy that tests the limits of comprehension (some radioactive elements, 
such as plutonium, will persist for thousands of years) 12 . These objects and 
subjects are inanimate (abandoned buildings, cars; soil and water) and 
animate―living organisms, encompassing not only humans but also other 
vertebrates and other sub-groups of the animal kingdom, in addition to insects, 
plants and bacteria, and the interconnected systems in which these organisms 
exist.                 
 Chernobyl is not simply a lost object. Rather, as mentioned, it names a 
network of countless individual subjects of loss and objects of loss. As such, the 
case of Chernobyl confounds Bowlby’s theory of object relations. For example, 
how does the human subject of loss adapt by forming new attachments to objects 
within their environment when it is this environment itself that is lost? Moreover, 
by positioning the environment itself as subject, and by reinterpreting “re-
attachment” as the adaptation of connections within an ecological network, we 
can subvert Bowlby’s paradigm to view the Exclusion Zone as quite effectively 
reconstituting its order of relations with the entities it connects and is connected 
to—the ecological system—in order to adapt to the relative absence of humans 
and the presence of radionuclides in its soil, waters, flora and fauna. At the same 
time, the Zone complicates the Bowlbyan concept of what Watkin terms a 
“metonymic environment”. As has been discussed, we experience and grapple 
with loss through the physical world of objects that remain behind after loss, 
objects through which we variously experience the proximity and distance of the 
lost object. These objects function metonymically as parts standing in for the 
untotalisable “whole” of absence (or death). Now that the object of loss is gone, it 
is only through our relations with the objects present around us that we can relate 
to the object we have lost. Such objects—a possession belonging to the lost one, a 
place in which we remember being with them—thus function as signs, or more 
specifically, as metonyms, standing in for the unquantifiable otherness of loss in 
our lives. The case of Chernobyl conflates the traditional scene of loss—Bowlby’s 
“metonymic environment” of objects that remain behind to speak of this loss and 
                                                          
12 See ‘Remember Chernobyl: a continuing nuclear tragedy’, by Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) (2011:1). 
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to evoke the proximity and distance of the lost object—with the lost object itself, 
and also with the mourning subject. This conflation strikes at the heart of why 
encountering the Zone is such a stupefying experience. Effectively, in many ways 
the Zone has been lost, to the extent that its once thriving human community of 
towns, agriculture and industry has perished, and thousands of people have 
literally lost their homes. And yet, the Zone itself remains, as physically real as it 
ever was. Moreover, it is only the loss of its human population that has enabled its 
woodlands and many species of wildlife to regenerate—where before the accident 
it was they who were being lost. With some paperwork and a guide, one can go 
there and walk around, literally return to the scene of loss. In doing so, one is 
confronted with a constellation of objects that not only attest to the different forms 
of loss that have occurred, but which themselves emanate from and constitute the 
occasion and environment of that loss. These objects not only function as material 
signifiers signifying the idea (mental concept or signified) of Chernobyl, but they 
are themselves singular, real components of the referent Chernobyl. That is, 
unlike in literary signification, as signifiers these physical objects do not negate 
the real referent in order to evoke an idea of the referent―rather they constitute a 
real part of the greater integrated entity that constitutes Chernobyl, and so in fact 
embody the metonymic interrelation of part and whole. That is, from the 
perspective of semiotics, the Zone’s environment is constituted of objects (signs) 
in which the material medium (that functions to signify the mental concept) and 
the real thing referred to are congruent. As evidenced through this case of 
Chernobyl, there is a sense in which the “metonymic environment” of ecological 
loss confounds our traditional means of comprehending and signifying loss, when 
what is “lost” is the scene of traditional loss and pastoral elegy, which 
paradoxically also remains—and when the objects through which we might trope 
this loss are in fact remnants of this loss.          
 To encounter the Zone is to enter a rich web of paradox. It is to walk around 
in a real and fertile landscape that has survived a Job-like devastation, yet which 
is itself an object of (subjective) loss and increasingly the object of a noir 
subculture (just Google the S.T.A.L.K.E.R. video games, or search ‘radioactive 
wolves’ on YouTube). For myself, and I imagine for certain others, visiting 
Chernobyl as what might be called a “dark tourist” was also to confront the 
question of my own ferocious fascination for a place that is unique on Earth in 
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providing the opportunity to glimpse what a post-apocalyptic landscape, a verdant 
yet post-nuclear radioactive landscape in the process of overtaking all evidence of 
human civilization and returning to wilderness, might look like. Was my 
fascination unseemly? Did it disrespect or negate the real tragedy of Chernobyl 
and the individuals involved? Certainly, looking out of a bus window and seeing 
ghostly clusters of ruined villages, obscured by trees, rush past—and walking 
through the collapsing rooms of a kindergarten abandoned and decaying for as 
long as I have been alive, to ponder old drawings, broken cots, and dolls in arrest 
since 1986—is an ethically fraught enterprise. Complicating the situation further 
is the undeniable thrill, the frisson of the imagination in entering such a radically 
strange landscape, the surreal sensation of inhabiting a dream or a science fiction 
film―as I stood in the silence of a city giving over to trees, the city of Pripyat, 
arrested in the Soviet eighties of Gorbachev. In the area surrounding the city 
centre, paths with names like ‘Lenin Boulevard’ are overgrown, and still surprise 
the walker with the odd public mural, standing like milestones in the ground. 
Wandering around the city centre’s industrial concrete expanse, I squinted at the 
solid grey forms of a bank, a supermarket, a hotel, a leisure centre, a cinema and 
the many apartment blocks, windowless and often filled with incipient trees, many 
still heralding their titles on signs in bold Soviet capitals. As I strained to imagine 
these buildings and this place almost three decades before, at times I experienced 
a shock of recognition at a poster, a shoe, or a history book, uncanny artefacts that 
provoked in me a visceral sensation of the familiar within the strange; which 
moved me and which, like conduits, animated in my imagination a sense of what 
had once been. There is an undoubtable aspect of voyeurism to encountering the 
Zone as a tourist, in which the landscape becomes an aesthetic object provoking 
both awe and fear, an experience linked to the sublime. To wander in a landscape 
evacuated of humans is to be launched into a future subjectivity, the awkward 
narrative position of the last man, the sole human survivor on a planet that has 
transcended us.                
 The Zone is a site of tragedy, a cautionary tragedy of the nuclear age which, if 
not for the actions of the clean-up workers, could have been unimaginably worse, 
and yet most strongly I registered the peace and beauty of such a vast area in 
overpopulated Europe being allowed, even in radioactivity, to offer haven to non-
human forms of plant and animal life that our civilisation continues to diminish, at 
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our own risk and to our own impoverishment. To a degree, the landscape of the 
Zone animated my own fantasy of a post-human futurity in which we do not take 
nature down with us, and the natural world in some measure survives humanity's 
self-destruction. Finally, the ethical question of my visit to Chernobyl to “see 
what it’s really like”, was compounded by my desire to write of it in a novel, 
through characters; to make of it a subject for fiction.       
 As the case of Chernobyl indicates, invoking the word “loss” in relation to an 
environment opens up a host of questions that demand scrutiny, particularly in 
view of the traditional elegiac movement. What happens when the “object” of loss  
is also a living ecosystem, comprised of many living subjects, and a site that the 
mourner can physically return to? What happens when the pastoral background 
that has for so long animated the elegy with natural tropes, is itself the lost object? 
How are we to reconceive of the lost object in such a way as to acknowledge that, 
as with Chernobyl, the “lost object” is in fact a multiplicitous network of 
organisms and processes that continues to exist and change, without negating the 
real loss that it represents? In seeking to address such questions, we must also 
interrogate what we mean when we use terms like nature, environment and 
ecology. Moreover, Chernobyl provides a vivid lens through which to critique the 
strange and unseemly desire that is implicated in not only imagining (through 
elegiac and speculative writing), but in actually visiting the site of, an eco-
apocalypse. At the same time, the case of Chernobyl complicates our ideas about 
what such an apocalypse might constitute. 
 
 
 
Defining eco-loss 
 
How are we to define the paradoxical instance of ecological loss, such as that 
represented by Chernobyl, in contrast to the absolute, bounded physical loss 
occasioned by, for example, the death of a person? In addressing this question, it 
is necessary to consider in greater detail the scope of varied meanings 
encompassed by the words “loss” and “absence”, as they pertain to the experience 
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and the state of (non) being or (non) presence. Interrogating the limits of these 
words in relation to the kind of absolute physical loss/absence entailed by the 
word “death”, will clarify their application to the experience of mourning, and to 
the kind of destruction and threat that mobilises ecological elegy. Doing so is 
particularly important in discussing eco-elegy, considering the fact that the 
majority of the literature within elegy studies conflates loss with physical death, 
specifically human death, and assumes that the meanings encompassed by the 
terms death, loss and absence, and the boundaries between them, are self-evident. 
The following overview draws from the OED’s exhaustive definitions, which 
assist in unpicking the dominant modes in which these terms are used, delineating 
the ways in which they pertain to relative and subjective states in addition to 
absolute, objective states.             
 The OED Online (2014) defines the word loss generally as pertaining to: 
‘Perdition, ruin, destruction; the condition or fact of being ‘lost’, destroyed, or 
ruined’, but assists by then delineating in detail the following diverse ways in 
which loss can pertain to ‘[t]he fact of losing’ (emphases are mine):  
 
 a. The being deprived of, or the failure to keep (a possession, appurtenance, right, 
 quality, faculty, or the like). 
 b. Loss of life n. the being put to death (as a punishment). Also, in generalized 
 sense, the destruction or ‘sacrifice’ of human lives. 
 c. The being deprived by death, separation, or estrangement, of (a friend, relative, 
 servant, or the like). Often contextually, the death (of a person regretted). 
 d. The losing of or being defeated in (a battle, game, or contest). Formerly also 
 without specific mention of the object: The state of being a loser, defeat. 
 e. Failure to take advantage or make good use (of time, etc.). 
 f. Failure to gain or obtain. 
 
Exempting further highly subject-specific applications of the word, loss is also 
defined as: 
 
 5a. Diminution of one's possessions or advantages; detriment or disadvantage  
 involved in being deprived of something, or resulting from a change of   
 conditions; an instance of this. (Opposed to gain.) 
 b. To have a (great) loss in (or of): to suffer severely by losing (usually, a person). 
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 7. Lack, default, want (“Loss, n.1.”, 2014).  
 
Absence, on the other hand, is defined by the OED Online primarily as: 
 
 1a. The state of being absent or away from a place, or from the company of a  
 person or persons.  
 2. Want, lack, privation, or failure of something; an instance of this (“Absence, n.”, 
 2014). 
 
By contrast, the OED Online defines death primarily as: 
 
 1. The act or fact of dying; the end of life; the permanent cessation of the vital  
 functions of a person, animal, plant, or other organism.  
  2. The state of being physically dead; the state or condition of being without  
 life.  
 
Additional definitions relevant to our purposes include: 
 
   5. Cessation of the existence or duration of a thing; end, disappearance,   
 destruction; (also) the cause or occasion of this. 
  7. Killing, bloodshed, slaughter, murder.  
 9. Loss of viability of tissue or of a part of the body of an organism. 
 11. Chiefly literary. Loss of sensation or vitality; unconsciousness, or a weakening of 
 consciousness, as in sleep or orgasm (“Death, n.”, 2014).  
 
As these detailed definitions indicate, the conditions of loss, absence and death are 
neither limited to the absolute, objective meanings they are often reduced to, nor 
as distinct as might be assumed—the boundaries between loss, absence and death 
are blurred. Just as loss can entail a literal ‘loss of life, the being put to death’ or 
‘being deprived by death’, so can loss entail deprivation by means of ‘separation, 
or estrangement’ or ‘the failure to keep (a possession, appurtenance, right, quality, 
faculty, or the like).’ Absence, similarly, pertains not only to objective instances 
of absolute absence, like death, total disappearance or annihilation—but also to 
subjective instances: ‘being absent or away from a place, or from the company of 
a person or persons’; ‘Want, lack, privation, or failure of something’. Also 
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important is the way in which death pertains not only to the physical ‘end of life; 
the permanent cessation of the vital functions of a person, animal, plant, or other 
organism’ but to the ‘Cessation of the existence or duration of a thing; end, 
disappearance, destruction’ and even to a ‘loss of vitality’.     
 Ultimately, it is via the understanding of loss as deprivation, (to which might 
be added diminishment) or estrangement, and absence as want, lack, or privation, 
and death as a state that can pertain to ecosystems as well as humans or animals, 
that we can negotiate the fraught territory of eco-loss and eco-elegy. 
 
 
Ecological elegy 
 
[h]uman society now finds itself in the midst of a mass 
extinction: a global evolutionary convulsion with few parallels 
in the entire history of life.  
 
– John Tuxill, Losing Strands in the Web of Life 
 
 
In his essay ‘The Dark Ecology of Elegy’ (2010), Timothy Morton offers a timely 
and thought-provoking consideration of ecological writing as it pertains 
specifically to the elegiac mode, discussing some of the key formal and ethical 
challenges of the form. Reiterating the traditional distinctions of Freud, Morton 
argues that a more responsible eco-elegy would resist the follow-through of 
“healthy” mourning, and espouse a melancholic movement of non-acceptance. 
Morton’s argument, however, is complicated by certain inconsistencies and 
contradictions, in addition to a lack of clarity in defining and qualifying key terms 
and concepts, as will be discussed in this and later chapters. While engaging with 
Morton’s essay, the following section considers some of the paradoxes and 
complexities of negotiating the ecological elegy as a form, and argues that any 
attempt to conceive of an ethical poetics of writing eco-elegy must examine and 
(re)define the signifier “loss” alongside the signifier “nature”, whereas, in 
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Morton’s (albeit brief) essay, attendance to the former is lacking.  Elegy, in both 
its traditional poetic form, and, perhaps even more commonly, as a more general 
literary tone or mode in prose, is a major form in ecological literature, a fact that 
is unsurprising considering mounting awareness of our planetary ecological crisis. 
At the same time, from its earliest origins, elegy has been bound up with the 
natural world, the scene of skies, rivers, birds and flowers, against which the 
speaker’s grief is staged, the presence of which throws into relief the reality of 
loss, through which the speaker grapples with how to live in this loss, and in 
which is lodged the tropes that animate the poem. That is, just as elegy is 
increasingly associated with ecological loss, as Morton notes, ‘elegy is also 
ecological’, inasmuch as its ‘formal topics and tropes are environmental’ 
(2010:252). Elegies are staged in an environment, whether pastoral or urban, that, 
perhaps more resonantly than in any other literary form, is foregrounded in both 
the narrative and poetic tropes of the text. For the world or environment of the 
elegist, in remaining behind after the thing they have lost, is animated by that loss 
and offers itself to the elegist in speaking of that loss. Moreover, there is 
something almost radically tautological in ecological elegy, in which—beyond 
functioning as the backdrop against which grief is staged, the presence which 
throws absence into greater relief, and the source of the poetic tropes that structure 
and vivify the writing—the environment itself is configured as the principal 
subject(s), or, as it may be object(s). As Morton notes, ecological language might 
be seen as predisposed to the elegiac mode because ‘nature is the ultimate lost 
object’ and ‘the never-arriving terminus of a metonymic series: birds, flowers, 
mountains’ (2010:252-3).              
 Complicating ecological elegy further is its uncertain relation to time, when 
necessarily it speaks of ‘events that have not yet (fully) happened’ and, diverging 
sharply from traditional elegy, ‘weeps for that which will have passed given a 
continuation of the current state of affairs’ (Morton, 2010:254). This strange 
simultaneity of looking back while looking forward in ‘prophecy’ is a reality of 
reading ecological elegy, suggests Morton, and ‘reproduces dualism’ (2010:254). 
It is also, of course, a reality of writing such elegy. If an event that has not yet 
fully happened is elegised, so Morton contends, the elegy effectively 
‘undermines’ the act of mourning at the very moment it is performed (2010:254). 
 176 
What Morton asserts of such apocalypticism in implicating the reader is also true 
of the writer who envisions it, engendering: 
 
 (…) a decidedly un-ecological subject position, sitting back and letting the other take 
 care of business. The content may be lamentation, but the subject position is passive 
 enjoyment (2010:254). 
 
Moreover, what is at stake in such writing and reading—which takes for granted 
that, at the current rate of ecological destruction and socio-political complacency, 
nature and our primal connection to it are as good as lost—is of a greater scale 
than what is at stake when we try, and fail, to perform the “true” mourning of 
someone who has died, in literature or in life. In addition, while the gravity of the 
ecological threat must of course be written and read about creatively as well as 
scientifically, the recent eco-elegiac “turn” in modern creative literature (poetry 
and prose) underlines the fact that, like death, ecological disaster makes for a 
compelling story to read, and rich material for writing. The vertiginous totality of 
destruction that such ecological apocalypticism envisions, not on a fantasy planet 
but on our own in the not-so-distant future, strains the imagination and terrifies 
the mind, and offers a subject of biblical proportions. In presenting this familiar 
world as strange, apocalyptic visions elicit the strange thrill of the uncanny, only 
intensified when we know that such a vision, as a trajectory of our current 
predicament, is not a long bow to draw. However, the category of aesthetic 
fascination that perhaps lends most enduring power to representations of eco-
apocalypse is that of the sublime, which Edmund Burke, in 1752, described as a 
sensory phenomenon ‘excit[ing] ideas of pain, and danger’ alongside the ‘terrible’ 
and which draws forth ‘the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of 
feeling’ (2008:39). Burke emphasises that:  
 
 When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and 
 are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may 
 be, and are delightful, as we everyday experience (2008:40). 
 
Here, Burke describes another strain of “unseemly” glee, or faintly monstrous 
pleasure derived from the sensory frisson that the terrible inspires in us as 
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spectators, writers and readers. While much fetishised in learned aristocratic 
circles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there is something universal and 
timeless about our fascination for disaster on a sublime scale. Intrinsic to the 
experience of the sublime, however, is a privileged subject position—while we 
must be near enough to the terrible to be awed and threatened by it, in order to 
feel its strange thrill we must have the leisure to contemplate, at an aesthetic 
distance from real danger. Whether or not ecological apocalypse is imagined as 
the total annihilation of Earth itself, or of humanity only, in order to create such a 
vision, a witness is required (whether foregrounded or effaced in the narrative), 
with Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) being a paradigmatic example. As 
Morton puts it, ‘consciousness goes on—we always imagine total destruction 
from some impossible imaginary vantage point, a future anterior’ (2010:254). 
Morton could as easily be speaking of the sublime when he discerns that ‘our love 
of nature is based on our capacity for devouring it’ (2010:255). Unlike the writer 
who elegises the loss of other kinds of objects, the writer who writes ecological 
loss is challenged by an object that is unbounded, measureless and not yet fully 
lost. Morton suggests this produces a ‘dilemma at the formal level’ when elegy 
‘presupposes the very loss it wants to prevent’, ‘‘getting rid of’ nature before full 
destruction occurs’ (2010:255). This movement reveals ‘the sadism of the 
(ecological) elegiac mode’ when it ‘kills nature for a second time, before it has 
fully happened for the first time’ (2010:255). Morton suggests that the 
‘narcissistic panic’ of eco-apocalypticism in elegy not only resigns itself to loss 
too soon, but also, in the vertiginous flurry of burying nature for good, ‘fails fully 
to account for the actual loss of actually existing species and environments’ 
(2010:255). Such an ‘unseemly rhetorical rush’, suggests Morton, ‘is at best 
unhelpfully paradoxical, and at worst implicated in the aggression towards the 
biosphere with which its content tries to frighten us’ (2010:255). Asserts Morton, 
‘[e]cological poetry must thus transcend the elegiac mode’ (2010:255), suggesting 
that to do this, the very idea of “nature” must evolve, from ‘something ‘over 
there’, the ultimate lost object’ to a more complex and ethical comprehension of 
ecology itself as the ‘thinking [of] how all beings are interconnected, in as deep a 
way as possible’ (2010:255).           
 While Morton raises useful points in observing key challenges facing the 
ecological elegy as a form, his neglect to examine the signifier of loss alongside 
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his critique of the signifier “nature” is inconsistent and confusing. Without 
qualifying the diverse meanings that “loss” can encompass, he speaks of 
traditional elegiac loss as an absolute that is thus incompatible with a responsible 
ecological reckoning with ecological destruction, before considering how a 
responsible elegiac mode might proceed in a way that resists giving up nature as 
lost. Morton’s consequent proposition of a melancholic elegiac mode that resists 
closure is undermined by the fact that, as with any elegiac form, a melancholic 
elegy still proceeds from an instance or apprehension of loss. What is required, 
here, I contend, is an attendance at once to how such a responsible elegiac mode 
would focalise and converge around loss as discrete, immediate and located 
instances within a greater reality in-process, instead of smearing over the 
contingency of Earth’s ecological systems by mourning for all nature as a 
generality, and as an absolute loss. Moreover, it must be recognised that both the 
terms loss and nature (or environment, ecology) operate as metonyms for what is 
really a series of encounters, or a network of (inter)relations. When I lose my 
friend to death or my country to civil war, while one loss is absolute and the other 
conditional, in both instances what I “lose” is in fact the continuation of a series of 
encounters made possible by the existence of my living friend, or my ability to 
live in my country. I lose the opportunity to continue encountering the other in its 
living alterity, to have the other outside of my subjectivity as an entity able to 
surprise me in a living exchange with difference. Instead, I am left only with my 
memory of these encounters, a circumstance of reduction and impoverishment. 
Similarly, when we invoke the words “nature”, “ecology” and “environment”, we 
invoke a stand-in term for an infinite network of interrelated but discrete 
organisms, organic elements and processes that constitute planet Earth, from a 
micro to macro level. As will be discussed in the following chapters, it is in this 
understanding of loss as a diminishment of contingency, complexity and diversity, 
and as a deprivation of the opportunity to encounter difference, that we can 
develop a more rigorous framework for thinking ethical eco-elegy. By examining 
Derrida’s complication of the question of ethical mourning, we can discern how a 
responsible writing of ecological loss can in many ways be guided by what 
constitutes a responsible commemoration of and for the friend. 
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3 
Eco-loss, mourning & 
melancholia 
 
 
It is not Christ who is crucified now, it is the tree itself… 
 
‒ John Fowles, The Tree 
 
What must be said here is the impossibility of telling about this 
place, here, and this grave. But even so, one can kiss the gray 
granite and weep over you. 
 
‒ Marguerite Duras, ‘The Death of the Young British Pilot’, in 
Writing 
 
 
How do we mourn ethically in elegy for a loss that is at once real and yet so 
divergent from the discrete, bounded, finite loss of (most) traditional mourning? 
Ecological loss refers to a phenomenon that, in its being at once contingent and 
constitutive of a loss of contingency, is amorphous, insidious, non-finite, and non-
absolute. Ecological loss refers to the loss of vital components of a wider 
structure, where each such loss threatens not only the loss of another component, 
but always a greater loss, the loss of the whole interdependent system, the stakes 
of which are ever-rising because it is all the time in-motion―as by increments 
vital drylands become desert. We live now under the perpetual, lengthening 
shadow of this loss, a loss that is happening without yet “having happened”; it is 
no wonder that writers are increasingly imagining a near future in which this 
shadow falls over us all. This chapter examines the implications of Morton’s 
argument that a melancholic elegiac mode presents a more ethical mode of 
representing ecology in crisis. In doing so, Morton’s critique of the ideal of 
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nature, and his proposition of “dark ecology” in contrast to “deep green ecology”, 
will also be considered. Ultimately, this chapter argues that any use of a term as 
culturally and critically loaded as melancholia must be more rigorously qualified, 
and must involve a greater attendance not only to the future loss that is now 
irremediable due to global warming, but to our human culpability and 
answerability in light of this loss.  
 
 
Nature/ecology 
 
From Bill McKibben in The End of Nature (1989) to William Cronon in ‘The 
Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature’ (1995), and Val 
Plumwood in ‘Nature in the Active Voice’ (2009), the term “nature” as a site of 
contested and contradictory meanings has long been the object of critical 
interrogation by environmental and cultural philosophers13. While, like Morton, 
most identify nature as a problematic construct in need of rethinking, their 
conclusions vary markedly. In the escalating effects of human activity on the 
biosphere, and the encroachment of human civilization on every aspect of a 
natural environment he views as having once been defined by its independence 
from us, McKibben discerns “the end of nature” as we have known it. In 
suggesting that ‘we are at the end of nature’, McKibben explains: 
 
 (…) I do not mean the end of the world. Though they may change dramatically, the 
 rain will still fall, and the sun shine. When I say ‘nature’, I mean a certain set of 
 human ideas about the world and our place in it. But the death of these ideas begins 
 with definite changes in the reality around us ‒ changes that scientists can measure 
 and enumerate. More and more frequently these changes will clash with our 
 perceptions, until, finally, our mistaken sense of nature as eternal and separate will be 
 washed away and we will see all too clearly what we have done (1990:7). 
                                                          
13  See also Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific 
Revolution (1980). 
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By contrast, Cronon is critical of such potentially totalising claims, suggesting 
that McKibben’s essay is affected by the very ideas about nature that have the 
capacity to obscure or prevent real progress toward a more ecologically 
sustainable coexistence of human and non-human life (1996:82-3). As Cronon 
notes: 
 
 The point is not that our current problems are trivial, or that our devastating effects 
 on the earth’s ecosystems should be accepted as inevitable or “natural”. It is rather 
 that we seem unlikely to make much progress in solving these problems if we hold 
 up to ourselves as the mirror of nature a wilderness we ourselves cannot inhabit 
 (1996:83). 
 
For Cronon, the idea of having caused the ‘end of nature’ overlooks the fact that 
humans have been altering the natural environment for as long as we have existed, 
and moreover is symptomatic of the dualistic thinking that positions human 
civilization to one side and pristine nature or wilderness to the other, suggesting 
that the only way to preserve nature is in fact to remove ourselves from it, an 
evidently unproductive conclusion for environmentalism (1996:83). Such thinking 
also perpetuates the notion that ‘we are separate from nature’, a notion only 
‘likely to reinforce environmentally irresponsible behavior’ (Cronon, 1996:87). 
Ultimately, in looking forward, Cronon affirms the ecological importance of 
recognising at once that we are inextricably connected with nature, and that we 
exist among nonhuman nature, life forms autonomous and other to us, 
commanding of honour and respect (1996:87-8). In doing so, Cronon argues that 
we must move beyond pious binaries of ‘the human and the nonhuman, the 
unnatural and the natural, the fallen and unfallen’, in favour of embracing and 
taking responsibility for nature as it exists in all its forms, not only in the wild but 
also in our suburbs, cities and backyards; ‘the Other within’, ‘next door’ and 
‘around us’ (1996:89). This would constitute a movement away from our cultural 
creations of nature and wilderness, which remain invested with all kinds of desire 
and denial, variously pertaining to an Eden from which we are exiled, the ‘savage’ 
frontier of civilisation, a frontier landscape of escape and freedom, and an 
opportunity to encounter ‘the sacred sublime’—ideas that also run throughout 
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environmentalist thinking (Cronon, 1996:79). Suggests Cronon, ‘[t]o think 
ourselves capable of causing “the end of nature” is an act of great hubris, for it 
means forgetting the wildness that dwells everywhere within and around us’, not 
to mention the fact that nonhuman nature will likely survive any event of human 
annihilation―as the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone portends (1996:89). It is 
worthwhile noting here that Cronon’s critique of the concept of wilderness has 
itself elicited disparaging criticism from wilderness advocate and environmental 
historian Samuel P. Hays, who suggests that Cronon’s thinking suffers from a lack 
of knowledge about ‘the more day-to-day and down-to-earth ideas and actions’ 
informing the reality of the wilderness movement (1996:30). Drawing from his 
own experience of this reality in the North-American context, Hays disputes 
Cronon’s perception of the movement as positioning wilderness in ‘some remote 
area’ beyond the local, as prioritising for protection only areas seen as pristine, 
and as invested in the idea of nature as a romantic ideal (1996:30-1). In Hays’s 
experience, the wilderness movement in fact is more frequently mobilised around 
‘the area of one’s personal experience—my backyard’, and focuses not on 
protecting wilderness in ‘some “original” or “pristine” condition’, but rather on 
‘“sav>ing@” wilderness areas from development’, and ‘“saving” for the future’ 
(1996:30). Moreover, Hays suggests that, rather than being grounded in a 
romantic and elitist relationship to nature, the idea of wilderness has emerged 
through a history and culture of ‘outdoor recreation’, which is in fact ‘middle 
class’ (1996:30-1). While Hays demonstrates, in this critique, the importance of 
qualifying claims made about discrete areas of environmental action within the 
context of environmental philosophy, Cronon’s interrogation of the idea of 
wilderness remains valuable to a consideration, more generally, of nature as a 
cultural signifier. More recently, Australian ecofeminist philosopher Val 
Plumwood has astutely emphasised the ways in which our dominant cultural 
paradigm of ‘>h@uman-centredness’ encourages ‘delusions of being ecologically 
invulnerable, beyond animality and ‘outside nature’ [which] lead to the failure to 
understand our ecological identities and dependencies on nature’ (2009:online). 
Such human-centredness is detrimental to humans and non-humans alike, suggests 
Plumwood, implicated in both ‘ethical’ and ‘prudential’ ecological failures, and as 
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such necessitates a rethinking of the binary between “deep” and “shallow” 
ecological thinking (2009:online). Further, Plumwood notes that Western: 
 
 >h@uman/nature dualism conceives the human as not only superior to but as different 
 in kind from the non-human, which is conceived as a lower non-conscious and non-
 communicative purely physical sphere that exists as a mere resource or instrument 
 for the higher human one (2009:online).  
 
Implicated in such dualistic thinking of the human as separate from nature is also, 
suggests Plumwood, ‘the reduction of nature’ to inanimate things ‘emptied of 
agency, spirit and intelligence’; ‘dead matter, to which some separate driver has to 
add life, organization, intelligence and design’ (2009:online).     
 With less precision than Plumwood, Morton, in arguing for an ethical 
melancholic mode for eco-elegy, also problematises human conceptions of 
nature—specifically, the idea of nature as an ideal entity that we have lost, of 
which he suggests ecology and ecological thinking must be exorcised. 14  In 
advancing this view of nature as a problematic metaphysical construct at odds 
with both the ecological reality of the world around us and with responsible 
ecological thought, Morton’s argument echoes Cronon’s. In the unnecessarily 
confusing formulation Morton proposes, we must at once ‘lose nature’ as ‘the 
ultimate lost object’, and espouse a melancholic mode of elegy that would 
constitute “an acknowledgement that ‘nature’ is not lost” (2010:255). However, 
Morton’s insistence that “nature” as an aestheticised ideal must be and is indeed 
lost, obfuscates his argument that we must engage in an active awareness of the 
fact that, despite ongoing destruction, we have not lost ecology—as he states, we 
must ‘lose nature, but gain ecology’ (2010:255). Much of this confusion is due 
simply to the fact that Morton, as in this example, routinely opposes the terms 
nature and ecology, and privileges using “ecology” and “ecological” over 
“nature” and “natural” without qualifying his framing of these terms―which 
elsewhere are commonly interchanged. The reasons for substituting one term for 
another are not self-evident, and such substitution, unqualified, solves little. Of 
                                                          
14 This argument is expanded in Morton’s Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental 
Aesthetics (2009). 
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course, Morton’s meaning here seems to be that we must move on from thinking 
of nature as “something ‘over there’, the ultimate lost object”, in order to develop 
a more responsible thinking about our interconnectedness with ecology (or 
nature)—yet the divergent meanings with which these crucial terms are inflected 
are never made explicit (2010:255). Neither is his critique of “nature”, and 
preferencing of “ecology”, presented in the context of the recent history of such 
critiques by those such as McKibben or Cronon, as might have been helpful. 
Moreover, Morton’s notion that we must “lose” the idea of nature as an ideal that 
is “lost” (a confusing double negative), requires more discussion than it is 
afforded, in order to be demarcated from the real and quantifiable ecological loss 
that has irrevocably occurred and that is in the process of occurring―the very 
loss that warrants not only an elegiac mode but, supposedly, Morton's own 
melancholic mode of mourning.  Dismissing the idealised construct of nature as an 
illusion, and asserting the prominence of nature as a vital reality in diverse forms 
all around us—as Morton, after Cronon, does—fails to address the way in which 
we are regardless facing an ecological threat of such proportions that terminal 
language like “end”, “death” and “loss” are necessarily invoked in reference to 
whatever it is we choose to call the fragile, interconnected web of human and non-
human life on this planet. As attested by a body of scientific evidence that grows 
by the day, we now live in a present, and face a future, of irreversible 
transformation due to human-induced global warming, a reality that endangers 
human and non-human life alike. While Cronon cites the precedence of 
comparable environmental changes in geological history not caused by humans 
(1996:13), the scale and implications of human-induced climate change have 
continued to emerge, since his 1995 essay, as constituting a threat unprecedented 
in the history of earth. Attesting to the scale of this threat is the growing currency, 
among diverse thinkers and writers, of the as-yet unofficial term 
“Anthropocene 15 ” to describe our present geological epoch, in which human 
activity has become a literal force of nature. As a geological epoch, the 
Anthropocene is inscribed with the terrifying scale of human agency in 
determining our planetary future, and suggests that, to a real, biospheric extent, 
                                                          
15 As proposed by scientists Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer in ‘The 
“Anthropocene”’(2000:17-41). 
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beyond our cultural ideas of what nature is, the otherness and autonomy of the 
nonhuman world has been and is in the process of being immeasurably and 
irreperably diminished. If the idea of nature as a lost ideal object is a fallacy to be 
thrown off, and yet ethical elegy comprises of affirming that nature is not lost, 
then it is important to qualify why and to what extent nature is not lost, by 
demarcating what loss, in this context, encompasses. This is especially true in 
light of the way that it is through a melancholic mode of mourning―a mode 
which, in literature as in life, is mobilised by real and symbolic loss―that Morton 
suggests elegists affirm this truth “that ‘nature’ is not lost” (2010:255). 
 
 
Eco-loss as deprivation 
 
Morton’s neglect to demarcate a frame of reference for the word "loss" as it 
pertains to eco-elegy, as discussed in the previous chapter, only compounds the 
confusion created by this inadequate attendance to the consequences of real and 
quantifiable ecological loss in discussing eco-elegy. The ecological loss that has 
already occurred is cause enough for mourning, let alone the dire and 
immeasurable scale of loss we face in coming decades and centuries. According 
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other scientific 
bodies, we have now moved well beyond the point of no return for a rise in global 
temperature that will immeasurably alter our way of life and the ecosystems in 
which we exist—the question now is only by how much. Compounding the 
challenges of a warming planet is the prospect of a global population which recent 
United Nations (2013) estimates predict will reach 9.6 billion by 2050, and which 
appears unlikely to cease rising this century (Gerland, et. al, 2014). In the face of 
such predictions, it is unsurprising that our critical and creative literatures are 
increasingly speaking of our global habitat in modes that are not only elegiac, but 
also terminal, negative and non-consolatory. The stakes of our present ecological 
predicament are driving increasingly radical forms of literary mourning and 
warning, to the point where, in works such as McKibbenʼs, lamentation for 
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foregone loss, and incipient loss that appears irremediable, saturates the 
corresponding call “to do something before itʼs too late” to a more radical degree 
than evidenced in earlier eco-elegiac literatures. The tradition of ecological 
lamentation, which simultaneously mourns foregone loss while looking to the 
future in warning of possible consequences if no action is taken, can be 
understood within the jeremiad tradition. As noted in Encyclopedia of American 
Studies, the term “jeremiad16” recalls ‘the biblical prophet who wore sackcloth 
and ashes to demonstrate his grief over Israel’s failure to live up to its covenant as 
Godʼs chosen people’ (2010:online). The ecological jeremiad can be traced back 
to Rachel Carsonʼs incendiary 1962 call for action against the U.S. chemical 
industry, in Silent Spring, which opens with ‘A Fable for Tomorrow’, in which 
Carson warns of what the future might entail if nothing changes―a “silent” 
spring, absent of birds and bees (1-3). However writers of eco-elegy engage or 
resist the jeremiad tradition of prophecy, warning and call to action, the degree to 
which we recognise eco-loss as a divergent phenomenon, at once foregone, in-
process and incipient―and thus contingent, no matter how likely disaster may 
seem―is surely key to an eco-elegiac ethics. In face of the scientific data that 
speaks, variously, to the ecological losses already sustained, currently in-process 
and toward which we are heading, it is easy to understand the increasing 
prominence of elegy as a literary mode in which ecology is represented. It must be 
acknowledged that, in fact, a great deal can and has been predicted (and to a 
certain point, ensured) regarding the ecological loss that is to come, a loss that is 
manifesting such real presence in scientific discourse and daily life that it is not 
only understandable, but imperative that it is also engaged with in our creative 
literatures, not least in elegy, our preeminent literary form for reckoning with the 
consequences of loss. The kind of incipient loss we are facing on a global scale 
due to climate change, overpopulation and the economic, political and industrial 
exploitation of our natural environments does and must have a real presence in 
elegy, despite and because of the fact that it “has not happened yet”. The 
incremental and insidious process of environmental destruction as it has occurred 
since the Industrial Revolution is such that it will never “have happened” in the 
                                                          
16 For a detailed discussion of the cultural history of (non-ecological) jeremiad in the American 
context, see Sacvan Bercovitch’s The American Jeremiad (1978). 
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absolute sense of being able to identify a line between before and after, as we can 
in speaking of losing a person who has died―because at that hypothetical point 
we, as part of the environment, will presumably no longer be here to speak of it. 
Consequently, we must develop a mode of speaking about not only absolute eco-
loss but eco-loss that is incipient and in-process, in such a way as to arrest feeling 
and attention at the point of this moment now, in the contingency of the present, 
on the verge of a future that is, to a great degree, still to be written, by the actions 
we take now. In this light, blasé platitudes about nature not being lost, which 
speak to the (already much-discussed) dangers and fallacies of idealising nature, 
are deeply inadequate to our current predicament. Certainly we should be mindful 
of and resist idealising nature as an object, but nature as a real, living biosphere on 
which we depend is gravely at risk of being lost in all kinds of very real ways that 
a refrain like this obscures. This loss is predicted not by elegists writing 
apocalypse but by scientists and other experts making careful projections from 
current evidence and a reality in which, regardless of what measures we take now, 
a global temperature rise beyond the already dangerous 2°C “safety” threshold for 
catastrophic implications is virtually guaranteed17. Attesting to the urgency of this 
conundrum is the recent decision by science historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik 
Conway, despairing at the failure of the calmly-worded statements of the IPCC to 
induce adequate socio-political change, to write a science-based novel set in the 
near future, entitled The Collapse of Western Civilisation: A View From the 
Future (2014), imagining in visceral detail the future we might be headed for 
should we continue on our current course.         
 One need only consult the statistics and projections of bodies such as the 
IPCC and World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) to obtain a sense of the real 
ecological loss that has already occurred as a result of human-induced ecosystem 
degradation, pollution and climate change—and the gravity of the future we face 
                                                          
17 Climate scientist James Hansen is among those who have argued the 2°C benchmark is itself 
dangerous, labelling it ‘a prescription for disaster’, as reported by Scientific American 
(2011:online). Yet, there is increasing doubt among experts about whether even this limit is 
attainable. Fatih Birol, chief economist at the International Energy Agency (IEA), suggested in 
2011 that ‘[w]ith current policies in place, global temperatures are set to increase 6 degrees 
Celsius, which has catastrophic implications’ (IEA:online). He further noted that, ‘[i]f as of 2017 
there is not a start of a major wave of new and clean investments, the door to 2 degrees will be 
closed’ (IEA:online). 
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even if radical widespread preventative action is taken soon. Many of these 
projections are, in a great sense, apocalyptic, and they are founded on scientific 
evidence which is now irrefutable, despite systemised campaigns of denial. The 
WWF indicates that conservative estimates of the species currently being lost to 
extinction are of ‘between 200 and 2,000’ each year, while ‘upper estimate(s)’ 
suggest ‘between 10,000 and 100,000’ (WWF:online). This is an astounding rate 
of extinction, unprecedented in the history of extinction events on Earth in its 
being caused by human beings rather than by independently arising geological 
processes. The IPCC predicts possible ‘impacts associated from global average 
temperature change’ as including decreases in water availability, biodiversity, and 
coastal wetlands, and notes the possibility of a 30% increase in extinction rates 
(2007:online). IPCC data (2007:online) also stipulates that drought, water and 
food shortages, and the health impacts of increased climate-related diseases, 
would lead to high loss of human life. Ultimately, the implications that such data 
speaks to are death, deprivation and diminution—loss in many forms, and on an 
enormous scale.     
 
 
Mourning & melancholia 
 
Just as Morton’s discussion is troubled by a lack of clarity in defining the different 
meanings and forms of loss, so is the exact nature of his meaning in invoking the 
loaded terms “melancholia” and “melancholic mourning”, in relation to the 
elegiac mode, inadequately, and somewhat too glibly, defined.     
 In advancing his argument that a melancholic elegiac mode is a more ethical 
means of approaching the elegiac writing of a threatened environment, Morton 
observes a crucial distinction between traditional elegy and ecological elegy, 
stating that, while in the former ‘the person departs and the environment echoes 
our woe’, in the latter, ‘the fear is that we will go on living, while the environment 
disappears around us’ (2010:253), or, I might add, that we might all die. As 
Morton astutely observes, our own human implication as part of the environment 
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prevents us from being able to stand as subjects apart from the object we are 
mourning: 
 
 We cannot mourn for the environment because we are so deeply attached to it—we 
 are it. So ecological discourse holds out the possibility of a mourning without end. 
 Ecological elegy,  then, must provide forms that undermine a sense of closure. 
 (2010:253). 
 
It is in this light that Morton suggests that ‘the truest ecological human is a 
melancholy dualist, mourning for something we never lost because we never had 
it, because we are it’ (2010:253). While this formulation represents a vast 
oversimplification, and is far from original, Morton makes the relevant point here 
that “nature” has long been viewed as an ideal object, in opposition to the human 
subject and to civilisation, an Edenic origin in the kind of metaphysical thinking 
that thinkers such as Derrida have proven so dangerous, and which has 
underwritten the history of humanity’s exploitation of what is in fact a fragile, 
finite and contingent living system on which we all depend. In considering the 
operations of elegy under this radical transposition in which the environment as 
‘backdrop becomes the foreground’, Morton posits melancholy as ‘an irreducible 
element of subjectivity, a primordial relationship to objects rather than one 
emotion among others’ (2010:253). Noting how, in the ancient theory of 
humourism, melancholy was considered ‘the humor that brought humans closest 
to the earth’, Morton suggests that ‘melancholy may provide the basis for an 
ecological fidelity to objects’ (2010:253). When the natural world no longer exists 
within elegy as a means of analogising the “real” lost object, and, instead, 
becomes itself this lost object as in the case of ecological elegy, such elegists face 
the dilemma of having to elegise without the form’s traditional recourse to use the 
environment as its stage, ‘sounding board’ and ‘echo chamber for the narrator’s 
cries of loss’ (2010:253). In this way, Morton describes ecological elegy as 
‘los>ing@ the objective correlative for loss itself’ (2010:253), and thus estranged 
from the mourning process, propelled instead into a movement of melancholia. 
 Considering the complex history of the term “melancholia” in psychiatric and 
cultural discourse, any useful application of the term in theorising a viable poetics 
of writing requires more delimitation, however, than Morton provides. 
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Consequently, the question of how Morton’s melancholic mourning, as a literary 
mode of reckoning with environmental destruction, intersects with, appropriates 
or diverges from melancholic mourning as an involuntary and diagnosable 
psychological state of grief following bereavement, or from the melancholic form 
of biological depression, is largely left to speculation in his account. Certainly, 
Morton’s argument that an ethical eco-elegy must depart from a traditional mode 
of elegiac mourning in favour of melancholia reiterates a long-standing 
psychoanalytic understanding, grounded in Freud’s early work on mourning, 
which places “healthy” mourning in opposition to “pathological” melancholia, 
rather than treating these processes as divergent yet coinciding points in a 
continuum. Additionally, Morton seems to take for granted that, at least in 
traditional or non-ecological elegy, a “successful”, non-melancholic movement of 
mourning, as a process with an end point, is possible, an assumption that Derrida 
(most notably) has carefully undermined in works such as Memoires: for Paul de 
Man (1986). In this vein, Morton references the pioneering elegy theorist Peter 
Sacks, whose work The English Elegy: Studies in the Genre from Spenser to Yeats 
(1985) is grounded in a traditional subject-centred Freudian understanding of 
mourning, in which elegy enacts a movement geared toward consolation for loss. 
Paraphrasing Sacks (1985), Morton writes of non-ecological elegy that ‘>n@ature 
becomes an analogue for the objectifying process of writing, which detaches our 
grief from us and makes it bearable by negating it’ (2010:253). Certainly, such a 
movement, grounded in the troping and substitution of the lost other in seeking 
consolation for grief, has long characterised the elegiac tradition. In describing 
bereaved Apollo’s ‘“turning” from the object of his love >Daphne@ to a sign of her 
>a laurel wreath@’, Sacks argues that Apollo is a ‘successful mourner’, finding a 
consoling substitute for his lost love (1987:5; 6). Suggests Sacks, ‘>i@t is this 
substitutive turn or act of troping that any mourner must perform’ (1987:5). 
However, this understanding of elegy as a consolatory process of working through 
grief to arrive at a sense of closure has been challenged by consequent research in 
the field, notably by Jahan Ramazani (1994), who posits that modern elegy in fact 
actively resists such closure, being compelled to keep the very wounds open that 
traditional elegists and critics such as Sacks (following from Freud’s early 
mourning theory), would have it help to heal. Ramazani’s suggestion that modern 
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elegiac writing forestalls such closure resonates in Paul Auster’s observation, in 
writing of his dead father, that ‘the act of writing has kept this wound open’ 
(2012:34). In the movement of twentieth century elegy, Ramazani identifies a 
fundamental shift from “compensatory” mourning to ‘melancholic mourning’ in 
which ‘the modern elegist tends not to achieve but to resist consolation, not to 
override but to sustain anger, not to heal but to reopen the wounds of loss’ 
(1994:xi). More recently, R. Clifton Spargo (2004) has posited the non-
consolatory movement of melancholic mourning as an integral feature of ethical 
mourning in the elegiac tradition. For Spargo, ‘melancholia interrogates the 
symbolic social structures that contain and reduce the meaning of the other who is 
being lamented’ (2004:11). In resisting traditional elegiac forms of closure and 
consolation, Spargo suggests that ‘the depressive meanings of melancholia insist 
upon the other’s uncancellable and unassimilable value’ (2004:13). As such, 
Spargo contends that ‘a resistant and incomplete mourning stands for an ethical 
acknowledgment of—or perhaps a ceding to—the radical alterity of the other 
whom one mourns’ (2004:13). Just as Ramazani and Spargo, without engaging 
with ecological elegy, have already identified melancholic mourning as a 
movement in operation within modern elegy generally (across a range of 
traditional and less-traditional elegiac subjects), so is Morton’s general notion of 
melancholic mourning already emergent in much contemporary ecological 
writing―especially in the sense of a more pervasive melancholic “tone” in 
prose18, and also in the recent work of elegists such as Peter Reading19 and Juliana 
Spahr―although, regrettably, the only elegy Morton’s essay explores is Shelley’s 
1816 Alastor.                
 Aside from its history as a loaded signifier in psychiatric discourse, the words 
“melancholia” and “melancholy” are inflected also with the historical significance 
of various cultural and artistic movements―including the Elizabethan cult of 
melancholy in 17th century England (epitomised by Shakespeare’s 1603 Hamlet, 
to which Morton refers); Sturm und Drang in 18th century Germany (exemplified 
                                                          
18 An evocative example of eco-elegiac prose is Terry Tempest Williams’s Refuge: An Unnatural 
History of Family and Place (1991). 
19 For another discussion within the emergent but currently sparse field of eco-elegy, see Iain 
Twiddy’s “‘Routine Periodic Faunal Extinctions’: Peter Reading’s Ecological Elegies” in Pastoral 
Elegy in Contemporary British and Irish Poetry (2012). 
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by Goethe’s 1774 The Sorrows of Young Werther); and Romanticism in 18th and 
19th century Europe and America (a pertinent text of which is Keats’s 1820 ‘Ode 
on Melancholy’). Importantly, the aestheticisation of melancholy within these 
movements was predicated on a contemplative distance between a rather self-
conscious observing subject and a melancholic object pertaining to death (be it a 
graveyard, a skull, an historical or mythological tragedy, or the dead themselves). 
Attesting to the prominence which melancholy reached, as an aesthetic experience 
strangely merging grief and pleasure, at the height of European Romanticism is 
Joseph Severn’s 1821 letter to William Haslam when he describes the restorative 
experience of visiting his friend Keats’s grave in Rome, as a ‘romantic spot’ 
inspiring in him ‘a most delicious melancholy which on many occasions has 
relieved my low spirits’ (2002:513). As an aesthetic experience predicated on a 
distance between subject and object, Romantic melancholy is also linked to the 
sublime, involving the rather self-conscious enjoyment of wild nature, or ruined, 
desolate landscapes devoid of people―as a spectacle to be regarded from a safe 
distance. This rich history with which any literary appropriation of melancholia is 
inflected sits in uncertain relation to Morton’s argument. On the one hand, the 
complicity of the Romantic strain of melancholia with the sublime would seem to 
be at odds with Morton’s argument that we be suspicious of the privileged 
vantage point that allows for such titillating objectification of the other, and 
positioning of “nature” as being “over there”. On the other hand, such a 
melancholic aesthetic as it is seen in the art of this period could also be interpreted 
as an exploration of our desire for and enjoyment of death, and the dark side of 
nature and as such could align with Morton’s argument.       
 Undoubtedly, the concept of melancholic mourning as an elegiac mode which 
would resist a movement of “making grief bearable” and instead “keep the wound 
open”, is a highly relevant consideration in developing an ethical poetics of eco-
elegy. However, Morton’s presentation of this concept is confusing and 
misleading not only in its neglect to define his application of melancholic 
mourning as a historically loaded term, but in its implication that a melancholic 
mode would constitute a new means of ethically approaching the unique demands 
of ecological elegy.  As will be discussed in Chapter 4, in fact, across both poetry 
and prose, there exist already varied examples of elegiac literature which reckons 
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with foregone, in-process and impending ecological loss in a negative and non-
consolatory (or “melancholic”) mode.  
 
 
Deep v.s. dark ecology 
 
Just as Cronon’s critique of wilderness attempts to redress underlying problems in 
environmentalist attitudes toward nature that paradoxically undermine their urgent 
objectives, Morton’s proposed “dark ecological” melancholy is presented as a 
counter to attitudes and practices espoused within ‘deep green elegy’, 
‘ecocriticism’ and ‘deep ecology’. In enacting a movement that ‘kills nature for a 
second time, before it has fully happened for the first time’, in order to mourn 
nature ‘too hastily’, Morton argues that ‘[d]eep green elegy’ constitutes a 
‘narcissistic panic’ and ‘unseemly rhetorical rush’—a totalising movement that in 
its terminal outlook skips over the moment of loss in pursuit of the absolute end 
(2010:255). By rushing to imagine this end, this movement, Morton suggests, 
negates, overruns or ‘fails fully to account’, and supposedly to fully make felt, the 
singular losses of ‘species and environments’ happening now (2010:255). That is, 
by attempting to deal with the totality of ecological crisis, deep green elegy fails 
to reckon with and evoke the singular instances of loss that constitute the totality. 
While this is an important point, the opposition Morton presents between the 
mourning of deep ecology and the proposed melancholy of his own “dark 
ecology” not only perpetuates the false dichotomy of Freudian mourning (as noted 
above), but misrepresents deep ecological thinking, which has much more in 
common with Morton’s melancholic dark ecology than his vague references to it 
suggest.                 
 In speculating about how a melancholic eco-elegiac mode might be 
characterised, Morton posits the possibility of a ‘Hamlet-like lingering in 
melancholy’ that: 
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 (…) would open up a philosophical and aesthetic space for the arrival of non-
 identity. It would be an attunement, an allowing of the object to stick in our throats—
 an acknowledgement that  ‘nature’ is not lost (2010:255).  
 
Morton is speaking here not about the content but the form of ecological poetry, 
for we are also in the process of losing ‘our habitual point of view’ founded on 
‘distance’, whereby ‘we are here and nature is ‘yonder’’ (2010:256). He posits 
that: 
 
 >a@ttention to form would open a space for a politicized melancholy—a presence to 
 the idea  that something is happening, right now, not at some impossible future date. 
 We could refuse to swallow the planet, metaphorically as well as literally (2010:255). 
 
This subject-object model of nature is of course a condition of traditional sublime 
experience of the kind that privileged (predominantly male European) Romantic 
sensibilities were able to celebrate—crucially, at a distance from the object of that 
experience. Morton proposes that it is in fact the loss of the conditions which 
created this narrative position that eco-elegy mourns for, and that: 
 >t@he really difficult elegiac work would consist in bringing into full consciousness 
 the reality of human and nonhuman interdependence, in a manner that threatens the 
 comfortable way in which humans appear in the foreground and everything else in 
 the background (2010:256). 
This reality of the interdependence of beings which truly radical ecological elegy 
would presumably make “felt” is at the heart of what Morton calls ‘the ecological 
thought’ 20 , a thought which also turns upon the concept and experience of 
intimacy and sentience (2010:257), in our relation to the other and to others. 
Morton emphasises that ‘[i]ntimacy involves closeness with beings who may or 
may not be sentient’ and foregrounds the dangerous ambiguity of sentience as a 
category of being when it is impossible to truly “know” an other, precisely 
because they are other (2010:257). As a ‘symptomatic text’ for considering the 
interception of elegy and ecology/nature, Morton analyses Shelley’s ‘radically 
ecological’ elegy Alastor, which for him:  
                                                          
20 Morton’s concept of “the ecological thought” is expanded in The Ecological Thought (2012). 
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 (…) suggests that ‘nature writing’ must break with the solipsism of which it is all too 
 capable, but that this break involves a frightening, excessive openness towards the 
 opacity of other beings (2010:256; 264; 257). 
 
Morton discusses Alastor as performing an ambivalent kind of elegiac erosion of 
the aesthetic distance that perpetuates dualistic thinking about nature, through 
such oppositional pairings such as ‘subject and object’, ‘subject and subject’ and 
‘subject and abject’ (2010:264). Further, Morton views Shelley’s text as working 
in a variety of ways to insidiously trouble the borders between such categories as 
self and other, life and death, animate and inanimate, natural and unnatural, 
human and inhuman, inside and outside, known and unknown, and desire and 
disgust. Ways in which Morton recognises the elegy as achieving this include the 
subtle use of ‘untagged indirect speech’; an ambiguous narrative structure of 
multiple narrators; and placing the reader in the uncomfortable position of 
identification with the dead poet, implicating them in the poem’s own 
“devouring” of its dead subject, and consequent flourishing in lush imagery in its 
own afterlife (2010:260; 261-4).           
 Morton presents melancholia as ‘more ethically refined than mourning’, 
contrasting the two states as, respectively, ‘letting the dead stick in our throat’ and 
‘allowing them to be digested’ (2010:267). In this elegiac mode of melancholia, 
we would linger in the disturbing and uncertain ecological reality of “how things 
are” right now, rather than endlessly pre-empting apocalypse—no matter how 
likely it may seem. In advancing his argument for a melancholic mode of eco-
elegy that envinces what Morton calls a “dark ecology”, Morton rather 
misleadingly locates this mode as being in opposition to the principles and 
practices espoused by deep ecology. The distinction drawn by Morton between 
deep ecological thinking and that of his proposed dark ecology is undermined by 
the fact that some figures considered central to deep ecology and its 
literature/poetics, notably Gary Snyder, have long exercised grave suspicions 
about the human idealisation and aestheticisation of “nature”, and advocated for 
modes of subversion corresponding to many of which Morton speaks.   
 Morton argues against what he views as a tendency, within deep ecology, to 
‘eras[e] the difference between consciousness and the world, or between subject 
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and object’ in order to ‘make ecological social practices inevitable’ (2010:267). 
Instead, through his reading of Shelley’s Alastor, Morton asserts that: 
 
 >t@ruly to love nature, not as a mirror of our mind, but as sheer otherness, would be to 
 love what is least subjective about it. It would be to fall in love with the dead. To 
 be fully ethical, then, is to admit to the perversity of our desire (2010:267). 
 
This acknowledgement and love of a nature beyond the pristine ideal, then, is 
what constitutes Morton’s dark ecology, whereby we embrace the unseemly, the 
abject and the rotting, the dead, the non-pastoral, the wild and the artificial in 
nature—and own our desires for this “dark side” of nature 21 . However, as 
demonstrated in Snyder’s ‘Unnatural Writing’, a highly relevant essay originally 
presented as a talk in 1992 and published in 199522, this opposition between deep 
ecology and Morton’s dark ecology represents a rather blasé totalisation of the 
former.  Like Morton, Snyder criticizes the historical privileging in Western art 
and thought of human civilization in binary opposition to the “wild”, and 
consequent overlooking of our own implication in the ecosystem. Diverging from 
Morton, he suggests that this mutual implication also relates to the way: 
 
 (…) that consciousness, mind, imagination, and language are fundamentally wild. 
 “Wild” as in wild ecosystems—richly interconnected, interdependent, and incredibly 
 complex (2008:168). 
 
Such an assertion of an ecological congruence of structure within human 
cognition and creation, however, is hardly equivalent to Morton’s reductive notion 
of deep ecology’s ‘erasing the difference between consciousness and the world’ 
(2010:267). Turning to the issue of artistic practice, Snyder suggests that an: 
 
                                                          
21 However, because this argument is inadequately qualified, it also lends itself to interpretations 
contradictory to Morton’s own thesis—there is a tone here that could be interpreted as 
irresponsible, if not sadistic or apocalyptic. It is one thing to resist the aestheticisation of nature as 
an ideal form, and another to embrace the very signs of ecology’s degradation, diminishment and 
consumption by a radically out of control human population.  
22 Which, it must be said, contains a brief misreading of deconstruction that does not concern this 
discussion. 
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 (…) “art of the wild” is to see art in the context of the process of nature—nature as 
 process rather than as product or commodity—because “wild” is a name for the  way 
 that phenomena  continually actualize themselves. Seeing this also serves to 
 acknowledge the autonomy and integrity of the nonhuman part of the world, an 
 “Other” that we are barely beginning to be able to know (2008:168). 
 
Here, Snyder echoes many voices in deep ecology in seeking for a balance 
between realising the proximity with which we exist in the environment with 
other beings, and preserving the distance necessary to respect and celebrate the 
alterity and difference of those other beings. On a practical level, Snyder suggests 
that the practice of such a “wild” or “unnatural” writing could entail a profound 
re-envisioning of traditional “nature writing”, and open the possibility for a 
writing which in its readiness to mindfully traverse beyond the intra-human 
familiar, is surprising, paradoxical and transgressive. In its embrace of eco-, bio- 
and narrative diversity, such a writing may be ‘irreverent, inharmonious, ugly, 
frazzled, unpredictable, simple, and clear—or virtually inaccessible’ (2008:169). 
Writes Snyder, ‘>w@ho will write of the odd barbed, hooked, bent, splayed, and 
crooked penises of nonhuman male creatures? Of sexism among spiders?’ 
(2008:169) Such sentiments reveal the thinking of a major proponent of deep 
ecology to be intrinsically aligned with Morton’s dark ecology, an inconsistency 
not addressed in Morton’s criticism of deep ecological thinking and which thus 
confuses his presentation of dark ecology as an alternative paradigm. In the 
following passage, for instance, Snyder’s promotion of a poetics of deep ecology 
sounds very similar to Morton’s dark ecology, in espousing for a scrutiny and 
honouring of the wild, dark, abject side of a non-ideal nature which we exist 
within and which exists within us, in connection to non-human systems, beings 
and organisms who also have agency: 
 
 I like to imagine a “depth ecology” that would go to the dark side of nature—the ball 
 of crunched bones in a scat, the feathers in the snow, the tales of insatiable appetite. 
 Wild systems…can also be seen as irrational, moldy, cruel, parasitic (…) Life is  not 
 just diurnal and a property of large interesting vertebrates, it is also nocturnal, 
 anaerobic, cannibalistic, microscopic, digestive, fermentative: cooking away in the 
 warm dark (…) there is a world of  nature on the decay side, a world of beings who 
 do rot and decay in the shade (2008:170). 
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Snyder here precedes Morton’s argument for a rethinking of, as Morton writes, 
‘nature [as] radically different, irreducibly strange, threatening our need for 
coherence, for a background that constitutes a human foreground’, and for the 
embracing of ‘our necrophiliac enjoyment of sheer nature, teeming and rotting’ 
(2010:265). This is at odds with Morton’s assertion that ‘>d@eep ecology is not 
deep enough, because it eschews the dead in favour of the living’ (2010:267). 
Snyder even references elegy in invoking Orpheus—alongside Izanagi, a figure in 
Japanese Shinto-mythology who also failed to retrieve his wife from the 
underworld, and Coyote Man, a mercurial trickster figure in Native American 
lore: 
 
 The other side of the “sacred” is the sight of your beloved in the underworld, 
 dripping with maggots. Coyote, Orpheus, and Izanagi cannot help but look, and they 
 lose her. Shame, grief, embarrassment, and fear are the anaerobic fuels of the dark 
 imagination (2008:170). 
 
Further, Snyder makes the radical and reflexive observation that when considered 
as a kind of “leaving”, literature is not limited to human civilization, but finds 
different form in the lives of other creatures: 
 
 Narrative in the deer world is a track of scents that is passed on from deer to deer, 
 with an art of interpretation which is instinctive. A literature of blood-stains, a bit 
 of piss, a whiff of estrus, a hit of rut, a scrape on a sapling, and long gone 
 (2008:170). 
 
Through such observations, which speak to the profound way in which any 
thinking of ecology must itself reflect the strange, complex and non-ideal reality 
of―at once―our implication with other-than-humans and their difference from 
us, Snyder demonstrates an intense understanding of the vacillation between 
intimacy and difference in relation to the other which Morton’s ethics foreground. 
Snyder’s sentiments in this essay also align with Val Plumwood’s more recent 
suggestion that ‘we need to spread concepts of agency and creativity more widely 
into what we have thought of as the dead world of nature’ (2009:online). 
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 Finally, Snyder offers some practical suggestions for conceiving of a ‘“New 
Nature Poetics”’ of writing wild, unnatural nature, such that ‘has the potential of 
becoming the most vital, radical, fluid, transgressive, pansexual, subductive, and 
morally challenging kind of writing on the scene’ and perhaps of figuring in the 
struggle to prevent ecological destruction (2008:171). Snyder suggests that such a 
writing be both ‘nature literate’ and ‘place literate’ (2008:171). That is, such a 
writing should demonstrate a mindfulness of ‘who’s who and what’s what in the 
ecosystem’, of ‘local specifics on both ecological-biotic and socio-political levels’ 
and of ‘social and environmental history’—even when the presence of these 
aspects are not overt in the writing (2008:171). Snyder also suggests the use of 
Coyote and Bear ‘as totem[s]’ for the respective qualities of being ‘open’ and 
‘shape shifting’, and ‘omnivorous, fearless, without anxiety, steady, generous, 
contemplative, and relentlessly protective of the wild’ (2008:171). Coyote, 
additionally, is a totem for ‘providing the eye of other beings going in and out of 
death’ and ‘laughing with the dark side’ (2008:171). Snyder also advocates that 
writers ‘find further totems’, and ‘study mind and language—language as wild 
system, mind as wild habitat, world as a “making” (poem), poem as a creature of 
the wild mind’ (2008:172). Moreover, he suggests we engage with science and 
explore new limits, moving ‘beyond nature literacy into the emergent new 
territories in science: landscape ecology, conservation biology, charming chaos, 
complicated systems theory’, and ‘into an awareness of the problematic and 
contingent aspects of so-called objectivity’ (2008:172). What is Snyder 
demonstrating and calling for here other than Morton’s own ‘ecological thought’, 
‘the thinking of the interconnectedness of all beings, in the most profound 
possible way’, which embraces ‘the unnatural within nature itself’? (Morton 
2010:257; 263). In light of the work of deep ecologists such as Snyder, it seems 
misguided to establish the way forward for ethical eco-elegy as a trajectory in 
opposition to deep ecology as an entire movement, as Morton might be seen to 
imply.                 
 While his application of melancholia as a central term demands greater 
qualification, and his argument is placed in a problematically vague opposition to 
deep ecology, Morton’s efforts to delineate a mode of ethically approaching the 
confounding phenomenon of ecological mourning within elegy offer a fertile 
ground for further discussion in an emergent area within elegy studies (and 
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beyond). However, in his vision of ethical eco-elegy as embracing representations 
of nature as a dystopic, yet interconnected, uncanny, the fate of which remains 
“undetermined”, Morton’s essay shies dangerously from the fact of the climate 
transformation that is now upon us and set to gravely alter the balance of our 
global ecologies and the lives that depend on them. In this vision, Morton also 
shies from the fact of our human culpability as a powerful and destructive force 
on a critically endangered planet, and the need of literature to engage with and 
answer to the unspeakable loss that has occurred, is occurring, and is due to occur 
in the near future, even if radical action is taken. Implied in the enormous agency 
of humans in altering our planet’s ecological and biospheric systems, is surely a 
correspondingly enormous responsibility23. Ultimately, Morton’s appeals for a 
greater literary consciousness of our human interrelation with other organisms 
within a shared planetary ecosystem neglects to adequately emphasise our human 
responsibility and implication in this planetary crisis. While Morton is wise to 
consider the dangers of elegy (unfairly represented as uniformly “deep green”) 
that rushes to depict the future of the ecological crisis we are heading toward, at 
the expense of attending to and feeling the real and singular loss that is in 
progress, it is all too simple to espouse as an alternative a supposed melancholic 
elegiac mode that allows for a focus on a crisis that is in-progress, where ‘nothing 
is determined yet’ (2010:255). It is to smear over the difficulty elegists face in 
reckoning with the untotalisable enormity of a loss which scientists themselves 
advise us, in elegiac terms and with ever-increasing urgency, that we are 
rollicking toward with the recklessness of the Titanic. It is to deny such a spectre, 
in not having happened yet, as eliciting real emotions of grief and loss demanding 
of an elegiac literary reckoning, despite the formal and ethical complications of 
incipient loss as an elegiac subject/object. The spectre of an apocalyptic near 
future is real because the scientific data attests to such a future being exactly what 
we are wagering, with each day of political inaction. Not only is the ecological 
threat an obvious vehicle for powerful elegiac writing—elegy as a traditional 
mode of literary mourning is an understandable recourse for writers who feel 
                                                          
23 Our continued tendency as humans to view ourselves, in various ways, as exceptional to non-
human others is a growing area of critical enquiry, encompassing animal studies, to which 
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deeply the loss that has occurred and the loss that seems inevitably to come, and 
whose writing instinctively follows the grain of what is a melancholy and painful 
preoccupation. In this context it seems implausible that we would ‘transcend the 
elegiac mode’. Morton’s ‘lingering in melancholy’ is itself bound to this mode, no 
matter how much celebration of dark, unseemly “necrophiliac” desire it includes. 
Rather, it would seem useful to rethink the elegiac mode, and in doing so, to 
refine our ideas about how we as writers might conceive of ecological elegy as a 
responsible relation to otherness in the face of both eco-loss and impending eco-
loss. This would involve the foregrounding of many of the qualities discussed by 
Cronon, Snyder and Morton alike in thinking the ecological other in relation to 
ourselves while respecting the other’s singularity—qualities including 
interdependence, intimacy, exchange, distance and proximity, and care. Such a 
rethinking of the ways in which writers might write about ecology must 
acknowledge at once the place of mourning as a natural response to real loss, and 
the necessity of approaching mourning in such a way as to be mindful of its 
potential for violence to the other and for the perpetuation of the kinds of thinking 
about nature that will abate progress.            
 Perhaps the most useful insight emphasised by Morton in the context of eco-
elegy concerns the paradoxical need to at once contract and preserve distance in 
our relations with the other-than-humans and otherness constituting our ecological 
systems, in order for these relations to be grounded in not only intimacy but 
respect for radical, unknowable alterity. In doing so, Morton echoes not only 
Cronon and Plumwood, in relation to environmental ethics, but Watkin speaking 
of ethical elegy more generally (via Bowlby), in relation to a metonymic relation 
to the lost other of ‘proxim>ity@ but separate>ness@’ (2004:165). However, as will 
be shown in the next chapter, it is in Derrida’s work on mourning that we find 
these concepts integrated within an intricate metonymic framework that comes 
closer to accounting for the complexity, paradox and difficulty of reckoning 
ethically with a lost other, with which we are interconnected. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Derrida’s late works contribute. See, for example, The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008) and The 
Beast and the Sovereign, Volumes I and II (2011). 
 202 
4 
Toward an ethical poetics of 
eco-elegy 
 
 
…everything is at stake in the decision of the gaze. 
 
‒ Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Gaze of Orpheus’ 
 
The young English corpse was everyone and it was also he 
alone. It was everyone and he. But “everyone” does not make 
you cry. 
 
‒ Marguerite Duras, ‘The Death of the Young British Pilot’, in 
Writing 
 
 
In rethinking the elegiac mode in application to the unique demands of ecological 
loss, Morton has asserted the potential of a “melancholic” mode of mourning that 
would linger in the darkness and difficulty of this contingent moment in our 
ecological crisis. By refusing to rush on to imagine an eco-apocalypse that hasn’t 
yet happened, Morton suggests that such a mode would sidestep the ‘sadism’ of 
traditional elegy (2010:255). However, this chapter contends that any poetics 
espousing a movement of melancholic mourning must attend to Derrida’s rigorous 
rethinking of the Freudian dichotomy between melancholic or pathological 
mourning, and “healthy” mourning. In grappling, via Morton and others, toward 
an ethical poetics of eco-elegy that eschews problematic dichotomising, this 
chapter examines Derrida’s metonymic conception of ethical mourning and 
commemoration for the other as a paradoxically impossible, unending and yet 
necessary co-movement of both introjection (“healthy” mourning) and 
incorporation (melancholic mourning) as an opportunity to complicate and refine 
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existing attempts to outline the possibilities of an ethical eco-elegiac mode. 
 Moreover, Derrida’s understanding of mourning, as both a metonymic 
relation to the dead other and as a law of living friendship, offers a compass by 
which to orient a more nuanced thinking of what an ethical poetics of writing 
ecological elegy might constitute for a loss that is not always forgone, but rather 
“in-process” or incipient. Drawing from Derrida’s work with reference to 
Barthes’s elegiac metonymy of the punctum, this chapter argues that such a 
poetics would involve an attitude of witness, in which the singularity and agency 
of the ecological other is recognised (distance), at the same moment as we 
recognise that in being answerable to ecology we are also answerable to ourselves 
(intimacy). In addition, I suggest that such a poetics would recognise that the 
movement enacted by eco-elegy is at once necessary, and completely unequal to 
its task—confounded by the enormity of a loss that cannot be measured, and by a 
reckoning that is without end. This is a movement of mourning in which is 
inscribed not only our responsibility to the dead other, but also to the living; 
encompassing a mourning not only of absolute loss, but of loss that is contingent, 
incipient, in progress, and partial. Such a conception of mourning comes closer to 
accounting for the divergent forms of eco-loss, all of which (in their 
comparatively recent emergence into socio-political and cultural consciousness) 
demand our attention and responsibility. In making this argument, I suggest a 
tentative allegory for the writing of ecological loss, consisting of an Orpheus who 
resists the urge to turn away from Eurydice, and instead meets her gaze. 
 
 
I. 
The other in us: Derrida’s metonymy of ethical 
mourning 
 
Impossible mourning & the law of friendship 
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As is commonly understood, we mourn for those to whom we have a relation. In 
fact, it may be more precise to say that it is the loss of this living relation, between 
ourselves and an other alive in the world, which we mourn when that other dies, 
and we are left alone with only our memories of them. The contingency of much 
ecological loss that is in-process and incipient, however, demands a means of 
encompassing mourning as a felt experience (and literary movement) beyond the 
absolute loss of physical death. Derrida’s articulation of mourning as a condition 
and responsibility that is not limited to death, but which exists as a living law of 
friendship, provides a means of considering this contingency of ecological loss, in 
relation to the sentiments of mourning and grief which are driving the emergent 
literature of eco-elegy. It is with this concept of a mourning preceding total loss, 
or what Derrida has called ‘[t]he anguished apprehension of mourning’, which 
anticipates the loss of relation to the still-living friend, that the tentative 
suggestions of this chapter are ultimately inflected. However, before discussing 
further Derrida’s conception of mourning in friendship, it is necessary to examine 
his understanding of mourning as a metonymic structure that confounds 
commonly applied distinctions between healthy mourning and melancholia—as 
instituted by Freud and perpetuated by Morton. As a paradoxical negotiation 
between both introjection (Freudian “healthy” mourning) and incorporation 
(Freudian “pathological” melancholia), Derridean mourning undermines the 
illusory Freudian split between these movements, insisting that the only choice of 
the faithful mourner is to try to redress one infidelity with another in an 
impossible effort to, at most, ‘fail well’ (Derrida, 2001:144, original emphasis). 
Derridean mourning thus challenges any unqualified suggestion that a singularly 
“melancholic” mode of commemorative mourning is possible, let alone more 
ethical, and thus offers a more rigorous, if unsettling, framework in which to 
refine an ethics of writing eco-loss.           
 Beyond its prosaic employment as a synonym for general sadness, and as it 
pertains to the complex psychological processes of mourning, “melancholia” is a 
rich site of overlapping and contested meanings. Since Freud’s seminal essay 
‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917) opposed melancholic mourning to so-called 
“healthy mourning”, psychoanalysts from Klein and Lacan, to Bowlby and 
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Kristeva have offered their own theories regarding the causes and characteristics 
of melancholic mourning, while the concept has also influenced literary criticism, 
in work such as Morton’s. According to Freud, both mourning and melancholia 
are ‘reaction>s@ to the real loss of a love object’, defined chiefly by the prevalence 
in melancholia of a ‘disturbance of self-regard’ (Freud, 1917:250; 244).  
Moreover, while both conditions involve features such as ‘painful dejection’ and 
‘inhibition of all activity’, mourning is understood by Freud as a means to an end-
point of the mourner’s detachment and disinvestment from the lost love object, 
whereby ‘the work of mourning is completed’ and ‘the ego becomes free and 
uninhibited again’ so that normal life might resume (Freud, 1917: 245). In order 
to arrive at this point, the mourner, through ‘>r@eality-testing’, realises ‘that the 
love object no longer exists’, and gradually withdraws their libido ‘from its 
attachments to that object’ (Freud, 1917:244). This withdrawal is accomplished 
via introjection, a process whereby: 
 
 >e@ach single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to 
 the object is brought up and hyper-cathected, and detachment of the libido is 
 accomplished in respect of it (Freud, 1917:245). 
 
Freudian melancholia, on the other hand, is deemed pathological to the extent that 
the subject fails to release their ego from the inhibition of libidinal attachment to 
the lost object, and resume “normal” life. The melancholic, unlike the mourner, 
then fails to ‘overcome’ loss, ‘after a certain lapse of time’ (Freud, 1917:244). 
Moreover, unlike mourning, melancholia is often associated with ‘loss of a more 
ideal kind’ (loss not contingent on actual death), or a loss which the subject feels 
deeply yet the nature (or possibly object) of which they struggle to define (Freud, 
1917:245). In this way, Freud suggests that in contrast to mourning, melancholia 
is ‘related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness’ (1917:245). 
Moreover, Freudian melancholia is marked by an extreme lowering of self-
esteem, a wounding of the ego leading to self-reproach, and a remarkable 
resistance to the instincts of self-preservation (1917:246). Suggests Freud, ‘>i@n 
mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is 
the ego itself’ (1917:246). Instead of successfully introjecting the object to free 
the ego to form new attachments, the melancholic undergoes a narcissistic 
 206 
identification with the lost object, a movement from ‘object-loss’ to ‘ego-loss’, a 
loss of self (Freud, 1917:249). Rather than turning toward new objects, the ego 
takes the lost object into itself, absorbing or “cannibalising” the object—the 
process of incorporation (Freud, 1917:249).          
 The mourning theory outlined in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ has deeply 
influenced the framework through which psychoanalysts and other thinkers, 
including literary theorists and creative writers, have understood loss and 
mourning, particularly as experiences focused on the subject rather than the lost 
other, on ends rather than a resistance to ends, and on consolation and substitution 
rather than on continued attachments. However, as Tammy Clewell (2004) has 
astutely argued, the mourning theory outlined in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ 
must be understood in light of Freud’s later 1923 work, The Ego and the Id, which 
significantly complicates his prior distinction between mourning and melancholia. 
As has been discussed, in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, Freud distinguishes the 
melancholic by means of their prolonged identification with the lost other, and 
incorporation of the lost other within the self, precipitating conflicting emotions of 
love and hate for the lost other, which are turned in upon the melancholic’s own 
self. By contrast, in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, the mourner, by relinquishing 
the lost other, frees the ego to form new attachments, thereby concluding the 
mourning process and regaining psychic health. However, in The Ego and the Id, 
Freud quite radically revises this earlier theory by contending that the process of 
incorporating the lost other within the grieving self, previously seen as defining 
melancholia or pathological mourning, in fact constitutes, quotes Clewell 
(2004:61), ‘the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects’ (Freud, 
1923:29). That is, Freud here suggests that melancholic incorporation is ultimately 
a process integral to the formation of subjectivity, and to any process of mourning 
loss, “healthy”, “pathological”, or otherwise. This transformed understanding of 
mourning is evident in a later 1929 letter to a bereaved friend24, in which Freud 
reflects upon his daughter’s death, and affirms that ultimately, as mourners, ‘we 
shall remain inconsolable and will never find a substitute’ for the being we have 
lost (1960:386). Indeed, Clewell argues that Freud’s late understanding of 
                                                          
24 This letter, to Ludwig Binswanger, is referenced by both Clewell (2004:61-2) and Bowlby 
(1980:23). 
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mourning, in suggesting that ‘there can be no final severance of attachments 
without dissolving the ego’, offers a means by which ‘the mourning subject may 
affirm the endurance of ambivalent bonds to those loved and lost others as a 
condition of its own existence’ (2004:65). In understanding the ego as constitutive 
of the subject’s experience of loss, or as an ‘elegiac formation’, Clewell contends 
that this late theory ‘raises the possibility for thinking about mourning as an 
affirmative and loving internalization of the lost other’ (2004:64). As such, 
Clewell proposes that:   
   
 Freud’s work on mourning helps us, finally, to establish an intimate, indeed ethical, 
 relation between past and future as we embark on the present work of endless 
 mourning (2004:65). 
 
While, as Clewell demonstrates, it is important to contextualise any discussion of 
Freud’s early mourning theory in light of his later theory, the focus of this essay 
on the distinction between introjection and incorporation (and identification) as 
outlined in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, is guided precisely by the influence of 
this theory (beyond any subsequent ones) on the application of mourning and 
melancholia by thinkers such as Sacks (1985), Ramazani (1994), and Morton 
(2010), to elegiac literature25. Moreover, despite Freud’s eventual recognition of 
the integral nature of interiorising the lost other to both mourning and subjectivity, 
he does not, as Clewell notes, ‘explicitly define identification as a positive 
incorporation of the lost other’ (2004:63). While ‘The Ego and the Id’ 
demonstrates an understanding of mourning far more nuanced and attentive to the 
demands of the lost other upon the mourner than Freud is often acknowledged for, 
at the same time its focus on identification (or incorporation) ignores the equal 
importance of introjection in mourning the lost other. Moreover, as Bowlby notes, 
the preoccupation of Freud and many other psychoanalysts with identification 
ignores the vital importance to mourning of the subject’s ‘striving to recover the 
lost person’, a striving contextualised by Bowlby’s attachment theory, as 
explained in Chapter 1 (1980:30).           
                                                          
25 Kristeva’s application of melancholia to literature in Black Sun (1987), which draws heavily 
from and also diverges from Freud, does reference The Ego and the Id. 
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 By contrast, what Derrida offers in his 1986 Memoires for Paul de Man (itself 
an elegiac text written in reflection of his friend de Man’s death) and in his essay 
‘Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’26 (1977) is a 
profound consideration of the paradoxical co-movement of both introjection and 
incorporation implicated in mourning a loved other, the necessary impossibility of 
“successful” mourning, and the question of how to answer to our responsibility to 
the other when we mourn. Thus Derrida complicates both Freudian and post-
Freudian distinctions between the “healthy” process of introjection and the 
“pathological” process of incorporation, questioning the ethics and foregrounding 
the ethical necessity of each, insisting that both figure in any effort to ethically 
mourn the other “in us”, an effort which in any case cannot succeed. As he notes 
in ‘Fors’: ‘Introjection/incorporation: everything is played out on the borderline 
which divides and opposes the two terms’ (1977:70). It is useful here to draw 
from this essay’s more analytical discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of 
introjection and incorporation in defining these terms. Introjection, as Derrida 
notes, is a theory formulated in 1909 by Sándor Ferenczi and appropriated by 
Freud and others, for a process whereby an image of an external object (generally 
comprising a selection of external and behavioural characteristics) is taken inside 
the self and assimilated into the mourner’s subjectivity, in order to ultimately be 
cathartically expelled so that the subject can move on. This narcissistic inclusion 
of (the image of) the other within of the self ‘expands the self’ (1977:70). As 
Derrida emphasises, psychoanalyst Maria Torok subjects the theory to an 
important reformulation when she notes that it is ‘not only the object but also the 
instincts and desires attached to it’ that are introjected, while also asserting the 
difference of the two terms which have historically been blurred (1977:70).  
 The process of incorporation as defined by Freud involves the subject’s 
narcissistic identification with the lost object and its taking in of the object as a 
discrete and separate being preserved within the self. This process of ‘>s@ealing 
the loss of the object, but also marking the refusal to mourn’, explains Derrida, ‘is 
foreign to and actually opposed to the process of introjection’ (1977:71). By 
contrast, in introjection:  
                                                          
26 Hereafter abbreviated to ‘Fors’. 
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 I pretend to keep the dead alive, intact, safe (save) inside me, but it is only in order to 
 refuse, in a necessarily equivocal way, to love the dead as a living part of me, dead 
 save in me (1977:71, emphases in original). 
 
In this way, Derrida presents introjection or “normative” mourning as a movement 
whereby the mourner denies the other entry into their self as a discrete living 
being, and incorporation as paradoxically a means of permitting the other some 
means of living on within the body of the bereaved (1977:71). For Derrida, 
contrary to Freud’s logic, in incorporation, the “sealing off” of the other as a 
separate entity inside the mourner’s self resists the cannibalistic assimilation and 
appropriation by the mourner of gestures and traits of the deceased involved in 
introjection, and in doing so preserves for the other a greater degree of alterity, 
inasmuch as the other who is no longer alive “save in me” retains alterity. As will 
be seen, however, neither introjection nor incorporation are able to circumvent a 
degree of violence to or betrayal of the other’s alterity, to the other as other, a fact 
which underwrites Derrida’s suspicion of whether true mourning is even possible, 
despite his insistence that we must try regardless.       
 Memoires: for Paul de Man proceeds from a similarly paradoxical and 
negative logic in questioning the nature of mourning as it pertains to memory and 
to ‘the other in us’, asking ‘where is the most unjust betrayal?’ (1986:6). In 
expanding from this question Derrida delineates introjection and incorporation as 
different forms of infidelity to the other arising from the interiorisation of the 
other within the living subject: 
 
 Is the most distressing, or even the most deadly infidelity that of a possible mourning 
 which would interiorize within us the image, idol, or ideal of the other who is dead 
 and lives only in us? Or is it that of the impossible mourning, which, leaving the 
 other his alterity, respecting thus his infinite remove, either refuses to take or is 
 incapable of taking the other within oneself, as in the tomb or the vault of some 
 narcissism? (1986:6)  
 
This reframing of the question of mourning to encompass the ethical demands of 
the dead other upon the mourner represents a transgressive departure from the 
traditional subject-oriented and end-based psychoanalytical focus upon mourning 
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as a means by which the subject either overcomes loss successfully and 
“completes” mourning, or else becomes arrested in a pathological state of 
melancholic mourning in need of clinical redress. In referring to the ‘other in us’, 
Derrida emphasises that, being dead, this ‘other living in us’ is distinctly ‘not 
living in himself’ and that our hosting of him27 within our: 
 
 (…) bereaved memory, can be neither the so-called resurrection of the other himself 
 (…) nor the simple inclusion of a narcissistic fantasy in a subjectivity that is closed 
 upon itself or even identical to itself (1986:21).  
 
Elaborating further, he notes that this being who no longer exists in himself except 
as a ‘being-in-us’ also exists as a being ‘between us’ (1986:28), suggesting a 
bereaved subjectivity at once divided from and interconnected with the other. Of 
this other, Derrida writes:  
 
 He lives only in us. But we are never ourselves, and between us, identical to us, a 
 “self” is never in itself or identical to itself (1986:28). 
 
Further, for Derrida, speaking now more generally of the condition that structures 
his understanding of friendship, yet which might also structure relations of love or 
hospitality, ‘the possibility of the death of the other as mine or ours in-forms any 
relation to the other and the finitude of memory’ (1986:33). That is, the 
knowledge that the other might die before us, and that we, surviving them, might 
be responsible for their remembrance, is always already inscribed into our relation 
to the other before their death. However, it is important to note Derrida’s 
distinction that the other does not come to live “in” or “between us” in bereaved 
memory until the event of their death, ‘or at least in the anticipated possibility of a 
death’, for death defines the possibility of the other’s “being in” the mourner, 
‘harbour[ed]’ as ‘something that is greater and other than them; something outside 
of them within them’ (1986:33; 34, emphasis in original). When we lose the other, 
we turn to our memory of them, revealed in its ‘finitude’ now that the other is 
                                                          
27 To avoid confusion, I have herein either followed Derrida’s routine use of the masculine generic 
pronoun, or else used the gender neutral “they” or “their”. 
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gone, and move to interiorize the other through this memory. This process, as it 
pertains to traditional “healthy” mourning, is described by Derrida as involving 
‘an interiorizing idealization [which] takes in itself or upon itself the body and 
voice of the other, the other’s visage and person, ideally and quasi-literally 
devouring them’, a process of mimesis (1986:34). To “succeed” in such a process 
of mourning by taking on the remembered aspects of the dead other in order to 
overcome losing them is in fact to fail, because in this assimilative process we 
neglect to allow the other a discrete living being in us (1986:35). Conversely, the 
movement of incorporation as ‘faithful interiorization’, in hosting the other as ‘a 
part of us, between us’ carried ‘like an unborn child, like a future’, strangely 
‘succeeds’ in preserving some measure of alterity for the other, in the sense that: 
 
 (…) an aborted interiorization is at the same time a respect for the other as other, a 
 sort of tender rejection, a movement of renunciation which leaves the other alone, 
 outside, over there, in his death, outside of us (1986:35). 
 
Characteristically, having presented these grounds for a subversion of the 
traditional introjection/incorporation dichotomy, Derrida then casts fresh doubt on 
his own logic, admitting that it is this very ‘schema’, whereby ‘success fails’ and 
‘failure succeeds’ that ‘makes true mourning impossible’ (1986:35). Here, he 
reflects upon the German word ‘Erinnerung’, denoting at once ‘memory and 
interiorization’ and thus commingling the notion of a ‘subjectivizing 
interiorization’ (1986:35). As Derrida explains, De Man, following Hegel, had 
himself considered Erinnerung alongside Gedächtnis as an ‘opposition (…) 
between remembrance as interiorization and a thinking memory which can also be 
linked to technical and mechanical hypomnesis’, which he notably compared to 
that of symbol and sign (1986:35-6). Derrida questions whether the kind of 
‘nonsubjectivizable law of thought beyond interiorization’ represented by 
Gedächtnis is what occurs in mourning the other in/between us when we 
remember them—or whether it is instead Erinnerung’s interiorising memory 
(1986:37). The following crucial passage outlines the process at stake: 
 
 The movement of interiorization keeps within us the life, thought, body, voice, look 
 or soul of the other, but in the form of those hypomnemata, memoranda, signs or 
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 symbols, images or mnesic representations which are only lacunary fragments, 
 detached and dispersed—only “parts” of the departed other. In turn they are parts of 
 us, included “in us” in a memory which suddenly seems greater and older than us, 
 “greater,” beyond any quantitative comparisons: sublimely greater than this other 
 that the memory harbors and guards within it, but also greater with this other, greater 
 than itself, inadequate to itself, pregnant with this other (Derrida, 1986:37). 
 
Here, Derrida describes the process by which ‘parts’ of the other are assimilated 
in the mourning subject through introjection, parts which render bereaved 
memory greater than either the self or the other and greater with this other 
(1986:37). Further, he suggests that: 
 
 The figure of this bereaved memory becomes a sort of (possible and impossible) 
 metonymy, where the part stands for the whole and for more than the whole that it 
 exceeds. An allegorical metonymy, too, which says something other than what it says 
 (…) It speaks the other and makes the other speak, but it does so in order to let the 
 other speak (…) (1986:37). 
 
This notion of mourning as a paradoxical metonymical movement, in which the 
bereaved subject takes into itself a part of the other which it preserves as a 
discrete being and by which this subject is themself expanded, constitutes a 
profound way of rethinking mourning beyond subject-object and introjection-
incorporation oppositions and revealing the co-presence and mutual implication of 
these polarities within mourning. At the same time, it refigures the question of 
mourning in view of the agency of the other, and of our answerability to the other 
in remembering and mourning the dead. Derrida refines this metonymical allegory 
when he emphasises that: 
 
 (…) what defies the simple and “objective” logic of sets, what disrupts the simple 
 inclusion of a part within the whole, is what recalls itself beyond interiorizing 
 memory (Erinnerung), is what recalls itself to thought (Gedächtnis) and thinks itself 
 as a “part” which is greater than the “whole” (1986:38). 
 
By this logic, we could say that this discrete, synecdochic part, this other that I 
harbour in me, in bereaved memory, is preserved in its otherness and makes me 
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other, more than one, more than myself—this other in me, in us, between us, 
exceeds me. Derrida goes on to say: 
 
 It is the other as other, the non-totalizable trace which is in-adequate to itself and to 
 the same. This trace is interiorized in mourning as that which can no longer be 
 interiorized, as impossible Erinnerung, in and beyond mournful memory—
 constituting it, traversing it, exceeding it, defying all reappropriation (…) (1986:38). 
 
In this unending, untotalisable movement lies, for Derrida, ‘the sublimity of a 
mourning without sublimation and without the obsessive triumph of which Freud 
speaks’, which honours the one we mourn by affirming their otherness that lives 
within us (1986:38-9). This paradoxical part-whole relation of the other in us, that 
transforms and expands the mourner while resisting and exceeding them, 
foregrounds the qualities of proximity, intimacy, interconnection and exchange in 
relating to the other, of which Watkin (extending from Bowlby regarding 
bereavement) and Morton (in view of ecological ethics) both speak. At the same 
time, Derrida’s metonymic conception of mourning encompasses a recognition of 
the difference and distinction of the other with respect to the mourner, a sense of 
not only the other’s ‘proxim>ity@ but >also of their@ separate>ness@’ that Watkin 
argues is central to ethical elegiac writing (2004:165). Such a recognition of 
negotiating between the ethical necessity of respecting the other’s unknowable 
alterity, and opening oneself to a relation of intimacy, mutual implication, and 
dialogue with the other, resonates throughout the discussions of various thinkers 
in the context of ecological ethics, including Morton, Cronon and Plumwood, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Derrida’s metonymical understanding of 
mourning presents an opportunity to test, develop and refine these ideas, in view 
of the possibility of an ethical elegiac mode pertaining to ecological loss. As a 
delicate and painful negotiation between infidelities in an effort to honour the 
dead other while avoiding as far as possible totalising him, Derridean mourning 
emphasises what we might call the ecological principles of intimacy and 
difference, which are reflected in the metonymical structure of the other as a part 
living within us―an other whom we not only witness, but are witnessed by. This 
formulation suggests a means of thinking our interconnection with nature while 
also accounting for its radical singularity, and acknowledging our answerability in 
 214 
writing nature.              
 Moreover, in Derrida’s understanding of friendship in relation to mourning is 
offered a means of figuring the paradoxical phenomenon of loss and mourning as 
an ongoing relation to a living other, preceding absolute loss. This is an 
understanding that provides for the contingency and incipience of the ecological 
loss that scientists determine we are facing now, no matter what we do, an 
expansion of the framework for thinking about loss that ethical eco-elegy 
demands. As Derrida explains in Politics of Friendship (1994): 
 
 The anguished apprehension of mourning (without which the act of friendship would 
 not spring forth in its very energy) insinuates itself a priori and anticipates itself; it 
 haunts and plunges the friend, before mourning, into mourning (…) it weeps death 
 before death (1997:14). 
 
That one friend will survive to witness and mourn the other’s death is, for Derrida, 
‘the condition of possibility for friendship’ (1997:14). Crucially for the task of 
eco-elegy, this concept of friendship as a relation which from the outset is 
structured by this condition provides a way of thinking mourning as a contingent 
structure that precedes the death of the other, a structure not predicated only on 
irrevocable “total” loss that has already occurred. (While species extinctions 
certainly qualify as ecological instances of such total loss, the insidious and 
incremental degradation in the health of Great Barrier Reef, for example, 
represents a loss that is at once in-process, incipient and contingent on our interim 
actions.) This structure offers a means of clarifying the demands and operations of 
mourning and loss in light of ecological “loss”, as not exclusive to death or 
absolute loss, but as also bearing upon a living, ongoing relation. In addition, 
Derrida’s concept of friendship facilitates an understanding of how the signifier 
“loss” names not simply the sudden lack of a finite thing but the loss of the 
opportunity for the continuation of a series of encounters, by which we engage 
with the alterity of a living other. When the other is dead or otherwise gone, this 
relationship can be carried on only between us and the other in us. In this light, it 
is possible to see how the signifiers “nature” and “ecology” also stand in for a 
series, functioning as a meta-noun for an endless constellation of inter-
relationships. To speak of “losing nature”/ecology, then, is to speak of losing the 
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opportunity for the continuation of a series of encounters with nature. In this way, 
Derrida’s conception of “anticipatory” mourning for the friend offers a way of 
rethinking elegiac loss in terms of a broader ecological understanding of loss as 
deprivation of experience (for transformative encounter and exchange with the 
living other) and as a diminishment of complexity. 
 
Commemoration & the metonymic force: ‘The Deaths of Roland 
Barthes’ 
 
Since MPM, Derrida has continued his painstaking consideration of not only the 
question of ethical mourning, but the question of ethical commemoration, in a 
series of reflexive and intimate writings which elegiacally enact commemoration 
for friends who have died, at the same time as they question whether and how it 
should be done. One such text, ‘The Deaths of Roland Barthes’ (2001), written 
upon the occasion of Barthes’s death in 1980, addresses the particular 
conundrums implicated in funerary writing, insights about which are also 
pertinent to elegy. In commemorating Barthes and speaking of the impossibilities 
of doing so without committing the various betrayals of mourning―while 
insisting finally on its necessity―Derrida expands upon his metonymic 
conception of the other in us and the law of friendship. Moreover, he does so in 
dialogue with Barthes’s own work—notably his metonymic structure of the 
punctum and studium presented in Camera Lucida (1980)―in this way enacting 
his recognition of the ethical imperative in commemoration to “let the other 
speak”, in addition to speaking of and to them. In reflection upon the loss of 
Barthes and upon Barthes’s own mourning of his mother which underwrites his 
conception of the punctum, Derrida demonstrates how metonymy allows for us to 
speak of the part in relation to the whole, the singular in relation to the general—
and in doing so, to transport ideas, to disturb and to move. As such, it is a text 
crucial to developing an understanding of metonymy as an allegorical movement 
for a more ethical elegiac writing, which might be extended to the context of eco-
loss.                   
 A profoundly elegiac text, written after Barthes’s mother’s death and shortly 
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before his own, Camera Lucida is at once a philosophical and personal inquiry 
into the nature of photography and mourning. In the effort to rediscover ‘the 
essence of [his mother’s] identity’ by searching through family photographs, 
Barthes describes himself as ‘struggling among images partially true, and 
therefore totally false’, an experience he compares to his frequent dreams of her, 
in which she is displaced, altered or obscured (2000:66). Both entail a ‘Sisyphean 
labor: to reascend, straining toward the essence, to climb back down without 
having seen it, and to begin all over again’ (2000:66). Yet, to his astonishment, 
Barthes does find a photograph in which he ‘rediscovered’ the ‘truth’ of his 
mother, her presence-in-absence, ‘a sentiment as certain as remembrance’ 
(2000:70). This photograph depicts his mother as a child in a winter garden, and 
as such is labelled ‘The Winter Garden Photograph’. Corresponding to this 
personal search in Camera Lucida is a more critical one, whereby in observing 
and questioning his own visceral reactions to various photographs in a 
phenomenological mode, Barthes provisionally delineates two central operational 
structures, or ‘themes’ at work: the punctum and the studium (2000:27). The 
punctum is conceived of as ‘wound’ or ‘prick’ which disturbs the more objective 
generality of the photographic scene, the field of the studium, which broadly 
inspires only the spectator’s ‘unconcerned desire’, interest or disinterest, taste or 
distaste (2000:26-7). The punctum is a singular yet seemingly arbitrary detail such 
as a child’s bad teeth or the quality of a hand, which draws the attention of a 
particular spectator as if by accident and moves or “pierces” them by some 
mysterious nature of its placement in the composition (2000:26). While at times it 
‘fills the whole picture’, more frequently, the detail of the punctum is that of ‘a 
partial object’ (2000:43; 45). Speaking of his own experience in viewing one 
photograph, Barthes locates the punctum in a woman’s ‘strapped pumps’, which 
provokes in him ‘great sympathy…almost a kind of tenderness’, an involuntary 
response which he is unable to quantify (2000:43, emphasis in original). In the 
operation of the punctum, Barthes detects a certain ‘power of expansion’ that he 
observes as being ‘often metonymic’ (2000:45). This metonymic power arises 
from the strange coincidence of part and whole in relation to the other, with one 
detail (a shoe, a house, a smile, a road) within the prosaic frame of the 
photographic studium. Within this frame, the punctum, through the spectator’s 
gaze, somehow yields or makes reference to something greater, a referent beyond 
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the frame. This ‘partial object’ has the strange capacity to draw the gaze, inspiring 
a kind of recognition that is nonetheless difficult to correlate, and to physically 
affect the individual spectator without their really knowing why, arousing, for 
example, a feeling of tenderness, an uncanny sense of home, or a vivid memory of 
place. This involuntary yet powerful sense of visitation, and of the familiar which 
is also strange, aligns Barthes’s phenomenon of the punctum with haunting and 
the uncanny. In its visceral suggestion of a beyond, the punctum’s partial object 
operates as a metonym. This metonymic power is described evocatively by 
Barthes in an example of a photograph of ‘a blind gypsy violinist being led by a 
boy’ (2000:45). While this is the photograph’s immediate, objective scene, it is 
not what “holds” Barthes, for he sees beyond it by the punctum’s seemingly 
magical power of transportation: 
 
 (…) now what I see, by means of this “thinking eye” which makes me add something 
 to the photograph, is the dirt road; its texture gives me the certainty of being in 
 Central Europe; I perceive the referent (…) I recognize, with my whole body, the 
 straggling villages I passed through on my long-ago travels in Hungary and Rumania 
 (2000:45). 
 
In this way, the photographic punctum lures Barthes, in the act of looking, into an 
involuntary and visceral experience of a beyond, an elsewhere outside the frame. 
Derrida describes this metonymical movement thus: 
 
 Though it is no longer there (present, living, real), its having-been-there presently a 
 part of the referential or intentional structure of my relationship to the photogram, the 
 return of the referent indeed takes the form of a haunting. (…) Already a sort of 
 hallucinating metonymy: it is something else, a piece come from the other (from the 
 referent) that finds itself in me, before me, but also in me like a piece of me (since 
 the referential implication is also intentional and noematic; it belongs neither to the 
 sensible body nor to the medium of the photogram) (2001b:54). 
 
Moreover, the metonymic structure of the punctum is described by Derrida as 
‘contrapuntal’ to the field of the studium, which it disturbs, and ‘induces’ 
metonymy (2001b:58; 57). The punctum’s power of expansion is also a power of 
supplement—the punctum supplements the photograph through the spectator who 
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associates it with a meaning that transcends the photograph’s apparent content. 
Moreover, it is a kind of displaced and dysfunctional signifier—the punctum fails 
to deliver an intelligible concept (a signified), yet provokes a sensory reaction. 
The process of signification here is short-circuited by the photograph’s direct 
projection of and toward a referent that cannot ultimately be manifested. Despite 
the punctum’s failure to manifest the referent in its reality, by way of its strange 
metonymical power of association it does paradoxically succeed in transmitting a 
trace, lending it its transcendental quality as an ‘emanation of the referent’, the 
return of the dead (Barthes, 2000:80).           
 The power of the punctum consists in its strange facilitation of the impossible, 
an “encounter” with the other. As a text mobilised by Barthes’s loss of his mother 
and desire to somehow “find” her again through the photographic image, Camera 
Lucida’s entire discourse is, to cite Derrida, ‘irradiated’ by one photographic 
punctum beyond all others (2001b:43). This is that of the Winter Garden 
Photograph, which we are never shown and yet are compelled to imagine. This 
long-searched-for photograph achieved the impossible for Barthes—by recalling 
the sense of his dead mother as a living being, through her unassuming image as a 
child captured one day, and preserved for the grieving Barthes decades later to 
find. Through his bereaved gaze, this photograph transcends the limits of its 
frame, and galvanises the wider quest of Camera Lucida. As Derrida says, ‘[t]he 
impossible sometimes, by chance, becomes possible: as a utopia’ (2001b:45). 
Here Derrida echoes Barthes’s admission in Camera Lucida that the Winter 
Garden Photograph ‘achieved for me, utopically, the impossible science of the 
unique being’ (1980:71). Reflecting on these words, Derrida observes that 
Barthes: 
 
 (…) said this uniquely, turned toward his mother and not toward the Mother. But the 
 poignant singularity does not contradict the generality, it does not forbid it from 
 having the force of law, but only arrows it, marks, and signs it (2001b:46).  
 
Here, Derrida distinguishes the way in which speaking of a singularity (the 
unique, particular being of Barthes’s own mother) paradoxically has the capacity 
to speak a more universal truth than when we address directly a figure or 
generality (the idea of the mother) in the first instance. This instinctive truth is 
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recalled by Duras’s proclamation, in the epigraph to this chapter, that ‘“everyone” 
does not make you cry’ (1999:35). In thus transmitting the “essence” of his 
mother as a ‘unique being’, this photograph accomplishes that which ‘is 
impossible and yet takes place, utopically, metonymically, as soon as it marks, as 
soon as it writes, even “before” language’ (Derrida, 2001b:43; 46). Utopically, 
through the punctum, Barthes’s mother, ‘the unique other’, ‘appears, that is to say, 
without appearing, for the other can appear only by disappearing’ (Derrida, 
2001b:48). The punctum, suggests Derrida, allows Barthes to express: 
 
 (…) the point of singularity, the traversal of discourse toward the unique, the 
 “referent” as the irreplaceable other, the one who was and will no longer be, who 
 returns like that which will never come back (2001b:56). 
 
That is, ‘>t@he metonymy of the punctum…allows us to speak of the unique, to 
speak of and to it. It yields the trait that relates to the unique’ (Derrida, 2001b:58). 
This metonymical movement between the singular and the general allows us to be 
moved by the punctum of the Winter Garden Photograph of Barthes’s mother, 
without knowing her or seeing her image. Suggests Derrida: 
 
 Only a metonymic force can continue to assure a certain generality to the discourse 
 (…) How else could we, without knowing her, be so deeply moved by what he said 
 about his mother, who was not only the Mother, or a mother, but the only one she 
 was and of whom such a photo was taken “on that day”? (2001b:58) 
 
In this way, the metonymic force of the Winter Garden Photograph at once 
“speaks of the unique”, the singularity of Roland Barthes’s mother, the being of 
Henriette Barthes, “on that day” when she was a child in a winter garden—and 
also speaks of a greater truth beyond Barthes’s mother, a truth of the lost beloved, 
the passing of time, and the strange visitation of the living by the dead, the 
persistence of presence in absence. The movement that allows us to be wounded 
by the Winter Garden Photograph rests not on a transposition but on a relation. 
This constitutes the relation of the singular to the general, a relation that preserves 
alterity—the alterity of the singular instance of Barthes’s mother in the Winter 
Garden Photograph—‘almost intact’ (Derrida, 2001b:58). As Derrida explains, ‘I 
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do not tend to replace his >Barthes’s@ mother with mine’ (2001b:58). Rather, the 
metonymic relation of the part to the whole or the specific to the universal allows 
for our reading of the WGP to encompass both Barthes’s mother and ‘the Figure 
of the Mother’, without the difference between the singular and the general being 
smeared (Derrida, 2001b:58). In this way, the Winter Garden Photograph as 
punctum illuminates the metonymic complication of mourning by Derrida, 
whereby as faithful mourners we must negotiate between attending to the 
singularity or unicity of the other, and ourselves relating to the other in an 
ongoing exchange that, to a degree, risks reducing this singularity. Neither 
movement alone is sufficient—we must negotiate the difficult movement between 
letting the other speak, and speaking of and to the other so as not to abandon 
them.                  
 As Derrida notes, in Camera Lucida, Barthes speaks of another punctum 
present in every photograph, and, Derrida suggests, in all metonymy, which is 
time (2001b:60). In its uncanny presentation of immediacy and history in the 
same frame, the photograph attests to what has been, existing literally as an 
‘emanation of the referent’ which it preserves and suspends (Barthes, 2000:80). It 
is this uncanny suspension of the referent that imparts to the photograph its 
revenential quality. This temporal punctum, Derrida observes, constitutes ‘the 
relation to some unique and irreplaceable referent’, which ‘took place only once’ 
(2001b:61). In speaking here of the temporal punctum as understood through 
Barthes’s meditation on photography, Derrida also describes the wider operations 
of the ‘metonymic force’: 
 
 The metonymic force thus divides the referential trait, suspends the referent and 
 leaves it to be desired, while still maintaining the reference. It is at work in the most 
 loyal of friendships; it plunges the destination into mourning while at the same time 
 engaging it (2001b:61).  
 
In speaking of Barthes’s punctum and of the latter’s photographic search for the 
impossible utopia of the singular other that is his own dead mother, Derrida 
reflexively discusses the impossibility of faithful mourning and commemoration 
in reference to his own mourning of Barthes, as an other who is no longer alive in 
himself, but who lives on only in those who knew him. Here, he once more 
 221 
presents the choice of the faithful mourner as being between ‘two infidelities’, 
resulting in the conundrum of ‘having to do and not do both at once’ (2001b:45). 
To avoid reducing the dead other by speaking of them, one could approach 
mourning by refraining from ‘say>ing@ anything that comes back to oneself’ or ‘to 
let oneself be accompanied or preceded in counterpoint by the friend’s voice’, 
‘just quoting’, thus letting the other speak while ‘effac>ing@ oneself’ (Derrida, 
2001b:45). And yet, ‘this excess of fidelity would end up saying and exchanging 
nothing’, denying the other a living place in ourselves, ‘sending death back to 
death’ (Derrida, 2001b:45). Conversely, suggests Derrida, one could refrain from 
‘all quotation, all identification, all rapproachment even’ (2001b:45), in order to 
preserve (some measure of) the other’s alterity. And yet the infidelity in this 
approach involves risking the disappearance of the other-as-other, and denying of 
hosting the other as a living part of oneself (Derrida, 2001b:24). And so it is that 
Derrida suggests that the only option of the faithful mourner is ‘having to do and 
not do both at once’, in a kind of constant, painstaking negotiation (2001b:24). 
This is a negotiation between letting the other speak and interrupting this speech 
so as to speak with the other, in an ongoing exchange between us the living and 
the other in ourselves who is in this way allowed a continued existence. Asks 
Derrida in his memorial essay for Lyotard: ‘How to leave him alone without 
abandoning him?’ (2001c:225). In attempting to do justice to the other in our 
mourning, we must recognise that the other lives no longer except ‘in or between 
us the living’ in our memory, and do not “in themselves” hear our orations of and 
to them (Derrida, 1986:32-3). We must do our mindful best to preserve the other’s 
alterity by ‘leaving him alone’ and letting him speak, while engaging with our 
living memory of the other in an ongoing exchange so as not to “abandon him” or 
deprive him of the potential for transformative exchange—and so as to permit him 
futurity, an ongoing existence within our being. That is, we must reflect, speak 
and write of and to the other, because our duty to the other demands we do so, 
despite the dilemmas of infidelity that such activity involves. For Derrida, ‘to 
succeed’ in mourning is paradoxically also ‘to fail, to fail well’, a formulation 
with evident implications for elegy (2001a:144). Like Barthes’s Camera Lucida, 
Derrida’s reflexive and self-conscious writing on mourning wagers more than 
theory in its enterprise—it is personal as well as philosophical, an enactment of 
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the critical concerns at stake; at once elegy and essay. In this light, it is 
understandable why Derrida’s own elegiac writings are pervaded with such 
mindful attention, hesitation and doubt, and why each of these writings reflexively 
calls into question its own mode of discourse and raison d'être, without arriving at 
a resolution. In his elegy-essay for Barthes as for many others, Derrida tries to let 
the other speak by quoting their words and proceeding in dialogue with their 
thought, questions his own right to speak, and reminds himself and us that the 
friend of whom he writes can no longer hear him, although in memory he lives on. 
To follow Derrida, we are, in writing elegy and reaching toward the lost other, 
condemned to fail, and yet our responsibility is to “fail well”, by speaking of and 
to the lost other, and by turning toward them. As Derrida articulates, in writing of 
the lost other, we must be wary of ‘finish>ing@ him off’ or ‘reduc>ing@ him in any 
case to what can still be contained by a literary or rhetorical performance’ 
(2001b:50). 
 
Being witnessed: ‘By Force of Mourning’ 
 
Just as Derrida’s commemoration of Barthes engages with Barthes’s own thought, 
so does he engage with major themes in the thought of Louis Marin in his 
commemorative lecture, ‘By Force of Mourning’ (2001), a text of particular 
relevance to the elegiac mode. Referencing Marin’s work on the portrait and on 
force, Derrida offers a profound way of expanding how we think about the images 
we are left with after the death of the other, who we are left to harbour in 
ourselves through ‘love, hospitality or friendship’ (2001a:160).      
 In speaking metonymically of the other-in-us, and ‘of inside and outside’, 
suggests Derrida, ‘we are naming space, we are speaking of a visibility of the 
body, a geometry of gazes, an orientation of perspectives’ (2001a:159), 
representing a refinement of Bowlby’s understanding of mourning as a process 
contingent on spatial relations. Moreover, Derrida deduces from this scenario that, 
ultimately, what is left in us of the other is reducible to images. What he argues is 
disregarded in ‘this rhetoric of space’, however: 
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 (…) is that the force of the image has to do less with the fact that one sees something 
 in it than with the fact that one is seen there in it. The image sees more than it is 
 seen. The image looks at us (2001a:160, my emphasis). 
 
This ‘inversion of the gaze’ (Derrida, 2001a:160), as I will shortly explain, has 
crucial implications for thinking about the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice as the 
meta-allegory of elegy, invoked implicitly and explicitly by elegists and elegy-
scholars, increasingly in view of ethics. The other in us, which we harbour within 
our bereaved memory and which in turn makes us other, will always also exceed 
us, exceed our memory’s finite store of images, and our ability to interiorize the 
other within our subjectivity. Our images of the other in us exceed us, resist our 
efforts to totalise them, and refer not only to the other but to ourselves. Our 
remembered images, that constitute the other within us, implicate us, “look at us”, 
demand we be answerable to the singular other they shelter within us, who is 
neither any longer “in himself” nor completely interiorised within us. Respecting 
the other whom we mourn involves recognising this complex and confounding 
metonymy, whereby the other is at once within us, between us and also outside 
us—while (being dead) no longer “in himself”. Says Derrida: 
 
 Louis Marin is outside and he is looking at me, he himself, and I am an image for 
 him (…) and it is for this, for him, that I am here this evening. He is my law, the law, 
 and I appear before him and his gaze. In my relationship to myself, he is here before 
 me, stronger or more forceful than I (2001a:160).  
 
Derrida further clarifies his meaning by affirming to his audience at a 
commemorative conference for Marin: ‘We are all looked at (…) and each one 
singularly, by Louis Marin. He looks at us. In us. He looks in us. This witness 
sees in us’ (2001a:161). Here, Derrida delineates a reflexive movement in which 
the traditional direction of the mourning gaze is not only inverted, but predicated 
on an exchange of gazes. Being ‘looked at’ by the other within us, having our 
gaze returned, demands the bereaved subject be answerable to the other not as a 
sublimated part of their own interiority but as a singular other who is at once 
within and outside them, and whose alterity can never be interiorised. Derrida has 
spoken already of this movement in mourning Barthes, insisting that ‘Roland 
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Barthes looks at us’, and cautioning that this look ‘is within us but it is not ours; 
we do not have it available to us like a moment or part of our interiority’ 
(2001b:44). The quality of this look might be anything from ‘indifferent’ to 
‘fervent’, for ultimately ‘it can give us any of the innumerable signs of life or 
death that we might draw from the circumscribed reserve of his texts in our 
memory’ (Derrida, 2001b:44). Derrida insists on constantly recalling that, being 
dead, neither Marin nor Barthes exist any longer “in themselves” to hear his 
words of commemoration or to look at or witness him—only the part of them that 
lives within those who mourn them, who must, in being faithful, realise how that 
“part” is not the whole. As Derrida urges, ‘[h]e is no more, he whom we see in 
images or in recollection, he of whom we speak, whom we cite, whom we try to 
let speak…he is no longer here’ (2001a:160). To recognise this, suggests Derrida, 
is comparable to ‘a debt, the last one, owed to the friend’ (2001a:160). In contrast 
to the state of the object who is only looked at, the mourner’s recognition of the 
other’s gaze upon them shelters, for the other, the agency and alterity of the 
subject who looks. To recognise, in mourning the other, that we are not only the 
witness of and to the other, but are ourselves witnessed by the other even, or, 
Derrida would say, especially after their death, is a transgressive proposition for 
elegy studies and for eco-elegy. Moreover, this being looked at/in by the other: 
 
 (…) indicate[s] an absolute excess and dissymmetry in the space of what relates us to 
 ourselves and constitutes the “being-in-us,” in something completely other than a 
 mere subjective interiority: in a place open to an infinite transcendence. The one who 
 looks at us in us—and for whom we are—is no longer; he is completely 
 other…(Derrida, 2001a:161, emphasis in original). 
 
This ‘excess and dissymmetry’ is constituted in this exchange of gazes, in the fact 
that we are not at liberty to look at the other without his looking back at us. In 
other words, far from simply absorbing the other of our memory within our 
‘subjective interiority’, our harbouring of the other in ourselves transforms us, 
acts upon us in a mode of reciprocity and exchange. We can only interiorise such 
a dissymmetry by having our own interiority exceeded, fractured or wounded 
(Derrida, 2001a:160). Ethical mourning demands we are alive to this, and take 
pains to at once acknowledge that the other in us is not equivalent to the other in 
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himself who is dead, and to preserve the alterity that remains to the other living in 
us.  The other in us and the other outside us divides our own subjectivity, opens us 
to an infinite alterity that we cannot contain, sublimate or interiorise: 
 
 We bear in ourselves the gaze that Louis Marin bears on us. Powers of the image. 
 This gaze is his, and it will always remain his, infinitely; it comes from him 
 singularly, from him alone, alone as always, more alone than ever, over there, 
 outside, far away. Far away in us. (Derrida, 2001a:161). 
 
Like his discussion of Barthes’s metonymy of the punctum, Derrida’s analogy 
here of the returned gaze, which draws from Marin’s own work on the portrait, 
illuminates his profound understanding of the responsibility we owe to the other, 
in life and in death, and how we are to reckon with the difficult task of its 
answering. Derrida’s spectatorial framing of the mourner’s situation and 
responsibility, as one who, ‘through friendship, love or hospitality’ opens their 
own interiority to the other so that they might live on as a part of the mourner, 
who ‘bear[s]’ in themselves the ‘gaze that [the other] bears on [them]’ 
(2001a:161) speaks powerfully to elegy, a literary tradition haunted by the 
sacrificial gaze of Orpheus.  In the defining moment of Ovid’s myth, the poet-
musician Orpheus, unable to resist his desire, turns to look at Eurydice before she 
has emerged from the shades of the underworld into mortal day, thus defying the 
gods and condemning her to a second death and himself to losing her twice. Then, 
as Eurydice descends once more to the underworld, Orpheus is condemned to turn 
back, to look away from her as he emerges into day without her, affected by his 
second loss and the freshly felt grief which moves him to sing of Eurydice’s 
absence, to create presence from felt absence in art. This crucial movement of 
Orpheus’s turn and turn back is the central movement of elegy, the movement 
defining the transition from felt absence to art, that ancient effort to make the 
absent present. To sing of Eurydice, Orpheus needed to lose her, and to look 
away, finding consolation in his song and in the natural world around him, which 
animate and are animated by his music. This sacrificial turn of Orpheus is not 
only that of every elegist, but also that of the traditional mourning subject who 
would seek an end to mourning by sublimating and turning from the lost other, 
denying them a harbour as a living and discrete part of themselves. In speaking of 
 226 
the image and the act of looking and being looked at, in an analogy inscribed with 
his metonymical understanding of responsible mourning, Derrida offers a way of 
reimagining the Orphic-elegiac gaze so as to encompass Eurydice’s agency and 
Orpheus’s answerability. Faithful mourning, if we follow Derrida’s cue, would 
demand that, in turning his gaze toward Eurydice, and in turning his gaze away 
from her, Orpheus registers that he is also looked at, and witnessed by Eurydice, 
whose singularity even (or especially) in death exceeds the part of her that lives in 
him—and recognises that in singing of her he must also let her speak, and that she 
will always exceed his song. 
 
 
II. 
Eco-elegy & ethics 
 
Derrida’s complex understanding of mourning as a metonymical relation to 
otherness and as a condition of living friendship provides a means of refining the 
ways in which we think about elegiac literature which resists, or is without 
recourse to enact the traditional elegiac movement of consolation. Such a 
movement, predicated on the possibility of there being an end to mourning, on 
turning away from the lost other and “moving on”, is manifestly not available to 
any responsible mode of elegy concerned with ecological loss. From Ramazani, 
speaking of divergent forms of loss in modern elegy, to Morton in specific view 
of eco-elegy, the term “melancholia” is increasingly being invoked to describe a 
mode of elegiac mourning in opposition to this traditional consolatory mode, 
when such mourning is not available, or is not ethical. The recourse to 
melancholia in our discourse about ethical eco-elegy by Morton, as a mode of 
“lingering” in the moment of loss without smearing over its painfulness or 
sublimating its urgency in the desire for consolation, acknowledges what is at 
stake and how far we have already gone in wagering the planet. Certainly, the 
confounding grief and resistance to closure which such a mode describes speaks 
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incisively to the formal and narrative movements at work in much recent 
ecopoetry and fiction.             
 However, as this chapter’s overview of his work indicates, Derrida’s 
understanding of mourning (and mournful commemoration) offers a means of 
rethinking the shortfalls of elegiac “melancholia” as discussed by Morton in view 
of eco-elegy. Such a rethinking is offered through Derrida’s acknowledgement 
and ethical complication of the distinction established by Freud between 
melancholic and normative mourning, and through his establishment of mourning 
as an impossible and unending responsibility which regardless is owed to the 
other. Additionally, his theory expands mourning to encompass contingent and 
incipient loss, and foregrounds the answerability of the mourner in light of the 
other’s agency. Finally, in his work on mourning Derrida establishes a 
metonymic, relational framework for thinking mourning as a responsibility of 
negotiating between intimacy with the other and preservation of the other’s 
alterity and distance.              
 In examining the implications of these aspects of Derridean mourning to the 
development of an ethical poetics of eco-elegy, it is necessary to briefly address 
another, more recent invocation of melancholia in reference to eco-elegy, by 
Margaret Ronda in her essay, ‘Melancholia in the Anthropocene’ (2013). 
Additionally, the remaining discussion speaks briefly to the eco-elegiac poetics at 
work within a work of poetry and a work of prose—Juliana Spahr’s elegiac poem 
‘Gentle Now, Don’t Add to Heartache28’ (1995), and Cormac McCarthy’s elegiac 
novel The Road (2006).               
 In discussing the literary implications of the “end of nature” paradigm as 
recognised by McKibben and others, in relation to the rise in ‘collective human 
agency’ at a time of ecological crisis (signified by the emergence of the term 
“Anthropocene” to define our present geological epoch), Ronda explores the 
‘melancholy’ poetics of Spahr’s ‘Gentle Now’. In doing so, Ronda also speaks to 
Morton’s application of melancholia to eco-elegy (without directly employing this 
phrase), yet does not criticise Morton’s espousal of elegiac melancholia in light of 
its complex history, against which, as this essay argues, Morton’s 
                                                          
28 Hereafter abbreviated to ‘Gentle Now’. 
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conceptualisations are inadequately defined.  Importantly, Ronda diverges from 
Morton in discussing melancholic eco-elegy with actual reference to an example 
of such an elegy that is pervaded by the confoundment and grief of our 
contemporary ecological crisis (in comparison to Morton’s 1816 example of 
Alastor). ‘Gentle Now’, a much-anthologised eco-elegy within the ecopoetic 
movement, converges around the changing relation of the speaker to a local 
stream. Unfolding in five parts, the poem tells of the gradual movement from an 
Edenic unity between speaker and stream, to the speaker’s ultimate forsaking of 
the stream. Thus ‘Gentle Now’ narrates the story of the speaker’s turn from the 
natural world in favour of other attachments, despite the complicity in the 
stream’s degradation that this turn involves. This movement is defined by the 
changing proximity of the speaker’s relation to the stream. The opening lines of 
Spahr’s poem suggest a mythical union between self and natural environment 
‘before division, individuation, and loss’: 
 
We come into the world. 
We come into the world and there it is. 
The sun is there. 
The brown of the river leading to the blue and the brown of the ocean is 
           there. 
Salmon and eels are there moving between the brown and the brown and 
           the blue. 
The green of the land is there. 
Elders and youngers are there. 
Fighting and possibility and love are there. 
And we begin to breathe. 
(…) 
We come into the world and begin to move between the brown  
           and the blue and the green of it (2007:124). 
 
As Ronda astutely notes, this evocation of unity with nature is ‘a fantasy of non-
agency’, in which humans exist in harmony with the natural environment in a 
relationship of interdependence rather than exploitation (2013:online). As Ronda 
observes: 
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 It is only midway through “Gentle Now” that this narrative of ecological intimacy is 
 revealed to be a reconstitution of an origin story from a retrospective position of 
 guilty grief (2013:online). 
 
In ‘Gentle Now’, Ronda reads a melancholy which ‘refus[es] to turn away from 
the work of impossible mourning’, thus coming closer to Derrida’s understanding 
of mourning (2013:online). Unlike Morton, in speaking of 
melancholy/melancholia in view of Spahr’s elegy, Ronda references Freud 
directly, speaking incisively of the strange way that ecological loss inverts and 
confounds Freud’s understanding of melancholia. Noting what Freud describes as 
the prevalence of a more ideal, unconscious, indistinct loss in melancholia in 
contrast to normative mourning and comparing this kind of loss to that 
represented in Spahr’s elegy, Ronda asks:  
 
 Is it the beings in the stream—the “elephant ear,” the “ohio pigtoe”? Is it the stream 
 itself? Do the stream and its creatures actually die, or does the speaker merely turn 
 away from them, so that they are lost to her consciousness? (2013:online) 
 
Ronda’s questions in reference to Spahr’s elegy here attest to the amorphousness 
and contingency which complicate our ability to speak of loss in relation to the 
infinite-yet-finite web of living and non-living forms that constitute the 
ecosystems of the natural world. Spahr’s stream, suggests Ronda (2013:online), 
represents what Freud in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ describes as a melancholic 
‘object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness’ (Freud, 1917:245). This, 
suggests Ronda, constitutes ‘a loss of an idea and its associated forms of 
experience, whose absence is at once too all-pervasive and too close to name’ 
(2013:online). However, Ronda’s suggestion here, in referring to the ‘loss of an 
idea’ of nature without qualifying the relation of that idea to either reality or a 
cultural ideal, risks perpetuating the blurring of the signifiers “nature” and “loss” 
which, as has been discussed, so frequently troubles discourse on ecological loss. 
The meaning that Ronda gestures toward in referring to loss as encompassing the 
‘forms of experience’ that the lost object allowed for, however, can be refined 
through Derrida’s understanding of friendship as a relation in which the duty of 
mourning is inscribed before the death of either friend, a relation conditioned 
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from its outset by the knowledge that one friend will witness and mourn the 
other’s death, and which understands the friend’s death as, fundamentally, a loss 
of contingency, a loss of the opportunity to encounter the friend in his living 
alterity, to transform and be transformed by encounters with the friend, who while 
living can surprise and confound our internalised ideas of them, whereas in death 
we are left with the responsibility of carrying them in us while trying to still 
preserve our memory of their living singularity. This understanding emphasises 
the loss of the living friend as a loss of the opportunity for living encounter and 
exchange with the other, and as a deprivation and impoverishment of our own self 
in living without the other.             
 Further, Ronda emphasises the divergence of Spahr’s ‘more pessimistic’ 
melancholy in ‘Gentle Now’ from Morton’s melancholy that embraces the messy, 
unseemly dark side of a non-ideal nature (2013:online). Unlike Morton’s, suggests 
Ronda, Spahr’s melancholy ‘dwells on the painful consequences of being 
“without nature,” refusing to move ‘beyond’ this loss’ (2013:online). While, notes 
Ronda, Morton’s melancholy focuses on ‘the present rather than the past, adjuring 
the elegiac poetics of loss, sorrow, and grieving for the uncanny, melancholic 
“reality” of ecological coexistence’, Spahr’s elegy ‘maintains the importance of 
elegiac retrospection and its language of necessity and loss’ (2013:online). In 
further contrast to Morton, Ronda notes that Spahr foregrounds ‘questions of 
obligation, culpability, and guilt’ (2013:online). In this way, Ronda suggests that 
Spahr’s poetics address ‘the determinative force of humans rather than indulging a 
claim that “nothing is determined yet”’ (2013:online). Moreover, Ronda astutely 
observes that Spahr’s melancholia is drawn from the understanding that the poetic 
‘conventions’ of elegy ‘are finally inadequate to their current task, and that any 
attempt to take responsibility for this determination is never sufficient’ 
(2013:online). Accordingly, Ronda echoes other thinkers (of modern elegy as well 
as eco-elegy) such as Watkin and Morton in noting that Spahr’s elegy ‘mourns, as 
well, for an idealised elegy that is now impossible, an elegy whose forms of 
closure are no longer inhabitable’ (2013:online). Further, Ronda, referencing 
Spargo (2004:13), suggests that: 
 
 If, as Spargo argues, melancholia offers an “ethics of mourning” through its 
 acknowledgement of “the other’s uncancellable and unassimilable value,” Spahr’s 
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 poem explores what it means to have already “cancelled” this “value”; its “ethics,” 
 then, can only be construed as negative rather than subversive or resistant, as in 
 Spargo’s version (2013:endnote 32).    
  
However, in suggesting that Spahr’s poem, in its poetics of negative mourning, 
goes so far as to “cancel the value” of the ecological other(s) it speaks of, Ronda 
overlooks the way that ‘Gentle Now’, for all its negative, non-foreclosed, and 
non-consolatory mourning, enacts a ceaseless affirmation of the profound 
fragility, singularity, richness and otherness of everything comprising the stream's 
ecology, the loss of which is too enormous and confounding for the speaker to 
commence mourning.             
 Additionally, Ronda’s location of the negative melancholia of ‘Gentle Now’, 
along with McKibben’s The End of Nature, as beyond the bounds of eco-
jeremiad, overlooks the way that the most sophisticated eco-jeremiadic texts, such 
as Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), resist “cancelling” and negating extant 
ecological loss not because the ecological realities they speak to are not (to 
varying degrees) potentially irremediable, but because our ecological predicament 
can always get worse. Moreover, the increasingly dire predictions of scientists, 
regarding the course on which we are set, does not ethically permit a position of 
despairing resignation. While McKibben’s subject (climate change) might be even 
more radically suggestive than Carson’s of relegating nature to a phenomenon 
whose ‘time has already run out’—as Ronda suggests of McKibben’s work 
(2013:online)—like Silent Spring, The End of Nature is mobilised by the 
commitment, despite and because of the direness of our ecological predicament, 
to incite efforts to minimise the losses our planet is on course for. That we make 
such efforts, and strive to be answerable to our ecological future and the non-
human lives and processes at stake in our actions, in the face of despair and 
impossibility is precisely what we owe these others and ourselves, and what 
ethical ego-elegy constitutes.             
 In fact, while Spahr’s ‘Gentle Now’ is pervaded with the paralysing, 
unutterable guilt and grief of an eco-loss that seems hopeless and irremediable, as 
the speaker attempts to sublimate this loss in work, material objects and human 
love, the speaker’s narrative of “not mourning” is testament to the value of each 
discrete, lost other that is named and counted: the ‘caddisfly larva’; the 
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‘slenderhead darter’. While Spahr does not provide answers, her poem stands as 
an urgent allegory for the profundity of what we are wagering, which attests to the 
ethical impossibility of turning away, as the speaker does, and which resists 
precisely such a total negation as “cancelling” these others’ value—a movement 
that would seem to constitute a form of melancholic foreclosure in contradiction 
to Ronda's central argument. In this way, the ethical poetics of ‘Gentle Now’ must 
be understood as operating in the context of what might be described as a form of 
“cognitive dissonance” between the literal reality of what the speaker says and the 
cumulative emotional truth to which her words, and the poem itself, ultimately 
attest.                  
 The question of whether an eco-jeremiadic mode remains viable, in the 
context of a global ecological reality so imperilled by human intervention that an 
alternate term for our present geological epoch (the Anthropocene) is gaining 
wide currency, speaks also to the problem of how we are to think ethical eco-
elegy. This question, to a great extent, demonstrates the importance when writing 
and thinking eco-elegy, of more clearly considering divergent forms of eco-loss 
and their mourning in relation to temporality. At best, eco-jeremiad—or, to be 
more precise, the synergy of lamentation and prophetic warning in writing about 
eco-loss—is necessarily inscribed with an attendance to what is ecologically at 
stake, an attendance to contingency and futurity, which need not constitute 
totalising apocalypticism. Attending in eco-elegiac mourning to loss that is not 
only foregone, but contingent, loss that is in-process or “on the horizon” of future 
possibility, while foregrounding the ecological value of what exists now, and what 
might be lost lest we take action—regardless of our chances of success—seems 
integral to an eco-elegiac ethics. Although the literary task of lamenting loss, 
while calling for the preservation of what remains at stake, is more enormous than 
ever before, attendance to the future and a will to act must not be foreclosed. Even 
in negative, non-consolatory mourning, in which answers are not presumed, there 
must be affirmation of the other to, of and for which we speak.    
 Certainly, as has been argued, Morton’s emphasis on the instantaneous and 
undetermined in eco-elegy neglects to adequately account for the need in eco-
elegy to testify to the irrevocable forms of ecological loss that are determined or 
anterior, in having already occurred (such as in extinction), and our culpability in 
this loss. However, neither does Ronda’s reading of Spahr’s melancholic poetics, 
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as being arrested in ‘elegiac retrospection’ and in the loss that has occurred, 
address the full scale of loss that an elegiac response to our ecological crisis 
demands (2013:online). Through her reading of ‘Gentle Now’, Ronda rightly 
intimates that Morton’s melancholy focuses too heavily on the present moment of 
ecological coexistence at the expense of attending to the pain and grief of what 
has already been lost. However, in speaking of melancholy as a mode of poetics 
that diverges from that of traditional elegy, it is also important (as writers and 
thinkers) to address explicitly the question of contingent and incipient loss, loss 
that has not yet occurred. Morton’s insistence of a poetics of melancholy that 
dwells in the present moment must be understood in light of his concerns 
regarding the danger, in elegising nature during this time of crisis, of leaping over 
the urgent moment we’re in now in envisioning a future apocalyptic loss. While 
such a movement is entirely understandable in light of current scientific 
projections, it carries ethical dilemmas. It is in view of the potential of such a 
movement to unhelpfully and violently totalise and forsake nature as a forgone 
loss prematurely, that Morton cautions against the ‘sadism of the elegiac mode’ 
and the need to ‘transcend’ this mode in favour of a melancholic lingering in the 
difficult ecological reality we’re in (2010:255). While Morton’s lack of recourse 
to examples of specific eco-elegies that envision eco-apocalypse in this 
problematic way is unhelpful, his caution against the dangers of an elegiac 
movement that perpetuates the sacrificial elegiac turn from an object we must not 
and cannot in reality turn from—a global environment in crisis—is well-advised. 
Greg Garrard also pinpoints a key danger in “apocalyptic rhetoric” when he 
suggests that: ‘>a@pocalypse provides an emotionally charged frame of reference 
within which complex, long-term issues are reduced to monocausal crises 
involving conflicts between recognisably opposed groups’ (2011:114). Further, 
Bradley J. Fest directs suspicion at eco-apocalyptic (and eco-jeremiadic) texts 
which: 
 
 (…) seem to blatantly ignore the facts that ecological disaster a) has already 
 occurred and is always already occurring, b) that simply the term ecology should 
 evoke the interconnectedness and complexity of the site of disaster in question (the 
 world), and c) that environmental disaster is not this absurd(ly simple) (2009:online). 
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In contrast to ‘nuclear and Christian’ traditions of apocalyptic prediction, Fest 
suggests that modes of eco-apocalypse are challenged by the fact that 
environmental destruction ‘is always occurring as a process…Species go extinct, 
the ice caps melt, New Orleans floods. These are all “ends,” not one, big, garish, 
world-historical ending’ (2009:online). In light of the way that eco-disaster, in 
reality, ‘is not linear nor narrative’, Fest argues for ‘eco-discourses not 
constrained to imagine themselves at a singular moment of crisis’ (2009:online). 
In this way, Fest foregrounds the importance, in representing eco-disaster, of a 
resistance to totalising eco-loss in a way that smears over both its contingency and 
the divergency of its relation to time, as this essay has also been at pains to 
demonstrate29.              
 However, in writing and speaking of eco-elegy we must also acknowledge the 
impossibility of not looking to the future and reckoning with the apparent 
incipience of loss that is still to come. This future (and in-process) loss, in its 
contingency, is the most urgent to address, and constitutes, perhaps more than any 
loss that has already occurred, the impetus behind the emotions of grief, guilt and 
mourning that are driving not only the emergence of eco-elegy but also the 
critical-creative discourses of ecocriticism, ecopoetics and cli-fi (fiction 
concerned with climate change).30 Indeed, it is only by facing the enormity of the 
future loss we are wagering (in addition to recognising what has been lost and 
what remains extant) that our ecological literatures (and our societies) can even 
begin to answer to what is now at stake. Lawrence Buell attests to this truth when 
he suggests that apocalyptic narratives ‘create images of doom to avert doom’, 
and, contentiously, that ‘>a@pocalypse is the single most powerful master metaphor 
that the contemporary environmental movement has at its disposal’ (1995:295; 
285). However, I would suggest that mobilising certain apocalyptic or otherwise 
                                                          
29 For a now-classic study of apocalyptic narrative, see Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending: 
Studies in the Theory of Fiction (1967). For a broader discussion of the dangers implicated in 
apocalyptic thinking, particularly in view of power relations in American politics, religion and 
culture, see Lee Quinby’s Anti-Apocalypse: Exercises in Genealogical Criticism (1994).  
30 The term “cli-fi” has recently emerged as an abbreviation for climate fiction, that is, fiction 
dealing directly with the subject of climate change, often in the near future, and frequently bearing 
a relation to sci-fi and themes of dystopia. Examples of recent literary fiction which can be 
encompassed within this broad category include Margaret Atwood’s Maddadam Trilogy (2009-
2013), Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl (2009), Barbara Kingsolver’s Flight Behaviour 
(2012), Emily St. John Mandel’s Station Eleven (2014), The term “cli-fi” can also pertain to film.  
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dystopic visions of our ecological future as a means of attending to the value and 
urgency of what we have to lose, need not necessarily be at odds with Garrard’s 
argument that ‘>o@nly if we imagine that the planet has a future…are we likely to 
take responsibility for it’ (2004:107). Rather, the extent to which such visions of 
future ecological loss—as mobilised in eco-elegiac literature—might be 
considered ethical or unethical depends on the extent to which such visions resist 
totalising or foreclosing the urgent contingency of our present ecological 
predicament and the divergency and multiplicity of loss, and non-human others, 
implicated in this predicament. As such, an ethical poetics of eco-elegy must 
neither focus on the present (at expense of past and future loss) as risked by 
Morton’s approach, nor the past (at expense of present and future loss) as Ronda’s 
reading of Spahr tends to emphasise, but to negotiate between foregone, in-
process, and incipient forms of loss; loss which also constitutes our own 
diminishment, deprivation, and imperilment—and for which we are answerable. 
 In a 2009 essay, Kate Rigby similarly argues for the power of a literary 
attendance to futurity through the ‘prophetic imagination’ in testifying to 
ecological destruction and imperilment. Without invoking elegy specifically, 
Rigby’s emphasis on the value of prophecy, or looking forward toward the future 
implications of our current trajectories in ecological writing, is presented as a 
‘mode of ecopoetic negativity’ in relation to a writing of lamentation in the 
Anthropocene, is directly applicable to the ethics and poetics of eco-elegy. 
Suggests Rigby: 
 
 The challenge for writing in the anthropocene, in the shadow of ecocide (…) is to 
 find new ways of raising our voices from the level of ‘idle chatter’ to that of biting 
 and  stinging ecoprophetic witness (2009:online). 
 
In this discussion, Rigby diverges from Ronda not only in foregrounding the 
importance of writing in view of the future ‘catastrophic consequences of 
continuing on our current ecocidal path’ (2009:online), but also in explicitly 
inscribing this call within the tradition of ecological jeremiad which Ronda’s 
reading of Spahr suggests is a mode we have now outstripped.     
 More recently, Deborah Bird Rose, also discussing ethical ecological writing 
in the Anthropocene (without addressing elegy directly), warns of the dangers in 
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such attendance in writing to a future that ultimately cannot be known. Recalling 
Morton’s cautions regarding apocalypticism, Rose speaks of the turn toward 
‘catastrophe thinking’ in writing ecological crisis (2013:12). In such thinking, 
warns Rose: 
 
 (…) the temptation is to contrast looming catastrophe with present knowledge, and 
 to think that we know the world as it is, even if we do not know the world as it will 
 become (2013:12). 
 
As such, Rose emphasises the need for ‘audacious faith’ grounded in an:  
 
 (…) accept>ance@ that neither the world as it now is, nor the world as it is becoming, 
 is fully knowable, and thus that we sustain our faith and our witness always in the 
 face of our need to take ethical stands from within life processes that both radically 
 precede and exceed us (2013:12). 
 
Unlike Morton, Rose hesitates from suggesting that ethical ecological writing 
must eschew all future projections. Somewhat more carefully, Rose emphasises 
the importance in such writing of mindfully negotiating between speaking and 
refraining from speaking of that which we cannot presume to know. In this way, 
Rose echoes Derrida’s understanding of ethical mourning and commemoration for 
the other, as a necessary yet impossible duty of negotiating between speaking of, 
to and for the other, and leaving the other to their alterity.  Suggests Rose, writing 
of ecological destruction at once involves ‘the necessity and the impossibility of 
speech’ (2013:8). To do so is to find oneself placed in an ‘impossible position as 
participants in and witnesses to catastrophes beyond our comprehension’ (Rose 
2). This position ‘concerns the necessity of speaking of that which is beyond our 
ken’ (8). Such a position, suggests Rose: 
 
 (…) requires us to acknowledge ethical silence, and our challenge, therefore, is to 
 speak without over-riding that silence. But ethical silence, in James Hatley’s terms, 
 does speak: it speaks the quandary of response and responsibility toward that which 
 is beyond our comprehension (2013:8).  
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Here, Rose foregrounds a form of careful negotiation, at once necessary and 
impossible, between speaking and hesitating from speaking of ecological loss, a 
phenomenon at once urgent and yet beyond our capacities to speak and imagine. 
Rose also foregrounds, in such a writing, modes of witness and dialogue31, and a 
‘>f@idelity to that which cannot be fully known’ (2013:12).     
 While the cautions of Morton and Rose regarding apocalyptic or catastrophic 
thinking in face of ecological crisis must be held in mind—and while Ronda is 
astute in recognising the difficulties posed for jeremiadic hope in the future “if 
action is taken”, by continued political inaction and scientific predictions of a 
dangerous temperature rise now being inevitable—Rigby’s jeremiadic urge to 
employ prophecy in writing to ‘awaken us to another way of thinking and being’, 
and to compel ‘just and compassionate action’ is more urgent than ever 
(2009:online). While inaction and the spectre of an inevitable two-degree 
temperature rise certainly render a negative, melancholic mode in literature 
understandable, abandoning the hope for change that constitutes ecological 
jeremiad is unconscionable, and would involve turning from and forsaking the 
other even as we grieve for them. Turning away from our ecological predicament 
in such a mode would constitute a form of literary negation, foreclosure and 
totalisation which ethical elegy must strive to resist.        
 Spahr’s ‘Gentle Now’ performs a movement that can be understood as 
resisting such a turn, even as its speaker herself narrates turning from the stream 
in favour of other objects. In looking back to recall a time before the degradation 
of the stream and her relation to it, Spahr’s speaker presents an image of 
profound, if ideal, ecological interconnection that is metonymic: 
 
 The stream had no name but it began from a spring and flowed down a 
            hill into the Scioto that then flopwed into the Ohio that then flowed  
              into the Mississippi that then flowed into the Gulf of Mexico. 
 The stream was a part of us and we were a part of the stream and we were 
             thus part of the rivers and thus part of the gulfs and the oceans. 
                                                          
31 In correspondence to Rose’s foregrounding of dialogue, Watkin (2004:223), speaking to ethical 
modes of writing about human death rather eco-loss, foregrounds conversation, while both 
emphasise these modes as forms of encounter with otherness. 
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 And we began to learn the stream. 
 (…) 
 We mimicked the catlike meow, the soft quirt or kwut, and the louder, 
              grating ratchet calls of the gray catbird.  
 We put our heads together. 
 We put our heads together with all these things, with the caddisfly larva, 
            with the creek chub and the slenderhead darter, with the  
              horsechestnut and the larch, with the gray catbird. 
 We put our heads together on a narrow pillow, on a stone, on a narrow  
              stone pillow, and we talked to each other all day long, because we  
              loved. 
 We loved the stream. 
 And we were of the stream (1997:124-5). 
 
Spahr’s poetics are also ecological here in the poem’s attendance not only to the 
interconnection of a wider environment but to the singular forms that constitute 
this whole, forms which are specifically named and counted―‘the horsechestnut’, 
‘the gray catbird’. The sense of mutual implication between the speaker and the 
ecosystem of the stream continues when the speaker attests to the refuse and 
pollutants that affect the stream, things that sometimes ‘knowingly’ and 
sometimes ‘unknowingly’ were ‘let into’ the stream, and thus also ‘let into our 
hearts’: ‘We let in soda cans and we let in cigarette butts and we let in pink/ 
tampon applicators (1997:129)’; ‘We let the runoff from agriculture, surface 
mines, forestry (1997:129) into our hearts’; ‘We let chloride, magnesium, 
sulphate, manganese, iron, nitrite/nitrate, aluminium, suspended solids (…) go 
through our skin and into our tissues’ (1997:129). This naming and counting of 
the discrete and disparate things both ‘knowingly’ and ‘unknowlingly’ ‘let into’ 
into the stream constitutes an intense, unflinching scrutiny of destructive human 
intervention in delicately balanced ecological systems, an intervention which, in 
wagering the health of the stream, wagers also the physical and emotional health 
of the people near it. As Spahr’s speaker admits, ‘These things were a part of us 
and would become more a part of us but/We did not know it yet/Still we noticed 
enough to sing a lament’ (1997:129). The speaker’s reference to this lament is 
inscribed with an understanding of the metonymic interdependence of the life 
forms within the stream’s ecosystem, whereby the loss of one risks another: ‘To 
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sing in lament for whoever lost her elephant ear lost her mountain madtom/and 
whoever lost her butterfly lost her harelip sucker’ (1997:129). In the final part of 
‘Gentle Now’, the speaker traces her turn from the stream and her realisation of 
the untotalisable enormity of the loss at stake: 
 
 What I did not know as I sang the lament of what was becoming lost and 
             what was already lost was how this loss would happen. 
 I did not know that I would turn from the stream to each other.  
 I did not know I would turn to each other. 
 That I would turn to each other to admire the softness of each other’s  
             breast, the folds of each other’s elbows (…) 
 Ensnared, bewildered, I turned to each other and from the stream. 
 I turned to each other and I began to work for the chemical factory and I  
             began to work for the papermill (…) (1997:129-30). 
 
The speaker’s mournful, if supressed, realisation of her complicity in losing the 
stream by turning from it in favour of attachments to human lovers, work that 
directly contributes to polluting the stream, and consumer objects such as  ‘a 
crystal Serenity Sphere with a Winter Stream view’ appears to hover on the verge 
of a reckoning too enormous to begin (1997:130). Says the speaker, ‘I replaced 
what I knew of the stream with Lifestream Total Cholesterol/ Test Packets, with 
Snuggle Emerald Stream Fabric Softener Dryer/Sheets’ (1997:130). In turning 
toward these things and away from the stream, the speaker explains that ‘I didn’t 
even say goodbye to elephant ear, mountain madtom, butterfly,/ Harelip sucker, 
white catspaw, rabbitsfoot, monkeyface (…)’ (1997:130). Having followed the 
movement of loss from a prior time of Edenic congruence between self and 
stream, through its pollution and the speaker’s eventual complicity in its 
degradation, ‘Gentle Now’ closes in suspending itself on the verge of a mourning 
yet to come, of a loss too enormous for understanding. Following the negation of 
the stream implicated it her turn from it, the speaker’s testimony moves from 
idealistic affirmation to negative utterance: 
 
 I just turned to each other and the body parts of each other suddenly 
                  glowed with the beauty and detail that I had found in the stream. 
 (…) 
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 And I did not sing. 
 I did not sing otototoi; dark, all merged together, oi. 
 I did not sing the groaning words.  
 (….) 
 I did not sing o wo, wo, wo! (1997:131) 
 
While Spahr’s speaker does not look forward to visualise the implications of the 
stream’s present degradation in view of future loss, the elegy ends on the brink of 
its reckoning, with the speaker’s repetitive refrains about what she ‘did not sing’. 
While the speaker narrates her turn from and forsaking of the stream, the speaker 
is mournfully conscious of this turn, which is inscribed in the poem as implicated 
in the degradation of the stream. As such, the unutterable, arrested grief with 
which the poem ends is a grief not only of loss but of guilt in being complicit in 
this loss. The course of the poem, from Edenic ideal to mournful reality, or, to 
echo Ronda, from non-agency to agency, enacts the speaker’s gradual realisation 
of this agency, the weight of which bears on the poem’s end, unresolved. Even as 
the speaker narrates her turn from and sublimation of the stream through her 
attachment to material things and a human lover, her stark articulation of the 
mourning cries she ‘did not sing’ registers the dumbfounding impact of the loss 
and deprivation she has borne and participated in. The impossibility of mourning 
of which Derrida so incisively speaks is embodied in Spahr’s poem, which 
recognises and testifies to the speaker’s complicity and implication with the fate 
of the stream even as she hesitates (or is unable) to fully do so. Despite the 
disconnect between the poem’s witness and the speaker’s understanding, Spahr’s 
elegy recognises the singularity of the stream’s many life forms, and the speaker’s 
metonymic implication with and answerability to its degradation.     
 Melancholia is invoked by both Morton and Ronda as an alternative to the 
bounded and consolatory (subject-object) mourning paradigm of traditional elegy 
and early mourning theory of Freud, however I suggest that alternate terms—such 
as “negative”, “non-consolatory”, “endless”, or “impossible” mourning—used in 
place of melancholia, might eschew some of the complications posed by this term. 
This is true particularly in light of the tendency in discussions of melancholia to 
reiterate Freud’s early dichotomous framing of “pathological” melancholia (and 
incorporation) as distinct from “normative” mourning (and introjection). By 
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contrast, as has been argued, Derrida’s conception of mourning as an ethical 
negotiation between two infidelities to the other offers a more viable framework 
for approaching ethical eco-elegy. An ethical poetics of eco-elegy entails not only 
recognising the impossibility of mourning as a process that can ever be 
completed, but also recognising that the enactment of both “normative” and 
“melancholic” mourning in writing about nature involve forms of ethical 
compromise. If we are to write at all, we must negotiate between these modes. In 
doing so, we must be precise about the different forms of loss of which we are 
thinking and writing. We must negotiate between writing of our interdependence, 
implication and intimacy with ecological systems, and writing in such a way that 
recognises the singularity, difference and distance of nonhuman life forms and 
processes. In doing so, we must speak to possible future loss, without turning too 
far from the vital contingency of this moment in our ecological predicament—
what has been lost already and, more urgently, what is at this instant in the 
process of being lost. In turning too far, in imagining a post-apocalyptic, 
dystopian future, with all the novelty and spectacle that such speculative visions 
command, some cli-fi novels risk placing such future visions at a distance from 
our present, at the expense of foregrounding the urgency of what is at stake now, 
and our human implication in these stakes. Despite the unseemly potential of 
elegy to further negate loss, perhaps, as a literary mode galvanised by the emotion 
of grief and the felt register of what it is we have lost, are losing, and have yet to 
lose, eco-elegy is in fact better positioned than cli-fi to resist losing sight of the 
pain, difficulty and urgency of our present contingent ecological predicament. 
 While Spahr’s ‘Gentle Now’ is a sophisticated example of such an eco-elegiac 
negotiation in poetry, Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006) is an example of a 
novel that enacts a movement that can be considered as eco-elegiac, and which, in 
different ways, also testifies to the enormity of what we as a species are wagering 
to lose. Unlike Spahr, whose elegy teeters on the brink of an untold further loss to 
come, McCarthy presents a possible future vision of loss, conceivable in light of 
our current trajectory and yet less explicit in its reckoning with specifically 
environmental concerns. While post-apocalyptic, The Road does not explicitly 
address the issue of climate change and as such does not constitute typical cli-fi. 
Further, the nature of the disaster that precipitated the bleak world the characters 
inhabit is only outlined—widespread fires, followed by an apparent nuclear 
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winter. Whatever role humanity played in this cataclysm, the world McCarthy 
envisions is a world in which the living processes and organisms that constitute 
ecological existence are lost beyond redemption. The same event that incinerated 
the land and the oceans, and caused even the sun to vanish from the earth, 
incinerated or otherwise caused the extinction of most other living beings, humans 
included. Moreover, The Road diverges from much cli-fi in the simplicity and 
limitations of its narrative scope. Rather than presenting a detailed scenario of a 
future dystopic society affected by climate change, with its intricate cultural, 
economic, political and technological realities, The Road follows a father and a 
son, struggling to survive in a hostile landscape as they travel south toward the 
coast in the hope of escaping the worsening cold. In a world reduced to a sparse 
population of fugitive survivors, themselves on the brink of death from cold and 
hunger, this nameless “man” and “boy” are ‘each the other’s world entire’. Living 
in terror of the cannibal armies who stalk the road in search of human prey, they 
try desperately to hold onto their humanity in a world in which hope itself has 
been lost. Despite the novel’s being set in the near future, the world which The 
Road presents through the experience of the man and boy ceaselessly recalls the 
world that is lost, the world that is not, with the immediacy, vibrancy and beauty 
with which things appear in their absence: 
 
 He dreamt of walking in a flowering wood where birds flew before them he and the 
 child and the sky was aching blue but he was learning how to wake himself from just 
 such siren worlds. Lying there in the dark with the uncanny taste of a peach from 
 some phantom orchard fading in his mouth. He thought if he lived long enough the 
 world at last would all be lost. Like the dying world the newly blind inhabit, all of it 
 slowly fading from memory (2007:17). 
 
The narrative present time of The Road is in reality a speculative projection of our 
near future, while the past time, which haunts the narrative through the man's 
painful memories, constitutes our present. Unlike some works of cli-fi or 
speculative fiction which imagine ecological apocalypse, the elegiac movement of 
The Road grounds its narrative in a kind of fidelity to the urgency of our present 
reality. The man constantly looks back: 
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 In those first years the roads were peopled with refugees shrouded up in their 
 clothing. (…) Creedless shells of men tottering down the causeways like migrants in 
 a feverland. The frailty of everything revealed at last (2007:28). 
 
Rather than focusing on establishing a vision of a future dystopic civilisation, 
McCarthy's novel attends to the immediate aftermath of an ecological cataclysm 
in the world we live in now. While in cli-fi such scenarios are imagined in order 
to comment on our present reality, too often this movement risks presenting a 
spectacle to be marvelled at for its derisive wit, novelty and invention rather than 
for its warning, risking placing our present moment at a distance from this 
imagined future. The world presented in The Road is still recognisable, and there 
is no invention to distract from its reckoning with the devastation of recent loss. 
Certainly, McCarthy’s novel does enact a kind of mourning for, in Morton’s 
words, ‘that which will have passed given a continuation of the current state of 
affairs’ (2010:254). However, The Road constitutes an example of an elegiac 
movement that challenges Morton’s argument that ecological apocalypticism 
‘always imagine[s] total destruction from some impossible imaginary vantage 
point’ (2010:254). The vantage point of such a ‘future anterior’ (Morton, 
2010:254) is of course “impossible” in that one can only speculate on a loss that 
hasn’t yet happened (and to which there might be no human witnesses) through 
the creative imagination―but this is the value of literature. The simple act of 
imagining future catastrophic ecological loss does not determine a work of elegy 
as unethical. Morton is too glib when he generalises of such works that ‘>t@he 
content may be lamentation, but the subject position is passive enjoyment’ 
(2010:254). While individual readers may approach The Road in such a manner, 
the narrative itself inherently resists offering itself to such a reading. This is 
evidenced in the way that, for all its glimpses of almost carnivalesque dystopian 
horror―newborns roasting on spits and deranged amputee prisoners being 
harvested slowly for their flesh by cannibal survivors―McCarthy places these 
images within a context too close to home, too feasibly possible to be consumed 
easily as mere titillation in the manner of a Hollywood horror film. The horror of 
such scenes, which appear so starkly only sparingly and even then just in a few 
lines, and which is more often only intimated within the narrative, is a horror that 
bears too closely on our predicament now, and upon us, to be consumed so 
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lightly. The Road’s elegiac movement is reflexive in that the horror of the future 
that McCarthy depicts is a horror in which we are implicated now, and it is 
inscribed with fear for a future which remains contingent. In reckoning with this 
fear, The Road resists smearing over the urgent moment between our present 
crisis and our uncertain future. Through the memories of the man, which run like 
touchstones throughout the novel’s course, we are constantly called to register 
what has been lost. In doing so, The Road foregrounds what is at stake, the vital 
immediacy of everything we have yet to lose, even the familiar sun, whose daily 
rising and setting we take for granted, and which is suddenly made strange when 
the man experiences the bright light emanating from a fire: 
 
 Everything was alight. As if the lost sun were returning at last. (...) The colour of it 
 moved something in him long forgotten. Make a list. Recite a litany. Remember 
 (2007:31). 
 
Whether eco-elegy projects forward to imagine future ecological catastrophe as 
does The Road, or hesitates on the brink of glimpsing such a future, as does 
‘Gentle Now’, the ethics of such elegy hinge on the degree to which they maintain 
proximity to the contingency and urgency of our present moment of crisis, the loss 
that hasn’t yet happened but the prospect of which must be urgently reckoned 
with. While The Road hesitates to foreground the sense of human culpability and 
guilt as starkly as does ‘Gentle Now’, the narrative remains inscribed with a sense 
of answerability to the catastrophe that has befallen Earth (or at least North 
America), as implicit in the man’s remembering of the early days of the disaster: 
 
 By day the dead impaled on spikes along the road. What had they done? He thought 
 that in the history of the world it might even be that there was more punishment than 
 crime but he took small comfort from it (2007:33). 
 
The final passage of The Road underscores the way in which its elegiac 
movement foregrounds and faces this urgency, looking to what in the novel has 
been lost beyond redemption, yet which remains for us in reality at stake, and not 
looking away: 
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 Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains…They smelled of moss 
 in your hand…On their backs were vermiculate patterns that were maps of the world 
 in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put back. Not be 
 made right again. In the deep glens where they lived all things were older than man 
 and they hummed of mystery (2007:306-7). 
 
In evocative, sensuous and physical detail, this passage recalls a sense of intimacy 
and interdependency with the animate natural world, a world of vital complexity 
and sustenance, which the incinerated landscape of the man and boy's reality has 
replaced. In this way, The Road speaks to an understanding of ecological loss as 
an unutterable diminishment of complexity and experience.      
 Both ‘Gentle Now’ and The Road present mournful, unflinching, and non-
consolatory elegiac testaments to ecological loss. While ‘Gentle Now’ hesitates 
from envisioning the future of the stream’s ecology, and The Road projects 
forward to imagine the aftermath of an ecological apocalypse in our near future, 
each constitutes an ethical form of elegy. Inscribed within each is an attendance 
to, and a grave reckoning with the contingency of ecological loss, in addition to 
loss that has occurred and loss that is in-process. ‘Gentle Now’ stages this 
reckoning in the present moment, from which the speaker at first looks back to 
remember a time before loss, then reflects upon present reality before concluding 
in the open question of a mourning to come. By contrast, the reckoning enacted by 
The Road occurs in a possible near future, while repeatedly looking back to 
remember a time in the novel’s recent past before everything was lost—a time 
which in reality constitutes our present.           
 In each movement, the time before loss upon which the narrator looks back is 
cast in a mythical light for its being beyond recapture. In ‘Gentle Now’, this past 
appears mythical not only because of its being situated at an earlier point in the 
degradation of the stream, but, as Ronda suggests, because of the speaker’s 
idealising of the stream and her relation to it in childhood as remembered from a 
present position of disenchanted, mournful knowingness. Conversely, in The 
Road, the past as remembered by the man appears mythical due precisely to the 
way that the ecological loss that is in our present reality contingent and incipient 
is, in the world of the novel, almost completely foregone. While different, both of 
these movements of looking back to a time of possession and presence, preceding 
 246 
a present moment of loss and absence, foreground the urgency of what we have 
still to lose, while resisting the urge to console for, provide closure for, or totalise 
a mourning and grief which cannot be foreclosed. Each seems to pose the question 
of what we are to do now, and how we are to answer for our present conundrum, 
while eschewing self-righteous indignation or the urge to achieve closure by 
offering simplistic answers.             
 In these ways, both ‘Gentle Now’ and The Road constitute disparate examples 
of elegiac movements that resist the sacrificial negation of traditional elegy in 
their negative, non-consolatory mourning. In facing the difficult and (temporally) 
divergent reality of ecological loss and not looking away—and in bearing a sense 
of answerability for this loss, without presuming to be (yet) capable of answering 
to it—both works resist the Orphic turn, and delineate the varied potential for an 
ethical poetics of eco-elegy in poetry and prose. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
We must do something but what 
 
 Brenda Hillman, Practical Water 
 
 
Leninist posters peeling in a rotting kindergarten, a Ferris wheel frozen for nearly 
thirty years, ruined villages glimpsed through pine trees—such eerie apparitions 
of tragedy, encountered in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, only hint at the scale of 
loss caused by the 1986 nuclear disaster. And yet, such reminders coexist with the 
strange and peaceful beauty of a depopulated environment of regenerating forest 
and returning wildlife. Uniquely unencumbered by humans, an ecosystem still 
ravaged by nuclear radiation is by increments reclaiming the austere concrete 
landscape of an ambitiously planned Soviet town, farmlands long cultivated for 
food production, and the surrounding villages which had stood for centuries. Grey 
wolves, once rare in the area, have found refuge, and are known to congregate in 
the ghost villages, to spy on elk from abandoned rooftops. The Zone at once 
constitutes an unprecedented warning of the consequences we wager in wreaking 
havoc on our natural environment, and, in its present existence as a haven for 
wildlife once rare in the area, a reminder of what we have to lose. Chernobyl’s 
existence as such a haven suggests that the presence of humans is more 
debilitating to populations of wolves and bears than nuclear irradiation, and as 
such is testament to the disastrous degree to which our very way of life constricts 
the ability of other beings in our midst to exist and thrive in a shared ecosystem. 
  The scale of loss precipitated by the Chernobyl disaster—which has been 
followed so recently by the 2011 Fukushima disaster—and which is risked by 
countless other forms of ecological devastation, including that which is implicated 
in global warming, confounds our customary modes of accounting for loss in 
language, and tests the limits of language itself. The forms of loss which have 
long moved writers to create elegiac literature, and critics to ponder it, have 
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traditionally pertained—as Freud says of mourning and melancholia—to ‘the loss 
of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of 
one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on’ (1917:243). Like other 
forms of discourse, elegiac literature is only beginning to reckon with the registers 
of loss implicated by the global ecological threat posed by climate change, 
overpopulation and an unsustainable economic system predicated on the 
unchecked exploitation of finite natural resources. The loss of a viable climate, of 
air quality, of wildlife habitat and of biodiversity are just some of the losses we 
are wagering in continuing to overpopulate and exploit our planet’s fragile, finite 
and interconnected ecosystems. How do we navigate the writing of elegy when 
the environment in which loss occurs, which structures our comprehension of loss 
and which animates the figures of elegiac language, is itself at stake? How do we 
mourn for something that is not yet “fully” lost? To write eco-elegy is not only to 
reckon with these questions, but also, in a sense, to elegise elegy itself. When the 
environment itself is at stake as the object of elegy, we are in the realm of meta-
elegy. If traditional elegy enacts an impossible movement, which reaches toward 
the restoration of one who is lost beyond restoration, then the task of eco-elegy is 
at once more and less impossible—and certainly, more urgent.     
 Led by the same preoccupations that define The Counterpart, this essay has 
considered the question of how to reckon responsibly with ecological loss in 
elegiac literature. As ecological loss, understood variously as a foregone event 
and as a future prospect in an age of global warming, increasingly compels writers 
to write elegiac literature, it is not only the formal operations of traditional elegy 
that are called into question. Ethical eco-elegy entails a reckoning with our 
responsibilities in elegising non-human others, and calls for a careful attendance 
to the divergency of ecological loss, which is at once more contingent and more 
total than elegy’s traditional frames of reference encompass. Despite the 
burgeoning disciplines of ecocriticism and ecopoetics, greater critical attention is 
called for in examining the intersection between elegy, ecology and ethics. In 
particular, further discussion within creative writing studies, of eco-elegy as a 
creative practice and ethics at work not only within poetry but also within prose, 
would be a valuable course with broad applications to the related disciplines of 
elegy studies and the environmental humanities. The two notable essays, 
discussed herein, by Morton and Ronda respectively—while located outside a 
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direct focus upon writerly practice—offer provocative grounds for such further 
discussion in thinking an ethical poetics of eco-elegy within and without Creative 
Writing Studies. However, both Morton and Ronda hesitate from defining more 
precisely the divergent nature of ecological loss as a subject for elegy, and do not 
speak to the way that elegy exists also as a movement within prose. Moreover, 
both frame their consideration of the poetics of eco-elegy within Freud’s 
conception of melancholia, when in fact such a poetics calls for a more rigorous 
dialogue with the philosophies of mourning, thanatopoetics and environmental 
criticism than such a framing offers.            
 This essay has aimed to propose, primarily through Derridean mourning 
theory and the allegory of the Orphic turn, a framework through which to rethink 
how we as writers might respond ethically to ecological loss in elegiac poetry and 
prose. In focusing upon this broader framework through which to think the 
possibilities for writing ethical eco-elegy, a greater attendance to the intricacies of 
the varied formal, stylistic and aesthetic manoeuvres by which such a writing 
might be achieved has been beyond the scope of this discussion. However, despite 
the infrequency of (eco)elegy as a form being directly addressed, various thinkers 
within creative writing studies and the environmental humanities speak incisively 
to the specifics of such manoeuvres, by which a more ecologically mindful 
writing might be approached. In the recent ecologically-focused special issue of 
the creative writing studies journal TEXT, Martin Harrison offers a detailed list of 
‘conditions’ which might pertain to ‘writing which fulfils some order of 
ecological requirement’ on both ‘formal’ and ‘aesthetic’ registers (2013:10). 
These conditions involve a variety of elements, such as ‘an undetermined, 
evolving, ergodic or not fully resolved form’, ‘a reference-level which explicitly 
opens up a field within an environment’ and ‘a way of positioning discourse 
outside of the discursive self’ (2013:10). In the same issue, Deborah Bird Rose 
emphasises dialogue as ‘a form of ethical practice amongst subjects (human and 
nonhuman)’ (2013:7). Elsewhere, Michael J. McDowell draws attention to the 
relevance of Bakhtinian narrative techniques in ecological writing to foreground 
‘the dialogic voices in a landscape’ (1996:386). Morton too (if only in passing), in 
his analysis of Shelley’s Alastor, notes the way that ‘untagged direct speech’ 
offers a means of ‘open[ing] up’ to the nonhuman other (while eschewing, I 
would add, a certain presumption in speaking for the other) (2010:260). With the 
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exception of Morton, however, none of these essays address elegy or eco-elegy 
specifically, despite their relevance to the form—a further indication of the value 
of more directed scholarly discussion surrounding eco-elegiac poetics and ethics.
 In proposing a framework through which to rethink an ethical poetics of eco-
elegy, I have examined the way that, in enacting a movement contingent on the 
absence of its object, elegy as a literary form is implicated in a complex ethical 
conundrum, converging around the question of what we, as writers, critics and 
readers, owe to the other whose absence we elegise. This traditional elegiac 
movement, identifiable within poetry and prose, on the levels of literary language 
and mourning, works to further negate the other whose loss the elegy mourns, 
while foregrounding the materiality of literary language through tropes such as 
metaphor and metonymy. As Watkin (2004) suggests, the differences between 
metaphor and metonymy as structures of relation between tenor and vehicle 
correspond to the differences between Freudian mourning and the mourning 
model espoused by Bowlby (1980), in the relation between mourning subject and 
lost object/other. While metaphor involves opposition and substitution, metonymy 
hinges on a proximate relation while preserving the separateness of each entity, 
and as such suggests, for Watkin, a more ethical mode of relation to the other in 
representing mourning through literature. Moreover, the negotiation between both 
intimacy and distance within metonymic relation between whole and part 
corresponds to understandings of ecology as a structure of relations predicated on 
both the interdependence and separateness of the discrete organisms and processes 
that constitute the greater structure.           
 In considering the way that elegy is further complicated when the object of 
loss is ecological, and in view of Morton’s essay, I have argued that an ethical 
poetics of eco-elegy calls for a more precise consideration of the divergent forms 
of ecological loss which we are facing in our global ecological crisis. This 
includes loss that is not only forgone as in traditional elegy, but loss that is, 
variously, in-process, contingent and incipient. Further, I have emphasised that an 
ethical poetics of eco-elegy must involve a greater attendance to our human 
culpability and answerability in light of this loss. Additionally, I have critiqued 
the application of melancholia by Morton and Ronda to the poetics of eco-elegy, 
arguing that this historically loaded term, inadequately qualified, risks 
perpetuating the binary opposition between introjection and incorporation, and 
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between mourning subject and lost other which structures Freud’s problematic 
understanding of mourning. As such, I have preferred alternate terms in referring 
to grief that resists consolation and closure, such as “negative”, “endless”, and 
“non-consolatory mourning”.            
 In advancing these claims, I have sought to show how Derrida’s complex 
understanding of mourning, as both a law of living friendship and as a metonymic 
relation to the dead other, provides a framework more able to account for the 
nuance and paradox of ecological loss, mourning and elegiac commemoration. In 
expanding the conception of mourning to encompass ‘the anguished 
apprehension’ (1997:14) of a loss that is to come, Derrida makes provision for the 
contingency of much of the ecological loss that provokes mournful attention in 
elegiac literature. This conception of mourning as an ethical condition structuring 
the relation of love, hospitality or friendship to the other while they are alive, in 
addition to when they are dead and only “in us”, extends mourning to account for 
the continuum of contingent or incipient loss, loss in-process and loss that has 
occurred, which bear on eco-elegy.          
 Moreover, Derrida’s metonymic conception of mourning as a relational 
process of difficult negotiation between maintaining intimacy with the other, and 
preserving their singularity, offers a more nuanced framework for thinking an 
ethical poetics of eco-elegy. This framework complicates the influential 
opposition (made distinct in Freud’s early mourning theory) between normative 
and melancholic mourning, by recognising the duty of ethical mourning as an 
unavoidable negotiation between these modes, each involving a form of violence 
to the other being mourned.  Such a comprehension of mourning comes closer to 
acknowledging not only the divergency of ecological loss, but the way that 
mourning, and thus elegy, understandably bear upon divergent forms of ecological 
loss. An ethical poetics of ecological elegy must recognise how “loss” names not 
simply the sudden lack of a finite thing but the loss of the opportunity for the 
continuation of a series of encounters, by which we engage with the alterity of a 
living other. That is, we must expand our understanding of eco-loss to encompass 
not only the contingency of such loss, but the way that such loss is also 
constitutive of a loss of contingency, brought about when a unique other is no 
longer alive in the world. In this light, it is possible to see how the signifiers 
“nature” and “ecology” also stand in for a series, functioning as a meta-noun for 
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an endless constellation of relationships. To speak of “losing nature”/ecology, 
then, is to speak of losing the opportunity for the continuation of a series of 
encounters with nature. This expanded conception of loss is rooted in the 
understanding of loss as fundamentally a deprivation or diminishment of 
experience and complexity.             
 The event of a global nuclear holocaust or some such total devastation is an 
endpoint we must at once hold in mind and yet be wary of accelerating toward in 
our literatures. In reality, such an apocalypse may not leave human witnesses. The 
reality of our interdependence with nature is such that, as long as we are here, 
alive on Earth, to speak of “losing nature” is to speak of the loss of integral, 
singular parts of a greater structure, loss which risks the structure but—
crucially—does not yet constitute such a total loss. Accordingly, we must 
continue to speak of the singular deprivation of being unable to encounter the 
creature that is the Tasmanian Tiger, or the living organism that constitutes the 
Great Barrier Reef. As these examples indicate, “loss” in this framework can 
signify an irreversible, foregone event of extinction, or an insidious degradation or 
imperilment currently in-process, along the trajectory of total loss. Spahr’s 
naming and repetitive listing of the names of various organisms within the 
stream’s ecology is a mode of recognising the singularity of forms that constitute 
a greater structure. As Derrida’s discussion of Barthes’s elegiac Camera Lucida 
suggests, metonymy allows for us to speak of the part in relation to the whole, the 
singular in relation to the general—and in doing so, to transport ideas, to affect, 
disturb, and move. Smearing over the difference between singular instances of 
loss by writing of eco-loss in generalist terms, and smearing over the distance that 
separates this present moment from a moment fifty or two hundred years hence in 
which we imagine the end of the world—are ethically problematic approaches to 
writing eco-loss.              
 Despite the validity of such cautions, however, the contingency of much 
ecological loss demands that elegy also reckon with the loss that is to come, be it 
loss that is impossible to prevent or contingent on our interim actions. The recent 
emergence of cli-fi—fiction that deals with the implications of climate change, 
often in the relatively near future—testifies to the increasing effect of ecological 
emergency on our literatures. The intricately plotted, speculative and highly 
inventive aspect of some such fiction, however, has the potential to create a 
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distance from our present reality, pursuing escapist apocalyptic thrill at the risk of 
smearing over the urgent, liminal moment of our present ecological crisis, in 
which the level of devastation we face (beyond what seems already assured) is 
contingent on what we do now. By contrast, literature which is grounded in (non-
consolatory) elegy’s movement of relation between past and present, and its 
register of the ongoing cost of loss, seems better placed to reckon with what is at 
stake in the climate change we are only beginning to discern. As exemplified by 
Mc Carthy’s The Road, envisioning eco-apocalypse in elegiac literature does not 
necessarily constitute a lack of ethics. Rather, the degree to which such a literature 
is ethical hinges on the degree of proximity it maintains, in imagining future 
apocalypse, to the contingency and urgency of our present moment of crisis, and 
the degree to which it resists totalising or foreclosing a mourning that exceeds 
such measures. While it hesitates from proffering easy answers, ethical eco-
elegiac literature is also inscribed with a recognition of human answerability to 
the ecological loss it laments, so much of which still remains contingent on us. 
 Eurydice is lost because Orpheus is blinded by ‘the fire of >his@ own 
presence’, by his desire to master her otherness, and to recreate her in his own 
image in elegy (Doolittle, 1983:52). Turning away, Orpheus chooses to walk back 
into the daylight of earth bereaved and alone, when he might have walked 
alongside living Eurydice. As Doolittle’s Eurydice says to Orpheus: ‘So you have 
swept me back, / I who could have walked with the live souls above the earth’ 
(1983:52). The dichotomy of human versus other-than-human nature, of 
civilisation versus wildlife, which the territory surrounding Chernobyl before and 
after human evacuation so radically attests to, constitutes a denial of—and a 
turning away from—our own interdependence and enrichment by other-than-
human nature. This denial, which imperils us all, hinges on a fundamental neglect 
of care and responsibility to animate, agential ecological beings and processes that 
are other-than-human, and also to ourselves. In elegy as in life, in the face of a 
biosphere at stake, we must resist the urge to turn away. After all, what good are 
the mourning songs of an Orpheus who no longer has a world to sing to? 
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Appendix: additional figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Abandoned buildings – Pripyat, Chernobyl (R. Todd, 2013) 
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Figure 5: Dodgems – Pripyat, Chernobyl (R. Todd, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Sunlit Chair in Hospital – Pripyat, Chernobyl (L. Lee, 2014) 
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Figure 7: Child’s Single Shoe – Pripyat, Chernobyl (L. Lee, 2014) 
 
